@aimarket/warden 0.5.0 → 0.7.0

package/dist/state.js

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+import { mkdir, open, readFile, rename, unlink } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+export function defaultStateDir() {
+    return process.env.WARDEN_STATE_DIR || join(process.env.XDG_STATE_HOME || join(homedir(), '.local', 'state'), 'warden');
+}
+export async function readState(path) {
+    try {
+        return JSON.parse(await readFile(path, 'utf8'));
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err.code === 'ENOENT')
+            return undefined;
+        throw err;
+    }
+}
+/** Atomic replace; a failed write never destroys the previous approval/snapshot. */
+export async function writeState(path, value) {
+    await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    const temp = `${path}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`;
+    try {
+        const file = await open(temp, 'wx', 0o600);
+        try {
+            await file.writeFile(JSON.stringify(value));
+            await file.sync();
+        }
+        finally {
+            await file.close();
+        }
+        await rename(temp, path);
+    }
+    finally {
+        await unlink(temp).catch(() => { });
+    }
+}
+/** Serialize read/compare/write across processes. A leftover lock fails closed. */
+export async function withStateLock(path, action) {
+    await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    const lock = `${path}.lock`;
+    let file;
+    for (let attempt = 0;; attempt++) {
+        try {
+            file = await open(lock, 'wx', 0o600);
+            break;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            if (err.code !== 'EEXIST' || attempt >= 100)
+                throw err;
+            await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 20));
+        }
+    }
+    try {
+        return await action();
+    }
+    finally {
+        await file.close();
+        await unlink(lock);
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=state.js.map

package/dist/state.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/static-scan.d.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ type Tier = "block" | "advise";
  * characters and a base64 blob could sit in the one field that reaches the model
  * first and WARDEN reported nothing.
  */
-type Surface = "name" | "description" | "inputSchema";
+type Surface = "name" | "description" | "inputSchema" | "title" | "outputSchema" | "annotations" | "metadata";
 /**
  * Ruleset version. Bump on ANY change to the table above — a scan result is only
  * comparable to another scan made under the same version and digest.
@@ -59,8 +59,17 @@ type Surface = "name" | "description" | "inputSchema";
  *     selecting for honest servers: the bare `exfiltrat*` noun, `system prompt`,
  *     `do not tell the user`, and (in severity only) the credential nouns. A
  *     rule's guards are part of this table and therefore of the digest.
+ * 5 — language-independent coverage. Text is FOLDED before matching (see ./fold.ts, FOLD_ID in
+ *     the digest): NFKC, Unicode-tag decoding, invisible-character stripping and mixed-script
+ *     look-alike mapping, so an English rule cannot be defeated by spelling the words in
+ *     fullwidth, with a zero-width space inside a word, in tag characters, or with a Cyrillic
+ *     "о". A new TOOL_DEF_SECRET_EXFIL rule blocks on the language-independent PAIR of a secret
+ *     store and an external address in one definition. Three field false positives are guarded
+ *     out: "send the user to <url>" (a redirect, `navigation`), "without asking the user" in
+ *     autonomy phrasing (`autonomy`), and the zero-width joiner inside an emoji sequence. The
+ *     hidden-character rule now also catches the Unicode-tag block and the bidi isolates.
  */
-export declare const STATIC_SCAN_RULESET_VERSION = "4";
+export declare const STATIC_SCAN_RULESET_VERSION = "6";
 export interface StaticScanRule {
     code: string;
     severity: Severity;
@@ -76,8 +85,12 @@ export interface StaticScanRule {
      * `polarity` reports different findings on the same text.
      */
     guards: string[];
+    /** True when the rule matches the raw text rather than the folded form. */
+    raw: boolean;
 }
 export interface StaticScanRuleset extends RulesetRef {
+    /** Identity of the pre-match text fold this ruleset applies. See ./fold.ts. */
+    fold: string;
     rules: StaticScanRule[];
 }
 /**

package/dist/static-scan.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"static-scan.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/static-scan.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAKA,OAAO,KAAK,EACV,UAAU,EACV,QAAQ,EAER,UAAU,EACV,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,YAAY,EACb,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAEpB;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAEH,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC;AAE/B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,aAAa,GAAG,aAAa,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,cAAc,GAAG,aAAa,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;AAqnB9G;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA8BG;AAGH,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,MAAM,CAAC;AAmB/C,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;IACnB,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACX,iFAAiF;IACjF,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IACpB,oEAAoE;IACpE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd;;;;OAIG;IACH,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjB,2EAA2E;IAC3E,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACd;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,iBAAkB,SAAQ,UAAU;IACnD,+EAA+E;IAC/E,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;CACzB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAgBrD;AAOD,uEAAuE;AACvE,wBAAgB,oBAAoB,IAAI,UAAU,CAGjD;AAED,qBAAa,cAAe,YAAW,UAAU;IAC/C,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,iBAAiB;IAE9B,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAe;IAEnC;;;;OAIG;gBACS,GAAG,GAAE,YAA6B;IAIxC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC;CAkFlE"}

package/dist/static-scan.js

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
 import { canonicalize } from "./jcs.js";
 import { displaySafe } from "./sanitize.js";
+import { foldForScan, FOLD_ID } from "./fold.js";
 import { silentLogger } from "./logger.js";
 /** Prose surfaces: the default, and everything a noun-keyed rule may look at. */
-const PROSE = ["description", "inputSchema"];
+const PROSE = ["description", "inputSchema", "title", "outputSchema", "annotations", "metadata"];
 /** Prose plus the identifier - for phrase and hidden-payload rules. */
-const ALL_SURFACES = ["name", "description", "inputSchema"];
+const ALL_SURFACES = ["name", ...PROSE];
 // Imperative instructions aimed at the model — the classic injection tells.
 const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
     { re: /\bignore\s+(?:all\s+|the\s+)?(?:previous|prior|above|preceding)\b/i, code: "TOOL_DEF_INJECTION", severity: "critical", tier: "block", surfaces: ALL_SURFACES, guards: ["mention"] },
@@ -17,7 +18,7 @@ const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
     // servers that were being careful. A blocking rule needs a concealment target
     // that refers to the tool's own action; the bare phrase does not carry one.
     { re: /\bdo\s+not\s+(?:tell|inform|mention|reveal\s+to|notify)\s+(?:the\s+)?user\b/i, code: "TOOL_DEF_INJECTION", severity: "medium", tier: "advise", surfaces: ALL_SURFACES, guards: ["mention"] },
-    { re: /\bwithout\s+(?:telling|informing|asking)\s+(?:the\s+)?user\b/i, code: "TOOL_DEF_INJECTION", severity: "high", tier: "block", surfaces: ALL_SURFACES },
+    { re: /\bwithout\s+(?:telling|informing|asking)\s+(?:the\s+)?user\b/i, code: "TOOL_DEF_INJECTION", severity: "high", tier: "block", surfaces: ALL_SURFACES, guards: ["autonomy"] },
     { re: /<\s*\/?\s*(?:system|instructions?|important)\s*>/i, code: "TOOL_DEF_INJECTION", severity: "high", tier: "block", surfaces: ALL_SURFACES },
     // Demoted in v4. The comment here used to say this was "the blocking rule most
     // likely to need a policy override"; the survey settled it — 15 findings across
@@ -46,6 +47,8 @@ const EXFIL_PATTERNS = [
         severity: "high",
         tier: "block",
         surfaces: ALL_SURFACES,
+        // "send the user to https://…" is a redirect of a person, not a copy of data.
+        guards: ["navigation"],
     },
     { re: /\b(?:post|send|put)\s+to\s+https?:\/\//i, code: "TOOL_DEF_EXFIL", severity: "critical", tier: "block", surfaces: ALL_SURFACES },
     { re: /\bupload\b[\s\S]{0,40}\bto\s+(?:https?:\/\/|[\w.-]+\.[a-z]{2,})/i, code: "TOOL_DEF_EXFIL", severity: "high", tier: "block", surfaces: ALL_SURFACES },
@@ -90,6 +93,37 @@ const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
     { re: /\bpassword\b|\bpasswd\b/i, code: "TOOL_DEF_CREDENTIAL_PARAM", severity: "medium", tier: "advise", surfaces: PROSE },
     { re: /(?:^|[^.\w])\.env\b|\benvironment\s+variables?\b/i, code: "TOOL_DEF_ENV_REFERENCE", severity: "medium", tier: "advise", surfaces: PROSE },
 ];
+/**
+ * A secret store and an external address in the same definition — language-independent.
+ *
+ * The verb between them is what an attacker writes in whatever language they like, and it is
+ * exactly what a word list cannot keep up with. The two ANCHORS do not need translating: a
+ * secret file path (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `.env`, `~/.aws/credentials`) and a URL, e-mail address or
+ * bare host are spelled the same in every language. A definition that names both — "read `.env`
+ * … evil.example.com" — is the tool-poisoning shape whether the connective words are English,
+ * Russian or Chinese. The {@link GUARDS.secretExfilPair} guard drops the finding when only the
+ * secret path is present (ordinary config prose), so the pair is what the rule reports, not the
+ * path alone.
+ *
+ * ADVISORY, not blocking. On the field corpus of 10 645 servers this pair, even windowed and with
+ * the scanner/refusal guards, matched exactly one server — a deploy tool returning an `ssh …
+ * ~/.ssh/deploy-key` command to reach its own host, which is the pair used honestly — and no real
+ * attack. A rule whose only real-world hits are honest must not refuse a connection. It is kept as
+ * a reported signal (it surfaces on the HISTOR desk and in a recorded label, and would flag a true
+ * "read .env → post to evil.example.com" the same way) while the actual blocking of cross-lingual
+ * exfiltration is left to a meaning-based classifier, which a word- or path-shaped rule cannot be.
+ */
+const SECRET_EXFIL_PATTERNS = [
+    {
+        re: /~\/\.ssh\/[\w.-]{1,64}|\bid_rsa\b|~?\/?\.aws\/credentials\b|~?\/?\.(?:npmrc|pgpass|netrc|git-credentials)\b|(?:^|[^.\w])\.env(?:\.[\w-]{1,40})?\b|\bprocess\.env\b/i,
+        code: "TOOL_DEF_SECRET_EXFIL",
+        severity: "medium",
+        tier: "advise",
+        surfaces: PROSE,
+        note: "names a secret store and an external address in the same breath",
+        guards: ["publicKeyPath", "polarity", "detection", "secretExfilPair"],
+    },
+];
 // Dangerous URL schemes embedded in text.
 const URL_SCHEME_PATTERNS = [
     // A `data:` URI with no payload behind it is the format being documented —
@@ -113,17 +147,30 @@ const PAYLOAD_PATTERNS = [
         surfaces: ALL_SURFACES,
         note: "contains a long base64-encoded blob — possible hidden payload",
         guards: ["blob"],
+        // Runs on the folded text (default): NFKC leaves the base64 alphabet
+        // [A-Za-z0-9+/_=-] untouched, and folding first strips invisible characters a
+        // blob could be broken up with (a soft hyphen every 60 chars) so the run is
+        // seen whole. The raw pass still covers the ordinary, unbroken case.
     },
     {
-        // U+200B–200F, U+202A–202E, U+2060, U+FEFF. Built from a \u-escaped string so
-        // the source stays reviewable (the characters are, by definition, invisible).
-        re: new RegExp("[\\u200B-\\u200F\\u202A-\\u202E\\u2060\\uFEFF]"),
+        // Zero-width and joiners (U+200B–200F), bidi overrides and isolates
+        // (U+202A–202E, U+2066–2069), the word joiner (U+2060), the BOM (U+FEFF), the
+        // Unicode TAG block (U+E0000–E007F, which can spell out a whole hidden
+        // sentence), and the variation-selector supplement (U+E0100–E01EF, a byte per
+        // character of hidden payload). The emoji variation selectors U+FE00–FE0F are
+        // deliberately NOT here: U+FE0F is part of ordinary emoji. Built from a
+        // \u-escaped string so the source stays reviewable — the characters are, by
+        // definition, invisible. The zeroWidth guard exempts the standard uses (emoji
+        // ZWJ sequences, subdivision-flag tags, joiner controls in Indic/Arabic).
+        re: new RegExp("[\\u200B-\\u200F\\u202A-\\u202E\\u2060\\u2066-\\u2069\\uFEFF\\u{E0000}-\\u{E007F}\\u{E0100}-\\u{E01EF}]", "u"),
         code: "TOOL_DEF_HIDDEN_UNICODE",
         severity: "high",
         tier: "block",
         surfaces: ALL_SURFACES,
-        note: "contains zero-width or bidi control characters hiding text from review",
+        note: "contains zero-width, bidi control or Unicode-tag characters hiding text from review",
         guards: ["zeroWidth"],
+        // The whole point of this rule is the characters the fold removes.
+        raw: true,
     },
 ];
 /**
@@ -200,6 +247,45 @@ function entropy(sample) {
  * blocking.
  */
 const SCRIPT_NEEDING_JOINER_CONTROL = /[\u0600-\u06FF\u0750-\u077F\u08A0-\u08FF\u0900-\u0DFF\uFB50-\uFDFF\uFE70-\uFEFE]/;
+/** Emoji and other pictographs \u2014 a U+200D between two of these is an emoji sequence. */
+const EXTENDED_PICTOGRAPHIC = /\p{Extended_Pictographic}/u;
+/**
+ * Is the code point next to `pos` a pictograph? `dir < 0` looks at the code point
+ * ending at `pos`, `dir > 0` at the one starting at `pos`. A U+FE0F emoji
+ * variation selector between the emoji and the position is skipped. Works on
+ * astral emoji by iterating code points, not code units.
+ */
+function isPictographAt(text, pos, dir) {
+    if (dir < 0) {
+        const cps = Array.from(text.slice(Math.max(0, pos - 5), pos + 1));
+        while (cps.length && cps[cps.length - 1] === "\ufe0f")
+            cps.pop();
+        const last = cps[cps.length - 1];
+        return last !== undefined && EXTENDED_PICTOGRAPHIC.test(last);
+    }
+    const cps = Array.from(text.slice(pos, pos + 6));
+    while (cps.length && cps[0] === "\ufe0f")
+        cps.shift();
+    const first = cps[0];
+    return first !== undefined && EXTENDED_PICTOGRAPHIC.test(first);
+}
+/**
+ * Is the tag character at `i` part of a subdivision-flag emoji \u2014 U+1F3F4 followed
+ * by tag letters (and normally the cancel tag U+E007F)? Walks back over the tag
+ * run looking for the black flag that opens it.
+ */
+function inFlagSequence(text, i) {
+    const cps = Array.from(text.slice(Math.max(0, i - 24), i));
+    for (let k = cps.length - 1, steps = 0; k >= 0 && steps < 8; k--, steps++) {
+        const c = cps[k].codePointAt(0);
+        if (c === 0x1f3f4)
+            return true;
+        if (c >= 0xe0020 && c <= 0xe007f)
+            continue;
+        return false;
+    }
+    return false;
+}
 const GUARDS = {
     /** A credential noun inside a refusal is a promise, not a request. */
     polarity(m, text) {
@@ -223,9 +309,12 @@ const GUARDS = {
     mention(m, text, surface) {
         const start = m.index;
         const end = start + m[0].length;
-        if (isQuoted(text, start, end))
+        const structured = ["inputSchema", "outputSchema", "annotations", "metadata"].includes(surface);
+        // JSON serialization quotes every string. Those delimiters do not make a
+        // description an innocent citation; preserve the narrow whole-token exemption below.
+        if (!structured && isQuoted(text, start, end))
             return "match is quoted or in backticks — a citation, not an instruction";
-        if (surface === "inputSchema" && text[start - 1] === '"' && text[end] === '"') {
+        if (["inputSchema", "outputSchema", "annotations", "metadata"].includes(surface) && text[start - 1] === '"' && text[end] === '"') {
             return "match is a complete JSON string token — an enum value or field name";
         }
         return null;
@@ -243,6 +332,11 @@ const GUARDS = {
         // javascript:, mailto:, data: schemes".
         if (after === "" || /^[\s"'`)\],;.]/.test(after))
             return "no URI payload after the scheme — a label, not a link";
+        // A real javascript: URI is followed by ASCII code, not by prose. NFKC turns a
+        // fullwidth colon (U+FF1A) into ':' , so "前端javascript：负责交互" folds to
+        // "javascript:负责…"; a non-URL character after the colon means a label, not a link.
+        if (!/^[\x21-\x7E]/.test(after))
+            return "scheme followed by non-ASCII prose — a label, not a link";
         return null;
     },
     /** A `data:` URI that carries no payload is documentation of the format. */
@@ -272,6 +366,13 @@ const GUARDS = {
         return null;
     },
     zeroWidth(m, text) {
+        const cp = m[0].codePointAt(0);
+        // A tag character (U+E0020-E007F) is a hidden-instruction carrier EXCEPT in
+        // the one place it is standard: a subdivision flag, U+1F3F4 followed by tag
+        // letters and the cancel tag U+E007F. Exempt a tag char that sits in such a run.
+        if (cp >= 0xe0020 && cp <= 0xe007f) {
+            return inFlagSequence(text, m.index) ? "tag character inside a subdivision-flag emoji — not concealment" : null;
+        }
         const ch = m[0];
         if (ch !== "\u200C" && ch !== "\u200D")
             return null;
@@ -280,6 +381,70 @@ const GUARDS = {
         if (SCRIPT_NEEDING_JOINER_CONTROL.test(prev) || SCRIPT_NEEDING_JOINER_CONTROL.test(next)) {
             return "joiner control adjacent to a script that requires it — orthography, not concealment";
         }
+        // A U+200D BETWEEN two pictographs is an emoji ZWJ sequence. Both sides must be
+        // a pictograph (a ZWJ with an emoji on one side only is still concealment), and
+        // a U+FE0F emoji variation selector between an emoji and the joiner is tolerated.
+        if (ch === "\u200D" && isPictographAt(text, m.index - 1, -1) && isPictographAt(text, m.index + 1, 1)) {
+            return "zero-width joiner between two emoji — an emoji sequence, not concealment";
+        }
+        return null;
+    },
+    /**
+     * "send the user to https://…" redirects a PERSON; it does not copy DATA out.
+     * The largest single exfil false positive in the field corpus.
+     */
+    navigation(m) {
+        // Only the OBJECT of "send … to" is inspected — the part before the last
+        // " to " in the match. The destination host is not: a real exfil target may
+        // legitimately be spelled `user.example.net`, and reading the person-word out
+        // of the destination would drop the finding it is supposed to keep.
+        const toAt = m[0].toLowerCase().lastIndexOf(" to ");
+        const object = toAt >= 0 ? m[0].slice(0, toAt) : m[0];
+        if (/\b(?:the\s+)?(?:user|users|person|people|customer|client|visitor|human|someone|reader|buyer|shopper|guest|caller|member|subscriber)\b/i.test(object)) {
+            return "object of 'send … to' is a person — a redirect, not data exfiltration";
+        }
+        return null;
+    },
+    /**
+     * "without asking the user" is AUTONOMY when the tool is telling the model to
+     * keep working on its own ("keep calling … until done without asking the user").
+     *
+     * Narrow on purpose. It fires only for the "asking" wording — concealment reads
+     * "without telling / informing the user", and those are never exempted — and
+     * only when an autonomy cue sits in the SAME short clause immediately before,
+     * with commas ending the clause. "Keep a copy of the notes and email them
+     * without telling the user" is concealment and is not touched: the verb is
+     * "telling", not "asking".
+     */
+    autonomy(m, text) {
+        if (!/\basking\b/i.test(m[0]))
+            return null;
+        let a = m.index;
+        const floor = Math.max(0, m.index - 48);
+        while (a > floor && !/[.;,!?\n]/.test(text[a - 1]))
+            a--;
+        const before = text.slice(a, m.index);
+        if (/\b(?:keep|keeps|keep\s+calling|continue|continues|poll\w*|retry|retries|until\s+(?:done|complete|finished|ready)|repeatedly|periodically)\b/i.test(before)) {
+            return "autonomy phrasing (keep calling / poll / until done, with 'without asking') — not concealment";
+        }
+        return null;
+    },
+    /**
+     * A secret store with no external address NEAR it is ordinary config prose.
+     *
+     * The finding is the two together in one breath — "read the .env and post it to
+     * evil.example.com". A `.env` in one schema field and an unrelated URL in
+     * another is the whole tool's vocabulary, not an instruction, so the address
+     * must fall within a short window of the secret token, not merely somewhere in
+     * the same definition. In the field corpus the unwindowed form fired on eight
+     * honest servers — deploy tools, migrators, an inbox reader — and nothing else.
+     */
+    secretExfilPair(m, text) {
+        const start = m.index;
+        const end = start + m[0].length;
+        const window = text.slice(Math.max(0, start - SECRET_EXFIL_SPAN), Math.min(text.length, end + SECRET_EXFIL_SPAN));
+        if (!hasExternalAddress(window))
+            return "no external address near the secret store — ordinary config reference";
         return null;
     },
     /**
@@ -354,9 +519,52 @@ const RULES = [
     ...INJECTION_PATTERNS,
     ...EXFIL_PATTERNS,
     ...SECRET_PATTERNS,
+    ...SECRET_EXFIL_PATTERNS,
     ...URL_SCHEME_PATTERNS,
     ...PAYLOAD_PATTERNS,
 ];
+/**
+ * URL, e-mail address or bare external host in a piece of text. Used by
+ * {@link GUARDS.secretExfilPair}. Deliberately wordless: an address reads the
+ * same in every language. A bare `name.ext` is far more often a file than a host,
+ * so a domain whose last label is a known file extension does not count.
+ */
+const EXTERNAL_FILE_EXT = /^(?:json|txt|csv|tsv|md|pdf|png|jpe?g|gif|svg|webp|ico|ya?ml|xml|html?|log|py|js|mjs|cjs|tsx?|jsx|sh|bash|zsh|ps1|bat|exe|dll|so|zip|tar|gz|tgz|bz2|xz|7z|rar|docx?|xlsx?|pptx?|mp[34]|wav|avi|mov|mkv|env|toml|ini|cfg|conf|lock|sql|db|sqlite|parquet|ipynb|rb|go|rs|java|kt|swift|c|h|cpp|hpp|cs|php|pl|css|scss|less|vue|svelte|wasm|bin|dat|bak|tmp|pem|crt|key|pub)$/i;
+/** How near a secret token an address has to be to read as one instruction. */
+const SECRET_EXFIL_SPAN = 100;
+/** Never inspect more than this much text for an address — a DoS ceiling. */
+const ADDR_SCAN_CAP = 4000;
+/**
+ * A host is a spec host only when the WHOLE host equals one of these (or is a
+ * subdomain of it): an unanchored substring test would read `w3.org.evil.com` or
+ * `localhost.attacker.net` as a spec host and let real exfiltration through.
+ */
+const SPEC_HOST = /^(?:localhost|(?:[a-z0-9-]+\.)*(?:json-schema\.org|schema\.org|spdx\.org|w3\.org|iana\.org|ietf\.org|rfc-editor\.org|purl\.org|xmlns\.com))$/i;
+// Linear regexes: every alternative is anchored so a run of dotted text has one
+// start, not one per character. Used only inside the bounded secret-exfil window.
+const ADDR_URL = /(?<![a-z0-9+.-])[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]{0,30}:\/\/(?:[a-z0-9._~%!$&'()*+,;=:-]{0,256}@)?(\[[0-9a-f:.]{2,64}\]|[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9.-]{0,252}[a-z0-9])?)/gi;
+const ADDR_EMAIL = /(?<![a-z0-9._%+-])[a-z0-9._%+-]{1,64}@((?:[a-z0-9-]{1,63}\.){1,10}[a-z]{2,24})(?![a-z0-9-])/gi;
+const ADDR_DOMAIN = /(?<![a-z0-9@/.:_%+-])((?:[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.){1,10}([a-z]{2,24}))(?![a-z0-9_-])/gi;
+const ADDR_IPV4 = /(?<![\d.])(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\d|1?\d?\d)(?:\.(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\d|1?\d?\d)){3}(?!\.?\d)/g;
+const host = (s) => s.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "").replace(/:\d+$/, "").replace(/^[a-z0-9._~%!$&'()*+,;=:-]*@/i, "").toLowerCase();
+function hasExternalAddress(text) {
+    const slice = text.length > ADDR_SCAN_CAP ? text.slice(0, ADDR_SCAN_CAP) : text;
+    for (const m of slice.matchAll(ADDR_URL)) {
+        if (!SPEC_HOST.test(host(m[1])))
+            return true;
+    }
+    const rest = slice.replace(ADDR_URL, " "); // URL userinfo is never read as an e-mail
+    ADDR_EMAIL.lastIndex = 0;
+    if (ADDR_EMAIL.test(rest))
+        return true;
+    const noEmail = rest.replace(ADDR_EMAIL, " ");
+    for (const m of noEmail.matchAll(ADDR_DOMAIN)) {
+        if (!EXTERNAL_FILE_EXT.test(m[2]) && !SPEC_HOST.test(m[1].toLowerCase()))
+            return true;
+    }
+    ADDR_IPV4.lastIndex = 0;
+    return ADDR_IPV4.test(noEmail);
+}
 /**
  * Ruleset version. Bump on ANY change to the table above — a scan result is only
  * comparable to another scan made under the same version and digest.
@@ -378,8 +586,19 @@ const RULES = [
  *     selecting for honest servers: the bare `exfiltrat*` noun, `system prompt`,
  *     `do not tell the user`, and (in severity only) the credential nouns. A
  *     rule's guards are part of this table and therefore of the digest.
+ * 5 — language-independent coverage. Text is FOLDED before matching (see ./fold.ts, FOLD_ID in
+ *     the digest): NFKC, Unicode-tag decoding, invisible-character stripping and mixed-script
+ *     look-alike mapping, so an English rule cannot be defeated by spelling the words in
+ *     fullwidth, with a zero-width space inside a word, in tag characters, or with a Cyrillic
+ *     "о". A new TOOL_DEF_SECRET_EXFIL rule blocks on the language-independent PAIR of a secret
+ *     store and an external address in one definition. Three field false positives are guarded
+ *     out: "send the user to <url>" (a redirect, `navigation`), "without asking the user" in
+ *     autonomy phrasing (`autonomy`), and the zero-width joiner inside an emoji sequence. The
+ *     hidden-character rule now also catches the Unicode-tag block and the bidi isolates.
  */
-export const STATIC_SCAN_RULESET_VERSION = "4";
+// v6 extends scanning to title, outputSchema, annotations and extension metadata;
+// JSON string delimiters no longer count as a benign quotation around instructions.
+export const STATIC_SCAN_RULESET_VERSION = "6";
 const SEVERITY_RANK = {
     info: 0,
     low: 1,
@@ -416,10 +635,11 @@ export function staticScanRuleset() {
         source: r.re.source,
         flags: r.re.flags,
         guards: [...(r.guards ?? [])],
+        raw: r.raw ?? false,
     })).sort((a, b) => cmp(a.code, b.code) || cmp(a.source, b.source) || cmp(a.flags, b.flags));
-    const preimage = canonicalize({ version: STATIC_SCAN_RULESET_VERSION, rules });
+    const preimage = canonicalize({ version: STATIC_SCAN_RULESET_VERSION, fold: FOLD_ID, rules });
     const digest = `sha256-${createHash("sha256").update(preimage, "utf8").digest("base64")}`;
-    return { version: STATIC_SCAN_RULESET_VERSION, digest, rules };
+    return { version: STATIC_SCAN_RULESET_VERSION, fold: FOLD_ID, digest, rules };
 }
 /** Code-unit comparison. See staticScanRuleset for why not localeCompare. */
 function cmp(a, b) {
@@ -452,23 +672,59 @@ export class StaticScanGate {
                 { text: tool.name ?? "", surface: "name", where: "name" },
                 { text: tool.description ?? "", surface: "description", where: "description" },
                 { text: schemaText, surface: "inputSchema", where: "input schema" },
+                { text: tool.title ?? "", surface: "title", where: "title" },
+                { text: safeStringifySchema(tool.outputSchema ?? {}), surface: "outputSchema", where: "output schema" },
+                { text: safeStringifySchema(tool.annotations ?? {}), surface: "annotations", where: "annotations" },
+                { text: safeStringifySchema(Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(tool).filter(([k]) => !["name", "description", "inputSchema", "title", "outputSchema", "annotations"].includes(k)))),
+                    surface: "metadata", where: "extension metadata" },
             ];
             // The name is quoted back in every message, so it is escaped once here
             // rather than at each call site. `finding.tool` keeps the raw name: it is
             // the key the host filters its tool list with.
             const shown = displaySafe(tool.name);
             for (const { text, surface, where } of haystacks) {
+                // A rule is matched against BOTH the folded text and the raw text, and
+                // reports if either yields a match its guards keep. The folded pass adds
+                // coverage — a compatibility spelling, an invisible character inside a
+                // word, a Unicode-tag instruction or a mixed-script look-alike cannot
+                // hide a match — while the raw pass guarantees v5 never misses what the
+                // unfolded rule would have caught (NFKC can, for instance, fuse a
+                // superscript digit into a word and break a `\b` the raw text still
+                // honours). The two hidden-payload rules set `raw` and skip the folded
+                // pass, because they look for exactly what the fold removes.
+                const folded = foldForScan(text);
+                const passes = rule_texts(text, folded);
                 for (const rule of RULES) {
                     if (!rule.surfaces.includes(surface))
                         continue;
-                    const m = matchOf(rule.re, text);
-                    if (!m)
-                        continue;
-                    const dropped = rule.guards?.map((g) => GUARDS[g](m, text, surface)).find((r) => r !== null);
-                    if (dropped) {
-                        this.log.debug(`static-scan: dropped ${rule.code} on "${shown}" ${where} — ${dropped}`);
+                    // First match, across either text, that every guard keeps. Guards run
+                    // against the text the match came from, so their offsets line up. A
+                    // rule that a guard drops on its first hit is tried on later hits and
+                    // on the other text, so one benign early match cannot mask a real one.
+                    let m = null;
+                    let hay = text;
+                    let dropped = null;
+                    for (const candidate of rule.raw ? [text] : passes) {
+                        for (const cm of allMatches(rule.re, candidate)) {
+                            const d = rule.guards?.map((g) => GUARDS[g](cm, candidate, surface)).find((r) => r !== null) ?? null;
+                            if (!d) {
+                                m = cm;
+                                hay = candidate;
+                                dropped = null;
+                                break;
+                            }
+                            dropped = d;
+                        }
+                        if (m)
+                            break;
+                    }
+                    if (!m) {
+                        if (dropped) {
+                            this.log.debug(`static-scan: dropped ${rule.code} on "${shown}" ${where} — ${dropped}`);
+                        }
                         continue;
                     }
+                    void hay;
                     // The matched text goes into the message. Without it the reader gets
                     // "matches TOOL_DEF_SECRET_HARVEST signature (\b(?:read|extract|…)" and
                     // cannot tell which alternative fired, or on what — which is most of
@@ -526,14 +782,33 @@ function describe(re) {
 /** How much of the matched text a finding quotes back. */
 const SPAN_MAX = 80;
 /**
- * First match, with its position, without mutating the shared rule regex.
+ * The texts a non-`raw` rule is matched against: the folded form and the raw
+ * form, the raw one dropped when the fold changed nothing so the common case
+ * scans once.
+ */
+function rule_texts(raw, folded) {
+    return raw === folded ? [raw] : [folded, raw];
+}
+/**
+ * Every match of a rule, in order, without mutating the shared rule regex.
  *
- * The rules are module-level constants reused for every tool, so `lastIndex` must
- * never be left behind on them: a `g`-flagged rule would silently start scanning
- * the next tool from wherever the previous match ended. None of them carry `g`
- * today; this makes that a non-issue rather than an invariant to remember.
+ * The rules are module-level constants reused for every tool, so a fresh `g`
+ * copy is made here rather than carrying `g` on the shared object, where a
+ * left-behind `lastIndex` would make the next tool start mid-string. Iterating
+ * every match (not just the first) is what lets a guard drop a benign early hit
+ * — an emoji ZWJ, a "send the user to …" redirect — without hiding a real one
+ * later in the same field.
  */
-function matchOf(re, text) {
-    return new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.replace(/[gy]/g, "")).exec(text);
+function* allMatches(re, text) {
+    const g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.replace(/[gy]/g, "") + "g");
+    let m;
+    let guardZeroWidth = 0;
+    while ((m = g.exec(text)) !== null) {
+        yield m;
+        if (m.index === g.lastIndex)
+            g.lastIndex++; // never spin on a zero-width match
+        if (++guardZeroWidth > text.length + 1)
+            break;
+    }
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=static-scan.js.map