@aihq/harness 0.4.0 → 0.4.1

package/README.md

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ aih init . --apply      # apply it
 | `aih guardrails` | Generate `.gitleaks.toml`, `.pre-commit-config.yaml`, and a CI license gate that blocks AGPL/strong-copyleft. |
 | `aih secrets` | Scan for plaintext `.env*`/`secrets/` and write agent deny rules + vault-injection guidance. `--verify` is the **secret-scan CI gate** (exit 1 when plaintext secrets exist); `--sarif <file>` emits one error-level result per path for GitHub code-scanning. |
 | `aih trust` | Vet, pin, and gate external GitHub repos and skills before an agent acquires them. `scan <target>` grades danger (auto-exec hooks, dependency-confusion, typosquat, incoming-MCP, secrets) and emits SARIF; `allow`/`pin` record reviewed sources + pinned SHAs in org policy; `list`/`verify` audit the committed policy and trust-lock evidence. |
-| `aih skill` | The **skill lifecycle** on top of `trust` — a complete governance loop for external agent skills. `vet <src>` runs the read-only gate pipeline (shape, license, trust scan) to a **GREEN/YELLOW/RED/UNKNOWN** verdict + a local evidence artifact (never installs). `card`/`approve --pin --owner` turn that evidence into committed governance: a skill card + a root **`aih-skills.lock.json`** entry, behind a fail-closed chain (pin → evidence → approvable verdict → license → owner; RED blocked, UNKNOWN refused, YELLOW = the manual review). `inventory` joins on-disk skills against the approvals — approved / unapproved / stale-pin, one row per physical install — and feeds a "Skill governance" panel in `report --v9`. `remove --name <skill>` retracts: archives the skill dir reversibly (`--delete` to hard-delete), drops the approval + card; refuses ambiguous duplicates, nested-skill collateral, and machine-root installs; cleans up orphaned approvals. |
+| `aih skill` | The **skill lifecycle** on top of `trust` — a complete governance loop for external agent skills. `vet <src>` runs the read-only gate pipeline (shape, license, trust scan) to a **GREEN/YELLOW/RED/UNKNOWN** verdict + a local evidence artifact (never installs). `card`/`approve --pin --owner` turn that evidence into committed governance: a skill card + a root **`aih-skills.lock.json`** entry, behind a fail-closed chain (pin → evidence → approvable verdict → license → owner; RED blocked, UNKNOWN refused, YELLOW = the manual review). The lockfile has **install-time teeth**: `workspace add` refuses promoting a skill with no committed approval *for that source's pinned commit* at `team`/`enterprise` posture (advisory at `vibe`) — a same-named skill from an unrelated source never inherits an approval, and stale approvals are refused. `inventory` joins on-disk skills against the approvals — approved / unapproved / stale-pin / quarantined, one row per physical install — and feeds a "Skill governance" panel in `report --v9`. `quarantine --name <skill>` **disables reversibly** (dir → `.aih/quarantine/`, approval kept; move it back to restore). `remove --name <skill>` retracts: archives the skill dir reversibly (`--delete` to hard-delete), drops the approval + card; refuses ambiguous duplicates, nested-skill collateral, machine-root installs, and stranding a parked copy's approval; cleans up orphaned approvals. |
 | `aih mcp` | Generate the MCP server config **for the targeted CLIs** (`--cli`/`--all-tools`, default claude): Claude/Cursor/Kiro/Kimi get their correct project file written (`.mcp.json`, `.cursor/mcp.json`, …); Codex (TOML), Copilot, OpenCode, Zed, and global-config tools get exact per-tool guidance instead of a file aih would get wrong. Scopes: local/project/remote. For locked-down orgs, `--mode offline` (vendored local-command servers) or `--mode none` (no MCP + a CLI-tool fallback) plus a `managed-mcp.json` admin template. |
 | `aih sandbox` | Generate a devcontainer + managed sandbox settings (egress allowlist, `failIfUnavailable`). |
 | `aih telemetry` | Inject OpenTelemetry env, a redacting Bindplane collector, and an analytics fetcher (usage + skills endpoints → `{ usage_report, skills }`). |