@ai-ecoverse/slicc 1.67.1 → 1.67.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -2
- package/package.json +7 -7
package/README.md
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@@ -1000,7 +1000,7 @@ Only browsers the user named are listed: the one seven runs in, `--cdp` and `--c
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- **Session-wide settings are refused on every relay session, including ordinary pages.** `Network.setExtraHTTPHeaders`, `Network.setUserAgentOverride`, `Emulation.setUserAgentOverride`, `Emulation.setLocaleOverride`, `Emulation.setTimezoneOverride`, `Network.setCacheDisabled`, `Network.emulateNetworkConditions`, `Network.emulateNetworkConditionsByRule`, `Network.overrideNetworkState`, `Network.setBlockedURLs`, and every method matching `/^Emulation\.(set|add|update|remove)[A-Z]/` other than the four display admits above receive `slicc: refused: settings for a whole session (headers, user agent, locale, time zone, cache, network conditions, blocked URLs, emulation) could reach seven’s pages or the vault, so the guard doesn’t allow them; change a request through Fetch instead`. These calls are never forwarded or answered with fake success.
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- **Browser-side inheriting navigation is refused.** `Page.navigate` to any `about:` URL, including `about:blank` and `about:srcdoc`, receives `slicc: refused: a browser-side navigation to about: gives the page the origin of whatever drives the browser, so the guard doesn’t send it; open a new tab on about:blank instead`. An absent or unparseable navigation URL receives the same error. Creating a fresh tab with `Target.createTarget` on `about:blank` remains available.
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- **Listing.** `Target.getTargets`, `Target.getTargetInfo`, `Target.targetCreated` and `Target.targetInfoChanged` still show protected targets, so seven knows its tab exists, but their `url` and `title` are only the origin (`https://seven.sliccy.ai`, `chrome://settings`, `chrome-extension://<id>`, or `about:blank`), or only the scheme for a URL without a host (`file:`). A target whose URL slicc can't parse isn't listed at all, since it has no origin to show: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, and its `targetCreated` and `targetInfoChanged` are dropped. A target of a `targetTypes` type (`browser_ui`) is never shown: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, its `targetCreated`, `targetInfoChanged`, `targetDestroyed` and `targetCrashed` are dropped, and `Target.getTargetInfo` on its id is refused like any other command that names it. Service worker registrations and versions on a protected origin are left out of `ServiceWorker` events, and `Storage`, `DOMStorage` and `BackgroundService` events that name a protected origin are dropped.
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- **Listing.** The origin-only rule covers page and tab targets only. `Target.getTargets`, `Target.getTargetInfo`, `Target.targetCreated` and `Target.targetInfoChanged` still show protected page and tab targets, so seven knows its tab exists, but their `url` and `title` are only the origin (`https://seven.sliccy.ai`, `chrome://settings`, `chrome-extension://<id>`, or `about:blank`), or only the scheme for a URL without a host (`file:`). A worker (`worker`, `shared_worker` or `service_worker`) is protected when its own URL is protected or a protected frame or target created it, including a `blob:` or `data:` URL and a worker auto-attached on an out-of-process iframe's session. That worker is not auto-attached and not listed at all: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, its `targetCreated`, `targetInfoChanged` and `targetDestroyed` are dropped, and `Target.getTargetInfo` answers `No target with given id found`, the same answer an unknown target gets. An auto-attached worker whose URL and creator frame are not known yet is held the same way a page without a URL is: the page does not get `attachedToTarget`, the worker stays paused (`waitForDebuggerOnStart` is not resumed), and it is left out of listings until its URL or that frame is known. Learning the creator frame decides the worker then, even when the worker was recorded first. If the creator is still unknown when the hold times out, the worker is resumed and detached without being shown. Detaching that page session, or turning auto-attach off on it (`autoAttach` false, `waitForDebuggerOnStart` false, `flatten` true, and no filter), does the same at once. `Target.attachToTarget` for a worker that is protected, still unresolved, or was never shown is refused, and `targetDestroyed` for a worker the page was never shown is dropped. A target whose URL slicc can't parse isn't listed at all, since it has no origin to show: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, and its `targetCreated` and `targetInfoChanged` are dropped. A target of a `targetTypes` type (`browser_ui`) is never shown: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, its `targetCreated`, `targetInfoChanged`, `targetDestroyed` and `targetCrashed` are dropped, and `Target.getTargetInfo` on its id is refused like any other command that names it. Service worker registrations and versions on a protected origin are left out of `ServiceWorker` events, and `Storage`, `DOMStorage` and `BackgroundService` events that name a protected origin are dropped.
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- **Protected URLs in what the page gets.** In every event and result the page gets, a URL field that holds a protected URL is cut to its origin, at any depth: every key ending in `url`, `urls`, `origin` or `origins` (any case, so `documentURL`, `unreachableUrl` and `securityOrigin` too), `referrer`, `location`, `href` and `src`, and every header value in `headers`, `requestHeaders` and `responseHeaders`. That covers `Page.frameRequestedNavigation`, `Page.frameNavigated`, `Network.requestWillBeSent`, `Page.windowOpen`, `Page.getFrameTree` and the rest. Every other string (header values such as `Link` and `Refresh`, `headersText` and `requestHeadersText`, cookie and storage values, DOM attributes) keeps its text, but each protected URL inside it (a `scheme://` run up to whitespace, a quote, `<` or `>`, a URL that doesn't parse included, a percent-encoded run decoded repeatedly to a fixed point through at most five layers, and an unschemed protected `host[:port]/path` run) is cut to its origin (or host for an unschemed run); if percent-decoding still changes a string after five layers, the whole string is blanked, and next to a protected URL field every field ending in `Fragment` (`urlFragment` of a request or frame) is blanked to `""`, while ordinary URLs keep theirs, so a redirect from an ordinary page to seven's `/auth/callback?code=…` shows the page only seven's origin, wherever it names that URL. Unprotected URLs stay intact. Everything inside a `value`, `preview`, `customPreview`, `arguments` or `returnValue` (evaluation results and their previews) is left alone.
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- **Limits.**
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- On Chromium, the filter relies on site isolation. A seven frame inside a page of another site is a target of its own (`iframe`), which the node protects. Frame reads, DOM, paint and input on its page ancestor are locked too, including compound frames whose protected child shares an ordinary iframe's renderer. An iframe's lock belongs to its parent root document: a different root loader stops a cached document's frames from locking the new page, and restoring that loader locks again before content commands are answered. Without generation evidence the page stays locked, unless `DOM.getFrameOwner` on the node's private page session explicitly says a directly parented iframe is absent from the current document. Missing replies, ambiguous parents and other errors keep the lock; root commits, restores and frame attachments invalidate negative ownership evidence. A same-site frame shares its parent's process and isn't a target. Every `sliccy.ai` host is protected, so this only matters for an extra origin, such as one port of `127.0.0.1` framed by a page on another.
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@@ -2631,7 +2631,7 @@ In the same process, probe ports, dirs and a process list passed in explicitly (
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**Port guard.** On CI (`CI` set), or with `SLICC_TEST_PORT_GUARD=1`, `TestMain` holds `127.0.0.1:9222` to `9229` (and `[::1]` where it can) for the whole run, and the run fails if anything connects to them, other than the one test that lends a port to its own fake browser. On CI a port it can't hold fails the run. Off CI it is off by default, so a developer's own Chrome on those ports is never touched; the guarded tests then skip.
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**Protected-origin vectors.** `test/integration/testdata/link/protect.js` exports `protectVectors`, the attacks the relay must stop, in a shape other guards reuse: `{ id, setup, trigger, control: { origin: 'ordinary', expected }, expected }`. Each runs three times, through the relay, against the same server under three names: an ordinary origin (`ordinary.test`, the control, which must succeed), seven (an `--origin`) and the vault (`vault.sliccy.ai`). A run passes when its observations match `control.expected` or `expected`, and a vector whose control fails fails as a whole. The only run left out is the vault in the same-site iframe cases, since no unprotected page is same-site with a `sliccy.ai` host. The observations come from the test server's log of requests and of the beacons an injected init script sends, and from what the page's own CDP session saw. **Waivers on this head** (slicc-browsers 1.22.
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**Protected-origin vectors.** `test/integration/testdata/link/protect.js` exports `protectVectors`, the attacks the relay must stop, in a shape other guards reuse: `{ id, setup, trigger, control: { origin: 'ordinary', expected }, expected }`. Each runs three times, through the relay, against the same server under three names: an ordinary origin (`ordinary.test`, the control, which must succeed), seven (an `--origin`) and the vault (`vault.sliccy.ai`). A run passes when its observations match `control.expected` or `expected`, and a vector whose control fails fails as a whole. The only run left out is the vault in the same-site iframe cases, since no unprotected page is same-site with a `sliccy.ai` host. The observations come from the test server's log of requests and of the beacons an injected init script sends, and from what the page's own CDP session saw. **Waivers on this head** (slicc-browsers 1.22.1; each waiver accepts only its documented failing leg): `C3.tab-attach` — guarded settle failure of `window.open` under main's empty-URL hold (runner folds that into `control: fail`, #260), not any other non-pass; stock Playwright/Puppeteer popup through the link guard stays green. Required green: `C3.popup`, `C3.tab-create`, `C3.tab-blank`, `C3.tab-protected`. The cases:
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- C1, an init script, then `location.href`;
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- C2, redirect chains through allowed hops (301, 302, 303, 307, 308, and a POST form through 307 and 308), and a chain that passes through the protected origin and back out;
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- C3, an instrumented popup that navigates itself, a popup opened on a redirect chain, and popups opened on a redirect chain or straight on the origin that never reach the page: not through auto-attach with or without `waitForDebuggerOnStart`, `Target.attachToTarget` or `activateTarget`, and not after they navigate to another path of the origin and the opener turns auto-attach on again; `Target.getTargetInfo` shows them without their path;
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package/package.json
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{
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"name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc",
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"version": "1.67.
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"version": "1.67.2",
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"description": "SLICC's command line for seven: links a machine's network, compute and browsers to seven over WebRTC",
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"license": "Apache-2.0",
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"repository": {
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"node": ">=18"
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},
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"optionalDependencies": {
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.67.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.67.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.67.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.67.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.67.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.67.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.67.2",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.67.2",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.67.2",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.67.2",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.67.2",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.67.2",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-jerk": "^1.9.1"
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}
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}
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