@ai-ecoverse/slicc 1.61.13 → 1.61.14

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  1. package/README.md +1 -1
  2. package/package.json +7 -7
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ Only browsers the user named are listed: the one seven runs in, `--cdp` and `--c
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  - **Privileged pages** (slicc-browsers ≥ 1.8.0) are protected the same way, as if they were seven's: every URL whose scheme is in `protectedSchemes` (`chrome:`, `chrome-untrusted:`, `chrome-extension:`, `devtools:`, `file:`, from 1.8.5 also `chrome-search:`, `chrome-native:`, `chrome-distiller:`, `isolated-app:`, `chrome-experimental-site-token-provider:`, `externalfile:` and `content:`, and the UI schemes of the catalog's other Chromium browsers, `edge:`, `brave:`, `opera:`, `vivaldi:` and `arc:`), on any host and path, except the new tab pages in `schemeExceptions` (`chrome://newtab`, `chrome://new-tab-page` and its `chrome-untrusted://new-tab-page` frames, `edge://newtab`, `brave://newtab`, `opera://startpage`), matched by the parsed scheme and exact host, so `chrome-untrusted://new-tab-page.evil/` stays protected. `chrome-error:` is not protected: Chrome's network and frame error pages stay readable, snapshottable, reattachable and navigable away from, like the ordinary pages they stand in for. So `chrome://settings`, `chrome://password-manager`, an extension's pages, frames and workers (a password manager's or a wallet's vault included) and any local file are refused, hidden from auto-attach and detached like a seven tab. A wrapper is judged by what it wraps: `view-source:chrome://settings/` and `view-source:file:///…` by their inner URL, `blob:` and `filesystem:` by their origin. An `about:` URL other than `about:blank` and `about:srcdoc` is judged as the `chrome://` URL Chrome makes of it, so `about:settings` is `chrome://settings`. A target whose `type` is in `targetTypes` (`browser_ui`, Chrome's own UI such as `chrome://omnibox-popup.top-chrome/`) is protected whatever its URL, and hidden altogether (see *Listing*).
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  - **Targets.** Before the stream opens, the node attaches its own session to the browser target and calls `Target.setDiscoverTargets` and `Target.getTargets` on it with ids of its own. Neither the session nor its messages ever reach the page. From then on it knows every target's URL and opener. A target on an inheriting URL (`about:blank`, `about:srcdoc`, none) is protected when it was protected before or when its opener is protected or unknown, so a blank popup that seven opens counts as seven. On a page session, the main frame's `securityOrigin` (`Page.frameNavigated`) and the default context's `origin` (`Runtime.executionContextCreated`) count too.
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  - **Extension worlds.** Any other execution context on a protected origin, such as a password manager's content-script isolated world on an ordinary page, is hidden rather than cutting the page. Seven never sees it, and commands, objects and call frames that name it are refused with `slicc: refused: that execution context belongs to a browser extension` ([§5.8](#58-cdp-cap-cdp-page--node)).
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- - **Extension frames** (slicc-browsers ≥ 1.20.3). A child frame whose scheme is in `protectedOrigins.extensionFrames.schemes` (`chrome-extension:`), such as a password manager's autofill list, no longer locks an ordinary tab. The frame itself stays out of reach: it can't be attached or read, and its URL is blanked to `about:blank` in target discovery, page reads, snapshots, accessibility trees and evaluate results. Plain occurrences of a currently tracked extension frame's exact URL, and of that frame's `chrome-extension://<id>` origin, are replaced with `about:blank` as a substring inside every string value and every object key in every message sent to seven; every other byte stays. A page can re-encode the URL (case changes, escapes, base64, concatenation), so this removes plain occurrences only. The tab's own page can still be read. `Page.captureScreenshot` and every `Input.*` method in `extensionFrames.whenShown` are allowed only while every such frame is hidden (`visibility: hidden` or no layout box; opacity and off-screen position do not count) and none holds the deep active element through nested documents or closed shadow roots; otherwise they are refused with `extensionFrames.shownRefusal`. Whole-page captures and streams in `extensionFrames.whilePresent` (`Page.captureSnapshot`, `Page.printToPDF`, `Page.startScreencast`, `HeadlessExperimental.beginFrame`) are refused while any extension frame is present, with `extensionFrames.presentRefusal`. A running screencast is stopped or has its later `Page.screencastFrame` events dropped until the frame is gone. A race between the visibility or focus check and the CDP reply is accepted. A frame from an extra origin that is the program's own extension, and any other protected frame, still locks the whole tab.
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+ - **Extension frames** (slicc-browsers ≥ 1.20.3). A child frame whose scheme is in `protectedOrigins.extensionFrames.schemes` (`chrome-extension:`), such as a password manager's autofill list, no longer locks an ordinary tab. The frame itself stays out of reach: it can't be attached or read, and its URL is blanked to `about:blank` in target discovery, page reads, snapshots, accessibility trees and evaluate results. Plain occurrences of a currently tracked extension frame's exact URL, and of that frame's `chrome-extension://<id>` origin, are replaced with `about:blank` as a substring inside every string value and every object key in every message sent to seven; every other byte stays. A page can re-encode the URL (case changes, escapes, base64, concatenation), so this removes plain occurrences only. The tab's own page can still be read. On the owner `IFRAME`/`FRAME` DOM nodes (from `DOM.getDocument`, `DOM.describeNode`, `DOM.setChildNodes`, and `DOM.childNodeInserted`) and on a `DOM.getFrameOwner` result for that frame, the guard adds a placement marker `sliccExtensionFrame: {"version":1,"kind":"extensionFrame"}` with no URL, id, origin, title, or frame id; any inbound property of that name is stripped first so only the guard can produce it. `DOM.getFrameOwner` for a tracked extension frame that belongs to the command's own session page is admitted and answers with only `backendNodeId`, `nodeId`, and that marker; attach, evaluate, `Page.createIsolatedWorld`, and every other method that names the extension frame stay refused. `Page.captureScreenshot` and every `Input.*` method in `extensionFrames.whenShown` are allowed only while every such frame is hidden (`visibility: hidden` or no layout box; opacity and off-screen position do not count) and none holds the deep active element through nested documents or closed shadow roots; otherwise they are refused with `extensionFrames.shownRefusal`. Whole-page captures and streams in `extensionFrames.whilePresent` (`Page.captureSnapshot`, `Page.printToPDF`, `Page.startScreencast`, `HeadlessExperimental.beginFrame`) are refused while any extension frame is present, with `extensionFrames.presentRefusal`. A running screencast is stopped or has its later `Page.screencastFrame` events dropped until the frame is gone. A race between the visibility or focus check and the CDP reply is accepted. A frame from an extra origin that is the program's own extension, and any other protected frame, still locks the whole tab.
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  - **Debugger (Stage 1).** One session per target on each relay stream owns the debugger. Only `Debugger.enable`, `setInstrumentationBreakpoint`, `disable`, `removeBreakpoint` for that owner's breakpoints, and `resume` at a published pause are admitted, on an ordinary target whose navigation guard is ready and whose reachable frames and worlds are placed and ordinary. Every other `Debugger.*`, `DOMDebugger.*` and `EventBreakpoints.*` command is refused with `slicc: refused: debugger methods other than enable, disable, setInstrumentationBreakpoint, removeBreakpoint and resume could read or run code in seven's pages or an extension's world, so the guard doesn't allow them`, including `setBreakpointByUrl`, stepping, `DOMDebugger.getEventListeners`, `getScriptSource` and `evaluateOnCallFrame`. Debugger events are not forwarded as they arrive: `scriptParsed` and `scriptFailedToParse` are held, and only the verified pause's script records, including every validated async and parent-stack script it references, are published before it; `breakpointResolved` and unrelated Debugger events are suppressed. Each `Debugger.paused` is held while the guard checks the current frame tree and the pause's context and document generation. An instrumentation pause is converted privately to a normal pause; instrumentation from an evaluation or a context already published in that document resumes privately. Only a verified ordinary pause and its scripts reach the owner. Bookkeeping for an admitted `enable` or `setInstrumentationBreakpoint` reply survives a document-only generation change, but a safety revocation still invalidates it. A verified batch that fits the stream window can wait for available credit without holding the output or guard lock. After waiting, a fresh frame-tree read orders the proof after queued browser events, then ownership, generation, root loader, contexts and admission are rechecked before a single atomic write within the original pause deadline. Failed proof, revocation or expired credit waits resume privately without publication. Anything protected, stale, unplaced or unverified resumes privately and publishes nothing. A frame-tree read has a 2 s bound; every owned pause has a 5 s deadline, after which the guard resumes it. [§5.8](#58-cdp-cap-cdp-page--node) has the ownership and publication rules.
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  - **Debugger memory.** All sessions on one relay share a 64 MiB retained-byte limit for script records, script identifiers and held pause data. A session that would exceed it drops its records, resumes its pause privately and refuses further Debugger work until a document change or a safety revocation clears the latch. A same-document admission failure (such as a hidden world or protected frame), or loss of the published pause’s context proof, also clears it; admission still has to become safe before work is admitted again. Commit and drop release its bytes.
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  - **URLs slicc can't parse** count as protected wherever the node judges a URL the browser will load or has loaded. Chrome's parser and the node's (WHATWG) disagree at the edges: Chrome loads `http://exa mple.sliccy.ai/` as `http://exa%20mple.sliccy.ai/`, a `sliccy.ai` host that gets seven's cookies, and, in some versions, `http://<U+200D>.sliccy.ai/` as `http://xn--1ug.sliccy.ai/`, and the node's parser rejects all of those forms. So a command whose destination doesn't parse (`url` of `Target.createTarget`, `Page.navigate`, `Fetch.continueRequest`, `Network.continueInterceptedRequest`, `Network.loadNetworkResource` and `PWA.launch`, `installUrlOrOrigin` of `PWA.install`, the `url` of a cookie command or any of the `urls` of `Network.getCookies` and `Page.getCookies`, and a history entry's `url` or `userTypedURL`) is refused with `slicc: refused: slicc can't parse this URL, so it could be a protected page`. An empty URL is fine (`Target.createTarget` with `url: ""` opens `about:blank`). On the browser's side, a target, a main frame's `securityOrigin`, an execution context's `origin`, a request or WebSocket, and a service worker whose URL doesn't parse are protected like seven's: left out of listings (see Listing), not attachable, detached, hidden, their document loads failed and their requests stripped. The opaque origins `null` and `://` are not affected. A `blob:null/…` URL (a blob made on an opaque origin, such as a `data:` page or a sandboxed frame) is: its inner `null/…` doesn't parse, and slicc can't name the blob's creator, so it is protected too. URLs the node only reads, such as storage keys and script URLs, are unaffected. In what the page gets, a URL that doesn't parse is cut whole (to an empty string), because it has no origin to keep. The cost: a page on a host that Chrome accepts and WHATWG doesn't (an invalid `xn--` label, a joiner such as U+200D, a space or another forbidden code point), and Chrome's error page for one, is cut too, and navigating to it is refused. URLs Chrome rejects as well (`http://[::1`, `http://a:99999/`, `http://1.2.3.4.5/`) lose nothing: Chrome answers `Page.navigate` with `Cannot navigate to invalid URL`, and `Target.createTarget` with a tab that never loads a document.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc",
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- "version": "1.61.13",
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+ "version": "1.61.14",
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  "description": "SLICC's command line for seven: links a machine's network, compute and browsers to seven over WebRTC",
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  "license": "Apache-2.0",
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  "repository": {
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
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  "node": ">=18"
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  },
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  "optionalDependencies": {
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- "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.61.13",
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- "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.61.13",
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- "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.61.13",
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- "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.61.13",
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- "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.61.13",
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- "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.61.13",
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+ "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.61.14",
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+ "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.61.14",
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+ "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.61.14",
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+ "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.61.14",
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+ "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.61.14",
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+ "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.61.14",
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  "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-jerk": "^1.4.2"
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  }
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  }