@ai-ecoverse/slicc 1.58.4 → 1.59.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +7 -1
- package/package.json +7 -7
package/README.md
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@@ -2263,6 +2263,12 @@ How a kernel program in seven reaches [§1.4](#14-a-seven-as-follower-leader-to-
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Native screen support is an explicit bundled-app transport; ordinary CLI links remain disabled. The `screen` capability is never offered until a verified, properly signed sliccy.app connects and a local grant is active. Genuine signed-app, exec, descriptor-handoff and running-slice validation are release gates; a merge does not enable sharing without that verified app and its approved bundled-CLI pin. The native sliccy.app owns capture, consent, source policy, the indicator and stop. slicc owns the `screen` effective capability, link streams, node lifetime and authenticated local transport; bios owns seven's consumer. There is no input capability, click/key protocol, Accessibility request or input implementation in this feature. Existing `agent`, `cdp`, `kernel-in` and browser `capture.screen` permissions grant no native capture authority and provide no fallback.
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**Verifier diagnostics.** `slicc - follow --native-screen --json --native-screen-proof` opts into content-free observations from the actual native verifier. It uses the same peer policy, deadlines and admission decisions as ordinary sharing, and creates no grant or additional trust role. No diagnostic events are emitted without this option; `--native-screen` and `--json` are both required.
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The stdout event is `native-screen-verification`, schema 1, listed in `capabilities.events.names` but emitted only with the diagnostic option. At most one `check` for each accepted/refused outcome on each `safety`/`frames` lane is emitted, followed by one `complete`: at most five rows, with contiguous integer `seq` values starting at 1. Check rows carry `lane`, `outcome` (`accepted` or `refused`), nullable `tokenMatched`, `pidAgreed`, `uidAgreed`, and `lost`. The booleans come from the real kernel reads: `true` requires agreement in both required pre/post reads; `false` means an actual disagreement in either read; `null` means a required comparison did not execute or was unavailable. Short-circuit refusal can therefore record a token mismatch while leaving later comparisons null. No identity values, paths, hashes, recipients, application content or frame bytes are included, and these events are not audit records or wire messages.
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Refusal observations remain buffered until native invalidation and socket closure have completed. The collector never waits for stdout and has fixed space for its five rows. Expected association closure does not itself set `lost`; incomplete/abandoned verifier observations do. A successful refusal may end with `complete` and `lost:false`. Consumers must treat missing, duplicate, gapped or lost reports, a missing final `complete`, and null comparisons required for their proof as inconclusive. CLI teardown joins the proof writer after native shutdown and before emitting `closed`, including startup refusal; native stop itself never waits for that writer. Output failure cannot change a verifier decision. An accepted check proves neither completed authentication nor permission to capture.
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**Capture boundary.** A human selects eligible apps/windows or one display in sliccy.app. The fixed exclusions are the browser hosting the receiving seven (all its windows, profiles and relevant helpers), sliccy.app, and macOS authorization, TCC and password surfaces/services. System Settings is excluded by default; only the local human may allow it, and its password/permission surfaces remain excluded. Other browsers are eligible. App names, titles, seven's claimed browser, default-browser association and page Origin are not process identity. The app must establish the hosting-browser identity with trustworthy local process evidence and protect newly discovered hosts before any affected output; ambiguous local-host attribution blocks the affected source. A recipient proven to be remote does not imply that an unrelated local browser is a host. Source policy changes or recipient changes require local confirmation, never a remote choice.
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The promise is to exclude protected **surfaces**, not to identify the provenance of every displayed pixel. An allowed app can display copied screenshots/text from a protected app. An app the user allows, such as Terminal, can automate protected apps if macOS lets it. This contract does not prevent that through other capabilities or existing local automation. It imposes no forced application allowlist or automation-proxy ban. Capture safety itself must still be provable through public macOS APIs: unresolved service-hosted sheets, system thumbnails/notifications, translucent composition, menus, child windows or transition races block the affected source; if the unsafe region cannot be bounded reliably, suppress all output. Passing a selected-window test does not qualify display capture.
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@@ -2281,7 +2287,7 @@ Stop/revoke on source death, unresolved source/Space/display change, lock, sleep
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{"screen":{"v":1,"scopes":["window","display"],"codec":"jpeg","limits":{"headerBytes":4096,"frameBytes":2097152,"longEdge":2560,"pixels":4000000,"defaultFps":5,"maxFps":10,"bytesPerSecond":8388608}}}
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```
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Scope metadata describes protocol support; the app must keep each source unavailable until its capture safety is proved. HELLO's static `caps` never contains `screen`; ordinary CLI runs and Linux/Windows/wasm omit the metadata too. No grant/session/epoch from HELLO is trusted. Each new link starts with effective screen caps `[]`. The page must advertise page cap `screen-state`; otherwise no grant and any `screen` OPEN is `EACCES`. An old page cannot receive pixels. A node incorrectly listing `screen` in HELLO caps is incompatible with this extension; bios does not open screen streams on that link. The extension authorizes `screen`, `screen-stop` and `screen-state` handling by the support metadata and negotiated page cap, without changing static gates for other kinds.
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Scope metadata describes protocol support; the app must keep each source unavailable until its capture safety is proved. HELLO's static `caps` never contains `screen`; ordinary CLI runs and Linux/Windows/wasm omit the metadata too. No grant/session/epoch from HELLO is trusted. Each new link starts with effective screen caps `[]`. The node sends its initial `screen-state` only after sending its own HELLO and receiving the page HELLO. The page must advertise page cap `screen-state`; otherwise no grant and any `screen` OPEN is `EACCES`. An old page cannot receive pixels. A node incorrectly listing `screen` in HELLO caps is incompatible with this extension; bios does not open screen streams on that link. The extension authorizes `screen`, `screen-stop` and `screen-state` handling by the support metadata and negotiated page cap, without changing static gates for other kinds.
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A full `screen-state` replacement has `caps` exactly `[]` or `["screen"]`; duplicate/other capabilities are `EPROTO`, clear viewing and never affect net/http/fs/cdp/credentialed or other link grants. `["screen"]` is the effective capability only while the authenticated native grant is active. On stop both brokers remove it immediately; delivery of the replacement is best effort. Support is not a grant. Limits use the minimum of node support, app grant, page implementation and OPEN request ceilings.
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package/package.json
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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{
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"name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc",
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"version": "1.
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"version": "1.59.0",
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"description": "SLICC's command line for seven: links a machine's network, compute and browsers to seven over WebRTC",
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"license": "Apache-2.0",
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"repository": {
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"node": ">=18"
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},
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"optionalDependencies": {
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.59.0",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.59.0",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.59.0",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.59.0",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.59.0",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.59.0",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-jerk": "^1.4.0"
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}
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}
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