@ai-ecoverse/slicc 1.49.28 → 1.49.30
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -2
- package/package.json +7 -7
package/README.md
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@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ Only browsers the user named are listed: the one seven runs in, `--cdp` and `--c
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- **Browser-side inheriting navigation is refused.** `Page.navigate` to any `about:` URL, including `about:blank` and `about:srcdoc`, receives `slicc: refused: a browser-side navigation to about: gives the page the origin of whatever drives the browser, so the guard doesn’t send it; open a new tab on about:blank instead`. An absent or unparseable navigation URL receives the same error. Creating a fresh tab with `Target.createTarget` on `about:blank` remains available.
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- **Listing.** `Target.getTargets`, `Target.getTargetInfo`, `Target.targetCreated` and `Target.targetInfoChanged` still show protected targets, so seven knows its tab exists, but their `url` and `title` are only the origin (`https://seven.sliccy.ai`, `chrome://settings`, `chrome-extension://<id>`, or `about:blank`), or only the scheme for a URL without a host (`file:`). A target whose URL slicc can't parse isn't listed at all, since it has no origin to show: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, and its `targetCreated` and `targetInfoChanged` are dropped. A target of a `targetTypes` type (`browser_ui`) is never shown: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, its `targetCreated`, `targetInfoChanged`, `targetDestroyed` and `targetCrashed` are dropped, and `Target.getTargetInfo` on its id is refused like any other command that names it. Service worker registrations and versions on a protected origin are left out of `ServiceWorker` events, and `Storage`, `DOMStorage` and `BackgroundService` events that name a protected origin are dropped.
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- **Protected URLs in what the page gets.** In every event and result the page gets, a URL field that holds a protected URL is cut to its origin, at any depth: every key ending in `url`, `urls`, `origin` or `origins` (any case, so `documentURL`, `unreachableUrl` and `securityOrigin` too), `referrer`, `location`, `href` and `src`, and every header value in `headers`, `requestHeaders` and `responseHeaders`. That covers `Page.frameRequestedNavigation`, `Page.frameNavigated`, `Network.requestWillBeSent`, `Page.windowOpen`, `Page.getFrameTree` and the rest. Every other string (header values such as `Link` and `Refresh`, `headersText` and `requestHeadersText`, cookie and storage values, DOM attributes) keeps its text, but each protected URL inside it (a `scheme://` run up to whitespace, a quote, `<` or `>`, a URL that doesn't parse included,
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- **Protected URLs in what the page gets.** In every event and result the page gets, a URL field that holds a protected URL is cut to its origin, at any depth: every key ending in `url`, `urls`, `origin` or `origins` (any case, so `documentURL`, `unreachableUrl` and `securityOrigin` too), `referrer`, `location`, `href` and `src`, and every header value in `headers`, `requestHeaders` and `responseHeaders`. That covers `Page.frameRequestedNavigation`, `Page.frameNavigated`, `Network.requestWillBeSent`, `Page.windowOpen`, `Page.getFrameTree` and the rest. Every other string (header values such as `Link` and `Refresh`, `headersText` and `requestHeadersText`, cookie and storage values, DOM attributes) keeps its text, but each protected URL inside it (a `scheme://` run up to whitespace, a quote, `<` or `>`, a URL that doesn't parse included, a percent-encoded run decoded repeatedly to a fixed point through at most five layers, and an unschemed protected `host[:port]/path` run) is cut to its origin (or host for an unschemed run); if percent-decoding still changes a string after five layers, the whole string is blanked, and next to a protected URL field every field ending in `Fragment` (`urlFragment` of a request or frame) is blanked to `""`, while ordinary URLs keep theirs, so a redirect from an ordinary page to seven's `/auth/callback?code=…` shows the page only seven's origin, wherever it names that URL. Unprotected URLs stay intact. Everything inside a `value`, `preview`, `customPreview`, `arguments` or `returnValue` (evaluation results and their previews) is left alone.
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- **Limits.**
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- The filter relies on Chrome's site isolation. A seven frame inside a page of another site is a target of its own (`iframe`), which the node protects. Frame reads, DOM, paint and input on its page ancestor are locked too, including compound frames whose protected child shares an ordinary iframe's renderer. An iframe's lock belongs to its parent root document: a different root loader stops a cached document's frames from locking the new page, and restoring that loader locks again before content commands are answered. Without generation evidence the page stays locked, unless `DOM.getFrameOwner` on the node's private page session explicitly says a directly parented iframe is absent from the current document. Missing replies, ambiguous parents and other errors keep the lock; root commits, restores and frame attachments invalidate negative ownership evidence. A same-site frame shares its parent's process and isn't a target. Every `sliccy.ai` host is protected, so this only matters for an extra origin, such as one port of `127.0.0.1` framed by a page on another.
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- A document that arrives without a request isn't failed: a page restored from the back/forward cache, and a `blob:` or `filesystem:` URL of a protected origin (which only that origin can make). Targets with protected history are content-locked before commands can race a restore, regardless of delayed commit events. The node still detaches after a protected commit. Navigation initiated outside the stream after fresh evidence, including loads already in flight before the guard was installed, remains a limit; this does not authorize content commands on a quarantined target.
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- **Privileged browser pages** (≥ 1.8.0) count as protected origins: every URL in `protectedSchemes` (`chrome:`, `chrome-untrusted:`, `chrome-extension:`, `devtools:`, `file:`, from 1.8.5 `chrome-search:`, `chrome-native:`, `chrome-distiller:`, `isolated-app:`, `chrome-experimental-site-token-provider:`, `externalfile:` and `content:`, `edge:`, `brave:`, `opera:`, `vivaldi:`, `arc:`) except the new tab pages in `schemeExceptions`, and never `chrome-error:`; `view-source:`, `blob:` and `filesystem:` by what they wrap; `about:` aliases as the `chrome://` URL they become (`aboutScheme`). Targets of a `targetTypes` type (`browser_ui`) are protected whatever their URL, and never listed or announced to the page. The refusal text is the same.
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- **URLs that don't parse** (WHATWG) count as protected wherever the node judges a URL the browser will load or has loaded: a command's destination (`Target.createTarget`, `Page.navigate`, `Fetch.continueRequest`, `Network.continueInterceptedRequest`, `Network.loadNetworkResource`, `PWA.launch`, `PWA.install`, cookie commands' `url` or `urls`, history entries) is refused with `slicc: refused: slicc can't parse this URL, so it could be a protected page`, and a target, main frame, execution context, request, WebSocket or service worker the browser reports on such a URL is redacted, refused, detached or hidden like seven's. An empty URL and the opaque origins `null` and `://` are not affected (a `blob:null/…` URL is: its inner `null/…` doesn't parse), and a target on such a URL isn't listed at all, and URLs the node only reads (storage keys, script URLs) keep "unparseable isn't protected", and in what the page gets such a URL is cut whole. Chrome canonicalises some URLs WHATWG rejects (`http://exa mple.sliccy.ai/` → `http://exa%20mple.sliccy.ai/`, U+200D → `xn--1ug`, invalid `xn--` labels), so this is what keeps those `sliccy.ai` hosts protected. The cost: pages on such exotic hosts, and Chrome's error pages for them, are cut even when they aren't protected. The rule and its refusal come from slicc-browsers' catalog (`protectedOrigins.unparseable` and `unparseableRefusal`, ≥ 1.10.0). [`cdp` (browser control)](#cdp-browser-control) has the details.
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- **In targets the stream touched** (attached to or created): the node fails every protected document load with `net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT`, so instrumentation installed before a navigation can never run in a protected document. That covers redirects, service-worker-served navigations and the page's own Fetch interception.
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- **Redirects into protected URLs:** a protected URL that reaches the page inside any string it gets, such as a redirect's `Location`, `Link` or `Refresh` header or a `headersText` line, plain or percent-encoded
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- **Redirects into protected URLs:** a protected URL that reaches the page inside any string it gets, such as a redirect's `Location`, `Link` or `Refresh` header or a `headersText` line, plain, unschemed (`host[:port]/path`) or percent-encoded (decoded repeatedly to a fixed point through at most five layers), is cut to its origin or unschemed host; a string that still changes after five decoding layers is blanked in full, and its `urlFragment` is blanked; unprotected URLs stay intact. A stylesheet or script whose URL, or any hop of whose redirect chain (as the node's own guard session saw it on that target, compared in WHATWG form without the fragment), is protected can't be read: `Page.getResourceContent` and `Page.searchInResource` for such a URL (or one that doesn't parse), and any command naming such a `styleSheetId` or `scriptId` (`CSS.getStyleSheetText`, `Debugger.getScriptSource`, `searchInContent` and the rest), are refused with `slicc: refused: the response came from seven's origin`, and the CSS rules and styles from such a stylesheet reach the page with only their `styleSheetId` and `origin`. `Network.loadNetworkResource` (Chrome follows its redirects with the user's cookies) and `Page.captureSnapshot` (it serialises every frame) are refused on every session. [`cdp` (browser control)](#cdp-browser-control) has the details.
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- **Workers:** a touched dedicated, shared or service worker gets a guard session too (Network only, to see its imports' redirect chains), and its commands wait for it the same way, except `Runtime.runIfWaitingForDebugger` on a shared or service worker, which goes ahead so the worker can't stall on its own guard; its imports from before the guard was ready then count as unseen and can't be read. A worker script other than the worker's own whose chain that guard didn't see, or which touched a protected URL, can't be read. In pages, scripts and stylesheets loaded before the node attached are a known residual.
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- **CDP command ids:** ids at or above `0x70000000` (1879048192) belong to the CLI and are refused from clients. `0x40000000` (2^30) through `0x6FFFFFFF` is reserved for seven's (bios) guard; other clients use ids below 2^30.
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- **Waiting for that guard:** page commands on a touched target's session wait while the node sets its guard up there. The wait fails closed after 30 s without progress (an answer or event on that target's own guard session, or the answer to the node's attach to it; answers and events elsewhere on the stream don't count) or 5 min in all, whichever comes first, and the refusal names the bound. At most 4096 commands or 64 MiB wait on a stream; more is `RESET ENOBUFS`.
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package/package.json
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{
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"name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc",
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"version": "1.49.
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"version": "1.49.30",
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"description": "SLICC's command line for seven: links a machine's network, compute and browsers to seven over WebRTC",
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"license": "Apache-2.0",
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"repository": {
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"node": ">=18"
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},
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"optionalDependencies": {
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.49.30",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.49.30",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.49.30",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.49.30",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.49.30",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.49.30",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-jerk": "^1.3.0"
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}
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}
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