@ai-ecoverse/slicc 1.49.27 → 1.49.28
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -1
- package/package.json +7 -7
package/README.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -1708,10 +1708,11 @@ On a [§1.3](#13-local-setup-without-cdp-loopback-signalling) loopback link, `un
|
|
|
1708
1708
|
- **Waiting for that guard:** page commands on a touched target's session wait while the node sets its guard up there. The wait fails closed after 30 s without progress (an answer or event on that target's own guard session, or the answer to the node's attach to it; answers and events elsewhere on the stream don't count) or 5 min in all, whichever comes first, and the refusal names the bound. At most 4096 commands or 64 MiB wait on a stream; more is `RESET ENOBUFS`.
|
|
1709
1709
|
- **Sessions the node doesn't know:** a page command whose `sessionId` the node hasn't seen on this stream (in a `Target.attachedToTarget`, in the answer to the page's `Target.attachToTarget` or `Target.attachToBrowserTarget`, or its own) is held, not forwarded, until the session appears, and is then decided as usual. Only messages on that session id count as progress. The same bounds and caps apply, and the refusal is `slicc: refused: slicc doesn't know which target this session belongs to: …`, naming the bound. A session that detached is refused at once, without the suffix. Commands without a `sessionId` are unaffected.
|
|
1710
1710
|
- **Auto-attached targets with no URL yet** (OOPIFs, popups) are held until the URL is known, then detached if protected. After 10 s with no URL they are treated as protected. The node's own setup connection ([§1.1](#11-local-setup-over-cdp)) isn't a `cdp` stream and is the one exception. [`cdp` (browser control)](#cdp-browser-control) has the details.
|
|
1711
|
-
- **Protection follows the target's own effective origin. Execution contexts on a protected origin are hidden, not cut,** unless the context is the target's own main-frame default context; that one still cuts the target as above. The typical case is an extension's content-script isolated world (`chrome-extension://<id>`) on an ordinary page. The page stays usable, and the hidden world is invisible and out of reach.
|
|
1711
|
+
- **Protection follows the target's own effective origin. Execution contexts on a protected origin are hidden, not cut,** unless the context is the target's own main-frame default context; that one still cuts the target as above. The typical case is an extension's content-script isolated world (`chrome-extension://<id>`) on an ordinary page. The page stays usable, and the hidden world is invisible and out of reach. A page that also holds a protected frame (below) loses the frame-scoped and rendering commands listed there.
|
|
1712
1712
|
- **Hidden:** the node learns every context of a touched target on its own guard session, whatever the page enabled. It drops these events from the stream: the world's `Runtime.executionContextCreated` and `executionContextDestroyed`, its `consoleAPICalled`, `exceptionThrown` and `bindingCalled`, and `Debugger.scriptParsed`/`scriptFailedToParse` for scripts in it. It also drops `Debugger.breakpointResolved` in those scripts. A `Debugger.paused` whose top frame is in the world is dropped, and the node resumes the target. The world's frames lower in the stack are removed from the call frames.
|
|
1713
1713
|
- **Refused** with `slicc: refused: that execution context belongs to a browser extension`: any command that names the world through a `contextId` or `executionContextId`, `uniqueContextId`, an `executionContextName` the world has, a remote `objectId` or `*ObjectId` (call arguments included) or `callFrameId` whose injected-script part is the world, or the `scriptId` of a script in it. So `Runtime.evaluate`, `callFunctionOn`, `compileScript`, `runScript`, `globalLexicalScopeNames`, `queryObjects`, `getProperties`, `addBinding`, `Debugger.evaluateOnCallFrame`, `setVariableValue`, `setScriptSource` and `DOM.resolveNode` there are all refused. The default world, and isolated worlds the page creates itself, are unaffected. A `uniqueContextId`, or a numeric `contextId` or `executionContextId`, on a target's session that names no live context the node has seen announced on that target, on its guard session or the page's (say one from a closed tab or another live tab, or a guess), is refused with `slicc: refused: that execution context is not exposed`, rather than passed to Chrome. `Runtime.addBinding` is refused on every relay session as a document-persistent command, regardless of its context selector.
|
|
1714
1714
|
- **Lifetime:** a hidden world is forgotten only when Chrome reports it gone (`executionContextDestroyed`, or `executionContextsCleared` on a session that reported it), never to make room. A target with more than 4096 live hidden worlds is refused every command there that names an execution context, object, call frame, script or context name, until its contexts are cleared. Seen contexts follow the same lifetime and bound; once a target passes 4096, contexts announced after that are refused as not exposed until its contexts are cleared, even if some are destroyed in between.
|
|
1715
|
+
- **Protected frames in the page's own process:** a default execution context on a protected origin whose frame isn't the target's main frame, such as an `about:blank` or `srcdoc` child that inherits seven's origin, marks the whole target as holding a protected frame. So does a target past the 4096-hidden-world bound, or a hidden default context reported without a `frameId`. While that holds, the node refuses with `slicc: refused: target is on seven's origin` every command that names that frame's `frameId`; every `DOM`, `DOMSnapshot`, `Accessibility` and `Input` command except `enable` and `disable`; `Page.getFrameTree`, `getResourceTree`, `getResourceContent`, `captureSnapshot`, `printToPDF`, `captureScreenshot` and `startScreencast`; the `LayerTree` snapshot commands (`makeSnapshot`, `loadSnapshot`, `replaySnapshot`, `profileSnapshot`, `snapshotCommandLog`); `HeadlessExperimental.beginFrame`; and `Cast.startTabMirroring`. A screencast already running when that state begins is stopped (`Page.stopScreencast` on the page's session), and its `Page.screencastFrame` events are dropped until the page starts a new cast, which works again only once the state has ended. A screenshot, layer replay, profile, command log or begin-frame answer that arrives after the state began is replaced with the same refusal. The state ends when Chrome reports the frame's context gone or the contexts cleared. Meanwhile a document that inherits its origin from one of the target's in-process child frames is refused; [`cdp` (browser control)](#cdp-browser-control) has the rules for inherited documents and their openers. A protected iframe target in another process also puts its page ancestor in this state, including an ordinary-origin iframe target whose renderer holds a protected local frame. The node resolves its `parentFrameId` from main-frame target ids, observed frame ids and execution-context frame ids; for preloaded frames it also reads frame trees through private sessions. Those internal answers and session attach/detach events are not forwarded to the client. An unresolved or missing parent locks every page target in the same browser context until ownership is resolved. The parent lock belongs to the root document the iframe is in: a new root document releases the old one's frames, which may stay frozen in the back/forward cache, and restoring that document locks the page again at once. When the node didn't see which document a protected iframe directly under the page belongs to, it asks Chrome privately which element owns the frame. Only Chrome's explicit answer that the frame isn't there releases the lock, until the root document changes or the frame attaches again; any other answer, or none, keeps it. The lock also ends when the iframe target goes away or ceases to be protected, including when its protected local-frame state ends. The rest of the page stays drivable, with the event filtering above: navigation, `Runtime` in the default world, `Network`, `Fetch` and the other domains.
|
|
1715
1716
|
- **Heap profiling:** a page's heap snapshot covers its whole renderer, other worlds included. So on page, iframe, background page and webview sessions every `HeapProfiler` command except `enable`, `disable`, `collectGarbage` and `getHeapObjectId` is refused with `slicc: refused: HeapProfiler reads the page's whole renderer, browser extensions' worlds included`, whether or not an extension is there.
|
|
1716
1717
|
- **Breakpoint conditions** run in whatever world the script belongs to, and a breakpoint by URL outlives reloads. So on those sessions a `Debugger.setBreakpointByUrl` with a `condition` needs a non-empty `url`, which can't name a protected script (see above). One by `urlRegex` or `scriptHash` or with an empty `url` is refused with `slicc: refused: a breakpoint condition that could run in a browser extension's world needs a url naming the page's own script`. Breakpoints without a condition are allowed; a pause they cause in a hidden world is resumed out of sight.
|
|
1717
1718
|
- **Profiles, coverage, stacks and initiators** can name any script in the isolate. So the node scrubs every message it sends the page, events and command results alike, outside opaque values (`value`, `preview`, `customPreview`, `arguments`, `returnValue`). Any `callFrames` list loses the frames on a protected URL or in a hidden world's script. That covers console, exception, pause, async, node-creation and initiator stacks, whatever the method. A coverage or type-profile list (entries with `scriptId` and `functions` or `entries`) also loses its entries for scripts without a URL. A profile node's `callFrame` in such a script becomes `(program)` and loses its `positionTicks`. An `initiator` on a protected `url` loses that `url` and its position.
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "1.49.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "1.49.28",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "SLICC's command line for seven: links a machine's network, compute and browsers to seven over WebRTC",
|
|
5
5
|
"license": "Apache-2.0",
|
|
6
6
|
"repository": {
|
|
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
|
|
|
18
18
|
"node": ">=18"
|
|
19
19
|
},
|
|
20
20
|
"optionalDependencies": {
|
|
21
|
-
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.49.
|
|
22
|
-
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.49.
|
|
23
|
-
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.49.
|
|
24
|
-
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.49.
|
|
25
|
-
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.49.
|
|
26
|
-
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.49.
|
|
21
|
+
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.49.28",
|
|
22
|
+
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.49.28",
|
|
23
|
+
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.49.28",
|
|
24
|
+
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.49.28",
|
|
25
|
+
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.49.28",
|
|
26
|
+
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.49.28",
|
|
27
27
|
"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-jerk": "^1.3.0"
|
|
28
28
|
}
|
|
29
29
|
}
|