@ai-ecoverse/slicc 1.49.22 → 1.49.24
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -2
- package/package.json +7 -7
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ Only browsers the user named are listed: the one seven runs in, `--cdp` and `--c
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- **Progress** for a target whose setup is under way is the answer to the node's attach to it, or any answer or event on the node's own guard session for that target. Answers and events on the page's sessions, and on other targets, don't count, so a guard that stays silent fails at the 30 s bound even while the browser and the page stay busy. The node checks the bounds every quarter of the shorter one (7.5 s by default).
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- **Idle bound:** a setup with no progress for 30 s fails, within one check of it (37.5 s). Only time the node spends waiting on the browser's socket counts toward the 30 s. The node reads the browser's messages one at a time and passes each on before it reads the next, so a page that is slow to credit its window stops the reads, and the guard's answers wait unread behind the page's messages. That time doesn't count, for setups and unknown sessions alike, and a stop over 2 s is logged under `SLICC_DEBUG`. The outer bound still counts it.
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- **Outer bound:** a setup still under way 5 min after it started fails, whatever its progress.
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- **Refusals:**
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- **Refusals:** When a setup call fails, the node's session is lost or the target closes, both the navigation guard and any pending document confirmation fail immediately; the waiting commands, and any after them, are refused at once with `slicc: refused: slicc can't keep seven's origin out of this target`. An inherited document whose opener or parent was never confirmed stays refused with `…: inherited document has an unknown opener or parent; slicc never confirmed it`; if that opener or parent closed, the reason is `…: inherited document has a gone opener or parent`. An in-process opener frame must map to its owning target through the node's frame or execution-context bookkeeping, and that target's guard must have finished successfully without protected history. The owning target must also have no protected frames or exhausted world tracking, and must still expose a live ordinary default execution context for that opener frame when confirmation decides. A protected or ordinary opener whose context has disappeared stays refused; unknown frame ownership stays refused. When a bound fires, the message names it: `…: its guard made no progress in 30s` or `…: its guard wasn't ready in 5m0s`.
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- **Caps:** more than 4096 waiting commands, or 64 MiB of them, on one stream reset it with `ENOBUFS`.
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- **Sessions the node doesn't know.** A page command with a `sessionId` the node hasn't seen on this stream is never forwarded as it stands. The node knows a session from a `Target.attachedToTarget` it relayed or held, from the answer to the page's `Target.attachToTarget` (for a target it knows) or `Target.attachToBrowserTarget`, and from its own sessions. Commands on an unknown session wait, in order, until the session appears, then any guard setup on its target, and are then decided as usual. So a browser that answers an attach before it announces the session can't open a gap.
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- **Progress** for an unknown session is only a message from the browser on that session id. The browser answering other commands doesn't count, because it says nothing about this session. The bounds are a target's setup bounds (30 s idle, 5 min outer, checked every quarter of the shorter), and so are the caps.
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@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ Only browsers the user named are listed: the one seven runs in, `--cdp` and `--c
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- **Listing.** `Target.getTargets`, `Target.getTargetInfo`, `Target.targetCreated` and `Target.targetInfoChanged` still show protected targets, so seven knows its tab exists, but their `url` and `title` are only the origin (`https://seven.sliccy.ai`, `chrome://settings`, `chrome-extension://<id>`, or `about:blank`), or only the scheme for a URL without a host (`file:`). A target whose URL slicc can't parse isn't listed at all, since it has no origin to show: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, and its `targetCreated` and `targetInfoChanged` are dropped. A target of a `targetTypes` type (`browser_ui`) is never shown: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, its `targetCreated`, `targetInfoChanged`, `targetDestroyed` and `targetCrashed` are dropped, and `Target.getTargetInfo` on its id is refused like any other command that names it. Service worker registrations and versions on a protected origin are left out of `ServiceWorker` events, and `Storage`, `DOMStorage` and `BackgroundService` events that name a protected origin are dropped.
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- **Protected URLs in what the page gets.** In every event and result the page gets, a URL field that holds a protected URL is cut to its origin, at any depth: every key ending in `url`, `urls`, `origin` or `origins` (any case, so `documentURL`, `unreachableUrl` and `securityOrigin` too), `referrer`, `location`, `href` and `src`, and every header value in `headers`, `requestHeaders` and `responseHeaders`. That covers `Page.frameRequestedNavigation`, `Page.frameNavigated`, `Network.requestWillBeSent`, `Page.windowOpen`, `Page.getFrameTree` and the rest. Every other string (header values such as `Link` and `Refresh`, `headersText` and `requestHeadersText`, cookie and storage values, DOM attributes) keeps its text, but each protected URL inside it (a `scheme://` run up to whitespace, a quote, `<` or `>`, a URL that doesn't parse included, and a run whose `://` is percent-encoded in whole or in part, such as `scheme%3A%2F%2F` or `scheme%3A//`, up to those or a raw `&`, decoded once; a doubly encoded one isn't decoded) is cut to its origin, and next to a protected URL field every field ending in `Fragment` (`urlFragment` of a request or frame) is blanked to `""`, while ordinary URLs keep theirs, so a redirect from an ordinary page to seven's `/auth/callback?code=…` shows the page only seven's origin, wherever it names that URL. Unprotected URLs stay intact. Everything inside a `value`, `preview`, `customPreview`, `arguments` or `returnValue` (evaluation results and their previews) is left alone.
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- **Limits.**
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- The filter relies on Chrome's site isolation. A seven frame inside a page of another site is a target of its own (`iframe`), which the node protects.
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- The filter relies on Chrome's site isolation. A seven frame inside a page of another site is a target of its own (`iframe`), which the node protects. Frame reads, DOM, paint and input on its page ancestor are locked too, including compound frames whose protected child shares an ordinary iframe's renderer. An iframe's lock belongs to its parent root document: a different root loader stops a cached document's frames from locking the new page, and restoring that loader locks again before content commands are answered. Without generation evidence the page stays locked, unless `DOM.getFrameOwner` on the node's private page session explicitly says a directly parented iframe is absent from the current document. Missing replies, ambiguous parents and other errors keep the lock; root commits, restores and frame attachments invalidate negative ownership evidence. A same-site frame shares its parent's process and isn't a target. Every `sliccy.ai` host is protected, so this only matters for an extra origin, such as one port of `127.0.0.1` framed by a page on another.
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- A document that arrives without a request isn't failed: a page restored from the back/forward cache, and a `blob:` or `filesystem:` URL of a protected origin (which only that origin can make). Targets with protected history are content-locked before commands can race a restore, regardless of delayed commit events. The node still detaches after a protected commit. Navigation initiated outside the stream after fresh evidence, including loads already in flight before the guard was installed, remains a limit; this does not authorize content commands on a quarantined target.
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- The network guard fails only `http` and `https` documents. Chrome itself keeps a web page from navigating to `chrome:`, `chrome-untrusted:`, `devtools:` and `file:` URLs, but not to an extension's web-accessible pages. A touched page that sends itself to one with a script or a link is detached after the commit, as above.
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- If the node loses its own session (`ECONNRESET: slicc lost track of the browser's targets`), it refuses every command and resets the stream unless the browser closes within 2 s.
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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{
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"name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc",
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"version": "1.49.
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"version": "1.49.24",
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"description": "SLICC's command line for seven: links a machine's network, compute and browsers to seven over WebRTC",
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"license": "Apache-2.0",
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"repository": {
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"node": ">=18"
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},
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"optionalDependencies": {
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.49.24",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.49.24",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.49.24",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.49.24",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.49.24",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.49.24",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-jerk": "^1.3.0"
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}
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}
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