@ai-ecoverse/slicc 1.49.21 → 1.49.23
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -1
- package/package.json +7 -7
package/README.md
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@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ Only browsers the user named are listed: the one seven runs in, `--cdp` and `--c
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- **Listing.** `Target.getTargets`, `Target.getTargetInfo`, `Target.targetCreated` and `Target.targetInfoChanged` still show protected targets, so seven knows its tab exists, but their `url` and `title` are only the origin (`https://seven.sliccy.ai`, `chrome://settings`, `chrome-extension://<id>`, or `about:blank`), or only the scheme for a URL without a host (`file:`). A target whose URL slicc can't parse isn't listed at all, since it has no origin to show: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, and its `targetCreated` and `targetInfoChanged` are dropped. A target of a `targetTypes` type (`browser_ui`) is never shown: `Target.getTargets` leaves it out, its `targetCreated`, `targetInfoChanged`, `targetDestroyed` and `targetCrashed` are dropped, and `Target.getTargetInfo` on its id is refused like any other command that names it. Service worker registrations and versions on a protected origin are left out of `ServiceWorker` events, and `Storage`, `DOMStorage` and `BackgroundService` events that name a protected origin are dropped.
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- **Protected URLs in what the page gets.** In every event and result the page gets, a URL field that holds a protected URL is cut to its origin, at any depth: every key ending in `url`, `urls`, `origin` or `origins` (any case, so `documentURL`, `unreachableUrl` and `securityOrigin` too), `referrer`, `location`, `href` and `src`, and every header value in `headers`, `requestHeaders` and `responseHeaders`. That covers `Page.frameRequestedNavigation`, `Page.frameNavigated`, `Network.requestWillBeSent`, `Page.windowOpen`, `Page.getFrameTree` and the rest. Every other string (header values such as `Link` and `Refresh`, `headersText` and `requestHeadersText`, cookie and storage values, DOM attributes) keeps its text, but each protected URL inside it (a `scheme://` run up to whitespace, a quote, `<` or `>`, a URL that doesn't parse included, and a run whose `://` is percent-encoded in whole or in part, such as `scheme%3A%2F%2F` or `scheme%3A//`, up to those or a raw `&`, decoded once; a doubly encoded one isn't decoded) is cut to its origin, and next to a protected URL field every field ending in `Fragment` (`urlFragment` of a request or frame) is blanked to `""`, while ordinary URLs keep theirs, so a redirect from an ordinary page to seven's `/auth/callback?code=…` shows the page only seven's origin, wherever it names that URL. Unprotected URLs stay intact. Everything inside a `value`, `preview`, `customPreview`, `arguments` or `returnValue` (evaluation results and their previews) is left alone.
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- **Limits.**
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- The filter relies on Chrome's site isolation. A seven frame inside a page of another site is a target of its own (`iframe`), which the node protects.
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- The filter relies on Chrome's site isolation. A seven frame inside a page of another site is a target of its own (`iframe`), which the node protects. Frame reads, DOM, paint and input on its page ancestor are locked too, including compound frames whose protected child shares an ordinary iframe's renderer. An iframe's lock belongs to its parent root document: a different root loader stops a cached document's frames from locking the new page, and restoring that loader locks again before content commands are answered. Without generation evidence the page stays locked, unless `DOM.getFrameOwner` on the node's private page session explicitly says a directly parented iframe is absent from the current document. Missing replies, ambiguous parents and other errors keep the lock; root commits, restores and frame attachments invalidate negative ownership evidence. A same-site frame shares its parent's process and isn't a target. Every `sliccy.ai` host is protected, so this only matters for an extra origin, such as one port of `127.0.0.1` framed by a page on another.
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- A document that arrives without a request isn't failed: a page restored from the back/forward cache, and a `blob:` or `filesystem:` URL of a protected origin (which only that origin can make). Targets with protected history are content-locked before commands can race a restore, regardless of delayed commit events. The node still detaches after a protected commit. Navigation initiated outside the stream after fresh evidence, including loads already in flight before the guard was installed, remains a limit; this does not authorize content commands on a quarantined target.
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- The network guard fails only `http` and `https` documents. Chrome itself keeps a web page from navigating to `chrome:`, `chrome-untrusted:`, `devtools:` and `file:` URLs, but not to an extension's web-accessible pages. A touched page that sends itself to one with a script or a link is detached after the commit, as above.
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- If the node loses its own session (`ECONNRESET: slicc lost track of the browser's targets`), it refuses every command and resets the stream unless the browser closes within 2 s.
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@@ -1704,6 +1704,7 @@ On a [§1.3](#13-local-setup-without-cdp-loopback-signalling) loopback link, `un
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- **In targets the stream touched** (attached to or created): the node fails every protected document load with `net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT`, so instrumentation installed before a navigation can never run in a protected document. That covers redirects, service-worker-served navigations and the page's own Fetch interception.
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- **Redirects into protected URLs:** a protected URL that reaches the page inside any string it gets, such as a redirect's `Location`, `Link` or `Refresh` header or a `headersText` line, plain or percent-encoded once (doubly encoded nesting isn't decoded), is cut to its origin, and its `urlFragment` is blanked; unprotected URLs stay intact. A stylesheet or script whose URL, or any hop of whose redirect chain (as the node's own guard session saw it on that target, compared in WHATWG form without the fragment), is protected can't be read: `Page.getResourceContent` and `Page.searchInResource` for such a URL (or one that doesn't parse), and any command naming such a `styleSheetId` or `scriptId` (`CSS.getStyleSheetText`, `Debugger.getScriptSource`, `searchInContent` and the rest), are refused with `slicc: refused: the response came from seven's origin`, and the CSS rules and styles from such a stylesheet reach the page with only their `styleSheetId` and `origin`. `Network.loadNetworkResource` (Chrome follows its redirects with the user's cookies) and `Page.captureSnapshot` (it serialises every frame) are refused on every session. [`cdp` (browser control)](#cdp-browser-control) has the details.
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- **Workers:** a touched dedicated, shared or service worker gets a guard session too (Network only, to see its imports' redirect chains), and its commands wait for it the same way, except `Runtime.runIfWaitingForDebugger` on a shared or service worker, which goes ahead so the worker can't stall on its own guard; its imports from before the guard was ready then count as unseen and can't be read. A worker script other than the worker's own whose chain that guard didn't see, or which touched a protected URL, can't be read. In pages, scripts and stylesheets loaded before the node attached are a known residual.
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- **CDP command ids:** ids at or above `0x70000000` (1879048192) belong to the CLI and are refused from clients. `0x40000000` (2^30) through `0x6FFFFFFF` is reserved for seven's (bios) guard; other clients use ids below 2^30.
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- **Waiting for that guard:** page commands on a touched target's session wait while the node sets its guard up there. The wait fails closed after 30 s without progress (an answer or event on that target's own guard session, or the answer to the node's attach to it; answers and events elsewhere on the stream don't count) or 5 min in all, whichever comes first, and the refusal names the bound. At most 4096 commands or 64 MiB wait on a stream; more is `RESET ENOBUFS`.
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- **Sessions the node doesn't know:** a page command whose `sessionId` the node hasn't seen on this stream (in a `Target.attachedToTarget`, in the answer to the page's `Target.attachToTarget` or `Target.attachToBrowserTarget`, or its own) is held, not forwarded, until the session appears, and is then decided as usual. Only messages on that session id count as progress. The same bounds and caps apply, and the refusal is `slicc: refused: slicc doesn't know which target this session belongs to: …`, naming the bound. A session that detached is refused at once, without the suffix. Commands without a `sessionId` are unaffected.
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- **Auto-attached targets with no URL yet** (OOPIFs, popups) are held until the URL is known, then detached if protected. After 10 s with no URL they are treated as protected. The node's own setup connection ([§1.1](#11-local-setup-over-cdp)) isn't a `cdp` stream and is the one exception. [`cdp` (browser control)](#cdp-browser-control) has the details.
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package/package.json
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{
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"name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc",
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"version": "1.49.
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"version": "1.49.23",
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"description": "SLICC's command line for seven: links a machine's network, compute and browsers to seven over WebRTC",
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"license": "Apache-2.0",
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"repository": {
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"node": ">=18"
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},
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"optionalDependencies": {
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.49.
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.49.23",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.49.23",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.49.23",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.49.23",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.49.23",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.49.23",
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"@ai-ecoverse/slicc-jerk": "^1.3.0"
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}
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}
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