@ai-ecoverse/slicc 1.46.1 → 1.46.3

package/README.md

@@ -1686,13 +1686,18 @@ On a [§1.3](#13-local-setup-without-cdp-loopback-signalling) loopback link, `un
   - **Auto-attached targets with no URL yet** (OOPIFs, popups) are held until the URL is known, then detached if protected. After 10 s with no URL they are treated as protected. The node's own setup connection ([§1.1](#11-local-setup-over-cdp)) isn't a `cdp` stream and is the one exception. [`cdp` (browser control)](#cdp-browser-control) has the details.
   - **Protection follows the target's own effective origin. Execution contexts on a protected origin are hidden, not cut,** unless the context is the target's own main-frame default context; that one still cuts the target as above. The typical case is an extension's content-script isolated world (`chrome-extension://<id>`) on an ordinary page. The page stays usable, and the hidden world is invisible and out of reach.
     - **Hidden:** the node learns every context of a touched target on its own guard session, whatever the page enabled. It drops these events from the stream: the world's `Runtime.executionContextCreated` and `executionContextDestroyed`, its `consoleAPICalled`, `exceptionThrown` and `bindingCalled`, and `Debugger.scriptParsed`/`scriptFailedToParse` for scripts in it. It also drops `Debugger.breakpointResolved` in those scripts. A `Debugger.paused` whose top frame is in the world is dropped, and the node resumes the target. The world's frames lower in the stack are removed from the call frames.
-    - **Refused** with `slicc: refused: that execution context belongs to a browser extension`: any command that names the world through a `contextId` or `executionContextId`, `uniqueContextId`, an `executionContextName` the world has, a remote `objectId` or `*ObjectId` (call arguments included) or `callFrameId` whose injected-script part is the world, or the `scriptId` of a script in it. So `Runtime.evaluate`, `callFunctionOn`, `compileScript`, `runScript`, `globalLexicalScopeNames`, `queryObjects`, `getProperties`, `addBinding`, `Debugger.evaluateOnCallFrame`, `setVariableValue`, `setScriptSource` and `DOM.resolveNode` there are all refused. The default world, and isolated worlds the page creates itself, are unaffected. A `uniqueContextId` on a target's session that names no live context the node has seen announced on that target, on its guard session or the page's (say one from a closed tab or another live tab, or made up), is refused with `slicc: refused: that execution context is not exposed`, rather than passed to Chrome. On page-like sessions, a `Runtime.addBinding` with neither `executionContextId` nor `executionContextName` is sent with `executionContextName: ""`, so it reaches every frame's main world now and after reloads, but no isolated world.
-    - **Lifetime:** a hidden world is forgotten only when Chrome reports it gone (`executionContextDestroyed`, or `executionContextsCleared` on a session that reported it), never to make room. A target with more than 4096 live hidden worlds is refused every command there that names an execution context, object, call frame, script or context name, until its contexts are cleared. Seen contexts follow the same lifetime and bound; once a target passes 4096, the `uniqueContextId`s of contexts announced after that are refused as not exposed until its contexts are cleared, even if some are destroyed in between.
+    - **Refused** with `slicc: refused: that execution context belongs to a browser extension`: any command that names the world through a `contextId` or `executionContextId`, `uniqueContextId`, an `executionContextName` the world has, a remote `objectId` or `*ObjectId` (call arguments included) or `callFrameId` whose injected-script part is the world, or the `scriptId` of a script in it. So `Runtime.evaluate`, `callFunctionOn`, `compileScript`, `runScript`, `globalLexicalScopeNames`, `queryObjects`, `getProperties`, `addBinding`, `Debugger.evaluateOnCallFrame`, `setVariableValue`, `setScriptSource` and `DOM.resolveNode` there are all refused. The default world, and isolated worlds the page creates itself, are unaffected. A `uniqueContextId`, or a numeric `contextId` or `executionContextId`, on a target's session that names no live context the node has seen announced on that target, on its guard session or the page's (say one from a closed tab or another live tab, or a guess), is refused with `slicc: refused: that execution context is not exposed`, rather than passed to Chrome. On page-like sessions, a `Runtime.addBinding` with neither `executionContextId` nor `executionContextName` is sent with `executionContextName: ""`, so it reaches every frame's main world now and after reloads, but no isolated world.
+    - **Lifetime:** a hidden world is forgotten only when Chrome reports it gone (`executionContextDestroyed`, or `executionContextsCleared` on a session that reported it), never to make room. A target with more than 4096 live hidden worlds is refused every command there that names an execution context, object, call frame, script or context name, until its contexts are cleared. Seen contexts follow the same lifetime and bound; once a target passes 4096, contexts announced after that are refused as not exposed until its contexts are cleared, even if some are destroyed in between.
     - **Heap profiling:** a page's heap snapshot covers its whole renderer, other worlds included. So on page, iframe, background page and webview sessions every `HeapProfiler` command except `enable`, `disable`, `collectGarbage` and `getHeapObjectId` is refused with `slicc: refused: HeapProfiler reads the page's whole renderer, browser extensions' worlds included`, whether or not an extension is there.
     - **Breakpoint conditions** run in whatever world the script belongs to, and a breakpoint by URL outlives reloads. So on those sessions a `Debugger.setBreakpointByUrl` with a `condition` needs a non-empty `url`, which can't name a protected script (see above). One by `urlRegex` or `scriptHash` or with an empty `url` is refused with `slicc: refused: a breakpoint condition that could run in a browser extension's world needs a url naming the page's own script`. Breakpoints without a condition are allowed; a pause they cause in a hidden world is resumed out of sight.
     - **Profiles, coverage, stacks and initiators** can name any script in the isolate. So the node scrubs every message it sends the page, events and command results alike, outside opaque values (`value`, `preview`, `customPreview`, `arguments`, `returnValue`). Any `callFrames` list loses the frames on a protected URL or in a hidden world's script. That covers console, exception, pause, async, node-creation and initiator stacks, whatever the method. A coverage or type-profile list (entries with `scriptId` and `functions` or `entries`) also loses its entries for scripts without a URL. A profile node's `callFrame` in such a script becomes `(program)` and loses its `positionTicks`. An `initiator` on a protected `url` loses that `url` and its position.
     - **Messages without a context:** on page-like sessions, the node drops `Console.messageAdded` whose `url` is empty or protected. It drops `Log.entryAdded` on a protected `url` or with a stack through such a frame. It drops `Profiler.consoleProfileStarted` and `consoleProfileFinished` altogether: they name no context, so the node can't tell whose `console.profile` they are.
-    - **Requests and sockets a hidden world starts:** a `Network.requestWillBeSent`, `webSocketCreated` or `webTransportCreated` whose initiator stack runs through a frame on a protected URL or in a hidden script, or whose initiator `url` is protected, loses those frames and that URL. The node treats it like a request to a protected origin: cookie headers are stripped, and its bodies are refused.
+    - **Requests and sockets a hidden world starts:** a `Network.requestWillBeSent`, `webSocketCreated` or `webTransportCreated` whose initiator stack runs through a frame on a protected URL or in a hidden script, or whose initiator `url` is protected, marks the request as the hidden world's (a WebTransport by its `transportId`). The node learns this on its own guard session as well as on the stream's sessions. Every later message to the page that names that request anywhere in its params or result, by `requestId`, `networkId`, `transportId` or any `…RequestId` (such as `Log`'s `networkRequestId`), is cut as a whole, and a `Log.entryAdded` about it is dropped. That includes extra-info events and nested references such as an `Audits` issue's affected request:
+      - every URL is cut to its origin;
+      - header maps are emptied;
+      - `postData`, `postDataEntries`, `headersText`, `requestHeadersText` and the cookie lists are removed.
+
+      The request is also treated like one to a protected origin on every session of the target, including sessions that missed its start, so its bodies and post data are refused and it can't be replayed. A pause of such a request (`Fetch.requestPaused`/`authRequired`, `Network.requestIntercepted`) is continued by the node and never shown to the page. A `Fetch.authRequired`, which carries no `networkId`, is answered by the node (`Default`) when its Fetch `requestId` belongs to such a pause. A pause whose request (`networkId` for `Fetch`, `requestId` for `Network.requestIntercepted`) the guard session hasn't reported yet waits up to 2 s for it. Past 4096 waiting pauses, the node continues further ones itself instead of showing them. A target with more than 65536 such requests fails closed: every request there is cut.
 
 #### 5.8.1 `browsers` updates (page cap `browsers`), node → page
 - **When:** the browser list changes while a link is up (a browser quits, or the TUI adds one). The node then opens `OPEN { "kind": "browsers", "browsers": [ … ] }` on the control channel, carrying the **full** current list in HELLO's shape. It replaces the previous list; there are no deltas.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc",
-  "version": "1.46.1",
+  "version": "1.46.3",
   "description": "SLICC's command line for seven: links a machine's network, compute and browsers to seven over WebRTC",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "repository": {
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@
     "node": ">=18"
   },
   "optionalDependencies": {
-    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.46.1",
-    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.46.1",
-    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.46.1",
-    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.46.1",
-    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.46.1",
-    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.46.1",
+    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-arm64": "1.46.3",
+    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-darwin-amd64": "1.46.3",
+    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-arm64": "1.46.3",
+    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-linux-amd64": "1.46.3",
+    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-arm64": "1.46.3",
+    "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-windows-amd64": "1.46.3",
     "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-jerk": "^1.0.0"
   }
 }