@ai-ecoverse/slicc-kernel 1.155.0 → 1.156.0

package/README.md

@@ -501,6 +501,7 @@ The module's default export (or its `main` export) is called with a context and
       - Before dialling, `cert` without `key` (or the reverse) is `EINVAL`. A key that doesn't match the leaf is `ERR_OSSL_X509_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH`, a wrong passphrase `ERR_OSSL_BAD_DECRYPT`, a missing one `ERR_OSSL_CRYPTO_INTERRUPTED_OR_CANCELLED`, and a key the engine can't read `ERR_OSSL_UNSUPPORTED`.
       - `pfx` is `ENOTSUP`: pass `cert` and `key`.
       - A server that requires a certificate and gets none refuses with an alert. On TLS 1.2 that fails the connect (`ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE`). On TLS 1.3 the client's side of the handshake is already done, so the next read or write fails with `ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT`, as Node's fails after `secureConnect`.
+      - **A reply that isn't TLS** ([#1548](https://github.com/ai-ecoverse/slicc-kernel/issues/1548)) is told apart by its first record's header, in OpenSSL's order, so a program gets Node's code: an SSLv2 version is `ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER`; a length over 16704 bytes `ERR_SSL_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG` (most plain-text replies, `HTTP/1.1 …` among them); a major version other than 3 `ERR_SSL_HTTP_REQUEST` for `GET ` or `PUT ` and `ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER` otherwise (`220 …`, `SSH-2.0…`, `+OK …`); a record over 16384 bytes `ERR_SSL_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`; and a handshake record that isn't a ServerHello `ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE`. Anything else stays `ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE`, or `ECONNRESET` for a server that closes.
       - **A fatal alert from the server**, at the handshake or after it, is in the error: its `detail` ends in ` (alert <n>)`, and a JS program's error has `alert: n`, the alert's description number (116 certificate_required, 40 handshake_failure).
     - **`keylog: true`** ([#1504](https://github.com/ai-ecoverse/slicc-kernel/issues/1504), tls-engine 4.2.0-10) gives the session's NSS key log lines as `conn.tls.keylog`, a frozen list of strings: `CLIENT_RANDOM …` on TLS 1.2, the four `…_TRAFFIC_SECRET…` lines on TLS 1.3, the lines Node's `keylog` event and `SSLKEYLOGFILE` carry. **They are the session's secrets: anyone holding them and a capture of the traffic can read it.** So a keylogged session is never sealed (`substitutes: false`; a placeholder goes out as written), and `keylog` on the transport path (A1, where the page makes the TLS) is `ENOTSUP`. Without `keylog` the engine collects nothing. The kernel wipes its copies once the lines are in the reply (the engine zeroes its buffer as it hands them out); the lines reach the program as JS strings, which can't be wiped, so they live as long as the program keeps them, as with its own `key`. A TLS server takes `keylog` too (`listen({ tls })`, `secure(conn, { server: true })`), for every connection it serves.
     - **`sni: false`** sends no server name. The leaf is still checked against `servername` exactly as with SNI.

package/dist/kernel-worker.js

@@ -8112,7 +8112,7 @@ function satisfies(version, range2) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var KERNEL_VERSION = true ? "1.155.0" : "0.0.0-dev";
+var KERNEL_VERSION = true ? "1.156.0" : "0.0.0-dev";
 var OS_RELEASE = "6.0.0-slicc";
 function procVersion() {
   return `Linux version ${OS_RELEASE} (slicc-kernel ${KERNEL_VERSION}) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
@@ -19467,6 +19467,7 @@ function openSession(o) {
 var Ciphertext = class {
   queue = [];
   ended = false;
+  opening = new Uint8Array(0);
   conn;
   session;
   constructor(conn, session) {
@@ -19475,11 +19476,19 @@ var Ciphertext = class {
   }
   hand(bytes) {
     if (bytes.length > 0) this.queue.push(bytes);
+    this.note(bytes);
+  }
+  note(bytes) {
+    if (this.opening.length >= OPENING) return;
+    const next3 = new Uint8Array(Math.min(OPENING, this.opening.length + bytes.length));
+    next3.set(this.opening);
+    next3.set(bytes.subarray(0, next3.length - this.opening.length), this.opening.length);
+    this.opening = next3;
   }
   async more() {
     if (this.queue.length === 0 && !this.ended) {
       const bytes = await this.conn.read();
-      if (bytes) this.queue.push(bytes);
+      if (bytes) this.hand(bytes);
       else this.ended = true;
     }
     if (this.queue.length === 0) {
@@ -19509,11 +19518,38 @@ async function send(conn, session) {
     }
   }
 }
-function refused2(engine, session, err) {
+var OPENING = 6;
+var PLAIN_MAX = 16384;
+var ENCRYPTED_MAX = PLAIN_MAX + 320;
+var HTTP_METHODS = ["GET ", "POST ", "HEAD ", "PUT ", "PATCH", "OPTIO", "DELET", "TRACE"];
+function headerClass(head) {
+  const [type, major, minor, hi, lo] = head;
+  if (major === 0 && minor === 2) return ["ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER", "wrong version number"];
+  const length2 = hi << 8 | lo;
+  if (length2 > ENCRYPTED_MAX) return ["ERR_SSL_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG", "packet length too long"];
+  if (major !== 3) {
+    const text = new TextDecoder("latin1").decode(head.subarray(0, 5));
+    if (HTTP_METHODS.some((m) => text.startsWith(m)))
+      return ["ERR_SSL_HTTP_REQUEST", "http request"];
+    return ["ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER", "wrong version number"];
+  }
+  if (length2 > PLAIN_MAX) return ["ERR_SSL_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG", "data length too long"];
+  if (type === 22 && head.length > 5 && head[5] !== 2)
+    return ["ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE", "unexpected message"];
+  return void 0;
+}
+function recordRefusal(opening2) {
+  if (opening2.length < 5) return void 0;
+  const found = headerClass(opening2);
+  return found && new KernelError("EPROTO", `${found[0]}: ${found[1]}`);
+}
+function refused2(engine, session, err, opening2) {
   const flags2 = session.verifyResult;
   const code = verifyCode(flags2);
   if (code && flags2 !== -1)
     return new KernelError("EPROTO", `${code}: ${engine.verifyInfo(flags2).trim()}`);
+  const record2 = recordRefusal(opening2);
+  if (record2) return record2;
   const text = err instanceof TlsError ? err.message : String(err);
   return new KernelError("EPROTO", `ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: ${text}${alertOf(session)}`);
 }
@@ -19528,15 +19564,12 @@ async function handshake(conn, o, session, inbox) {
       done5 = session.handshake();
     } catch (err) {
       await send(conn, session).catch(() => void 0);
-      throw refused2(o.engine, session, err);
+      throw refused2(o.engine, session, err, inbox.opening);
     }
     await send(conn, session);
     if (done5) return;
     if (!await inbox.more()) {
-      throw new KernelError(
-        "ECONNRESET",
-        "the server closed the connection during the TLS handshake"
-      );
+      throw recordRefusal(inbox.opening) ?? new KernelError("ECONNRESET", "the server closed the connection during the TLS handshake");
     }
   }
 }