@ai-ecoverse/slicc-kernel 1.125.7 → 1.125.9

package/README.md

@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ The module's default export (or its `main` export) is called with a context and
       - With `rejectUnauthorized: false`, `chainError` says what is wrong with the chain apart from the name, with Node's names, and is absent when the chain is fine:
         - a self-signed leaf alone is `DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT`;
         - an untrusted chain ending in a self-signed root is `SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN`;
-        - self-signed means the certificate's own key verifies its signature (RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, ECDSA P-256/384/521 or Ed25519), not just that its issuer and subject names match, so a self-issued certificate signed by another key, such as a CA rollover certificate, is not self-signed, as in Node ([#1059](https://github.com/ai-ecoverse/slicc-kernel/issues/1059));
+        - self-signed means the certificate's own key verifies its signature (RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-PSS, ECDSA P-256/384/521 or Ed25519; a signature the kernel can't verify is not self-signed), not just that its issuer and subject names match, so a self-issued certificate signed by another key, such as a CA rollover certificate, is not self-signed, as in Node ([#1059](https://github.com/ai-ecoverse/slicc-kernel/issues/1059));
         - a lone leaf whose issuer is unknown is `UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE`;
         - an untrusted longer chain is `UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY`;
         - otherwise it's the reason's code, such as `CERT_HAS_EXPIRED`.
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ Releases are cut by semantic-release on every push to `main`, in two jobs, and o
 
 Every change is certified in its pull request, before it merges (`cert-review-pr.yml`, next section), and `cert-review` is a required check of the merge queue, so every commit on `main`, and every release built from it, was certified first. A release is then **verified on npm** (`release / verify on npm` in `release.yml`, `tools/cert-review/verify.mjs`), in code, for every tag the run made:
 
-- It waits up to an hour for npm to serve the version (an accepted publish can take a while to appear; 1.125.4 took 55 min). `release-recover` waits 25 min for a version it just published and then hands it to this job instead of failing, and a version npm still doesn't serve after the hour is a "not served yet, re-run" failure, never a supply-chain alert. It then downloads the tarball and checks `dist.integrity` (sha512), the SLSA v1 provenance (the tarball's sha512 is its subject; `release.yml` on `refs/heads/main`, a GitHub-hosted builder; `gitCommit` = `gitHead` = the tag, on `main`), and `npm audit signatures`. npm serves a version's attestations a little after the version itself, so a 404 from the attestations, or `npm audit signatures`' E404 on them, is retried within the same hour: it's a supply-chain alert only once the version has been served for 30 min, its packument has stopped changing for 10, and the attestations still answer 404, or the hour has run out. Any other status, or attestations that don't match, fail at once. A version that `release-recover.mjs` skipped because npm's `latest` is newer (#837) has nothing to verify.
+- It waits up to an hour for npm to serve the version (an accepted publish can take a while to appear; 1.125.4 took 55 min). `release-recover` waits 25 min for a version it just published and then hands it to this job instead of failing, and a version npm still doesn't serve after the hour is a "not served yet, re-run" failure, never a supply-chain alert. It then downloads the tarball and checks `dist.integrity` (sha512), the SLSA v1 provenance (the tarball's sha512 is its subject; `release.yml` on `refs/heads/main`, a GitHub-hosted builder; `gitCommit` = `gitHead` = the tag, on `main`), and `npm audit signatures`. npm serves a version's attestations a little after the version itself, so a 404 from the attestations, a missing `dist.attestations`, an `npm view` or network error while looking for them, or `npm audit signatures`' E404 on them, is retried within the same hour: it's a supply-chain alert only once the version has been served for 30 min, its packument has stopped changing for 10, and the attestations still answer 404, or the hour has run out. Any other status, or attestations that don't match, fail at once. A version that `release-recover.mjs` skipped because npm's `latest` is newer (#837) has nothing to verify.
 - It then writes `certified @ai-ecoverse/slicc-kernel@<v> sha256=<64 hex> (covers <first>–<v>; ci: <run>; pr-certified: <each merged pull request's cert-review at its merge>; known: <open known-issue issues>)` into the GitHub release's notes, between `<!-- cert-verify -->` markers. homescoop's ci reads exactly that prefix and re-hashes the npm tarball against it. `covers` starts after the last version npm serves, so a skipped version is covered by the next. Notes that already carry the identical line stay unchanged. A pull request's `cert-review` is the newest finished one (success, failure or error) on its head at or before its merge, or the newest pending one if none had finished. A re-review that a later `merge-ok` re-label starts on the same head, still pending at the merge or ending after it, doesn't change what the merge queue saw, and a status posted after the merge can't change a release's line.
 - A mismatch writes no line. The job is red with a `supply-chain alert`, and so is a line already in the notes with another sha256.
 

package/dist/kernel-worker.js

@@ -6632,7 +6632,7 @@ function satisfies(version, range2) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var KERNEL_VERSION = true ? "1.125.7" : "0.0.0-dev";
+var KERNEL_VERSION = true ? "1.125.9" : "0.0.0-dev";
 var OS_RELEASE = "6.0.0-slicc";
 function procVersion() {
   return `Linux version ${OS_RELEASE} (slicc-kernel ${KERNEL_VERSION}) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
@@ -17313,8 +17313,32 @@ var HASHES = {
   "2a8648ce3d040302": ["ECDSA", "SHA-256"],
   "2a8648ce3d040303": ["ECDSA", "SHA-384"],
   "2a8648ce3d040304": ["ECDSA", "SHA-512"],
-  "2b6570": ["Ed25519", ""]
+  "2b6570": ["Ed25519", ""],
+  "2a864886f70d01010a": ["RSA-PSS", "SHA-1"]
 };
+var PSS_HASHES = {
+  "2b0e03021a": "SHA-1",
+  "608648016503040201": "SHA-256",
+  "608648016503040202": "SHA-384",
+  "608648016503040203": "SHA-512"
+};
+function pssOf(der, algorithm) {
+  const params = children2(der, algorithm, 2)?.[1];
+  let hash = "SHA-1";
+  let salt = 20;
+  for (const field4 of params && der[params.start] === 48 ? children2(der, params, 3) ?? [] : []) {
+    const inner = tlv2(der, field4.body);
+    if (!inner) return void 0;
+    if (der[field4.start] === 160) {
+      const known = PSS_HASHES[oidOf(der, inner) ?? ""];
+      if (!known) return void 0;
+      hash = known;
+    } else if (der[field4.start] === 162) {
+      salt = der.subarray(inner.body, inner.end).reduce((n, b) => n * 256 + b, 0);
+    }
+  }
+  return { hash, salt };
+}
 var CURVES = {
   "2a8648ce3d030107": ["P-256", 32],
   "2b81040022": ["P-384", 48],
@@ -17349,10 +17373,13 @@ function signedOf(der) {
   const spki = parts2?.tbs[5];
   if (!tbs || !algorithm || !value2 || !spki || der[value2.start] !== 3) return void 0;
   const known = HASHES[oidOf(der, algorithm) ?? ""];
-  if (!known) return "unknown";
-  const [scheme, hash] = known;
+  if (!known) return void 0;
+  const [scheme] = known;
+  const pss = scheme === "RSA-PSS" ? pssOf(der, algorithm) : void 0;
+  if (scheme === "RSA-PSS" && !pss) return void 0;
+  const hash = pss?.hash ?? known[1];
   const curve = scheme === "ECDSA" ? curveOf(der, spki) : void 0;
-  if (scheme === "ECDSA" && !curve) return "unknown";
+  if (scheme === "ECDSA" && !curve) return void 0;
   const signature = der.subarray(value2.body + 1, value2.end);
   return {
     tbs: raw(der, tbs),
@@ -17360,7 +17387,8 @@ function signedOf(der) {
     signature,
     scheme,
     hash,
-    ...curve ? { curve } : {}
+    ...curve ? { curve } : {},
+    ...pss ? { salt: pss.salt } : {}
   };
 }
 async function verifiesItself(s) {
@@ -17371,13 +17399,12 @@ async function verifiesItself(s) {
   ]);
   const signature = s.curve ? fixedEcdsa(s.signature, s.curve[1]) : s.signature;
   if (!signature) return false;
-  const params = s.scheme === "ECDSA" ? { name: "ECDSA", hash: s.hash } : { name: s.scheme };
+  const params = s.scheme === "ECDSA" ? { name: "ECDSA", hash: s.hash } : s.salt === void 0 ? { name: s.scheme } : { name: s.scheme, saltLength: s.salt };
   return crypto.subtle.verify(params, key, new Uint8Array(signature), new Uint8Array(s.tbs));
 }
 async function selfSigned(der) {
   if (!selfIssued(der)) return false;
   const signed = signedOf(der);
-  if (signed === "unknown") return true;
   if (!signed) return false;
   return verifiesItself(signed).catch(() => false);
 }