@ai-ecoverse/slicc-browsers 1.10.3 → 1.12.0

package/README.md

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ Every feature builds for `wasm32-wasip1`.
 
 `guard-driver.mjs` is described under [Guard vectors](#guard-vectors).
 
-`protected.mjs` is the reference matcher for [protected origins](#protected-origins): `import { protectedOrigins } from '@ai-ecoverse/slicc-browsers/protected.mjs'`, then `protectedOrigins(catalog.protectedOrigins, extraOrigins)` returns `{ url(text), target({ url, previous, opener }), cookieDomain(domain), storageKey(key), unparseable(text) }`, each a boolean. `url(text)` uses the load/loaded-URL fail-closed rule; `url(text, { readOnly: true })` preserves the old parse-failure result for read-only keys and value redaction, and `storageKey(key)` uses that mode internally. `unparseable(text)` identifies parse or unwrap failures without changing whether a parsed origin is protected. It needs only the WHATWG `URL`, so it runs in Node and in a browser. `protected.mjs` and `seven.mjs` import nothing and re-export nothing, so an extension or service worker can ship either file alone; `npm run validate` (through `scripts/self-contained.mjs`) evaluates each as a module in a fresh `node:vm` context that has only `URL`, with no linker resolution allowed.
+`protected.mjs` is the reference matcher for [protected origins](#protected-origins): `import { protectedOrigins } from '@ai-ecoverse/slicc-browsers/protected.mjs'`, then `protectedOrigins(catalog.protectedOrigins, extraOrigins)` returns `{ url(text), target({ url, previous, opener, type, documentURL, unreachableURL, navigating }), cookieDomain(domain), storageKey(key), unparseable(text) }`, each a boolean. `url(text)` uses the load/loaded-URL fail-closed rule; `url(text, { readOnly: true })` preserves the old parse-failure result for read-only keys and value redaction, and `storageKey(key)` uses that mode internally. `unparseable(text)` identifies parse or unwrap failures without changing whether a parsed origin is protected. It needs only the WHATWG `URL`, so it runs in Node and in a browser. `protected.mjs` and `seven.mjs` import nothing and re-export nothing, so an extension or service worker can ship either file alone; `npm run validate` (through `scripts/self-contained.mjs`) evaluates each as a module in a fresh `node:vm` context that has only `URL`, with no linker resolution allowed.
 
 ## `catalog.json`
 
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ Every feature builds for `wasm32-wasip1`.
   - `discardExceptions`: where the site pattern and the extra origins' hosts go, as a `list` of strings or as a `chrome-time-map`, a map from site to the time it was added (microseconds since 1601-01-01 UTC, as a decimal string);
   - `cleanExit`: values that mark the last exit clean;
   - `form` says where a key comes from: `six` (SLICC six's keys) or `chrome-154` (what Chrome 154 reads).
-- `protectedOrigins`: what browser control must never reach, see [Protected origins](#protected-origins). `domains` (`sliccy.ai`), `hosts` (`vault.sliccy.ai`), `schemes` (`https`, `http`), `innerSchemes` (`blob`, `filesystem`, `view-source`), `anySchemes` (`devtools`), `protectedSchemes` (`chrome`, `chrome-untrusted`, `chrome-search`, `chrome-native`, `chrome-distiller`, `chrome-experimental-site-token-provider`, `isolated-app`, `externalfile`, `content`, `chrome-extension`, `devtools`, `edge`, `brave`, `opera`, `vivaldi`, `arc`, `file`) with `schemeExceptions` (`chrome://newtab`, `chrome://new-tab-page`, `chrome-untrusted://new-tab-page`, `edge://newtab`, `brave://newtab`, `opera://startpage`), `aboutScheme` (`chrome`), `targetTypes` (`browser_ui`), `inheriting` (`about:blank`, `about:srcdoc`), `unparseable` (`protected`) with `unparseableRefusal`, and `refusal`, the text of a parsed protected-origin refusal.
+- `protectedOrigins`: what browser control must never reach, see [Protected origins](#protected-origins). `domains` (`sliccy.ai`), `hosts` (`vault.sliccy.ai`), `schemes` (`https`, `http`), `innerSchemes` (`blob`, `filesystem`, `view-source`), `anySchemes` (`devtools`), `protectedSchemes` (`chrome`, `chrome-untrusted`, `chrome-search`, `chrome-native`, `chrome-distiller`, `chrome-experimental-site-token-provider`, `isolated-app`, `externalfile`, `content`, `chrome-extension`, `devtools`, `edge`, `brave`, `opera`, `vivaldi`, `arc`, `file`) with `schemeExceptions` (`chrome://newtab`, `chrome://new-tab-page`, `chrome-untrusted://new-tab-page`, `edge://newtab`, `brave://newtab`, `opera://startpage`), `aboutScheme` (`chrome`), `targetTypes` (`browser_ui`), `inheriting` (`about:blank`, `about:srcdoc`), `errorPage` (`url: "chrome-error://chromewebdata/"`, `target: "previous"`, `redact: "origin"`), `unparseable` (`protected`) with `unparseableRefusal`, and `refusal`, the text of a parsed protected-origin refusal.
 - `profiles`: SLICC profiles live in `<config dir>/<root>/<name>`, and a snap's in `~/snap/<snap>/common/<snapRoot>/<name>`. `legacyRoot` is the old root, never scanned; on macOS's case-insensitive volume it is SLICC six's root too. `sixProfilePattern` matches six's profile names, case-insensitively. `namePattern` is a valid profile name. `six` describes SLICC six's Chrome profiles (see [SLICC six's profiles](#slicc-sixs-profiles)):
   - `roots`: six's profile root per OS (`macos`, `linux`, `windows`), a `base` location followed by the `path` segments. The base is its `env` when that is set and not empty (any value, as six takes it), else `home` under the home dir.
   - `defaultName` (`browser-coding-agent-chrome`), `defaultPort` (5710) and `portSuffix` (`-{port}`): six's profile for its serve port `<port>` is `<root>/<defaultName>`, with `portSuffix` added for any port other than `defaultPort`.
@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@ A guard must refuse navigation, creation and attach on protected schemes, includ
 
 **New-tab checks (1.8.2).** In fresh default profiles on macOS, Chrome for Testing 156.0.8078.4 (Playwright build 1248) and Chrome 155.0.8059.82 commit `chrome://newtab/` to `chrome://new-tab-page/` and embed `chrome-untrusted://new-tab-page/one-google-bar?paramsencoded=` as an out-of-process frame. Direct `chrome://new-tab-page/` also commits as itself. Edge 155.0.4283.60 commits `edge://newtab/` to `https://ntp.msn.com/edge/ntp` with an `about:blank` child and no internal-scheme child observed; directly opening `edge://ntp/` returns `ERR_INVALID_URL`. These observations are for fresh default profiles, not every browser configuration. Brave, Opera and Vivaldi were not installed locally, and this repository's CI installs only Chromium, so their redirects and internal frames were not verified and no additional exceptions are inferred. Incognito Chrome and Edge new tabs omit the ordinary new tab's frame tree; the reachability vector therefore uses the default context.
 
+**Protected-URL error pages.** `errorPage` in both the catalog and `protected.json` retains the previous target decision; it never locks an allowed target or unlocks an already-protected target. The exemption requires the last main-frame different-document commit to be `chrome-error://chromewebdata/`, with opaque `securityOrigin` (`://`), and `unreachableUrl` exactly equal to the reported `TargetInfo.url`, with no main-frame navigation in flight. A URL mismatch, unavailable commit evidence or an in-flight navigation does not qualify; guards fail closed while their state is unknown. `protected.mjs.target` takes validated `documentURL`, `unreachableURL` and `navigating` evidence in addition to `previous`; callers must track commits and readiness, rather than trust `TargetInfo.url` alone. Browser UI target types remain protected. Read-only discovery still redacts the URL **and title** to the protected origin in `getTargets`, `getTargetInfo`, `targetCreated`, `targetInfoChanged` and `attachedToTarget`, including held sessions released later. Path, query and fragment secrets must never survive in those fields. Navigation destinations remain protected: the exception permits recovery, not a protected `Page.navigate` destination.
+
+Main-frame loaders start at `Page.frameStartedNavigating`, excluding `sameDocument` and `historySameDocument`, and end on the corresponding commit, `Network.loadingFailed` with matching requestId, or main-frame `Page.frameStoppedLoading`. A different-document commit clears older loaders; `BackForwardCacheRestore` clears the entire set, even though it reuses the restored document’s old loaderId. A guard that is not ready, cannot parse parameters, or has more than 64 loaders in flight must fail closed. BFCache can report the protected TargetInfo before its restore commit, so waiting for `frameNavigated` alone is not sufficient.
+
 **Privileged-scheme follow-up checks.** With the expanded catalog, fresh default-profile Chrome for Testing 156.0.8078.4 on macOS again committed both NTP entry points to `chrome://new-tab-page/`, with an `about:blank` background child and only `chrome-untrusted://new-tab-page/one-google-bar?paramsencoded=` as its internal-scheme OOPIF. `C8.newtab` passed both attach and ordinary-navigation legs; no `chrome-search` exceptions are added or inferred for other profile/search-provider configurations. Direct `Page.navigate` to `chrome-search://most-visited/` returned `net::ERR_INVALID_URL` and committed `chrome-error://chromewebdata/` with that exact `unreachableUrl`, confirming why `C8.chrome-search` distinguishes a browser response from a guard refusal rather than requiring a successful search-document commit. The catalog-adopting emulator passed every C8 protection row; plain clients failed them, and removing only `chrome-search` from the adopted catalog failed the new row. C1.href, C2.302, C3.popup-self-nav, all tested C4 iframe process layouts and C5.document passed their guarded and control legs with the expanded schemes; plain clients passed controls and failed protection expectations. Those HTTP fixtures deliberately protect only the seven host, leaving their same-site control host ordinary, while adopting every internal-scheme rule unchanged.
 
 **Unparseable URL boundaries.** Fail closed on command destinations: navigation and target creation, the URL and `userTypedURL` of a selected history entry, `Fetch.continueRequest` and legacy interception overrides, `Network.loadNetworkResource`, PWA install/launch, and cookie-command URLs when no domain is supplied. Also fail closed on security-relevant Chrome-reported URLs: targets, main-frame `securityOrigin`, execution-context origins, requests/redirect responses, web sockets and web transports, and service-worker scopes/scripts. A protected default execution context still cuts its session; a protected foreign isolated world stays hidden. This is not a rule to reject arbitrary strings a guard merely reads: storage-command origin keys, storage keys/cache ids, script/stack URLs, generic value redaction and storage events retain the old not-protected result for a parse failure. Cookie domains remain suffix matches, so `exa%20mple.sliccy.ai` is already covered.
@@ -167,7 +171,7 @@ A same-site frame shares its parent's process and has no target of its own. Ever
 
 **Refusals** carry the text in `refusal`, `slicc: refused: target is on seven's origin`.
 
-**`protected.json`** (schema `schema/protected.schema.json`): `unparseable` (`protected`) and `unparseableRefusal`, in step with the catalog; `origins`, the extra origins every vector runs with; `urls` (`url`, `protected`); `targets` (`url`, `type?`, the target's `TargetInfo.type`; `previous?`, whether the target was protected before; `opener?`, `protected`, `unprotected` or `unknown`, and no `opener` for a target without one; `protected`); `cookieDomains` (`domain`, `protected`); `storageKeys` (`key`, `protected`). `npm run validate` runs every vector through `protected.mjs`, and no vector uses a port from 9222 to 9229.
+**`protected.json`** (schema `schema/protected.schema.json`): `errorPage` (the committed-error previous-decision and origin-redaction rule), `unparseable` (`protected`) and `unparseableRefusal`, in step with the catalog; `origins`, the extra origins every vector runs with; `urls` (`url`, `protected`); `targets` (`url`, `documentURL?` and `unreachableURL?` for validated main-frame error-commit evidence, `navigating?` for a main-frame navigation in flight; `type?`, the target's `TargetInfo.type`; `previous?`, whether the target was protected before; `opener?`, `protected`, `unprotected` or `unknown`, and no `opener` for a target without one; `protected`); `cookieDomains` (`domain`, `protected`); `storageKeys` (`key`, `protected`). `npm run validate` runs every vector through `protected.mjs`, and no vector uses a port from 9222 to 9229.
 
 ## Guard vectors
 
@@ -178,7 +182,7 @@ Every CDP guard runs the vectors in `guard-vectors.json` (schema `schema/guard-v
 - `C5.continue-request` and `C5.continue-response`, added next to `C5.document`;
 - the `C8` rows for privileged pages: `C8.navigate` (a page navigates to `chrome://settings`, `chrome://password-manager`, an extension page or `file:///`; refused), `C8.view-source` (the same through `view-source:`; refused), `C8.create` (`Target.createTarget` straight on those pages; refused), `C8.browser-ui-listed` (`Target.getTargets` lists no `browser_ui` target) and `C8.browser-ui-attach` (`Target.attachToTarget` by a `browser_ui` target's id; refused). All five have an unguarded control, since the guard refuses them only on the privileged target. Two cases aren't rows, because Chrome itself blocks them, so an unguarded client can't tell a guard from none: a page's `window.open('chrome://settings')`, and an `about:` alias such as `about:settings`, which `Page.navigate` and `Target.createTarget` both turn into `about:blank#blocked`. The `about:` aliases are in `protected.json` instead.
 
-The `C9` foreign extension isolated-world family requires `extensionWorld`: a browser hosting a foreign content-script extension on the ordinary fixture page. `C9.world-hidden` requires the page default context to remain visible after `Runtime.enable`, while the extension context and Runtime/Debugger identifiers remain hidden without cutting or detaching the session. `C9.world-select` probes numeric and unique context selectors, object and argument handles, promises, properties, named bindings and DOM node resolution; each command selecting the hidden world must fail with the `slicc: refused:` prefix, never an ordinary browser error. Numeric guesses also sweep ids 1–32: an id not exposed to this client must be refused, while every exposed numeric context must remain usable; none of those guarded probes may reach the fixture content-script marker. The marker combines the content script’s global lexical `root` binding with its extension-id DOM marker and `chrome.runtime.id`, and is independently required to be absent from the page default world. `C9.world-debugger` pauses inside that content script: the control must reach its frame, while the guard must refuse or hide it. `C9.page-drivable` evaluates `self.origin`, captures a DOM snapshot and dispatches an Input click on the same ordinary page; cutting the entire session fails this regression row. All four use an unguarded control, the default browser context and observer discovery of the real extension world, not an invented isolated world. Protected default contexts remain session-cutting evidence; hiding a foreign isolated world does not weaken any seven-origin row.
+The `C9` foreign extension isolated-world family requires `extensionWorld`: a browser hosting a foreign content-script extension on the ordinary fixture page. `C9.world-hidden` requires the page default context to remain visible after `Runtime.enable`, while the extension context and Runtime/Debugger identifiers remain hidden without cutting or detaching the session. `C9.world-select` probes numeric and unique context selectors, object and argument handles, promises, properties, named bindings and DOM node resolution; each command selecting the hidden world must fail with the `slicc: refused:` prefix, never an ordinary browser error. Numeric guesses also sweep ids 1–32: an id not exposed to this client must be refused, while every exposed numeric context must remain usable; none of those guarded probes may reach the fixture content-script marker. The marker combines the content script’s global lexical `root` binding with its extension-id DOM marker and `chrome.runtime.id`, and is independently required to be absent from the page default world. `C9.world-debugger` pauses inside that content script: the control must reach its frame, while the guard must refuse or hide it. The control waits up to 5000 ms (scaled by `settleScale`) for `Debugger.paused`; when it never pauses, `reachable` records `"incomplete"`, not `false`, and the row fails with `extensionWorld debugger: no Debugger.paused within <ms>ms`. The guarded leg waits up to 1500 ms, scaled by `refusalScale`. `C9.page-drivable` evaluates `self.origin`, captures a DOM snapshot and dispatches an Input click on the same ordinary page; cutting the entire session fails this regression row. All four use an unguarded control, the default browser context and observer discovery of the real extension world, not an invented isolated world. Protected default contexts remain session-cutting evidence; hiding a foreign isolated world does not weaken any seven-origin row.
 
 The integration launcher loads shared-web 1.25.2’s harness extension exactly once through `Extensions.loadUnpacked` (`ankmbodmgimjemnojmeddfcdlbocolob`), whose content script runs on HTTP(S) pages. shared-web 1.25.2 also loads it by default in its own harness. A transport unable to host a foreign content-script extension omits `extensionWorld` and reports `not-supported:extensionWorld`; an advertised capability with no observed world fails, rather than silently skipping.
 
@@ -188,6 +192,8 @@ The integration launcher loads shared-web 1.25.2’s harness extension exactly o
 
 The `C8.newtab` reachability control attaches through the guard to a settled ordinary new tab, including its internal frames, then navigates that same tab to an ordinary document. Both legs must succeed, including without a guard. It requires `chromeUrlsAttach`, so an extension transport reports it as `skip` with `not-supported:chromeUrlsAttach`. The C8 protection rows expect a refusal on the guarded leg and run their controls unguarded, so they don't require it and still run on extension transports. It uses the default browser context, since an incognito new tab omits the ordinary new tab's internal frames. It covers `chrome://newtab/` and directly opened `chrome://new-tab-page/`.
 
+`C8.protected-error-page` touches an allowed tab, scripts a protected navigation, and requires the guard to fail its Document request. The independent observer verifies the committed error document and the exact unreachable/reported URL pair. The session stays attached; reload, navigation to `about:blank` and close succeed, while `Target.getTargetInfo`, `Target.getTargets`, the `Target.attachedToTarget` of a fresh attach and the `targetCreated`/`targetInfoChanged` events redact URL and title to the origin (`infoRedacted`, `listRedacted`, `attachRedacted`, `eventsRedacted`), and none of them shows the full failed URL (`fullURL`). The failed URL carries a secret path, `?query` and `#fragment`; the `.query` and `.fragment` variants of this row and of `C8.protected-error-page-sticky` fail `/doc?query-secret=…` and `/doc#fragment-secret-…` instead, so no path, query or fragment secret may survive alone either. The unguarded control uses independent Fetch failure injection and keeps raw discovery values: its `fullURL` must be `true`. `C8.protected-document-restore` seeds a real protected document before attachment, navigates away, then restores it from BFCache in the same tab after the error/recovery sequence; evaluate, attach and close must be refused. A real `BackForwardCacheRestore` commit is required, so a second failed network request cannot masquerade as this control. `C8.protected-error-page-sticky` additionally fails a request after that real protected restore and requires the already-protected tab to remain locked. They run on browser-session and page-session-only transports alike, have unguarded controls and clean up their own targets. The regression tests include URL-only locking, unconditional error-page unlocking, and a plain client with only request-failure injection.
+
 `C8.network-error` and `C8.iframe-error` are ordinary-error reachability controls: request the configured `network-error` URL (default `http://nonexistent.invalid/`) directly or in an ordinary iframe, observe a failed Document request, reattach to the settled tab, evaluate and snapshot its document, then navigate the same tab to an ordinary document. Both control and guarded legs must pass. The failing URL is unchanged on the control, rather than replaced with a healthy origin, and the rows require `browserSession` but not `chromeUrlsAttach`. With Chrome for Testing 156.0.8078.4, scheme-wide `chrome-error` protection made the direct-error row fail both legs because reattachment was refused; removing it passed both rows, with readable DOM and successful recovery. The old emulator still allowed the cross-process iframe parent because the iframe TargetInfo kept the failing HTTP URL, but that layout-specific behavior is not grounds for protecting the error scheme. Plain-client controls and reachability legs also passed both rows.
 
 A client may register `Fetch.enable` patterns naming a protected origin in either of two conformant ways: the guard allows registration but never pauses or forwards protected requests to the client and refuses continue, fulfil or fail calls for request ids it did not hand out; or the guard refuses registration with its declared refusal text. Setup calls explicitly naming a protected placeholder are refusable with `refusal.onlyProtected: true`, and interception-dependent observations depend on that refusal. Wildcard and ordinary-only patterns do not receive this exemption. The ordinary-origin control still runs through the guard and must succeed.
@@ -247,6 +253,8 @@ Popups are observed by `Target.targetCreated` with the opener's `openerId`, or b
 
 `{ "extensionWorld": "hidden" | "select" | "debugger" | "drivable", "as": "world", "requires": ["extensionWorld"] }` runs the C9 compound probe on the current ordinary page. The runner attaches an independent observer to discover actual context ids, unique ids and names, and sends probes through the client session. Discovery matches the expected fixture extension’s exact origin, never the first extension world: `run()`’s optional `extensionWorldId` defaults to shared-web’s harness id `ankmbodmgimjemnojmeddfcdlbocolob`. Multiple unrelated content-script worlds are ignored for fixture selection, while guards must still protect foreign worlds. A custom fixture must provide the same content-script marker contract. Object handles are minted and validated on the unguarded control session, then replayed as guesses on the guarded leg; Chrome object handles and DOM node ids are session-local, so observer handles must never be mistaken for client handles. Numeric ids from the control are also replayed alongside fresh observer-discovered selectors, but numeric ids are local to a tab: a control id may name the next tab’s exposed default context, which must work and return no extension marker. The same-tab hidden world’s actual numeric id and every extension unique-id guess still require a matched refusal. Unknown numeric ids and stale object handles (`not exposed`) need explicit refusals rather than Chrome’s invalid-id errors. `guessesRefused` aggregates only required refusals; `guessesReached` must be false on the guarded leg, and `exposedContextsWork` must remain true. Its result contains boolean evidence consumed by ordinary `result` checks. The unguarded leg validates those selectors against Chrome itself before guarded evidence can pass.
 
+`{ "errorPage": "recover", "secret"?: "all" | "query" | "fragment", "as": "errorPage" }` (also modes `restore` and `sticky`; `secret` defaults to `all`) runs the protected-error-page compound probe with independent commit evidence, discovery redaction and recovery or sticky-lock checks. The unguarded observer seeds the protected history and failed commit, so the rows run on page-session-only transports too. The guarded client uses only `Target.getTargetInfo` with a `targetId`, `Target.getTargets`, `Target.setDiscoverTargets`, `Target.attachToTarget`, `Target.detachFromTarget` and `Target.closeTarget` without a session, which page-session transports answer themselves, and everything else on its page session; the rows require no capability. The runner leaves this probe’s independent Fetch sessions to the probe rather than answering their pauses itself.
+
 `{ "unparseable": true, "as": "unparseable" }` runs the C8 malformed-URL compound probe on the current ordinary page: independent browser ground truth, raw/canonical destination commands, discovery/attach and cookie checks. Boolean evidence is consumed by ordinary `result` checks, with native Chrome outcomes retained in its diagnostics.
 
 **The control rule.** Every vector has a control on an ordinary origin: the same setup and trigger against an unprotected origin must succeed. A missing or failing control fails the id. With `via: "guard"`, the control runs through the guard. With `via: "unguarded"`, the runner runs setup and trigger through its own CDP against the ordinary origin and against the protected stand-in, and both must show the effect. The runner reports the control's transport as `via`.
@@ -358,7 +366,7 @@ every alternative of an `any`, or a required (`all`, `not` or plain) check, need
 selects one variant or an array; omission selects all. `parallel` defaults to 1.
 With the `browserContexts` capability each leg runs in its own browser context. A `Target.createBrowserContext` that fails with a timeout is retried once, and the row's `notes` records it; any other failure fails the row.
 
-`settleScale` (default 1) multiplies the bounds of waits for events the leg expects to happen: settles (beacon, served, title and load) on the control leg and `required` settles on either leg, `paused` on the control leg, page and child loads, the wait for a background step's `as` result (`<as> did not complete within <ms>ms`), and the wait for an observation the leg expects to be `true`. Adopters on slow hosts can set 3 or 4. Every wait polls and returns as soon as its event arrives, so a larger bound only costs time when something is really missing, and each timeout error names the bound it used. An observation read from the fixture (`observer: "fixture"`, such as a beacon or a served request) that the leg expects to be `true` is polled for up to 5000 ms (scaled) instead of read once. One that the leg expects to be `false` is still read once.
+`settleScale` (default 1) multiplies the bounds of waits for events the leg expects to happen: settles (beacon, served, title and load) on the control leg and `required` settles on either leg, `paused` on the control leg, page and child loads, the wait for a background step's `as` result (`<as> did not complete within <ms>ms`), the wait for the pre-action beacons, the C9 control's `Debugger.paused`, and the wait for an observation the leg expects to be `true`. Adopters on slow hosts can set 3 or 4. Every wait polls and returns as soon as its event arrives, so a larger bound only costs time when something is really missing, and each timeout error names the bound it used. An observation read from the fixture (`observer: "fixture"`, such as a beacon or a served request) that the leg expects to be `true` is polled for up to 5000 ms (scaled) instead of read once. One that the leg expects to be `false` is still read once.
 
 `refusalScale` (default 1) multiplies the bounds of waits for what the guarded leg expects to be absent, the beacon, request, title or navigation that the guard should block: settles that are not `required`, and `paused`, on the guarded leg. Such a wait runs to its full bound whenever the guard works, so `settleScale` leaves it alone. The trade-off: a larger `refusalScale` gives more sensitivity to a leak that arrives late on a slow host, because the observations after the wait see it, at the cost of that much more time per guarded row. Adopters should keep `refusalScale` at 1 or higher, never below 1; the runner refuses a `refusalScale` below 1 with `refusalScale must be a number of at least 1`.
 
@@ -393,7 +401,13 @@ observations: a missing or failing effect fails the control. Guarded liveness
 requires the exact target URL in the fixture log or a target-origin `/live`
 heartbeat; alternatively a pre-action `/live?tag=...&step=pre&to=...` request and
 an exact-URL block/error from the client or unguarded frame tree. An error for a
-different URL is not evidence. `blocked` accepts either `{ url }` for one exact URL
+different URL is not evidence. Before judging, the runner waits, bounded at 5 s (scaled by `settleScale`), for the
+pre-action beacon of every trigger step it ran, since a keepalive beacon has no ordering
+guarantee. When one never arrives, an `eitherWhen` that needs it is `"incomplete"` and
+excluded from that field's expectations, and the guarded leg is not live with
+`not live: pre beacon not observed for <url>` in the row's `why`, never a false
+mismatch. Once the beacon is in, a failing `eitherWhen` whose field mismatches, and a
+failing `liveCheck`, are rechecked for up to 1.5 s (scaled) before they count. `blocked` accepts either `{ url }` for one exact URL
 or `{ anyOf: [url, ...] }` for a nonempty list of exact URLs; each URL can be a
 string or `{ hops, to, index? }`. Both forms allow `session` and `frame`. With `frame`,
 the unguarded observer also reads the page's out-of-process iframe targets (matched by

package/catalog.json

@@ -738,6 +738,11 @@
     "aboutScheme": "chrome",
     "targetTypes": ["browser_ui"],
     "inheriting": ["about:blank", "about:srcdoc"],
+    "errorPage": {
+      "url": "chrome-error://chromewebdata/",
+      "target": "previous",
+      "redact": "origin"
+    },
     "unparseable": "protected",
     "unparseableRefusal": "slicc: refused: slicc can't parse this URL, so it could be a protected page",
     "refusal": "slicc: refused: target is on seven's origin"

package/extension-world.mjs

@@ -73,7 +73,17 @@ async function drivable(client, session, live) {
   };
 }
 
-async function debuggerWorld({ client, reader, session, observer, world, events, live }) {
+async function debuggerWorld({
+  client,
+  reader,
+  session,
+  observer,
+  world,
+  events,
+  live,
+  side,
+  pauseMs,
+}) {
   const debug = await outcome(client.send('Debugger.enable', {}, session));
   const probe = outcome(
     reader.send(
@@ -87,7 +97,7 @@ async function debuggerWorld({ client, reader, session, observer, world, events,
       observer
     )
   );
-  const deadline = Date.now() + 1500;
+  const deadline = Date.now() + pauseMs;
   while (
     debug.ok &&
     !events().some((event) => event.method === 'Debugger.paused') &&
@@ -123,9 +133,11 @@ async function debuggerWorld({ client, reader, session, observer, world, events,
         event.method === 'Debugger.scriptParsed' && event.params.executionContextId === world.id
     ) || Boolean(paused);
   await outcome(client.send('Debugger.disable', {}, session));
+  const incomplete = side === 'control' && debug.ok && !paused;
   return {
     exists: true,
-    reachable: reached,
+    reachable: incomplete ? 'incomplete' : reached,
+    ...(incomplete ? { incomplete: `no Debugger.paused within ${pauseMs}ms` } : {}),
     protected: refused(debug) || frameRefused || !exposed,
     alive: await live(),
   };
@@ -310,6 +322,7 @@ export async function extensionWorld({
   side,
   controls,
   extensionId = DEFAULT_EXTENSION_WORLD_ID,
+  pauseMs = side === 'control' ? 5000 : 1500,
 }) {
   const attached = await reader.send('Target.attachToTarget', { targetId, flatten: true });
   const observer = attached.sessionId;
@@ -370,7 +383,18 @@ export async function extensionWorld({
       await outcome(client.send('Debugger.disable', {}, session));
       return { exists: true, listed, leaks, defaultSeen, alive: enabled.ok && (await live()) };
     }
-    const input = { client, reader, session, observer, world, events, live, side, controls };
+    const input = {
+      client,
+      reader,
+      session,
+      observer,
+      world,
+      events,
+      live,
+      side,
+      controls,
+      pauseMs,
+    };
     if (mode === 'drivable') return await drivable(client, session, live);
     if (mode === 'debugger') return await debuggerWorld(input);
     return await selectWorld(input);

package/guard-driver.mjs

@@ -144,10 +144,14 @@ export function judge(vector, side, observed) {
       (observed?.[k] === 'not-supported' && vector.observe?.[k]?.requires?.length > 0) ||
       (vector.observe?.[k]?.dependsOn ?? []).some((d) => refused.includes(d))
   );
+  const incomplete = Object.keys(want).filter(
+    (k) => !skipped.includes(k) && observed?.[`${k}.either`] === 'incomplete'
+  );
   const mismatches = Object.entries(want)
     .filter(
       ([k, v]) =>
         !skipped.includes(k) &&
+        !incomplete.includes(k) &&
         !matches(observed?.[`${k}.either`] === true ? 'either' : v, observed?.[k])
     )
     .map(([k, v]) => `${k}: got ${q(observed?.[k])}, want ${q(v)}`);
@@ -222,7 +226,7 @@ export function result(vector, run) {
     why.push('refused on the protected target without a passing control');
   } else why.push(...g.mismatches);
   const live = run.live === true ? 'pass' : 'fail';
-  if (live === 'fail') why.push('not live');
+  if (live === 'fail') why.push(['not live', run.liveWhy].filter(Boolean).join(': '));
   return {
     ...row,
     control,

package/guard-runner.mjs

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import {
   result,
   steps,
 } from './guard-driver.mjs';
+import { protectedErrorPage } from './protected-error-page.mjs';
 import { canonicalURL, unparseableURLs } from './unparseable-url.mjs';
 
 const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
@@ -113,8 +114,10 @@ class Execution {
     this.contexts = [];
     this.pending = [];
     this.errors = [];
+    this.preSent = [];
     this.notes = [];
     this.answers = [];
+    this.internalSessions = new Set();
     this.attachSettings = new Map();
     this.childSteps = [];
     this.deferred = [];
@@ -234,6 +237,17 @@ class Execution {
     return read.ok && canary.untouched(state.value, read.result?.result?.value);
   }
 
+  async awaitPre() {
+    const sent = [...new Set(this.preSent)];
+    if (!sent.length || !usesPre(this.vector)) return [];
+    const missing = async () => {
+      const seen = await Promise.all(sent.map((url) => this.attemptCheck({ pre: url })));
+      return sent.filter((_, index) => !seen[index]);
+    };
+    await this.poll(async () => (await missing()).length === 0, 5000);
+    return missing();
+  }
+
   async attemptCheck(c) {
     const logs = owned((await this.options.fixture.log()).slice(this.requestStart), this.vars.tag);
     if (c.pre) {
@@ -450,7 +464,10 @@ class Execution {
       for (const event of this.client.events.slice(this.eventStart)) {
         if (this.processed.has(event)) continue;
         this.processed.add(event);
-        if (event.method === 'Fetch.requestPaused' || event.method === 'Fetch.authRequired') {
+        if (
+          (event.method === 'Fetch.requestPaused' || event.method === 'Fetch.authRequired') &&
+          !this.internalSessions.has(event.sessionId)
+        ) {
           this.pending.push(
             this.answer(event).catch((error) => this.errors.push(String(error.message ?? error)))
           );
@@ -604,9 +621,11 @@ class Execution {
       this.errors.push(
         `${step.refusal.name} failed without a refusal: ${String(out.error?.message ?? out.error)}`
       );
-    if ((step.extensionWorld || step.unparseable) && !out.ok)
+    if (step.extensionWorld && out.result?.incomplete)
+      this.errors.push(`extensionWorld ${step.extensionWorld}: ${out.result.incomplete}`);
+    if ((step.extensionWorld || step.unparseable || step.errorPage) && !out.ok)
       this.errors.push(
-        `${step.unparseable ? 'unparseable' : 'extensionWorld'}: ${out.error?.message ?? 'probe failed'}`
+        `${step.unparseable ? 'unparseable' : step.errorPage ? 'errorPage' : 'extensionWorld'}: ${out.error?.message ?? 'probe failed'}`
       );
     if (step.as && !out.result?.pending) this.calls[step.as] = out;
     if (step.cdp) (this.calls.$cdp ??= []).push({ method: step.cdp, ...out });
@@ -657,6 +676,22 @@ class Execution {
       await this.settle(step.settle);
       return;
     }
+    if (step.errorPage)
+      return outcome(
+        protectedErrorPage({
+          client: this.client,
+          reader: this.reader,
+          session,
+          targetId: this.pageTarget,
+          ordinary: this.vars.ordinary,
+          protectedOrigin: this.vars.seven,
+          tag: this.vars.tag,
+          internalSessions: this.internalSessions,
+          mode: step.errorPage,
+          side: this.side,
+          secret: step.secret,
+        })
+      );
     if (step.unparseable)
       return outcome(
         unparseableURLs({
@@ -681,6 +716,7 @@ class Execution {
           origin: this.vars.ordinary,
           side: this.side,
           controls: (this.clients.extensionWorldControls ??= {}),
+          pauseMs: this.bound(this.side === 'control' ? 5000 : 1500, this.side !== 'control'),
           extensionId: this.options.extensionWorldId,
         })
       );
@@ -814,16 +850,19 @@ class Execution {
       this.pageTarget = tab.targetId;
       return { ok: true, result: tab };
     }
+    if (pre && step.page !== 'framed') this.preSent.push(url);
     if (step.page === 'navigate') {
       if (pre) await this.evaluate(pre, session);
       return this.navigate(this.client, session, url);
     }
-    if (step.page === 'framed')
+    if (step.page === 'framed') {
+      if (phase === 'trigger') this.preSent.push(url);
       return this.navigate(
         this.client,
         session,
         `${step.from}/framed?tag=${encodeURIComponent(this.vars.tag)}&url=${encodeURIComponent(url)}&log=${encodeURIComponent(this.vars.log)}`
       );
+    }
     let expression = pageExpression(step, url);
     if (pre) expression = `(() => { ${pre} return (${expression}); })()`;
     const promise = this.evaluate(expression, session);
@@ -880,6 +919,8 @@ class Execution {
     const want = (this.side === 'control' ? this.vector.control.expected : this.vector.expected)?.[
       name
     ];
+    if (check?.result && at(this.calls[check.result], check.path) === 'incomplete')
+      return 'incomplete';
     if (want !== true || check?.observer !== 'fixture') return this.check(check);
     let seen = false;
     await this.poll(async () => {
@@ -1078,6 +1119,42 @@ class Execution {
     }
   }
 
+  async observeAll(unseen) {
+    const observed = { ...this.refused };
+    const incomplete = [];
+    for (const [name, observation] of Object.entries(this.vector.observe ?? {})) {
+      if (!supported(observation.requires, this.options.capabilities)) {
+        observed[name] = 'not-supported';
+        continue;
+      }
+      if ((observation.dependsOn ?? []).some((dep) => this.refused[dep])) continue;
+      observed[name] = await this.observe(name, observation.check);
+      if (!observation.eitherWhen || this.side !== 'guarded') continue;
+      const holds = await this.either(observation.eitherWhen, observed[name], name, unseen);
+      observed[`${name}.either`] = holds;
+      if (holds === 'incomplete') incomplete.push(name);
+    }
+    return { observed, incomplete };
+  }
+
+  async either(check, value, name, unseen) {
+    const holds = () => this.check(check);
+    if (await holds()) return true;
+    if (unseen.length) return usesPre(check) ? 'incomplete' : false;
+    if (value === this.vector.expected?.[name]) return false;
+    return this.poll(holds, 1500);
+  }
+
+  async liveness(unseen, incomplete) {
+    if (this.side === 'control') return { live: true };
+    const alive = () => this.check(this.vector.liveCheck);
+    let live = await alive();
+    if (!live && !unseen.length) live = await this.poll(alive, 1500);
+    if (!unseen.length || (live && !incomplete.length)) return { live };
+    const detail = incomplete.length ? ` (${incomplete.join(', ')} incomplete)` : '';
+    return { live: false, liveWhy: `pre beacon not observed for ${unseen.join(', ')}${detail}` };
+  }
+
   async run() {
     this.requestStart = (await this.options.fixture.log()).length;
     let pumping;
@@ -1093,25 +1170,16 @@ class Execution {
       await this.execute(plan.setup, undefined, 'setup');
       await this.execute(plan.trigger, undefined, 'trigger');
       await sleep(100);
-      const observed = { ...this.refused };
-      for (const [name, observation] of Object.entries(this.vector.observe ?? {})) {
-        if (!supported(observation.requires, this.options.capabilities)) {
-          observed[name] = 'not-supported';
-          continue;
-        }
-        if ((observation.dependsOn ?? []).some((dep) => this.refused[dep])) continue;
-        observed[name] = await this.observe(name, observation.check);
-        if (observation.eitherWhen && this.side === 'guarded')
-          observed[`${name}.either`] = await this.check(observation.eitherWhen);
-      }
+      const unseen = await this.awaitPre();
+      const { observed, incomplete } = await this.observeAll(unseen);
       this.options.debug?.({
         events: this.client.events.slice(this.eventStart),
         calls: this.calls,
         requests: await this.options.fixture.log(),
         side: this.side,
       });
-      const live = this.side === 'control' ? true : await this.check(this.vector.liveCheck);
-      return { observed, live, errors: this.errors, notes: this.notes };
+      const { live, liveWhy } = await this.liveness(unseen, incomplete);
+      return { observed, live, liveWhy, errors: this.errors, notes: this.notes };
     } finally {
       this.stopped = true;
       await pumping;
@@ -1134,6 +1202,12 @@ class Execution {
   }
 }
 
+const usesPre = (value) =>
+  Boolean(value && typeof value === 'object') &&
+  (Object.hasOwn(value, 'pre') ||
+    Object.hasOwn(value, 'history') ||
+    Object.values(value).some(usesPre));
+
 const observerRequired = (check) => {
   if (check?.observer === 'unguarded') return true;
   if (check?.all) return check.all.some(observerRequired);
@@ -1426,6 +1500,7 @@ async function executeRow(job, opts, made, set, slot, index, flights) {
       control: legs.control.observed,
       guarded: legs.guarded.observed,
       live: legs.control.live && legs.guarded.live,
+      liveWhy: legs.guarded.liveWhy,
     }),
     transportVariant: base.transportVariant,
     observations: { control: legs.control.observed, guarded: legs.guarded.observed },