@ai-ecoverse/slicc-bios 1.51.27 → 1.51.28

package/README.md

@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ Seven keeps its secrets in the vault, a separate origin (`@ai-ecoverse/slicc-vau
 - **`model.vault`** (spectrum's `VaultPort`) gives Settings › Secrets, the value requests and the composer's hold synchronous `status()` and `list()` snapshots (re-listed after every `changed`), `audit`, `availability()` (`connecting` until the welcome, `waiting` without one within 5 s or while an answer is 2 s late, then `locked` or `ready`), and the page ops `put` (with spectrum's `PutOptions` passed through), `cancel`, `remove`, `restore`, `import`, `export`, `lock` and `dismissBackupReminder`. Rejections are `Error`s with the vault's errno as `code`. Values go only through `put` (and `seal`), are never logged, stored or put into an error message, and never reach the agent worker.
 - **`button()`** is a plain iframe of `<vault origin>/button.html`, with no `sandbox`, so it can open the vault's popup. Every `button` message carries seven's current colour scheme as `theme`, and is sent again on the frame's `load` and whenever the scheme changes; spectrum (≥ 1.68.3) gives the iframe the same `color-scheme`, so Chrome doesn't paint it opaque.
 - **The agent's port:** for slicc-agent ≥ 4.0.0 only, each agent worker gets its own `agent`-role port, posted raw as `{ vault, scrub }` next to the agent's `{ kernel, admin }`, and again with a fresh port after the frame reloads. The agent port gets no events, so every lock change in the page port's `status` is posted to the worker as `{ locked: true | false }`. `scrub` is the last `{ needed, version, ready }` pair (`localStorage['slicc-os.vault-scrub']`, `null` before any vault connected); each new pair is posted to the worker as `{ scrub }` before seven relays the `put`, `seal` or `import` answer that caused it. Agents before 4.0.0 speak an earlier draft of that wire, so they get no port and stay inert.
-- **`/dev/sealed`:** the kernel's `sealed` hook relays each request with its kernel stamp (`caller`, unchanged) as the vault's `sealed` op, and returns its one reply. While kernel users aren't `enforce`, `materialize` and `materializeConsume` are refused with `EACCES`; under `enforce`, `materialize` is relayed like the rest, and the kernel's `materializeConsume` (`ticket`, `stamp`, `path`, `resolved`, `argv`, `cwd`, `interpreters`, `trusted`, unchanged) goes to the vault's page op of that name, whose `{ values, placeholders }` go back to the kernel only. jerk's requests (`src/seed/jerk.js`) are answered with `answer`: `jop: list` with rows from each linked device that runs jerk (J1 `list`), `jop: status` from the vault's records (exit 3 without one), `jop: create` through J1 `create` with its progress lines (exit 4 without a jerk device), `unseal` by removing the provider's `jerk:` records, and `oauth` and `jerk-seal` with exit 5 until seven signs in itself. A `cancelled` event stops a running J1 `create`.
+- **`/dev/sealed`:** the kernel's `sealed` hook relays each request with its kernel stamp (`caller`, unchanged) as the vault's `sealed` op, and returns its one reply. While kernel users aren't `enforce`, `materialize` and `materializeConsume` are refused with `EACCES`; under `enforce`, `materialize` is relayed like the rest, and the kernel's `materializeConsume` (`ticket`, `stamp`, `path`, `resolved`, `argv`, `cwd`, `interpreters`, `trusted`, unchanged) goes to the vault's page op of that name, whose `{ values, placeholders }` go back to the kernel only. jerk's requests (`src/seed/jerk.js`) are answered with `answer`: `jop: list` with rows from each linked device that runs jerk (J1 `list`), `jop: status` from the vault's records, where `mcp:<server>` also counts a `list.mcp` record of exactly that server (exit 3 without one; the vault, not bios, checks that the reader is root), `jop: create` through J1 `create` with its progress lines (exit 4 without a jerk device), `unseal` by removing the provider's `jerk:` records, and `oauth` and `jerk-seal` with exit 5 until seven signs in itself. A `cancelled` event stops a running J1 `create`.
 - **Forward (seam):** `forward` is passed through with the kernel's full stamp as `owner` (`users` included, since the vault injects only for `enforce`) and the response port transferred; the exit router's use of it is VAULT-1b's follow-up.
 - **fnox** (the optional catalog's `fnox`, wasi-fnox): every kernel process gets `FNOX_CONFIG_DIR=/etc/fnox`, sudo included, and bios writes `/etc/fnox/config.toml` once as root's `0644` (`default_provider = "seven"`, provider `seven` of type `sealed`), so cones read it and only `sudo` changes it. A boot skips that seed when `/etc/fnox` is already root's `0755` directory and `config.toml` a non-empty regular file, root's `0644`; any other owner, mode or type reruns it, which keeps the file's contents and repairs only its owner and mode. fnox keeps placeholders there and reaches the vault through `/dev/sealed`; while the vault frame never answered, every sealed operation fails at once with `ENOTCONN`. Use `fnox set` to change a secret (`fnox edit` is refused on WASI).
 - **Egress:** the vault's token refreshes arrive as `egress` events; seven sends them without following redirects (through its exits when the transport hands redirects back, else the page's own `fetch` with `redirect: 'manual'`), answers a redirect with an error, zeroes the request body once it's sent, and answers on the event's port within 30 s, never logging the request.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ai-ecoverse/slicc-bios",
-  "version": "1.51.27",
+  "version": "1.51.28",
   "description": "Slim loader that boots SLICC into OPFS and serves the UI from there",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",