@ahood/cli 0.8.7 → 0.8.8

package/dist/commands/add.js

@@ -480,10 +480,10 @@ export async function resolveMcpServerConfig(buffer, options = {}) {
             throw new Error(`${sanitizeForTerminal(variable.name)} is required by ${sanitizeForTerminal(manifest.name)} but is not set -- export ${sanitizeForTerminal(variable.name)} and re-run.`);
         }
     }
-    // Required-ness needs no separate check on the secret path: every branch
-    // below either resolves a value or throws, so a required secret with
-    // nothing to fall back on already fails loudly (the non-TTY guard) or is
-    // supplied at the prompt (ahood-cli#120).
+    // Required-ness is consulted on the secret path only in the one branch
+    // where a secret can still end up unresolved: the unattended update guard
+    // below. Every other branch either resolves a value or prompts for one, so
+    // an `is_required` check there would change nothing (ahood-cli#120).
     const secretNames = [];
     for (const variable of envVars) {
         if (!variable.is_secret)
@@ -511,6 +511,21 @@ export async function resolveMcpServerConfig(buffer, options = {}) {
             continue;
         }
         if (!allowNonTtyPrompt && !process.stdin.isTTY) {
+            // Optional means optional here too, exactly as it does on the
+            // non-secret pass above (ahood-cli#126). This guard used to fire for
+            // ANY unresolved secret, so a single artifact declaring an optional
+            // token that nothing had exported aborted the whole `ahood skill
+            // update` walk -- and said the variable "is required" while the
+            // manifest that declared it said otherwise. Announced rather than
+            // silent because skipping and carrying forward leave different entries
+            // in .mcp.json and nothing else distinguishes them; the notice is
+            // confined to this branch, so an interactive `add` (which still prompts
+            // for optional secrets) and a routine update whose credential carries
+            // forward both stay quiet.
+            if (!variable.is_required) {
+                console.warn(`${sanitizeForTerminal(variable.name)} is optional and is not set -- updating ${sanitizeForTerminal(manifest.name)} without it.`);
+                continue;
+            }
             throw new Error(`${sanitizeForTerminal(variable.name)} is required by ${sanitizeForTerminal(manifest.name)} but is not set, and there is no terminal to prompt on -- export ${sanitizeForTerminal(variable.name)} and re-run.`);
         }
         env[variable.name] = await promptSecret(`${sanitizeForTerminal(variable.name)} (${sanitizeForTerminal(variable.description)}): `);

package/dist/http.js

@@ -37,6 +37,30 @@ export async function apiFetch(path, init = {}) {
     }
 }
 const MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LENGTH = 500;
+// The HTML/length checks below (ahood-cli#31) let a *short, non-HTML* body
+// through verbatim, which meant an error string could still carry ANSI escapes
+// straight to the terminal (ahood-cli#127). That matters here more than in the
+// archive-content path ahood-cli#122 hardened, because sanitizeErrorMessage
+// sits on every apiJson call in the CLI -- including `add`, which prints
+// server-sourced text immediately before a masked secret prompt, the exact
+// moment a cursor-movement/line-clear sequence can repaint what the user sees.
+//
+// Control characters are replaced with a space rather than deleted so that
+// stripping can't silently glue two tokens into one misleading word.
+//
+// Newlines (\x0a) and carriage returns (\x0d) are inside this range and are
+// deliberately flattened too: a forged prompt line ("...\n\nEnter your token:")
+// needs no escape sequence at all, just a newline, so preserving them would
+// leave the spoofing half of the threat model open while closing the escape
+// half. The readability cost is small because anything reaching this branch is
+// already capped at MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LENGTH -- a few lines' worth of text, not
+// a stack trace.
+//
+// Known duplication: this is the same substitution as `sanitizeForTerminal` in
+// src/commands/add.ts (ahood-cli#122). It is copied rather than shared on
+// purpose -- promoting a shared helper means editing add.ts's call sites, which
+// is follow-up refactor work kept out of this security fix; see ahood-cli#127.
+const CONTROL_CHARACTERS = /[\x00-\x1f\x7f-\x9f]/g;
 // Defense in depth (ahood-cli#31): the API is expected to never forward a raw
 // upstream error body (an HTML block page from a proxy/WAF, a giant stack
 // trace, etc.) into `error`, but this CLI shouldn't trust that unconditionally
@@ -46,7 +70,7 @@ const MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LENGTH = 500;
 export function sanitizeErrorMessage(message) {
     const looksLikeHtml = /<!DOCTYPE|<html[\s>]/i.test(message);
     if (!looksLikeHtml && message.length <= MAX_ERROR_MESSAGE_LENGTH)
-        return message;
+        return message.replace(CONTROL_CHARACTERS, " ");
     // No preview of the raw content: an HTML-shaped body's first bytes are
     // exactly where infra details (e.g. a Cloudflare block page's title, Ray
     // ID) live, so a "helpful" excerpt would leak the same details this

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@ahood/cli",
-  "version": "0.8.7",
+  "version": "0.8.8",
   "description": "CLI for ahood, a registry for installing and publishing Claude Code skills.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "homepage": "https://github.com/AlexKay28/ahood-cli",