@aglyn/tenant-data-admin 1.0.0-beta.200 → 1.0.0-beta.201

package/src/lib/server/payment-risk-record.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * @license
+ * Copyright 2026 Aglyn LLC
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+import { type PaymentRiskSignal } from '@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/payment-risk';
+import type { AglynNotificationType } from '@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/notifications';
+/** The notifier's shape: `notifyHostManagers` from the admin barrel. */
+export type PaymentRiskNotifier = (hostId: string, payload: {
+    type: AglynNotificationType;
+    title: string;
+    body: string;
+    link: string;
+}) => Promise<void>;
+export interface RecordPaymentRiskInput {
+    ref: FirebaseFirestore.DocumentReference;
+    signal: PaymentRiskSignal;
+    /** The site whose managers are told. Empty tells nobody. */
+    hostId: string;
+    /** What the record is, as the merchant calls it: `Order 1042`, `Booking`. */
+    subjectLabel: string;
+    /** The console path the notification opens. */
+    link: string;
+    /** The plugin's own notification type: `content.order`, `content.booking`. */
+    notificationType: AglynNotificationType;
+    /**
+     * More fields to write in the same transaction, from the record as read —
+     * a plugin's own activity line (an order's timeline) rides here.
+     */
+    extraUpdate?: (data: Record<string, unknown>) => Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+/**
+ * Stamp `signal` on `input.ref` and notify, once. Returns true when this
+ * delivery wrote it; false for a redelivery or a record that is gone.
+ * Throws only when the write throws, which the webhook answers with a 500 and
+ * Stripe's redelivery.
+ */
+export declare function recordPaymentRiskOnRecord(input: RecordPaymentRiskInput, deps: {
+    firestore: FirebaseFirestore.Firestore;
+    notify: PaymentRiskNotifier;
+}): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * Record a dispute's outcome on the signal already stamped for it. Silent:
+ * the plugin that owns money movement on a lost dispute says so itself.
+ */
+export declare function settlePaymentRiskDisputeOnRecord(ref: FirebaseFirestore.DocumentReference, disputeId: string, outcome: string, deps: {
+    firestore: FirebaseFirestore.Firestore;
+}): Promise<boolean>;

package/src/lib/server/payment-risk-record.js

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import { _ as _extends } from "@swc/helpers/_/_extends";
+/**
+ * @license
+ * Copyright 2026 Aglyn LLC
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */ /*==========================================
+ * STAMP A STRIPE FRAUD SIGNAL ON A MERCHANT'S RECORD (AGL-3360).
+ *
+ * The server half of `@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/payment-risk`. A plugin that
+ * finds its own record behind a charge — an order, a booking — hands the
+ * document here, and this writes the `paymentRisk` field once per signal and
+ * tells the site's managers once. Any plugin that sells through Stripe uses
+ * the same two calls; nothing about the record's kind is known here.
+ *
+ * NOTHING IS REFUNDED OR CANCELED. The merchant decides for their own
+ * customer; the notification says so.
+ *
+ * Dependencies are passed in — the Firestore handle and the notifier — so a
+ * plugin's spec that substitutes the admin barrel substitutes these too.
+ *=========================================*/ import { addPaymentRiskSignal, NOTHING_MOVED, PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD, paymentRiskAdvice, paymentRiskTitle, settlePaymentRiskDispute } from "@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/payment-risk";
+/**
+ * Stamp `signal` on `input.ref` and notify, once. Returns true when this
+ * delivery wrote it; false for a redelivery or a record that is gone.
+ * Throws only when the write throws, which the webhook answers with a 500 and
+ * Stripe's redelivery.
+ */ export async function recordPaymentRiskOnRecord(input, deps) {
+    const written = await deps.firestore.runTransaction(async (transaction)=>{
+        var _fresh_data;
+        const fresh = await transaction.get(input.ref);
+        if (!fresh.exists) return false;
+        const data = (_fresh_data = fresh.data()) != null ? _fresh_data : {};
+        const next = addPaymentRiskSignal(data[PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD], input.signal);
+        if (!next) return false;
+        transaction.update(input.ref, _extends({}, input.extraUpdate ? input.extraUpdate(data) : {}, {
+            [PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD]: next
+        }));
+        return true;
+    });
+    if (written && input.hostId) {
+        await deps.notify(input.hostId, {
+            type: input.notificationType,
+            title: paymentRiskTitle(input.signal.kind),
+            body: `${input.subjectLabel}. ${paymentRiskAdvice(input.signal.kind)}` + (input.signal.detail ? ` Stripe says: ${input.signal.detail.replace(/_/g, ' ')}.` : '') + ` ${NOTHING_MOVED}`,
+            link: input.link
+        }).catch(()=>undefined);
+    }
+    return written;
+}
+/**
+ * Record a dispute's outcome on the signal already stamped for it. Silent:
+ * the plugin that owns money movement on a lost dispute says so itself.
+ */ export async function settlePaymentRiskDisputeOnRecord(ref, disputeId, outcome, deps) {
+    return deps.firestore.runTransaction(async (transaction)=>{
+        const fresh = await transaction.get(ref);
+        if (!fresh.exists) return false;
+        const next = settlePaymentRiskDispute(fresh.get(PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD), disputeId, outcome);
+        if (!next) return false;
+        transaction.update(ref, {
+            [PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD]: next
+        });
+        return true;
+    });
+}
+
+//# sourceMappingURL=payment-risk-record.js.map

package/src/lib/server/payment-risk-record.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../../../../../libs/tenant/data/admin/src/lib/server/payment-risk-record.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @license\n * Copyright 2026 Aglyn LLC\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/*==========================================\n * STAMP A STRIPE FRAUD SIGNAL ON A MERCHANT'S RECORD (AGL-3360).\n *\n * The server half of `@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/payment-risk`. A plugin that\n * finds its own record behind a charge — an order, a booking — hands the\n * document here, and this writes the `paymentRisk` field once per signal and\n * tells the site's managers once. Any plugin that sells through Stripe uses\n * the same two calls; nothing about the record's kind is known here.\n *\n * NOTHING IS REFUNDED OR CANCELED. The merchant decides for their own\n * customer; the notification says so.\n *\n * Dependencies are passed in — the Firestore handle and the notifier — so a\n * plugin's spec that substitutes the admin barrel substitutes these too.\n *=========================================*/\n\nimport {\n  addPaymentRiskSignal,\n  NOTHING_MOVED,\n  PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD,\n  type PaymentRisk,\n  type PaymentRiskSignal,\n  paymentRiskAdvice,\n  paymentRiskTitle,\n  settlePaymentRiskDispute,\n} from '@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/payment-risk'\nimport type { AglynNotificationType } from '@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/notifications'\n\n/** The notifier's shape: `notifyHostManagers` from the admin barrel. */\nexport type PaymentRiskNotifier = (\n  hostId: string,\n  payload: {\n    type: AglynNotificationType\n    title: string\n    body: string\n    link: string\n  },\n) => Promise<void>\n\nexport interface RecordPaymentRiskInput {\n  ref: FirebaseFirestore.DocumentReference\n  signal: PaymentRiskSignal\n  /** The site whose managers are told. Empty tells nobody. */\n  hostId: string\n  /** What the record is, as the merchant calls it: `Order 1042`, `Booking`. */\n  subjectLabel: string\n  /** The console path the notification opens. */\n  link: string\n  /** The plugin's own notification type: `content.order`, `content.booking`. */\n  notificationType: AglynNotificationType\n  /**\n   * More fields to write in the same transaction, from the record as read —\n   * a plugin's own activity line (an order's timeline) rides here.\n   */\n  extraUpdate?: (data: Record<string, unknown>) => Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/**\n * Stamp `signal` on `input.ref` and notify, once. Returns true when this\n * delivery wrote it; false for a redelivery or a record that is gone.\n * Throws only when the write throws, which the webhook answers with a 500 and\n * Stripe's redelivery.\n */\nexport async function recordPaymentRiskOnRecord(\n  input: RecordPaymentRiskInput,\n  deps: {\n    firestore: FirebaseFirestore.Firestore\n    notify: PaymentRiskNotifier\n  },\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const written = await deps.firestore.runTransaction(async (transaction) => {\n    const fresh = await transaction.get(input.ref)\n    if (!fresh.exists) return false\n    const data = (fresh.data() ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>\n    const next = addPaymentRiskSignal(\n      data[PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD] as PaymentRisk | undefined,\n      input.signal,\n    )\n    if (!next) return false\n    transaction.update(input.ref, {\n      ...(input.extraUpdate ? input.extraUpdate(data) : {}),\n      [PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD]: next,\n    })\n    return true\n  })\n  if (written && input.hostId) {\n    await deps\n      .notify(input.hostId, {\n        type: input.notificationType,\n        title: paymentRiskTitle(input.signal.kind),\n        body:\n          `${input.subjectLabel}. ${paymentRiskAdvice(input.signal.kind)}` +\n          (input.signal.detail\n            ? ` Stripe says: ${input.signal.detail.replace(/_/g, ' ')}.`\n            : '') +\n          ` ${NOTHING_MOVED}`,\n        link: input.link,\n      })\n      .catch(() => undefined)\n  }\n  return written\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a dispute's outcome on the signal already stamped for it. Silent:\n * the plugin that owns money movement on a lost dispute says so itself.\n */\nexport async function settlePaymentRiskDisputeOnRecord(\n  ref: FirebaseFirestore.DocumentReference,\n  disputeId: string,\n  outcome: string,\n  deps: { firestore: FirebaseFirestore.Firestore },\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  return deps.firestore.runTransaction(async (transaction) => {\n    const fresh = await transaction.get(ref)\n    if (!fresh.exists) return false\n    const next = settlePaymentRiskDispute(\n      fresh.get(PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD) as PaymentRisk | undefined,\n      disputeId,\n      outcome,\n    )\n    if (!next) return false\n    transaction.update(ref, { [PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD]: next })\n    return true\n  })\n}\n"],"names":["addPaymentRiskSignal","NOTHING_MOVED","PAYMENT_RISK_FIELD","paymentRiskAdvice","paymentRiskTitle","settlePaymentRiskDispute","recordPaymentRiskOnRecord","input","deps","written","firestore","runTransaction","transaction","fresh","get","ref","exists","data","next","signal","update","extraUpdate","hostId","notify","type","notificationType","title","kind","body","subjectLabel","detail","replace","link","catch","undefined","settlePaymentRiskDisputeOnRecord","disputeId","outcome"],"mappings":";AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;CAeC,GAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;2CAc2C,GAE3C,SACEA,oBAAoB,EACpBC,aAAa,EACbC,kBAAkB,EAGlBC,iBAAiB,EACjBC,gBAAgB,EAChBC,wBAAwB,QACnB,sCAAqC;AAgC5C;;;;;CAKC,GACD,OAAO,eAAeC,0BACpBC,KAA6B,EAC7BC,IAGC;IAED,MAAMC,UAAU,MAAMD,KAAKE,SAAS,CAACC,cAAc,CAAC,OAAOC;YAG3CC;QAFd,MAAMA,QAAQ,MAAMD,YAAYE,GAAG,CAACP,MAAMQ,GAAG;QAC7C,IAAI,CAACF,MAAMG,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;QAC1B,MAAMC,QAAQJ,cAAAA,MAAMI,IAAI,cAAVJ,cAAgB,CAAC;QAC/B,MAAMK,OAAOlB,qBACXiB,IAAI,CAACf,mBAAmB,EACxBK,MAAMY,MAAM;QAEd,IAAI,CAACD,MAAM,OAAO;QAClBN,YAAYQ,MAAM,CAACb,MAAMQ,GAAG,EAAE,aACxBR,MAAMc,WAAW,GAAGd,MAAMc,WAAW,CAACJ,QAAQ,CAAC;YACnD,CAACf,mBAAmB,EAAEgB;;QAExB,OAAO;IACT;IACA,IAAIT,WAAWF,MAAMe,MAAM,EAAE;QAC3B,MAAMd,KACHe,MAAM,CAAChB,MAAMe,MAAM,EAAE;YACpBE,MAAMjB,MAAMkB,gBAAgB;YAC5BC,OAAOtB,iBAAiBG,MAAMY,MAAM,CAACQ,IAAI;YACzCC,MACE,GAAGrB,MAAMsB,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE1B,kBAAkBI,MAAMY,MAAM,CAACQ,IAAI,GAAG,GAC/DpB,CAAAA,MAAMY,MAAM,CAACW,MAAM,GAChB,CAAC,cAAc,EAAEvB,MAAMY,MAAM,CAACW,MAAM,CAACC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,GAC1D,EAAC,IACL,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE9B,eAAe;YACrB+B,MAAMzB,MAAMyB,IAAI;QAClB,GACCC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAMC;IACjB;IACA,OAAOzB;AACT;AAEA;;;CAGC,GACD,OAAO,eAAe0B,iCACpBpB,GAAwC,EACxCqB,SAAiB,EACjBC,OAAe,EACf7B,IAAgD;IAEhD,OAAOA,KAAKE,SAAS,CAACC,cAAc,CAAC,OAAOC;QAC1C,MAAMC,QAAQ,MAAMD,YAAYE,GAAG,CAACC;QACpC,IAAI,CAACF,MAAMG,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;QAC1B,MAAME,OAAOb,yBACXQ,MAAMC,GAAG,CAACZ,qBACVkC,WACAC;QAEF,IAAI,CAACnB,MAAM,OAAO;QAClBN,YAAYQ,MAAM,CAACL,KAAK;YAAE,CAACb,mBAAmB,EAAEgB;QAAK;QACrD,OAAO;IACT;AACF"}

package/src/lib/server/sending-domains.d.ts

@@ -360,5 +360,11 @@ export declare function resolveHostSendingIdentity(options: {
  * declares a cache has also declared how long it may be trusted.
  */
 export declare function hostSendingIdentity(hostId: string | null | undefined, cache?: Map<string, SendingIdentityVerdict>): Promise<SendingIdentityVerdict>;
+/**
+ * The verdict a suspended site's mail gets: a refusal, whatever identity the
+ * site would otherwise have sent on. `sendEmail` reads it and answers
+ * `suspended` without calling the provider.
+ */
+export declare function suspendedSendingIdentity(scope: string | null | undefined): SendingIdentityVerdict;
 /** The record keys a surface highlights as outstanding. */
 export declare function outstandingSendingRecords(record: SendingDomainRecord): SendingDnsRecord[];

package/src/lib/server/sending-domains.js

@@ -65,9 +65,16 @@ import { _ as _extends } from "@swc/helpers/_/_extends";
  * stopped there refuses sends, which is the correct behavior for a domain that
  * has no signing key.
  */ import { assessDmarc, assessSendingRecords, isPlatformSendingDomain, isSharedSendingDomain, normalizeLocalPart, normalizeSendingDomain, resolveSendingIdentity, safeProviderDetail, SENDING_SUBDOMAIN, sendingDnsRecords, sendingTrackingHost, sendingDomainRequiredRecords, sendingRecordKey, sharedTenantSendingFrom, validateSendingDomain } from "@aglyn/shared-util-email";
+import { lockdownMode } from "@aglyn/aglyn/server";
 import firebaseAdmin from "./firebase-admin.js";
 import { lookupCaa, lookupMx, lookupTxt } from "./dns-probe.js";
 import { getOrgForHost } from "./organizations.js";
+import { getSiteLockdown } from "./tenant-write-lockdown.js";
+// Also INSTALLS the outbound phishing screen's review store on `sendEmail`
+// (AGL-3356): every sender whose identity comes from `hostSendingIdentity`
+// has therefore installed the gate the workspace stamped below is read by.
+import { sendingWorkspaceFor } from "./outbound-send-review.js";
+import { flagLookalikeDomain } from "./hosted-page-review.js";
 const firestore = ()=>firebaseAdmin.app().firestore();
 /** Subcollection under the owning org. */ export const SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION = 'sendingDomains';
 const domainRef = (orgId, domain)=>firestore().collection('orgs').doc(orgId).collection(SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION).doc(domain);
@@ -150,6 +157,15 @@ const domainRef = (orgId, domain)=>firestore().collection('orgs').doc(orgId).col
     await ref.set(record, {
         merge: true
     });
+    // A domain that wears a brand (`paypa1.com`) goes to staff in the abuse
+    // queue the moment it is claimed — flagged, not refused (AGL-3362). Mail
+    // from it is held at the send seam whatever staff decide. Never throws.
+    await flagLookalikeDomain({
+        kind: 'sending',
+        hostId: null,
+        orgId: options.orgId,
+        domain
+    });
     return {
         record,
         error: null,
@@ -489,6 +505,17 @@ export async function listSendingDomains(orgId) {
     }), {
         merge: true
     });
+    // Again on verification, the moment it can actually send (AGL-3362): a
+    // claim added before this check existed is caught here. One row per
+    // domain, so this counts rather than re-alerts.
+    if (verified) {
+        await flagLookalikeDomain({
+            kind: 'sending',
+            hostId: null,
+            orgId,
+            domain
+        });
+    }
     return {
         record: readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get()),
         missing: verdict.missing,
@@ -643,7 +670,7 @@ export async function listSendingDomains(orgId) {
  * a site sending on a domain that no longer authenticates. A caller that
  * declares a cache has also declared how long it may be trusted.
  */ export async function hostSendingIdentity(hostId, cache) {
-    var _ref, _ref1, _ref2, _ref3;
+    var _ref, _snapshot_data, _ref1, _ref2, _ref3, _ref4, _ref5, _ref6, _snapshot_data1;
     const id = String(hostId != null ? hostId : '').trim();
     if (!id) {
         /*
@@ -663,16 +690,81 @@ export async function listSendingDomains(orgId) {
     if (hit) return hit;
     const snapshot = await firestore().collection('hosts').doc(id).get().catch(()=>null);
     const owner = await getOrgForHost(id).catch(()=>null);
-    const verdict = await resolveHostSendingIdentity({
-        orgId: (_ref = owner == null ? void 0 : owner.orgId) != null ? _ref : null,
-        selectedDomain: (_ref1 = snapshot == null ? void 0 : snapshot.get('sendingDomain')) != null ? _ref1 : '',
-        selectedLocalPart: (_ref2 = snapshot == null ? void 0 : snapshot.get('sendingLocalPart')) != null ? _ref2 : '',
+    /*
+   * A SUSPENDED SITE SENDS NOTHING (AGL-3356).
+   *
+   * This is the door every tenant sender but the campaign core uses, so it
+   * is where one check covers them all — workflow and automation steps, the
+   * CRM's one-off mail, inbox replies, member posts, receipts, reminders.
+   * Refusing here rather than at each caller is the same argument this
+   * function's own docblock makes about identities: nineteen call sites
+   * asked to remember produce a twentieth that does not, and the incident
+   * behind this was exactly that — a locked workspace whose workflow could
+   * still mail for it.
+   *
+   * FULL locks only. A read-only lock is a maintenance window whose point
+   * is that the site keeps serving and earning, and a receipt for an order
+   * taken before it began must still arrive. Staff suspensions for abuse,
+   * fraud and billing are full locks, which is the case this closes.
+   *
+   * The documents read above are handed to the verdict, so the check costs
+   * the TTL-cached platform read and nothing else. It inherits the
+   * verdict's fail-open posture and its takedown ratchet.
+   */ const lock = await getSiteLockdown(id, Date.now(), {
+        org: (_ref = owner == null ? void 0 : owner.org) != null ? _ref : null,
+        host: (snapshot == null ? void 0 : snapshot.exists) ? (_snapshot_data = snapshot.data()) != null ? _snapshot_data : null : null
+    });
+    if (lock && lockdownMode(lock) === 'full') {
+        const suspended = suspendedSendingIdentity(lock.scope);
+        cache == null ? void 0 : cache.set(id, suspended);
+        return suspended;
+    }
+    const resolved = await resolveHostSendingIdentity({
+        orgId: (_ref1 = owner == null ? void 0 : owner.orgId) != null ? _ref1 : null,
+        selectedDomain: (_ref2 = snapshot == null ? void 0 : snapshot.get('sendingDomain')) != null ? _ref2 : '',
+        selectedLocalPart: (_ref3 = snapshot == null ? void 0 : snapshot.get('sendingLocalPart')) != null ? _ref3 : '',
         hostId: id,
-        poolMember: (_ref3 = snapshot == null ? void 0 : snapshot.get('sendingPoolMember')) != null ? _ref3 : ''
+        poolMember: (_ref4 = snapshot == null ? void 0 : snapshot.get('sendingPoolMember')) != null ? _ref4 : ''
+    });
+    /*
+   * THE WORKSPACE, STAMPED FOR THE PHISHING SCREEN (AGL-3356).
+   *
+   * `sendEmail` screens every tenant message whose identity carries this,
+   * so stamping it here is what puts CRM mail, inbox replies, newsletters,
+   * member posts, sweeps, flow steps and receipts behind one screen without
+   * any of them passing anything. Built from the two documents read above:
+   * the screen costs no read of its own.
+   */ const verdict = _extends({}, resolved, {
+        workspace: sendingWorkspaceFor({
+            hostId: id,
+            orgId: (_ref5 = owner == null ? void 0 : owner.orgId) != null ? _ref5 : null,
+            org: (_ref6 = owner == null ? void 0 : owner.org) != null ? _ref6 : null,
+            host: (snapshot == null ? void 0 : snapshot.exists) ? (_snapshot_data1 = snapshot.data()) != null ? _snapshot_data1 : null : null
+        })
     });
     cache == null ? void 0 : cache.set(id, verdict);
     return verdict;
 }
+/**
+ * The verdict a suspended site's mail gets: a refusal, whatever identity the
+ * site would otherwise have sent on. `sendEmail` reads it and answers
+ * `suspended` without calling the provider.
+ */ export function suspendedSendingIdentity(scope) {
+    const what = scope === 'platform' ? 'Sending is paused platform-wide' : scope === 'org' ? 'This workspace is suspended' : 'This site is suspended';
+    const message = `${what}, so no email is sent on its behalf until the suspension is lifted.`;
+    return {
+        from: null,
+        source: null,
+        domain: null,
+        summary: message,
+        refusal: {
+            code: 'workspace-suspended',
+            domain: null,
+            message,
+            missing: []
+        }
+    };
+}
 /** The record keys a surface highlights as outstanding. */ export function outstandingSendingRecords(record) {
     var _ref;
     const missing = new Set((_ref = record == null ? void 0 : record.lastMissing) != null ? _ref : []);

package/src/lib/server/sending-domains.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../../../../../libs/tenant/data/admin/src/lib/server/sending-domains.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @license\n * Copyright 2026 Aglyn LLC\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * CUSTOM SENDING DOMAINS — durable half.\n *\n * The record, the DNS lookups and the status transitions. The decisions all\n * live in `@aglyn/shared-util-email`'s `sending-domain.ts`, which is pure;\n * this module is the I/O around them, and it holds no policy of its own.\n *\n * ## Per-org record, per-host selection\n *\n * The record is at `orgs/{orgId}/sendingDomains/{domain}`, alongside\n * `orgs/{orgId}/ssoDomains/{domain}` and for the same reason: proving control\n * of a zone is a property of the ORG that proved it, and an agency running\n * four sites on `client.com` should publish the DKIM record once rather than\n * four times.\n *\n * Which identity a given site SENDS on is a separate per-host field,\n * `hosts/{hostId}.sendingDomain`. That split is what answers the two halves of\n * the question at once: per-org verification keeps the DNS chore down, and a\n * per-host selection is what an agency's client actually wants, because the\n * `From:` their recipients see belongs to the site, not to the agency.\n *\n * ## Reads are cheap on purpose\n *\n * `resolveHostSendingIdentity` is on the path of a campaign send, so it reads\n * the host document the caller already has and at most ONE org subcollection\n * document. It never scans, never lists, and never touches DNS — the standing\n * rule against unrequested reads on a hot path applies here more than most,\n * because a campaign resolves an identity once for thousands of messages.\n *\n * ## Why the provider call is not in here\n *\n * Issuing a DKIM key means creating a domain at the mail provider, which needs\n * a credential that can create things — a different one from the send-only\n * `RESEND_API_KEY`, which is exactly why `email-health.ts` can use the domains\n * endpoint as a read-only credential probe.\n *\n * That credential belongs to the console alone, so the driver that reads it\n * lives in the console app — `apps/console/utils/server/` — and not here.\n * **This library is imported by the tenant runtime**, which\n * serves untrusted published sites; a module it can import is a module whose\n * environment read is one bug away from being reachable from a site request.\n * A file in `apps/console` is not importable from the tenant app at all —\n * there is no path mapping to it and nx's module boundaries forbid app→app —\n * so the isolation is structural rather than a convention.\n *\n * What stays here is the seam: {@link recordIssuedSendingDomain} takes what a\n * provider returned, and {@link recordSendingDomainIssueFailure} takes what it\n * refused. `requestSendingDomain` still stops at `requested`, and a domain\n * stopped there refuses sends, which is the correct behavior for a domain that\n * has no signing key.\n */\n\nimport {\n  assessDmarc,\n  assessSendingRecords,\n  isPlatformSendingDomain,\n  isSharedSendingDomain,\n  normalizeLocalPart,\n  normalizeSendingDomain,\n  resolveSendingIdentity,\n  safeProviderDetail,\n  SENDING_SUBDOMAIN,\n  sendingDnsRecords,\n  sendingTrackingHost,\n  sendingDomainRequiredRecords,\n  sendingRecordKey,\n  sharedTenantSendingFrom,\n  validateSendingDomain,\n  type DmarcAssessment,\n  type SendingDnsRecord,\n  type SendingDomainRecord,\n  type SendingDomainSelection,\n  type SendingIdentityPurpose,\n  type SendingIdentityVerdict,\n  type SendingVerification,\n} from '@aglyn/shared-util-email'\nimport firebaseAdmin from './firebase-admin'\nimport { lookupCaa, lookupMx, lookupTxt } from './dns-probe'\nimport { getOrgForHost } from './organizations'\n\nconst firestore = () => firebaseAdmin.app().firestore()\n\n/** Subcollection under the owning org. */\nexport const SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION = 'sendingDomains'\n\nconst domainRef = (orgId: string, domain: string) =>\n  firestore()\n    .collection('orgs')\n    .doc(orgId)\n    .collection(SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION)\n    .doc(domain)\n\n/**\n * The DKIM selector issued to one org for one domain.\n *\n * Includes the org id so two orgs verifying the same name occupy different\n * record names. Without that they would share `resend._domainkey.<domain>`,\n * and whichever verified second would overwrite the first — or, worse, inherit\n * the first's verification without ever publishing anything.\n */\nexport function sendingDkimSelector(orgId: string): string {\n  const safe = String(orgId ?? '')\n    .toLowerCase()\n    .replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '')\n    .slice(0, 24)\n  return `aglyn${safe ? `-${safe}` : ''}`\n}\n\n/** Both keys always present, one always null — `strictNullChecks` is off. */\nexport interface SendingDomainResult {\n  record: SendingDomainRecord | null\n  error: string | null\n  /** The HTTP status a route should answer with. */\n  status: number\n}\n\n/**\n * One stored document as a record.\n *\n * Exported so the re-check sweep, which reaches these documents through a\n * collection-group query rather than by org and name, shapes them the same way\n * every other reader here does — a second reader with its own defaults is how\n * two callers come to disagree about what an absent field means.\n */\nexport function readSendingDomainRecord(\n  snapshot: FirebaseFirestore.DocumentSnapshot,\n): SendingDomainRecord | null {\n  if (!snapshot?.exists) return null\n  const data = snapshot.data() ?? {}\n  return {\n    domain: String(data.domain ?? snapshot.id),\n    status: data.status ?? 'requested',\n    dkimSelector: String(data.dkimSelector ?? ''),\n    dkimPublicKey: data.dkimPublicKey ?? null,\n    returnPathHost: data.returnPathHost ?? null,\n    providerDomainId: data.providerDomainId ?? null,\n    trackingTarget: data.trackingTarget ?? null,\n    createdAtMs: Number(data.createdAtMs) || null,\n    verifiedAtMs: Number(data.verifiedAtMs) || null,\n    lastCheckedAtMs: Number(data.lastCheckedAtMs) || null,\n    lastIssueError: data.lastIssueError ?? null,\n    lastIssueAtMs: Number(data.lastIssueAtMs) || null,\n    lastMissing: Array.isArray(data.lastMissing) ? data.lastMissing : null,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Start (or re-read) a claim on a sending domain.\n *\n * Idempotent, and deliberately non-destructive on a re-request: an existing\n * record keeps its selector and its key, because reissuing either would\n * invalidate a record the customer may already have published and turn a\n * working setup into a mysterious failure. This mirrors `issueDomainClaim`.\n */\nexport async function requestSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n}): Promise<SendingDomainResult> {\n  const { domain, error } = validateSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!domain) return { record: null, error, status: 400 }\n  if (!options?.orgId) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'Missing organization', status: 400 }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  const existing = await ref.get()\n  if (existing.exists) {\n    return { record: readSendingDomainRecord(existing), error: null, status: 200 }\n  }\n\n  const record: SendingDomainRecord = {\n    domain,\n    status: 'requested',\n    dkimSelector: sendingDkimSelector(options.orgId),\n    dkimPublicKey: null,\n    returnPathHost: null,\n    createdAtMs: Date.now(),\n  }\n  await ref.set(record, { merge: true })\n  return { record, error: null, status: 201 }\n}\n\n/**\n * Record the key the mail provider issued, moving the domain to\n * `records-issued` so the customer has something to publish.\n *\n * Separated from {@link requestSendingDomain} because it needs a credential\n * that may not exist. Nothing here calls the provider: the caller supplies\n * what it was given, so a deployment whose key cannot create domains still has\n * a working path — an operator can complete this step by hand — and this\n * module never grows a dependency on a credential it cannot assume. The\n * console holds the credential and the driver that uses it; this library,\n * which the tenant runtime also imports, holds neither.\n *\n * ## `records-issued` is a promise that records exist\n *\n * The write is refused unless the resulting record actually yields a DKIM\n * record with a value. The alternative is the failure this whole feature is\n * arranged against: a status saying the customer has records to publish, next\n * to a records table with an empty DKIM row, which cannot ever verify and\n * reads to the customer as our bug.\n *\n * ## An issued key is never overwritten\n *\n * A second call carrying a DIFFERENT key is refused rather than applied. The\n * customer may already have published the first one, and replacing it turns a\n * finished setup into a domain that silently stops signing. Re-recording the\n * SAME key is a no-op and succeeds, so a retried request is safe.\n *\n * The SELECTOR, by contrast, comes from the provider when it supplies one:\n * the record a customer publishes has to be the name the provider will sign\n * under, and `sendingDkimSelector` only proposes it.\n */\nexport async function recordIssuedSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n  dkimPublicKey: string\n  /** The selector the provider issued, when it chose its own. */\n  dkimSelector?: string\n  returnPathHost?: string\n  providerDomainId?: string\n  /**\n   * The provider's tracking host, when it issued one — see\n   * `SendingDomainRecord.trackingTarget`. Absent leaves the domain sending\n   * and unmeasured rather than unsent.\n   */\n  trackingTarget?: string | null\n}): Promise<SendingDomainResult> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  const key = String(options?.dkimPublicKey ?? '').trim()\n  if (!domain) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'Missing domain', status: 400 }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  const snapshot = await ref.get()\n  if (!snapshot.exists) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'No claim on that domain', status: 404 }\n  }\n\n  const existing = readSendingDomainRecord(snapshot)\n  const held = String(existing?.dkimPublicKey ?? '').trim()\n  if (held && held !== key) {\n    return {\n      record: existing,\n      error:\n        'That domain already has an issued signing key. Release the domain ' +\n        'and add it again to start over.',\n      status: 409,\n    }\n  }\n\n  const selector =\n    String(options?.dkimSelector ?? '').trim() || existing?.dkimSelector || ''\n  const returnPathHost = options.returnPathHost || existing?.returnPathHost\n\n  /*\n   * The only thing standing between a caller and `records-issued`, and it is\n   * asked of the SAME function that prints the records for the customer and\n   * that the verifier compares against — not a truthiness check on the key,\n   * which would be this write's private opinion of what \"publishable\" means\n   * and could agree with nothing else.\n   */\n  const issued = sendingDomainRequiredRecords({\n    domain,\n    dkimSelector: selector,\n    dkimPublicKey: key,\n    returnPathHost,\n  })\n  if (!issued.some((entry) => entry.purpose === 'dkim')) {\n    return {\n      record: existing,\n      error: 'Refusing to issue records for a domain with no publishable DKIM record',\n      status: 400,\n    }\n  }\n\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      status: 'records-issued',\n      dkimPublicKey: key,\n      ...(selector ? { dkimSelector: selector } : {}),\n      ...(options.returnPathHost\n        ? { returnPathHost: options.returnPathHost }\n        : {}),\n      ...(options.providerDomainId\n        ? { providerDomainId: String(options.providerDomainId) }\n        : {}),\n      // Only when the provider issued one. Writing an empty value would put a\n      // tracking CNAME with no target in front of a customer, which is the\n      // blank-record shape `sendingDnsRecords` refuses everywhere else.\n      ...(String(options.trackingTarget ?? '').trim()\n        ? { trackingTarget: String(options.trackingTarget).trim() }\n        : {}),\n      // A previous failure is not part of the record once it succeeded.\n      lastIssueError: firebaseAdmin.firestore.FieldValue.delete(),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n  return { record: readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get()), error: null, status: 200 }\n}\n\n/**\n * Record that the provider did not issue anything, WITHOUT moving the status.\n *\n * The point of a separate function is that there is no path from a provider\n * failure to `records-issued`. A `4xx` or `5xx` means no key exists, so the\n * domain stays `requested` — where it refuses sends, which is correct for a\n * domain that cannot sign — and carries a reason an admin can act on instead\n * of appearing to have finished.\n *\n * `detail` is a short code the caller built from a fixed vocabulary, never a\n * provider's response body. {@link safeProviderDetail} is the second line:\n * an `Authorization` header echoed back by a provider must not become a\n * Firestore document.\n */\nexport async function recordSendingDomainIssueFailure(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n  detail: string\n}): Promise<void> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!options?.orgId || !domain) return\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  if (!(await ref.get()).exists) return\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      lastIssueError: safeProviderDetail(options.detail) || 'unknown',\n      lastIssueAtMs: Date.now(),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n}\n\nexport interface SendingDomainView {\n  record: SendingDomainRecord\n  /** Exactly what the customer must publish. */\n  records: SendingDnsRecord[]\n  /** Their DMARC policy, read and never written. */\n  dmarc: DmarcAssessment | null\n}\n\n/** One domain plus the records it needs, for a surface that shows both. */\nexport async function getSendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<SendingDomainView | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) return null\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await domainRef(orgId, domain).get())\n  if (!record) return null\n  return { record, records: sendingDnsRecords(record), dmarc: null }\n}\n\nexport async function listSendingDomains(\n  orgId: string,\n): Promise<SendingDomainRecord[]> {\n  if (!orgId) return []\n  const snapshot = await firestore()\n    .collection('orgs')\n    .doc(orgId)\n    .collection(SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION)\n    .get()\n  return snapshot.docs.map(readSendingDomainRecord).filter(Boolean)\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the customer's DMARC policy.\n *\n * Advisory in both directions: it never blocks verification and it is never\n * written. A domain under `p=reject` with our DKIM unpublished hard-fails\n * every message, and a customer deserves to be told that before they wonder\n * why their campaign vanished.\n */\nexport async function readDmarcPolicy(\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<DmarcAssessment | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!domain) return null\n  const lookup = await lookupTxt(`_dmarc.${domain}`)\n  // An unreachable lookup is not \"they have no policy\" — saying so would tell\n  // a customer under p=reject that they have no protection.\n  if (!lookup.answered) return null\n  return assessDmarc(lookup.records)\n}\n\n/**\n * Start (or read) the hold that keeps a tracked domain's links alive.\n *\n * Stamped on FIRST sighting rather than computed from an orphan timestamp,\n * because there is no reliable one: a label reassignment leaves no record of\n * when it happened, and the reaper re-infers the orphan on every pass. The\n * stamp is the record of when the hold began, so a domain cannot be held\n * forever by a sweep that keeps starting the clock over.\n *\n * @returns the instant the domain may be released, or `null` when there is\n *          nothing to stamp it on — a domain with no org record cannot be\n *          held, and refusing to release it on the strength of a hold nobody\n *          can see would strand a provider slot permanently.\n */\nexport async function holdTrackedSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string | null\n  domain: string\n  nowMs: number\n  windowMs: number\n}): Promise<number | null> {\n  const orgId = String(options?.orgId ?? '').trim()\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain || options.windowMs <= 0) return null\n\n  const ref = domainRef(orgId, domain)\n  const snapshot = await ref.get().catch(() => null)\n  if (!snapshot?.exists) return null\n\n  const held = Number(snapshot.get('trackingRetentionUntilMs')) || 0\n  if (held > 0) return held\n\n  const until = options.nowMs + options.windowMs\n  await ref\n    .set({ trackingRetentionUntilMs: until }, { merge: true })\n    // A stamp we could not write is a hold we cannot prove later, so the\n    // caller is told there is none rather than being asked to wait on a\n    // deadline that will restart on the next pass.\n    .catch(() => null)\n  return until\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether this domain publishes a CAA policy that would REFUSE the tracking\n * host's certificate.\n *\n * The question decides whether a customer is shown a CAA record at all, and\n * asking it is the difference between guidance and a footgun. CAA restricts\n * which authorities may issue, and the lookup stops at the first name in the\n * tree publishing any record — so:\n *\n *  - A domain publishing NOTHING needs nothing. Any authority may already\n *    issue, and handing over a CAA record to paste would be the change that\n *    STARTS restricting them, breaking whatever else renews on that name.\n *  - A domain that publishes some, none of which name our authority, has to\n *    add one ALONGSIDE what it has.\n *  - A domain that already names our authority is done.\n *\n * Walks up from the tracking host exactly as a certificate authority does,\n * and stops where a real lookup stops: at the first name with any record.\n *\n * @returns `null` when DNS could not be reached, which is not \"they publish\n *          none\" — telling a customer to add a CAA on the strength of an\n *          unanswered lookup is how a working zone gets narrowed by mistake.\n */\nexport async function readTrackingCaaNeed(\n  rawDomain: string,\n  authority: string,\n): Promise<'not-needed' | 'must-add' | 'satisfied' | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  const ca = String(authority ?? '').trim().toLowerCase()\n  if (!domain || !ca) return null\n\n  /*\n   * From the tracking host upward. Every label is asked because a CAA on a\n   * closer name overrides a broader one — a customer who already scoped a\n   * policy to `links.` must not be told to widen their root.\n   */\n  const labels = sendingTrackingHost(domain).split('.')\n  for (let index = 0; index < labels.length - 1; index += 1) {\n    const name = labels.slice(index).join('.')\n    const lookup = await lookupCaa(name)\n    if (!lookup.answered) return null\n    if (!lookup.records.length) continue\n    // The first name with any record is where issuance is decided.\n    const issuers = lookup.records\n      .filter((entry) => / issue \"/.test(entry))\n      .map((entry) => entry.toLowerCase())\n    return issuers.some((entry) => entry.includes(`\"${ca}\"`))\n      ? 'satisfied'\n      : 'must-add'\n  }\n  return 'not-needed'\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the live DNS for one record and say what it establishes. Writes\n * nothing.\n *\n * Split out so the two callers that need this answer ask the SAME question of\n * the SAME resolvers: {@link verifySendingDomain}, which acts on it\n * immediately, and the unattended re-check sweep, which counts conclusive\n * failures before it acts. A sweep that assessed the records its own way would\n * be a second opinion on \"are these published\", and the customer would meet\n * whichever one happened to run last.\n *\n * The three lookups run together because they are independent and the caller\n * is waiting on the slowest either way.\n */\nexport async function probeSendingRecords(\n  record: SendingDomainRecord,\n): Promise<SendingVerification> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(record?.domain ?? '')\n  const sendHost = `${SENDING_SUBDOMAIN}.${domain}`\n  const dkimHost = `${record.dkimSelector}._domainkey.${domain}`\n  const [spf, dkim, mx] = await Promise.all([\n    lookupTxt(sendHost),\n    lookupTxt(dkimHost),\n    lookupMx(sendHost),\n  ])\n\n  return assessSendingRecords(record, {\n    spfTxt: spf.records,\n    dkimTxt: dkim.records,\n    mx: mx.records,\n    // All three, not any: a record we could not read is not a record that is\n    // absent, and one unreadable lookup is enough to make the whole answer\n    // evidence of nothing.\n    conclusive: spf.answered && dkim.answered && mx.answered,\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * Check the live DNS and move the record to `verified` or `failed`.\n *\n * Never throws: a sweep across every org must not stop at the first bad zone.\n *\n * An INCONCLUSIVE result writes nothing but the check time. A resolver outage\n * must not un-verify a working domain — which would silently stop that\n * tenant's mail — and must not fail a customer who is midway through\n * publishing either. This is the `hold` arm the SSO drift sweep uses, and the\n * reason `assessSendingRecords` has three outcomes rather than two.\n *\n * Acts on ONE conclusive answer, and that is right for this caller: an admin\n * pressed Verify and is watching the result, so the check is attended and its\n * outcome is immediately visible and immediately retryable. The unattended\n * sweep over already-verified domains is the caller that cannot say that, and\n * `sending-domain-recheck.ts` is where the extra evidence it needs is\n * gathered.\n */\nexport async function verifySendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<{\n  record: SendingDomainRecord | null\n  missing: string[]\n  inconclusive: boolean\n  error: string | null\n}> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) {\n    return { record: null, missing: [], inconclusive: false, error: 'Invalid domain' }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(orgId, domain)\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get())\n  if (!record) {\n    return {\n      record: null,\n      missing: [],\n      inconclusive: false,\n      error: 'No claim on that domain — add it first.',\n    }\n  }\n\n  const verdict = await probeSendingRecords(record)\n\n  const now = Date.now()\n  if (verdict.status === 'inconclusive') {\n    await ref.set({ lastCheckedAtMs: now }, { merge: true })\n    return { record, missing: [], inconclusive: true, error: null }\n  }\n\n  const verified = verdict.status === 'verified'\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      status: verified ? 'verified' : 'failed',\n      lastCheckedAtMs: now,\n      ...(verified\n        ? {\n            verifiedAtMs: now,\n            lastMissing: firebaseAdmin.firestore.FieldValue.delete(),\n          }\n        : { lastMissing: verdict.missing }),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n\n  return {\n    record: readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get()),\n    missing: verdict.missing,\n    inconclusive: false,\n    error: null,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop a claim.\n *\n * The host selections pointing at it are NOT rewritten to the platform\n * identity. A site that was sending as its own domain and now has no verified\n * one must refuse, not quietly revert — silently moving a tenant's mail back\n * onto the shared domain is the exact fallback this feature exists to prevent,\n * and doing it during a delete would be no better than doing it during a send.\n */\nexport async function releaseSendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) return\n  await domainRef(orgId, domain)\n    .delete()\n    .catch(() => undefined)\n}\n\n/*==========================================\n  The read on the send path\n==========================================*/\n\n/**\n * The identity one host sends on, ready to hand to `sendEmail`.\n *\n * Two document reads at most, and none at all for a host that has no\n * selection. The host document is passed in rather than re-fetched because\n * every caller already holds it.\n *\n * ## This function cannot return an `aglyn.com` address, and that is the point\n *\n * Every caller here is resolving mail FOR A SITE — that is what \"host\" in the\n * name means — so every verdict it produces is tenant mail by construction.\n * `audience: 'tenant'` is therefore passed unconditionally and is not a\n * parameter: a caller that could choose would eventually choose wrong, and the\n * wrong choice puts a merchant's list quality onto the domain the platform's\n * own invoices and password resets leave on.\n *\n * A site that has selected NOTHING does not reach `USAGE_EMAIL_FROM` either.\n * All of its mail goes on the shared pool member `hostSharedFrom` assigns it,\n * marketing included. What keeps the pool usable is measurement rather than\n * prohibition: a pooled campaign is graded against the stricter reputation\n * thresholds, so the site earning complaints is the one that stops.\n */\nexport async function resolveHostSendingIdentity(options: {\n  orgId: string | null | undefined\n  /** `hosts/{hostId}.sendingDomain`, the site's selection. */\n  selectedDomain: string | null | undefined\n  /** `hosts/{hostId}.sendingLocalPart`, defaulted when unset. */\n  selectedLocalPart?: string | null\n  platformFrom?: string | null\n  /**\n   * The site, so an unselected host can be assigned a pool member.\n   *\n   * Optional because two of the three callers resolve an identity for a host\n   * they are already holding and one — the console's identity view — is asking\n   * about a specific site by id. A caller that omits it gets no shared\n   * identity, which is the honest answer: the pool assignment is per site, and\n   * \"some pool member\" is not a thing to send a receipt from.\n   */\n  hostId?: string | null\n  /**\n   * A pool member this host is pinned to, overriding the hash.\n   *\n   * `hosts/{hostId}.sendingPoolMember`. The QUARANTINE lever: a site whose\n   * transactional mail is generating complaints can be moved onto a member set\n   * aside for it, without disturbing any of the other sites that hash to the\n   * member it was on. Ignored unless it names a real member of the current\n   * pool, so a stale or hand-edited value degrades to the ordinary assignment\n   * rather than to an address nothing signs for.\n   */\n  poolMember?: string | null\n  /** See `SendingIdentityPurpose`. Defaults to transactional. */\n  purpose?: SendingIdentityPurpose\n}): Promise<SendingIdentityVerdict> {\n  const platformFrom =\n    options?.platformFrom ?? process.env.USAGE_EMAIL_FROM ?? null\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.selectedDomain ?? '')\n  const purpose = options?.purpose\n  const sharedFrom = hostSharedFrom(options?.hostId, options?.poolMember)\n\n  if (!domain || !options?.orgId) {\n    return resolveSendingIdentity({\n      selection: null,\n      platformFrom,\n      sharedFrom,\n      purpose,\n      audience: 'tenant',\n    })\n  }\n\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await domainRef(options.orgId, domain).get())\n\n  /*\n   * Whose domain this is, decided from the NAME rather than from the record.\n   *\n   * The record is what a released domain no longer has, and a site pointed at\n   * a subdomain of our own apex is still pointed at a subdomain of our own\n   * apex whether or not one exists for it. Deriving this from the name keeps\n   * the two possible failures apart: a missing record for OUR name is our\n   * provisioning that did not finish, a missing record for THEIRS is a domain\n   * they asked to send as and nothing has verified.\n   */\n  const platformIssued = isPlatformSendingDomain(domain)\n\n  /*\n   * A selection naming a CUSTOMER'S domain with no record refuses rather than\n   * falling back. The record can be gone because it was released, or because\n   * the selection was written against a different org — both mean the site is\n   * configured to send as a domain nothing has verified, and neither is a\n   * reason to send as somebody else.\n   *\n   * `platformIssued` rides on the selection either way, and the resolver reads\n   * it only on the unverified branch: a platform subdomain that has not\n   * finished provisioning drops to the pool for transactional mail instead,\n   * because nothing about it is a merchant instruction to contradict.\n   */\n  const selection: SendingDomainSelection = record\n    ? {\n        domain: record.domain,\n        status: record.status,\n        localPart: normalizeLocalPart(options.selectedLocalPart ?? '') || 'hello',\n        missing: record.lastMissing ?? [],\n        platformIssued,\n      }\n    : { domain, status: 'failed', localPart: '', missing: [], platformIssued }\n\n  /*\n   * `sharedFrom` is passed even here, where a selection exists and will decide\n   * the outcome. 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Asking nineteen call\n * sites to each assemble the same three values is the shape that produces a\n * twentieth which does not — and the cost of forgetting here is a message\n * leaving on the platform's own domain.\n *\n * ## The cache is per-call-graph, not per-process\n *\n * Passed a `cache`, repeated resolutions for one host cost one pair of reads.\n * A sweep that mails two hundred abandoned carts across a dozen sites, or a\n * webhook that sends a receipt and a seller notice for the same order, holds\n * one map for the run and pays for each site once.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a module-level cache. Verification status is exactly the\n * thing that changes underneath a long-lived process — the re-check sweep\n * un-verifies a domain whose records have gone — and a stale entry would keep\n * a site sending on a domain that no longer authenticates. 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../../../../../libs/tenant/data/admin/src/lib/server/sending-domains.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @license\n * Copyright 2026 Aglyn LLC\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * CUSTOM SENDING DOMAINS — durable half.\n *\n * The record, the DNS lookups and the status transitions. The decisions all\n * live in `@aglyn/shared-util-email`'s `sending-domain.ts`, which is pure;\n * this module is the I/O around them, and it holds no policy of its own.\n *\n * ## Per-org record, per-host selection\n *\n * The record is at `orgs/{orgId}/sendingDomains/{domain}`, alongside\n * `orgs/{orgId}/ssoDomains/{domain}` and for the same reason: proving control\n * of a zone is a property of the ORG that proved it, and an agency running\n * four sites on `client.com` should publish the DKIM record once rather than\n * four times.\n *\n * Which identity a given site SENDS on is a separate per-host field,\n * `hosts/{hostId}.sendingDomain`. That split is what answers the two halves of\n * the question at once: per-org verification keeps the DNS chore down, and a\n * per-host selection is what an agency's client actually wants, because the\n * `From:` their recipients see belongs to the site, not to the agency.\n *\n * ## Reads are cheap on purpose\n *\n * `resolveHostSendingIdentity` is on the path of a campaign send, so it reads\n * the host document the caller already has and at most ONE org subcollection\n * document. It never scans, never lists, and never touches DNS — the standing\n * rule against unrequested reads on a hot path applies here more than most,\n * because a campaign resolves an identity once for thousands of messages.\n *\n * ## Why the provider call is not in here\n *\n * Issuing a DKIM key means creating a domain at the mail provider, which needs\n * a credential that can create things — a different one from the send-only\n * `RESEND_API_KEY`, which is exactly why `email-health.ts` can use the domains\n * endpoint as a read-only credential probe.\n *\n * That credential belongs to the console alone, so the driver that reads it\n * lives in the console app — `apps/console/utils/server/` — and not here.\n * **This library is imported by the tenant runtime**, which\n * serves untrusted published sites; a module it can import is a module whose\n * environment read is one bug away from being reachable from a site request.\n * A file in `apps/console` is not importable from the tenant app at all —\n * there is no path mapping to it and nx's module boundaries forbid app→app —\n * so the isolation is structural rather than a convention.\n *\n * What stays here is the seam: {@link recordIssuedSendingDomain} takes what a\n * provider returned, and {@link recordSendingDomainIssueFailure} takes what it\n * refused. `requestSendingDomain` still stops at `requested`, and a domain\n * stopped there refuses sends, which is the correct behavior for a domain that\n * has no signing key.\n */\n\nimport {\n  assessDmarc,\n  assessSendingRecords,\n  isPlatformSendingDomain,\n  isSharedSendingDomain,\n  normalizeLocalPart,\n  normalizeSendingDomain,\n  resolveSendingIdentity,\n  safeProviderDetail,\n  SENDING_SUBDOMAIN,\n  sendingDnsRecords,\n  sendingTrackingHost,\n  sendingDomainRequiredRecords,\n  sendingRecordKey,\n  sharedTenantSendingFrom,\n  validateSendingDomain,\n  type DmarcAssessment,\n  type SendingDnsRecord,\n  type SendingDomainRecord,\n  type SendingDomainSelection,\n  type SendingIdentityPurpose,\n  type SendingIdentityVerdict,\n  type SendingVerification,\n} from '@aglyn/shared-util-email'\nimport { lockdownMode } from '@aglyn/aglyn/server'\nimport firebaseAdmin from './firebase-admin'\nimport { lookupCaa, lookupMx, lookupTxt } from './dns-probe'\nimport { getOrgForHost } from './organizations'\nimport { getSiteLockdown } from './tenant-write-lockdown'\n// Also INSTALLS the outbound phishing screen's review store on `sendEmail`\n// (AGL-3356): every sender whose identity comes from `hostSendingIdentity`\n// has therefore installed the gate the workspace stamped below is read by.\nimport { sendingWorkspaceFor } from './outbound-send-review'\nimport { flagLookalikeDomain } from './hosted-page-review'\n\nconst firestore = () => firebaseAdmin.app().firestore()\n\n/** Subcollection under the owning org. */\nexport const SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION = 'sendingDomains'\n\nconst domainRef = (orgId: string, domain: string) =>\n  firestore()\n    .collection('orgs')\n    .doc(orgId)\n    .collection(SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION)\n    .doc(domain)\n\n/**\n * The DKIM selector issued to one org for one domain.\n *\n * Includes the org id so two orgs verifying the same name occupy different\n * record names. Without that they would share `resend._domainkey.<domain>`,\n * and whichever verified second would overwrite the first — or, worse, inherit\n * the first's verification without ever publishing anything.\n */\nexport function sendingDkimSelector(orgId: string): string {\n  const safe = String(orgId ?? '')\n    .toLowerCase()\n    .replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '')\n    .slice(0, 24)\n  return `aglyn${safe ? `-${safe}` : ''}`\n}\n\n/** Both keys always present, one always null — `strictNullChecks` is off. */\nexport interface SendingDomainResult {\n  record: SendingDomainRecord | null\n  error: string | null\n  /** The HTTP status a route should answer with. */\n  status: number\n}\n\n/**\n * One stored document as a record.\n *\n * Exported so the re-check sweep, which reaches these documents through a\n * collection-group query rather than by org and name, shapes them the same way\n * every other reader here does — a second reader with its own defaults is how\n * two callers come to disagree about what an absent field means.\n */\nexport function readSendingDomainRecord(\n  snapshot: FirebaseFirestore.DocumentSnapshot,\n): SendingDomainRecord | null {\n  if (!snapshot?.exists) return null\n  const data = snapshot.data() ?? {}\n  return {\n    domain: String(data.domain ?? snapshot.id),\n    status: data.status ?? 'requested',\n    dkimSelector: String(data.dkimSelector ?? ''),\n    dkimPublicKey: data.dkimPublicKey ?? null,\n    returnPathHost: data.returnPathHost ?? null,\n    providerDomainId: data.providerDomainId ?? null,\n    trackingTarget: data.trackingTarget ?? null,\n    createdAtMs: Number(data.createdAtMs) || null,\n    verifiedAtMs: Number(data.verifiedAtMs) || null,\n    lastCheckedAtMs: Number(data.lastCheckedAtMs) || null,\n    lastIssueError: data.lastIssueError ?? null,\n    lastIssueAtMs: Number(data.lastIssueAtMs) || null,\n    lastMissing: Array.isArray(data.lastMissing) ? data.lastMissing : null,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Start (or re-read) a claim on a sending domain.\n *\n * Idempotent, and deliberately non-destructive on a re-request: an existing\n * record keeps its selector and its key, because reissuing either would\n * invalidate a record the customer may already have published and turn a\n * working setup into a mysterious failure. This mirrors `issueDomainClaim`.\n */\nexport async function requestSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n}): Promise<SendingDomainResult> {\n  const { domain, error } = validateSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!domain) return { record: null, error, status: 400 }\n  if (!options?.orgId) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'Missing organization', status: 400 }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  const existing = await ref.get()\n  if (existing.exists) {\n    return { record: readSendingDomainRecord(existing), error: null, status: 200 }\n  }\n\n  const record: SendingDomainRecord = {\n    domain,\n    status: 'requested',\n    dkimSelector: sendingDkimSelector(options.orgId),\n    dkimPublicKey: null,\n    returnPathHost: null,\n    createdAtMs: Date.now(),\n  }\n  await ref.set(record, { merge: true })\n  // A domain that wears a brand (`paypa1.com`) goes to staff in the abuse\n  // queue the moment it is claimed — flagged, not refused (AGL-3362). Mail\n  // from it is held at the send seam whatever staff decide. Never throws.\n  await flagLookalikeDomain({ kind: 'sending', hostId: null, orgId: options.orgId, domain })\n  return { record, error: null, status: 201 }\n}\n\n/**\n * Record the key the mail provider issued, moving the domain to\n * `records-issued` so the customer has something to publish.\n *\n * Separated from {@link requestSendingDomain} because it needs a credential\n * that may not exist. Nothing here calls the provider: the caller supplies\n * what it was given, so a deployment whose key cannot create domains still has\n * a working path — an operator can complete this step by hand — and this\n * module never grows a dependency on a credential it cannot assume. The\n * console holds the credential and the driver that uses it; this library,\n * which the tenant runtime also imports, holds neither.\n *\n * ## `records-issued` is a promise that records exist\n *\n * The write is refused unless the resulting record actually yields a DKIM\n * record with a value. The alternative is the failure this whole feature is\n * arranged against: a status saying the customer has records to publish, next\n * to a records table with an empty DKIM row, which cannot ever verify and\n * reads to the customer as our bug.\n *\n * ## An issued key is never overwritten\n *\n * A second call carrying a DIFFERENT key is refused rather than applied. The\n * customer may already have published the first one, and replacing it turns a\n * finished setup into a domain that silently stops signing. Re-recording the\n * SAME key is a no-op and succeeds, so a retried request is safe.\n *\n * The SELECTOR, by contrast, comes from the provider when it supplies one:\n * the record a customer publishes has to be the name the provider will sign\n * under, and `sendingDkimSelector` only proposes it.\n */\nexport async function recordIssuedSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n  dkimPublicKey: string\n  /** The selector the provider issued, when it chose its own. */\n  dkimSelector?: string\n  returnPathHost?: string\n  providerDomainId?: string\n  /**\n   * The provider's tracking host, when it issued one — see\n   * `SendingDomainRecord.trackingTarget`. Absent leaves the domain sending\n   * and unmeasured rather than unsent.\n   */\n  trackingTarget?: string | null\n}): Promise<SendingDomainResult> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  const key = String(options?.dkimPublicKey ?? '').trim()\n  if (!domain) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'Missing domain', status: 400 }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  const snapshot = await ref.get()\n  if (!snapshot.exists) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'No claim on that domain', status: 404 }\n  }\n\n  const existing = readSendingDomainRecord(snapshot)\n  const held = String(existing?.dkimPublicKey ?? '').trim()\n  if (held && held !== key) {\n    return {\n      record: existing,\n      error:\n        'That domain already has an issued signing key. Release the domain ' +\n        'and add it again to start over.',\n      status: 409,\n    }\n  }\n\n  const selector =\n    String(options?.dkimSelector ?? '').trim() || existing?.dkimSelector || ''\n  const returnPathHost = options.returnPathHost || existing?.returnPathHost\n\n  /*\n   * The only thing standing between a caller and `records-issued`, and it is\n   * asked of the SAME function that prints the records for the customer and\n   * that the verifier compares against — not a truthiness check on the key,\n   * which would be this write's private opinion of what \"publishable\" means\n   * and could agree with nothing else.\n   */\n  const issued = sendingDomainRequiredRecords({\n    domain,\n    dkimSelector: selector,\n    dkimPublicKey: key,\n    returnPathHost,\n  })\n  if (!issued.some((entry) => entry.purpose === 'dkim')) {\n    return {\n      record: existing,\n      error: 'Refusing to issue records for a domain with no publishable DKIM record',\n      status: 400,\n    }\n  }\n\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      status: 'records-issued',\n      dkimPublicKey: key,\n      ...(selector ? { dkimSelector: selector } : {}),\n      ...(options.returnPathHost\n        ? { returnPathHost: options.returnPathHost }\n        : {}),\n      ...(options.providerDomainId\n        ? { providerDomainId: String(options.providerDomainId) }\n        : {}),\n      // Only when the provider issued one. Writing an empty value would put a\n      // tracking CNAME with no target in front of a customer, which is the\n      // blank-record shape `sendingDnsRecords` refuses everywhere else.\n      ...(String(options.trackingTarget ?? '').trim()\n        ? { trackingTarget: String(options.trackingTarget).trim() }\n        : {}),\n      // A previous failure is not part of the record once it succeeded.\n      lastIssueError: firebaseAdmin.firestore.FieldValue.delete(),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n  return { record: readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get()), error: null, status: 200 }\n}\n\n/**\n * Record that the provider did not issue anything, WITHOUT moving the status.\n *\n * The point of a separate function is that there is no path from a provider\n * failure to `records-issued`. A `4xx` or `5xx` means no key exists, so the\n * domain stays `requested` — where it refuses sends, which is correct for a\n * domain that cannot sign — and carries a reason an admin can act on instead\n * of appearing to have finished.\n *\n * `detail` is a short code the caller built from a fixed vocabulary, never a\n * provider's response body. {@link safeProviderDetail} is the second line:\n * an `Authorization` header echoed back by a provider must not become a\n * Firestore document.\n */\nexport async function recordSendingDomainIssueFailure(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n  detail: string\n}): Promise<void> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!options?.orgId || !domain) return\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  if (!(await ref.get()).exists) return\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      lastIssueError: safeProviderDetail(options.detail) || 'unknown',\n      lastIssueAtMs: Date.now(),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n}\n\nexport interface SendingDomainView {\n  record: SendingDomainRecord\n  /** Exactly what the customer must publish. */\n  records: SendingDnsRecord[]\n  /** Their DMARC policy, read and never written. */\n  dmarc: DmarcAssessment | null\n}\n\n/** One domain plus the records it needs, for a surface that shows both. */\nexport async function getSendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<SendingDomainView | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) return null\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await domainRef(orgId, domain).get())\n  if (!record) return null\n  return { record, records: sendingDnsRecords(record), dmarc: null }\n}\n\nexport async function listSendingDomains(\n  orgId: string,\n): Promise<SendingDomainRecord[]> {\n  if (!orgId) return []\n  const snapshot = await firestore()\n    .collection('orgs')\n    .doc(orgId)\n    .collection(SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION)\n    .get()\n  return snapshot.docs.map(readSendingDomainRecord).filter(Boolean)\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the customer's DMARC policy.\n *\n * Advisory in both directions: it never blocks verification and it is never\n * written. A domain under `p=reject` with our DKIM unpublished hard-fails\n * every message, and a customer deserves to be told that before they wonder\n * why their campaign vanished.\n */\nexport async function readDmarcPolicy(\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<DmarcAssessment | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!domain) return null\n  const lookup = await lookupTxt(`_dmarc.${domain}`)\n  // An unreachable lookup is not \"they have no policy\" — saying so would tell\n  // a customer under p=reject that they have no protection.\n  if (!lookup.answered) return null\n  return assessDmarc(lookup.records)\n}\n\n/**\n * Start (or read) the hold that keeps a tracked domain's links alive.\n *\n * Stamped on FIRST sighting rather than computed from an orphan timestamp,\n * because there is no reliable one: a label reassignment leaves no record of\n * when it happened, and the reaper re-infers the orphan on every pass. The\n * stamp is the record of when the hold began, so a domain cannot be held\n * forever by a sweep that keeps starting the clock over.\n *\n * @returns the instant the domain may be released, or `null` when there is\n *          nothing to stamp it on — a domain with no org record cannot be\n *          held, and refusing to release it on the strength of a hold nobody\n *          can see would strand a provider slot permanently.\n */\nexport async function holdTrackedSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string | null\n  domain: string\n  nowMs: number\n  windowMs: number\n}): Promise<number | null> {\n  const orgId = String(options?.orgId ?? '').trim()\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain || options.windowMs <= 0) return null\n\n  const ref = domainRef(orgId, domain)\n  const snapshot = await ref.get().catch(() => null)\n  if (!snapshot?.exists) return null\n\n  const held = Number(snapshot.get('trackingRetentionUntilMs')) || 0\n  if (held > 0) return held\n\n  const until = options.nowMs + options.windowMs\n  await ref\n    .set({ trackingRetentionUntilMs: until }, { merge: true })\n    // A stamp we could not write is a hold we cannot prove later, so the\n    // caller is told there is none rather than being asked to wait on a\n    // deadline that will restart on the next pass.\n    .catch(() => null)\n  return until\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether this domain publishes a CAA policy that would REFUSE the tracking\n * host's certificate.\n *\n * The question decides whether a customer is shown a CAA record at all, and\n * asking it is the difference between guidance and a footgun. CAA restricts\n * which authorities may issue, and the lookup stops at the first name in the\n * tree publishing any record — so:\n *\n *  - A domain publishing NOTHING needs nothing. Any authority may already\n *    issue, and handing over a CAA record to paste would be the change that\n *    STARTS restricting them, breaking whatever else renews on that name.\n *  - A domain that publishes some, none of which name our authority, has to\n *    add one ALONGSIDE what it has.\n *  - A domain that already names our authority is done.\n *\n * Walks up from the tracking host exactly as a certificate authority does,\n * and stops where a real lookup stops: at the first name with any record.\n *\n * @returns `null` when DNS could not be reached, which is not \"they publish\n *          none\" — telling a customer to add a CAA on the strength of an\n *          unanswered lookup is how a working zone gets narrowed by mistake.\n */\nexport async function readTrackingCaaNeed(\n  rawDomain: string,\n  authority: string,\n): Promise<'not-needed' | 'must-add' | 'satisfied' | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  const ca = String(authority ?? '').trim().toLowerCase()\n  if (!domain || !ca) return null\n\n  /*\n   * From the tracking host upward. Every label is asked because a CAA on a\n   * closer name overrides a broader one — a customer who already scoped a\n   * policy to `links.` must not be told to widen their root.\n   */\n  const labels = sendingTrackingHost(domain).split('.')\n  for (let index = 0; index < labels.length - 1; index += 1) {\n    const name = labels.slice(index).join('.')\n    const lookup = await lookupCaa(name)\n    if (!lookup.answered) return null\n    if (!lookup.records.length) continue\n    // The first name with any record is where issuance is decided.\n    const issuers = lookup.records\n      .filter((entry) => / issue \"/.test(entry))\n      .map((entry) => entry.toLowerCase())\n    return issuers.some((entry) => entry.includes(`\"${ca}\"`))\n      ? 'satisfied'\n      : 'must-add'\n  }\n  return 'not-needed'\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the live DNS for one record and say what it establishes. Writes\n * nothing.\n *\n * Split out so the two callers that need this answer ask the SAME question of\n * the SAME resolvers: {@link verifySendingDomain}, which acts on it\n * immediately, and the unattended re-check sweep, which counts conclusive\n * failures before it acts. A sweep that assessed the records its own way would\n * be a second opinion on \"are these published\", and the customer would meet\n * whichever one happened to run last.\n *\n * The three lookups run together because they are independent and the caller\n * is waiting on the slowest either way.\n */\nexport async function probeSendingRecords(\n  record: SendingDomainRecord,\n): Promise<SendingVerification> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(record?.domain ?? '')\n  const sendHost = `${SENDING_SUBDOMAIN}.${domain}`\n  const dkimHost = `${record.dkimSelector}._domainkey.${domain}`\n  const [spf, dkim, mx] = await Promise.all([\n    lookupTxt(sendHost),\n    lookupTxt(dkimHost),\n    lookupMx(sendHost),\n  ])\n\n  return assessSendingRecords(record, {\n    spfTxt: spf.records,\n    dkimTxt: dkim.records,\n    mx: mx.records,\n    // All three, not any: a record we could not read is not a record that is\n    // absent, and one unreadable lookup is enough to make the whole answer\n    // evidence of nothing.\n    conclusive: spf.answered && dkim.answered && mx.answered,\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * Check the live DNS and move the record to `verified` or `failed`.\n *\n * Never throws: a sweep across every org must not stop at the first bad zone.\n *\n * An INCONCLUSIVE result writes nothing but the check time. A resolver outage\n * must not un-verify a working domain — which would silently stop that\n * tenant's mail — and must not fail a customer who is midway through\n * publishing either. This is the `hold` arm the SSO drift sweep uses, and the\n * reason `assessSendingRecords` has three outcomes rather than two.\n *\n * Acts on ONE conclusive answer, and that is right for this caller: an admin\n * pressed Verify and is watching the result, so the check is attended and its\n * outcome is immediately visible and immediately retryable. The unattended\n * sweep over already-verified domains is the caller that cannot say that, and\n * `sending-domain-recheck.ts` is where the extra evidence it needs is\n * gathered.\n */\nexport async function verifySendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<{\n  record: SendingDomainRecord | null\n  missing: string[]\n  inconclusive: boolean\n  error: string | null\n}> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) {\n    return { record: null, missing: [], inconclusive: false, error: 'Invalid domain' }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(orgId, domain)\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get())\n  if (!record) {\n    return {\n      record: null,\n      missing: [],\n      inconclusive: false,\n      error: 'No claim on that domain — add it first.',\n    }\n  }\n\n  const verdict = await probeSendingRecords(record)\n\n  const now = Date.now()\n  if (verdict.status === 'inconclusive') {\n    await ref.set({ lastCheckedAtMs: now }, { merge: true })\n    return { record, missing: [], inconclusive: true, error: null }\n  }\n\n  const verified = verdict.status === 'verified'\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      status: verified ? 'verified' : 'failed',\n      lastCheckedAtMs: now,\n      ...(verified\n        ? {\n            verifiedAtMs: now,\n            lastMissing: firebaseAdmin.firestore.FieldValue.delete(),\n          }\n        : { lastMissing: verdict.missing }),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n\n  // Again on verification, the moment it can actually send (AGL-3362): a\n  // claim added before this check existed is caught here. One row per\n  // domain, so this counts rather than re-alerts.\n  if (verified) {\n    await flagLookalikeDomain({ kind: 'sending', hostId: null, orgId, domain })\n  }\n\n  return {\n    record: readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get()),\n    missing: verdict.missing,\n    inconclusive: false,\n    error: null,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop a claim.\n *\n * The host selections pointing at it are NOT rewritten to the platform\n * identity. A site that was sending as its own domain and now has no verified\n * one must refuse, not quietly revert — silently moving a tenant's mail back\n * onto the shared domain is the exact fallback this feature exists to prevent,\n * and doing it during a delete would be no better than doing it during a send.\n */\nexport async function releaseSendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) return\n  await domainRef(orgId, domain)\n    .delete()\n    .catch(() => undefined)\n}\n\n/*==========================================\n  The read on the send path\n==========================================*/\n\n/**\n * The identity one host sends on, ready to hand to `sendEmail`.\n *\n * Two document reads at most, and none at all for a host that has no\n * selection. The host document is passed in rather than re-fetched because\n * every caller already holds it.\n *\n * ## This function cannot return an `aglyn.com` address, and that is the point\n *\n * Every caller here is resolving mail FOR A SITE — that is what \"host\" in the\n * name means — so every verdict it produces is tenant mail by construction.\n * `audience: 'tenant'` is therefore passed unconditionally and is not a\n * parameter: a caller that could choose would eventually choose wrong, and the\n * wrong choice puts a merchant's list quality onto the domain the platform's\n * own invoices and password resets leave on.\n *\n * A site that has selected NOTHING does not reach `USAGE_EMAIL_FROM` either.\n * All of its mail goes on the shared pool member `hostSharedFrom` assigns it,\n * marketing included. What keeps the pool usable is measurement rather than\n * prohibition: a pooled campaign is graded against the stricter reputation\n * thresholds, so the site earning complaints is the one that stops.\n */\nexport async function resolveHostSendingIdentity(options: {\n  orgId: string | null | undefined\n  /** `hosts/{hostId}.sendingDomain`, the site's selection. */\n  selectedDomain: string | null | undefined\n  /** `hosts/{hostId}.sendingLocalPart`, defaulted when unset. */\n  selectedLocalPart?: string | null\n  platformFrom?: string | null\n  /**\n   * The site, so an unselected host can be assigned a pool member.\n   *\n   * Optional because two of the three callers resolve an identity for a host\n   * they are already holding and one — the console's identity view — is asking\n   * about a specific site by id. A caller that omits it gets no shared\n   * identity, which is the honest answer: the pool assignment is per site, and\n   * \"some pool member\" is not a thing to send a receipt from.\n   */\n  hostId?: string | null\n  /**\n   * A pool member this host is pinned to, overriding the hash.\n   *\n   * `hosts/{hostId}.sendingPoolMember`. The QUARANTINE lever: a site whose\n   * transactional mail is generating complaints can be moved onto a member set\n   * aside for it, without disturbing any of the other sites that hash to the\n   * member it was on. Ignored unless it names a real member of the current\n   * pool, so a stale or hand-edited value degrades to the ordinary assignment\n   * rather than to an address nothing signs for.\n   */\n  poolMember?: string | null\n  /** See `SendingIdentityPurpose`. Defaults to transactional. */\n  purpose?: SendingIdentityPurpose\n}): Promise<SendingIdentityVerdict> {\n  const platformFrom =\n    options?.platformFrom ?? process.env.USAGE_EMAIL_FROM ?? null\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.selectedDomain ?? '')\n  const purpose = options?.purpose\n  const sharedFrom = hostSharedFrom(options?.hostId, options?.poolMember)\n\n  if (!domain || !options?.orgId) {\n    return resolveSendingIdentity({\n      selection: null,\n      platformFrom,\n      sharedFrom,\n      purpose,\n      audience: 'tenant',\n    })\n  }\n\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await domainRef(options.orgId, domain).get())\n\n  /*\n   * Whose domain this is, decided from the NAME rather than from the record.\n   *\n   * The record is what a released domain no longer has, and a site pointed at\n   * a subdomain of our own apex is still pointed at a subdomain of our own\n   * apex whether or not one exists for it. Deriving this from the name keeps\n   * the two possible failures apart: a missing record for OUR name is our\n   * provisioning that did not finish, a missing record for THEIRS is a domain\n   * they asked to send as and nothing has verified.\n   */\n  const platformIssued = isPlatformSendingDomain(domain)\n\n  /*\n   * A selection naming a CUSTOMER'S domain with no record refuses rather than\n   * falling back. The record can be gone because it was released, or because\n   * the selection was written against a different org — both mean the site is\n   * configured to send as a domain nothing has verified, and neither is a\n   * reason to send as somebody else.\n   *\n   * `platformIssued` rides on the selection either way, and the resolver reads\n   * it only on the unverified branch: a platform subdomain that has not\n   * finished provisioning drops to the pool for transactional mail instead,\n   * because nothing about it is a merchant instruction to contradict.\n   */\n  const selection: SendingDomainSelection = record\n    ? {\n        domain: record.domain,\n        status: record.status,\n        localPart: normalizeLocalPart(options.selectedLocalPart ?? '') || 'hello',\n        missing: record.lastMissing ?? [],\n        platformIssued,\n      }\n    : { domain, status: 'failed', localPart: '', missing: [], platformIssued }\n\n  /*\n   * `sharedFrom` is passed even here, where a selection exists and will decide\n   * the outcome. It is inert by construction — the selection branch of\n   * `resolveSendingIdentity` never reads it — and passing it unconditionally\n   * keeps the call shape identical between the two arms, so a future edit\n   * cannot produce a path that had a pool available and did not offer it.\n   *\n   * It must NOT become a fallback for an unverified selection, and it is the\n   * resolver's structure rather than this call site that guarantees that.\n   */\n  return resolveSendingIdentity({\n    selection,\n    platformFrom,\n    sharedFrom,\n    purpose,\n    audience: 'tenant',\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * The pool address for one host: the pinned member if it names a real one, the\n * hash assignment otherwise.\n *\n * The override is validated against the LIVE pool rather than trusted, because\n * a stale value is the expected case — an operator shrinks the pool, or a\n * quarantine was lifted by deleting the member rather than the field — and an\n * address on a domain that no longer exists is a send that fails at the\n * provider instead of one that quietly goes back to normal.\n */\nfunction hostSharedFrom(\n  hostId: string | null | undefined,\n  poolMember: string | null | undefined,\n): string {\n  const id = String(hostId ?? '').trim()\n  if (!id) return ''\n\n  const pinned = normalizeSendingDomain(String(poolMember ?? ''))\n  if (pinned && isSharedSendingDomain(pinned)) {\n    const shared = sharedTenantSendingFrom(id)\n    const at = shared.lastIndexOf('@')\n    return at > 0 ? `${shared.slice(0, at)}@${pinned}` : ''\n  }\n\n  return sharedTenantSendingFrom(id)\n}\n\n/**\n * The identity one site sends on, from a `hostId` alone.\n *\n * The door every tenant sender uses. {@link resolveHostSendingIdentity} needs\n * the org id and the host's two selection fields, and a survey of the tenant\n * send sites found that all of them hold a `hostId` while only three hold an\n * org id and half never read the host document at all. Asking nineteen call\n * sites to each assemble the same three values is the shape that produces a\n * twentieth which does not — and the cost of forgetting here is a message\n * leaving on the platform's own domain.\n *\n * ## The cache is per-call-graph, not per-process\n *\n * Passed a `cache`, repeated resolutions for one host cost one pair of reads.\n * A sweep that mails two hundred abandoned carts across a dozen sites, or a\n * webhook that sends a receipt and a seller notice for the same order, holds\n * one map for the run and pays for each site once.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a module-level cache. Verification status is exactly the\n * thing that changes underneath a long-lived process — the re-check sweep\n * un-verifies a domain whose records have gone — and a stale entry would keep\n * a site sending on a domain that no longer authenticates. A caller that\n * declares a cache has also declared how long it may be trusted.\n */\nexport async function hostSendingIdentity(\n  hostId: string | null | undefined,\n  cache?: Map<string, SendingIdentityVerdict>,\n): Promise<SendingIdentityVerdict> {\n  const id = String(hostId ?? '').trim()\n  if (!id) {\n    /*\n     * No host is not \"the platform is speaking\", and it is not \"any pool\n     * member will do\" either. It is a caller that does not know which site it\n     * is sending for, and the honest answer to that is a refusal.\n     *\n     * No `sharedFrom` is passed, which is what makes that structural rather\n     * than a rule: the pool is assigned FROM the host id, so a caller without\n     * one has nothing to be assigned.\n     */\n    return resolveSendingIdentity({ selection: null, audience: 'tenant' })\n  }\n\n  const hit = cache?.get(id)\n  if (hit) return hit\n\n  const snapshot = await firestore()\n    .collection('hosts')\n    .doc(id)\n    .get()\n    .catch(() => null)\n  const owner = await getOrgForHost(id).catch(() => null)\n\n  /*\n   * A SUSPENDED SITE SENDS NOTHING (AGL-3356).\n   *\n   * This is the door every tenant sender but the campaign core uses, so it\n   * is where one check covers them all — workflow and automation steps, the\n   * CRM's one-off mail, inbox replies, member posts, receipts, reminders.\n   * Refusing here rather than at each caller is the same argument this\n   * function's own docblock makes about identities: nineteen call sites\n   * asked to remember produce a twentieth that does not, and the incident\n   * behind this was exactly that — a locked workspace whose workflow could\n   * still mail for it.\n   *\n   * FULL locks only. A read-only lock is a maintenance window whose point\n   * is that the site keeps serving and earning, and a receipt for an order\n   * taken before it began must still arrive. Staff suspensions for abuse,\n   * fraud and billing are full locks, which is the case this closes.\n   *\n   * The documents read above are handed to the verdict, so the check costs\n   * the TTL-cached platform read and nothing else. It inherits the\n   * verdict's fail-open posture and its takedown ratchet.\n   */\n  const lock = await getSiteLockdown(id, Date.now(), {\n    org: (owner?.org as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? null,\n    host: snapshot?.exists\n      ? 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Built from the two documents read above:\n   * the screen costs no read of its own.\n   */\n  const verdict: SendingIdentityVerdict = {\n    ...resolved,\n    workspace: sendingWorkspaceFor({\n      hostId: id,\n      orgId: owner?.orgId ?? null,\n      org: (owner?.org as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? null,\n      host: snapshot?.exists\n        ? ((snapshot.data() as Record<string, unknown>) ?? null)\n        : null,\n    }),\n  }\n\n  cache?.set(id, verdict)\n  return verdict\n}\n\n/**\n * The verdict a suspended site's mail gets: a refusal, whatever identity the\n * site would otherwise have sent on. `sendEmail` reads it and answers\n * `suspended` without calling the provider.\n */\nexport function suspendedSendingIdentity(\n  scope: string | null | undefined,\n): SendingIdentityVerdict {\n  const what =\n    scope === 'platform'\n      ? 'Sending is paused platform-wide'\n      : scope === 'org'\n        ? 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package/src/lib/server/stripe-card-authentication.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * @license
+ * Copyright 2026 Aglyn LLC
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+/** What the card is being collected for. */
+export type CardAuthenticationUse = 'one-time' | 'off-session';
+/** The value Stripe's `request_three_d_secure` takes. */
+export type RequestThreeDSecure = 'automatic' | 'any';
+/** The param name, identical on PaymentIntents, SetupIntents and Checkout Sessions. */
+export declare const REQUEST_THREE_D_SECURE_PARAM = "payment_method_options[card][request_three_d_secure]";
+/** `automatic` for a one-time payment, `any` for a card kept for later. */
+export declare function requestThreeDSecureFor(use: CardAuthenticationUse): RequestThreeDSecure;
+/**
+ * The form-encoded params to spread into a Stripe request body, beside the
+ * request's own fields in the `URLSearchParams` it builds.
+ */
+export declare function cardAuthenticationParams(use: CardAuthenticationUse): Record<string, string>;
+/**
+ * The same params for a Checkout Session, chosen by its `mode`: a
+ * `subscription` or `setup` session keeps the card for off-session charges,
+ * a `payment` session does not.
+ */
+export declare function checkoutSessionCardAuthenticationParams(mode: 'payment' | 'subscription' | 'setup'): Record<string, string>;