@aglyn/tenant-data-admin 1.0.0-beta.143

package/src/lib/server/sending-domains.js.map

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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../../../../../libs/tenant/data/admin/src/lib/server/sending-domains.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @license\n * Copyright 2026 Aglyn LLC\n *\n * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the \"License\");\n * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.\n * You may obtain a copy of the License at\n *\n *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\n *\n * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\n * distributed under the License is distributed on an \"AS IS\" BASIS,\n * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\n * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\n * limitations under the License.\n */\n\n/**\n * CUSTOM SENDING DOMAINS — durable half.\n *\n * The record, the DNS lookups and the status transitions. The decisions all\n * live in `@aglyn/shared-util-email`'s `sending-domain.ts`, which is pure;\n * this module is the I/O around them, and it holds no policy of its own.\n *\n * ## Per-org record, per-host selection\n *\n * The record is at `orgs/{orgId}/sendingDomains/{domain}`, alongside\n * `orgs/{orgId}/ssoDomains/{domain}` and for the same reason: proving control\n * of a zone is a property of the ORG that proved it, and an agency running\n * four sites on `client.com` should publish the DKIM record once rather than\n * four times.\n *\n * Which identity a given site SENDS on is a separate per-host field,\n * `hosts/{hostId}.sendingDomain`. That split is what answers the two halves of\n * the question at once: per-org verification keeps the DNS chore down, and a\n * per-host selection is what an agency's client actually wants, because the\n * `From:` their recipients see belongs to the site, not to the agency.\n *\n * ## Reads are cheap on purpose\n *\n * `resolveHostSendingIdentity` is on the path of a campaign send, so it reads\n * the host document the caller already has and at most ONE org subcollection\n * document. It never scans, never lists, and never touches DNS — the standing\n * rule against unrequested reads on a hot path applies here more than most,\n * because a campaign resolves an identity once for thousands of messages.\n *\n * ## Why the provider call is not in here\n *\n * Issuing a DKIM key means creating a domain at the mail provider, which needs\n * a credential that can create things — a different one from the send-only\n * `RESEND_API_KEY`, which is exactly why `email-health.ts` can use the domains\n * endpoint as a read-only credential probe.\n *\n * That credential belongs to the console alone, so the driver that reads it\n * lives in the console app — `apps/console/utils/server/` — and not here.\n * **This library is imported by the tenant runtime**, which\n * serves untrusted published sites; a module it can import is a module whose\n * environment read is one bug away from being reachable from a site request.\n * A file in `apps/console` is not importable from the tenant app at all —\n * there is no path mapping to it and nx's module boundaries forbid app→app —\n * so the isolation is structural rather than a convention.\n *\n * What stays here is the seam: {@link recordIssuedSendingDomain} takes what a\n * provider returned, and {@link recordSendingDomainIssueFailure} takes what it\n * refused. `requestSendingDomain` still stops at `requested`, and a domain\n * stopped there refuses sends, which is the correct behavior for a domain that\n * has no signing key.\n */\n\nimport {\n  assessDmarc,\n  assessSendingRecords,\n  isPlatformSendingDomain,\n  isSharedSendingDomain,\n  normalizeLocalPart,\n  normalizeSendingDomain,\n  resolveSendingIdentity,\n  safeProviderDetail,\n  SENDING_SUBDOMAIN,\n  SENDING_TRACKING_SUBDOMAIN,\n  sendingDnsRecords,\n  sendingDomainRequiredRecords,\n  sendingRecordKey,\n  sharedTenantSendingFrom,\n  validateSendingDomain,\n  type DmarcAssessment,\n  type SendingDnsRecord,\n  type SendingDomainRecord,\n  type SendingDomainSelection,\n  type SendingIdentityPurpose,\n  type SendingIdentityVerdict,\n  type SendingVerification,\n} from '@aglyn/shared-util-email'\nimport firebaseAdmin from './firebase-admin'\nimport { lookupCaa, lookupMx, lookupTxt } from './dns-probe'\nimport { getOrgForHost } from './organizations'\n\nconst firestore = () => firebaseAdmin.app().firestore()\n\n/** Subcollection under the owning org. */\nexport const SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION = 'sendingDomains'\n\nconst domainRef = (orgId: string, domain: string) =>\n  firestore()\n    .collection('orgs')\n    .doc(orgId)\n    .collection(SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION)\n    .doc(domain)\n\n/**\n * The DKIM selector issued to one org for one domain.\n *\n * Includes the org id so two orgs verifying the same name occupy different\n * record names. Without that they would share `resend._domainkey.<domain>`,\n * and whichever verified second would overwrite the first — or, worse, inherit\n * the first's verification without ever publishing anything.\n */\nexport function sendingDkimSelector(orgId: string): string {\n  const safe = String(orgId ?? '')\n    .toLowerCase()\n    .replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '')\n    .slice(0, 24)\n  return `aglyn${safe ? `-${safe}` : ''}`\n}\n\n/** Both keys always present, one always null — `strictNullChecks` is off. */\nexport interface SendingDomainResult {\n  record: SendingDomainRecord | null\n  error: string | null\n  /** The HTTP status a route should answer with. */\n  status: number\n}\n\n/**\n * One stored document as a record.\n *\n * Exported so the re-check sweep, which reaches these documents through a\n * collection-group query rather than by org and name, shapes them the same way\n * every other reader here does — a second reader with its own defaults is how\n * two callers come to disagree about what an absent field means.\n */\nexport function readSendingDomainRecord(\n  snapshot: FirebaseFirestore.DocumentSnapshot,\n): SendingDomainRecord | null {\n  if (!snapshot?.exists) return null\n  const data = snapshot.data() ?? {}\n  return {\n    domain: String(data.domain ?? snapshot.id),\n    status: data.status ?? 'requested',\n    dkimSelector: String(data.dkimSelector ?? ''),\n    dkimPublicKey: data.dkimPublicKey ?? null,\n    returnPathHost: data.returnPathHost ?? null,\n    providerDomainId: data.providerDomainId ?? null,\n    trackingTarget: data.trackingTarget ?? null,\n    createdAtMs: Number(data.createdAtMs) || null,\n    verifiedAtMs: Number(data.verifiedAtMs) || null,\n    lastCheckedAtMs: Number(data.lastCheckedAtMs) || null,\n    lastIssueError: data.lastIssueError ?? null,\n    lastIssueAtMs: Number(data.lastIssueAtMs) || null,\n    lastMissing: Array.isArray(data.lastMissing) ? data.lastMissing : null,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Start (or re-read) a claim on a sending domain.\n *\n * Idempotent, and deliberately non-destructive on a re-request: an existing\n * record keeps its selector and its key, because reissuing either would\n * invalidate a record the customer may already have published and turn a\n * working setup into a mysterious failure. This mirrors `issueDomainClaim`.\n */\nexport async function requestSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n}): Promise<SendingDomainResult> {\n  const { domain, error } = validateSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!domain) return { record: null, error, status: 400 }\n  if (!options?.orgId) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'Missing organization', status: 400 }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  const existing = await ref.get()\n  if (existing.exists) {\n    return { record: readSendingDomainRecord(existing), error: null, status: 200 }\n  }\n\n  const record: SendingDomainRecord = {\n    domain,\n    status: 'requested',\n    dkimSelector: sendingDkimSelector(options.orgId),\n    dkimPublicKey: null,\n    returnPathHost: null,\n    createdAtMs: Date.now(),\n  }\n  await ref.set(record, { merge: true })\n  return { record, error: null, status: 201 }\n}\n\n/**\n * Record the key the mail provider issued, moving the domain to\n * `records-issued` so the customer has something to publish.\n *\n * Separated from {@link requestSendingDomain} because it needs a credential\n * that may not exist. Nothing here calls the provider: the caller supplies\n * what it was given, so a deployment whose key cannot create domains still has\n * a working path — an operator can complete this step by hand — and this\n * module never grows a dependency on a credential it cannot assume. The\n * console holds the credential and the driver that uses it; this library,\n * which the tenant runtime also imports, holds neither.\n *\n * ## `records-issued` is a promise that records exist\n *\n * The write is refused unless the resulting record actually yields a DKIM\n * record with a value. The alternative is the failure this whole feature is\n * arranged against: a status saying the customer has records to publish, next\n * to a records table with an empty DKIM row, which cannot ever verify and\n * reads to the customer as our bug.\n *\n * ## An issued key is never overwritten\n *\n * A second call carrying a DIFFERENT key is refused rather than applied. The\n * customer may already have published the first one, and replacing it turns a\n * finished setup into a domain that silently stops signing. Re-recording the\n * SAME key is a no-op and succeeds, so a retried request is safe.\n *\n * The SELECTOR, by contrast, comes from the provider when it supplies one:\n * the record a customer publishes has to be the name the provider will sign\n * under, and `sendingDkimSelector` only proposes it.\n */\nexport async function recordIssuedSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n  dkimPublicKey: string\n  /** The selector the provider issued, when it chose its own. */\n  dkimSelector?: string\n  returnPathHost?: string\n  providerDomainId?: string\n  /**\n   * The provider's tracking host, when it issued one — see\n   * `SendingDomainRecord.trackingTarget`. Absent leaves the domain sending\n   * and unmeasured rather than unsent.\n   */\n  trackingTarget?: string | null\n}): Promise<SendingDomainResult> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  const key = String(options?.dkimPublicKey ?? '').trim()\n  if (!domain) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'Missing domain', status: 400 }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  const snapshot = await ref.get()\n  if (!snapshot.exists) {\n    return { record: null, error: 'No claim on that domain', status: 404 }\n  }\n\n  const existing = readSendingDomainRecord(snapshot)\n  const held = String(existing?.dkimPublicKey ?? '').trim()\n  if (held && held !== key) {\n    return {\n      record: existing,\n      error:\n        'That domain already has an issued signing key. Release the domain ' +\n        'and add it again to start over.',\n      status: 409,\n    }\n  }\n\n  const selector =\n    String(options?.dkimSelector ?? '').trim() || existing?.dkimSelector || ''\n  const returnPathHost = options.returnPathHost || existing?.returnPathHost\n\n  /*\n   * The only thing standing between a caller and `records-issued`, and it is\n   * asked of the SAME function that prints the records for the customer and\n   * that the verifier compares against — not a truthiness check on the key,\n   * which would be this write's private opinion of what \"publishable\" means\n   * and could agree with nothing else.\n   */\n  const issued = sendingDomainRequiredRecords({\n    domain,\n    dkimSelector: selector,\n    dkimPublicKey: key,\n    returnPathHost,\n  })\n  if (!issued.some((entry) => entry.purpose === 'dkim')) {\n    return {\n      record: existing,\n      error: 'Refusing to issue records for a domain with no publishable DKIM record',\n      status: 400,\n    }\n  }\n\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      status: 'records-issued',\n      dkimPublicKey: key,\n      ...(selector ? { dkimSelector: selector } : {}),\n      ...(options.returnPathHost\n        ? { returnPathHost: options.returnPathHost }\n        : {}),\n      ...(options.providerDomainId\n        ? { providerDomainId: String(options.providerDomainId) }\n        : {}),\n      // Only when the provider issued one. Writing an empty value would put a\n      // tracking CNAME with no target in front of a customer, which is the\n      // blank-record shape `sendingDnsRecords` refuses everywhere else.\n      ...(String(options.trackingTarget ?? '').trim()\n        ? { trackingTarget: String(options.trackingTarget).trim() }\n        : {}),\n      // A previous failure is not part of the record once it succeeded.\n      lastIssueError: firebaseAdmin.firestore.FieldValue.delete(),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n  return { record: readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get()), error: null, status: 200 }\n}\n\n/**\n * Record that the provider did not issue anything, WITHOUT moving the status.\n *\n * The point of a separate function is that there is no path from a provider\n * failure to `records-issued`. A `4xx` or `5xx` means no key exists, so the\n * domain stays `requested` — where it refuses sends, which is correct for a\n * domain that cannot sign — and carries a reason an admin can act on instead\n * of appearing to have finished.\n *\n * `detail` is a short code the caller built from a fixed vocabulary, never a\n * provider's response body. {@link safeProviderDetail} is the second line:\n * an `Authorization` header echoed back by a provider must not become a\n * Firestore document.\n */\nexport async function recordSendingDomainIssueFailure(options: {\n  orgId: string\n  domain: string\n  detail: string\n}): Promise<void> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!options?.orgId || !domain) return\n  const ref = domainRef(options.orgId, domain)\n  if (!(await ref.get()).exists) return\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      lastIssueError: safeProviderDetail(options.detail) || 'unknown',\n      lastIssueAtMs: Date.now(),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n}\n\nexport interface SendingDomainView {\n  record: SendingDomainRecord\n  /** Exactly what the customer must publish. */\n  records: SendingDnsRecord[]\n  /** Their DMARC policy, read and never written. */\n  dmarc: DmarcAssessment | null\n}\n\n/** One domain plus the records it needs, for a surface that shows both. */\nexport async function getSendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<SendingDomainView | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) return null\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await domainRef(orgId, domain).get())\n  if (!record) return null\n  return { record, records: sendingDnsRecords(record), dmarc: null }\n}\n\nexport async function listSendingDomains(\n  orgId: string,\n): Promise<SendingDomainRecord[]> {\n  if (!orgId) return []\n  const snapshot = await firestore()\n    .collection('orgs')\n    .doc(orgId)\n    .collection(SENDING_DOMAINS_COLLECTION)\n    .get()\n  return snapshot.docs.map(readSendingDomainRecord).filter(Boolean)\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the customer's DMARC policy.\n *\n * Advisory in both directions: it never blocks verification and it is never\n * written. A domain under `p=reject` with our DKIM unpublished hard-fails\n * every message, and a customer deserves to be told that before they wonder\n * why their campaign vanished.\n */\nexport async function readDmarcPolicy(\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<DmarcAssessment | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!domain) return null\n  const lookup = await lookupTxt(`_dmarc.${domain}`)\n  // An unreachable lookup is not \"they have no policy\" — saying so would tell\n  // a customer under p=reject that they have no protection.\n  if (!lookup.answered) return null\n  return assessDmarc(lookup.records)\n}\n\n/**\n * Start (or read) the hold that keeps a tracked domain's links alive.\n *\n * Stamped on FIRST sighting rather than computed from an orphan timestamp,\n * because there is no reliable one: a label reassignment leaves no record of\n * when it happened, and the reaper re-infers the orphan on every pass. The\n * stamp is the record of when the hold began, so a domain cannot be held\n * forever by a sweep that keeps starting the clock over.\n *\n * @returns the instant the domain may be released, or `null` when there is\n *          nothing to stamp it on — a domain with no org record cannot be\n *          held, and refusing to release it on the strength of a hold nobody\n *          can see would strand a provider slot permanently.\n */\nexport async function holdTrackedSendingDomain(options: {\n  orgId: string | null\n  domain: string\n  nowMs: number\n  windowMs: number\n}): Promise<number | null> {\n  const orgId = String(options?.orgId ?? '').trim()\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.domain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain || options.windowMs <= 0) return null\n\n  const ref = domainRef(orgId, domain)\n  const snapshot = await ref.get().catch(() => null)\n  if (!snapshot?.exists) return null\n\n  const held = Number(snapshot.get('trackingRetentionUntilMs')) || 0\n  if (held > 0) return held\n\n  const until = options.nowMs + options.windowMs\n  await ref\n    .set({ trackingRetentionUntilMs: until }, { merge: true })\n    // A stamp we could not write is a hold we cannot prove later, so the\n    // caller is told there is none rather than being asked to wait on a\n    // deadline that will restart on the next pass.\n    .catch(() => null)\n  return until\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether this domain publishes a CAA policy that would REFUSE the tracking\n * host's certificate.\n *\n * The question decides whether a customer is shown a CAA record at all, and\n * asking it is the difference between guidance and a footgun. CAA restricts\n * which authorities may issue, and the lookup stops at the first name in the\n * tree publishing any record — so:\n *\n *  - A domain publishing NOTHING needs nothing. Any authority may already\n *    issue, and handing over a CAA record to paste would be the change that\n *    STARTS restricting them, breaking whatever else renews on that name.\n *  - A domain that publishes some, none of which name our authority, has to\n *    add one ALONGSIDE what it has.\n *  - A domain that already names our authority is done.\n *\n * Walks up from the tracking host exactly as a certificate authority does,\n * and stops where a real lookup stops: at the first name with any record.\n *\n * @returns `null` when DNS could not be reached, which is not \"they publish\n *          none\" — telling a customer to add a CAA on the strength of an\n *          unanswered lookup is how a working zone gets narrowed by mistake.\n */\nexport async function readTrackingCaaNeed(\n  rawDomain: string,\n  authority: string,\n): Promise<'not-needed' | 'must-add' | 'satisfied' | null> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  const ca = String(authority ?? '').trim().toLowerCase()\n  if (!domain || !ca) return null\n\n  /*\n   * From the tracking host upward. Every label is asked because a CAA on a\n   * closer name overrides a broader one — a customer who already scoped a\n   * policy to `links.` must not be told to widen their root.\n   */\n  const labels = `${SENDING_TRACKING_SUBDOMAIN}.${domain}`.split('.')\n  for (let index = 0; index < labels.length - 1; index += 1) {\n    const name = labels.slice(index).join('.')\n    const lookup = await lookupCaa(name)\n    if (!lookup.answered) return null\n    if (!lookup.records.length) continue\n    // The first name with any record is where issuance is decided.\n    const issuers = lookup.records\n      .filter((entry) => / issue \"/.test(entry))\n      .map((entry) => entry.toLowerCase())\n    return issuers.some((entry) => entry.includes(`\"${ca}\"`))\n      ? 'satisfied'\n      : 'must-add'\n  }\n  return 'not-needed'\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the live DNS for one record and say what it establishes. Writes\n * nothing.\n *\n * Split out so the two callers that need this answer ask the SAME question of\n * the SAME resolvers: {@link verifySendingDomain}, which acts on it\n * immediately, and the unattended re-check sweep, which counts conclusive\n * failures before it acts. A sweep that assessed the records its own way would\n * be a second opinion on \"are these published\", and the customer would meet\n * whichever one happened to run last.\n *\n * The three lookups run together because they are independent and the caller\n * is waiting on the slowest either way.\n */\nexport async function probeSendingRecords(\n  record: SendingDomainRecord,\n): Promise<SendingVerification> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(record?.domain ?? '')\n  const sendHost = `${SENDING_SUBDOMAIN}.${domain}`\n  const dkimHost = `${record.dkimSelector}._domainkey.${domain}`\n  const [spf, dkim, mx] = await Promise.all([\n    lookupTxt(sendHost),\n    lookupTxt(dkimHost),\n    lookupMx(sendHost),\n  ])\n\n  return assessSendingRecords(record, {\n    spfTxt: spf.records,\n    dkimTxt: dkim.records,\n    mx: mx.records,\n    // All three, not any: a record we could not read is not a record that is\n    // absent, and one unreadable lookup is enough to make the whole answer\n    // evidence of nothing.\n    conclusive: spf.answered && dkim.answered && mx.answered,\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * Check the live DNS and move the record to `verified` or `failed`.\n *\n * Never throws: a sweep across every org must not stop at the first bad zone.\n *\n * An INCONCLUSIVE result writes nothing but the check time. A resolver outage\n * must not un-verify a working domain — which would silently stop that\n * tenant's mail — and must not fail a customer who is midway through\n * publishing either. This is the `hold` arm the SSO drift sweep uses, and the\n * reason `assessSendingRecords` has three outcomes rather than two.\n *\n * Acts on ONE conclusive answer, and that is right for this caller: an admin\n * pressed Verify and is watching the result, so the check is attended and its\n * outcome is immediately visible and immediately retryable. The unattended\n * sweep over already-verified domains is the caller that cannot say that, and\n * `sending-domain-recheck.ts` is where the extra evidence it needs is\n * gathered.\n */\nexport async function verifySendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<{\n  record: SendingDomainRecord | null\n  missing: string[]\n  inconclusive: boolean\n  error: string | null\n}> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) {\n    return { record: null, missing: [], inconclusive: false, error: 'Invalid domain' }\n  }\n\n  const ref = domainRef(orgId, domain)\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get())\n  if (!record) {\n    return {\n      record: null,\n      missing: [],\n      inconclusive: false,\n      error: 'No claim on that domain — add it first.',\n    }\n  }\n\n  const verdict = await probeSendingRecords(record)\n\n  const now = Date.now()\n  if (verdict.status === 'inconclusive') {\n    await ref.set({ lastCheckedAtMs: now }, { merge: true })\n    return { record, missing: [], inconclusive: true, error: null }\n  }\n\n  const verified = verdict.status === 'verified'\n  await ref.set(\n    {\n      status: verified ? 'verified' : 'failed',\n      lastCheckedAtMs: now,\n      ...(verified\n        ? {\n            verifiedAtMs: now,\n            lastMissing: firebaseAdmin.firestore.FieldValue.delete(),\n          }\n        : { lastMissing: verdict.missing }),\n    },\n    { merge: true },\n  )\n\n  return {\n    record: readSendingDomainRecord(await ref.get()),\n    missing: verdict.missing,\n    inconclusive: false,\n    error: null,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop a claim.\n *\n * The host selections pointing at it are NOT rewritten to the platform\n * identity. A site that was sending as its own domain and now has no verified\n * one must refuse, not quietly revert — silently moving a tenant's mail back\n * onto the shared domain is the exact fallback this feature exists to prevent,\n * and doing it during a delete would be no better than doing it during a send.\n */\nexport async function releaseSendingDomain(\n  orgId: string,\n  rawDomain: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(rawDomain)\n  if (!orgId || !domain) return\n  await domainRef(orgId, domain)\n    .delete()\n    .catch(() => undefined)\n}\n\n/*==========================================\n  The read on the send path\n==========================================*/\n\n/**\n * The identity one host sends on, ready to hand to `sendEmail`.\n *\n * Two document reads at most, and none at all for a host that has no\n * selection. The host document is passed in rather than re-fetched because\n * every caller already holds it.\n *\n * ## This function cannot return an `aglyn.com` address, and that is the point\n *\n * Every caller here is resolving mail FOR A SITE — that is what \"host\" in the\n * name means — so every verdict it produces is tenant mail by construction.\n * `audience: 'tenant'` is therefore passed unconditionally and is not a\n * parameter: a caller that could choose would eventually choose wrong, and the\n * wrong choice puts a merchant's list quality onto the domain the platform's\n * own invoices and password resets leave on.\n *\n * A site that has selected NOTHING does not reach `USAGE_EMAIL_FROM` either.\n * All of its mail goes on the shared pool member `hostSharedFrom` assigns it,\n * marketing included. What keeps the pool usable is measurement rather than\n * prohibition: a pooled campaign is graded against the stricter reputation\n * thresholds, so the site earning complaints is the one that stops.\n */\nexport async function resolveHostSendingIdentity(options: {\n  orgId: string | null | undefined\n  /** `hosts/{hostId}.sendingDomain`, the site's selection. */\n  selectedDomain: string | null | undefined\n  /** `hosts/{hostId}.sendingLocalPart`, defaulted when unset. */\n  selectedLocalPart?: string | null\n  platformFrom?: string | null\n  /**\n   * The site, so an unselected host can be assigned a pool member.\n   *\n   * Optional because two of the three callers resolve an identity for a host\n   * they are already holding and one — the console's identity view — is asking\n   * about a specific site by id. A caller that omits it gets no shared\n   * identity, which is the honest answer: the pool assignment is per site, and\n   * \"some pool member\" is not a thing to send a receipt from.\n   */\n  hostId?: string | null\n  /**\n   * A pool member this host is pinned to, overriding the hash.\n   *\n   * `hosts/{hostId}.sendingPoolMember`. The QUARANTINE lever: a site whose\n   * transactional mail is generating complaints can be moved onto a member set\n   * aside for it, without disturbing any of the other sites that hash to the\n   * member it was on. Ignored unless it names a real member of the current\n   * pool, so a stale or hand-edited value degrades to the ordinary assignment\n   * rather than to an address nothing signs for.\n   */\n  poolMember?: string | null\n  /** See `SendingIdentityPurpose`. Defaults to transactional. */\n  purpose?: SendingIdentityPurpose\n}): Promise<SendingIdentityVerdict> {\n  const platformFrom =\n    options?.platformFrom ?? process.env.USAGE_EMAIL_FROM ?? null\n  const domain = normalizeSendingDomain(options?.selectedDomain ?? '')\n  const purpose = options?.purpose\n  const sharedFrom = hostSharedFrom(options?.hostId, options?.poolMember)\n\n  if (!domain || !options?.orgId) {\n    return resolveSendingIdentity({\n      selection: null,\n      platformFrom,\n      sharedFrom,\n      purpose,\n      audience: 'tenant',\n    })\n  }\n\n  const record = readSendingDomainRecord(await domainRef(options.orgId, domain).get())\n\n  /*\n   * Whose domain this is, decided from the NAME rather than from the record.\n   *\n   * The record is what a released domain no longer has, and a site pointed at\n   * a subdomain of our own apex is still pointed at a subdomain of our own\n   * apex whether or not one exists for it. Deriving this from the name keeps\n   * the two possible failures apart: a missing record for OUR name is our\n   * provisioning that did not finish, a missing record for THEIRS is a domain\n   * they asked to send as and nothing has verified.\n   */\n  const platformIssued = isPlatformSendingDomain(domain)\n\n  /*\n   * A selection naming a CUSTOMER'S domain with no record refuses rather than\n   * falling back. The record can be gone because it was released, or because\n   * the selection was written against a different org — both mean the site is\n   * configured to send as a domain nothing has verified, and neither is a\n   * reason to send as somebody else.\n   *\n   * `platformIssued` rides on the selection either way, and the resolver reads\n   * it only on the unverified branch: a platform subdomain that has not\n   * finished provisioning drops to the pool for transactional mail instead,\n   * because nothing about it is a merchant instruction to contradict.\n   */\n  const selection: SendingDomainSelection = record\n    ? {\n        domain: record.domain,\n        status: record.status,\n        localPart: normalizeLocalPart(options.selectedLocalPart ?? '') || 'hello',\n        missing: record.lastMissing ?? [],\n        platformIssued,\n      }\n    : { domain, status: 'failed', localPart: '', missing: [], platformIssued }\n\n  /*\n   * `sharedFrom` is passed even here, where a selection exists and will decide\n   * the outcome. It is inert by construction — the selection branch of\n   * `resolveSendingIdentity` never reads it — and passing it unconditionally\n   * keeps the call shape identical between the two arms, so a future edit\n   * cannot produce a path that had a pool available and did not offer it.\n   *\n   * It must NOT become a fallback for an unverified selection, and it is the\n   * resolver's structure rather than this call site that guarantees that.\n   */\n  return resolveSendingIdentity({\n    selection,\n    platformFrom,\n    sharedFrom,\n    purpose,\n    audience: 'tenant',\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * The pool address for one host: the pinned member if it names a real one, the\n * hash assignment otherwise.\n *\n * The override is validated against the LIVE pool rather than trusted, because\n * a stale value is the expected case — an operator shrinks the pool, or a\n * quarantine was lifted by deleting the member rather than the field — and an\n * address on a domain that no longer exists is a send that fails at the\n * provider instead of one that quietly goes back to normal.\n */\nfunction hostSharedFrom(\n  hostId: string | null | undefined,\n  poolMember: string | null | undefined,\n): string {\n  const id = String(hostId ?? '').trim()\n  if (!id) return ''\n\n  const pinned = normalizeSendingDomain(String(poolMember ?? ''))\n  if (pinned && isSharedSendingDomain(pinned)) {\n    const shared = sharedTenantSendingFrom(id)\n    const at = shared.lastIndexOf('@')\n    return at > 0 ? `${shared.slice(0, at)}@${pinned}` : ''\n  }\n\n  return sharedTenantSendingFrom(id)\n}\n\n/**\n * The identity one site sends on, from a `hostId` alone.\n *\n * The door every tenant sender uses. {@link resolveHostSendingIdentity} needs\n * the org id and the host's two selection fields, and a survey of the tenant\n * send sites found that all of them hold a `hostId` while only three hold an\n * org id and half never read the host document at all. Asking nineteen call\n * sites to each assemble the same three values is the shape that produces a\n * twentieth which does not — and the cost of forgetting here is a message\n * leaving on the platform's own domain.\n *\n * ## The cache is per-call-graph, not per-process\n *\n * Passed a `cache`, repeated resolutions for one host cost one pair of reads.\n * A sweep that mails two hundred abandoned carts across a dozen sites, or a\n * webhook that sends a receipt and a seller notice for the same order, holds\n * one map for the run and pays for each site once.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a module-level cache. Verification status is exactly the\n * thing that changes underneath a long-lived process — the re-check sweep\n * un-verifies a domain whose records have gone — and a stale entry would keep\n * a site sending on a domain that no longer authenticates. A caller that\n * declares a cache has also declared how long it may be trusted.\n */\nexport async function hostSendingIdentity(\n  hostId: string | null | undefined,\n  cache?: Map<string, SendingIdentityVerdict>,\n): Promise<SendingIdentityVerdict> {\n  const id = String(hostId ?? '').trim()\n  if (!id) {\n    /*\n     * No host is not \"the platform is speaking\", and it is not \"any pool\n     * member will do\" either. It is a caller that does not know which site it\n     * is sending for, and the honest answer to that is a refusal.\n     *\n     * No `sharedFrom` is passed, which is what makes that structural rather\n     * than a rule: the pool is assigned FROM the host id, so a caller without\n     * one has nothing to be assigned.\n     */\n    return resolveSendingIdentity({ selection: null, audience: 'tenant' })\n  }\n\n  const hit = cache?.get(id)\n  if (hit) return hit\n\n  const snapshot = await firestore()\n    .collection('hosts')\n    .doc(id)\n    .get()\n    .catch(() => null)\n  const owner = await getOrgForHost(id).catch(() => null)\n\n  const verdict = await resolveHostSendingIdentity({\n    orgId: owner?.orgId ?? null,\n    selectedDomain: snapshot?.get('sendingDomain') ?? '',\n    selectedLocalPart: snapshot?.get('sendingLocalPart') ?? '',\n    hostId: id,\n    poolMember: snapshot?.get('sendingPoolMember') ?? 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package/src/lib/server/serve-media-cdn.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+/**
+ * @license
+ * Copyright 2026 Aglyn LLC
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *   http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+import { type LockdownState, type MediaVideoRendition } from '@aglyn/aglyn/server';
+import { type MediaCdnScope } from '@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/media-cdn-scope';
+import type { NextApiRequest, NextApiResponse } from 'next';
+/**
+ * Variant widths generated at upload (AGL-175).
+ *
+ * Re-exported, not defined: the list now lives in `@aglyn/aglyn`'s media-ref
+ * so the RENDERER can reach it too. `image.tsx` carried its own
+ * `[320, 640, 1280]` literal, so a width added here never reached the srcSet.
+ */
+export { MEDIA_CDN_VARIANT_WIDTHS } from '@aglyn/aglyn/server';
+/**
+ * The scope grammar and the refusal this handler enforces (AGL-1043).
+ *
+ * Re-exported, not defined: the pure rule lives in `@aglyn/aglyn`'s
+ * `media-cdn-scope`, so the readers that must reach this handler's verdict —
+ * the composition's video facts and the besigner canvas — call the functions
+ * it calls.
+ */
+export { mediaCdnAllows, type MediaCdnScope, type MediaCdnScopeRefusal, mediaCdnScopeRefusal, parseMediaCdnScope, } from '@aglyn/aglyn/app-utils/media-cdn-scope';
+/**
+ * The query string to carry onto the stable URL when a stale content pin
+ * redirects (AGL-2685).
+ *
+ * REBUILT from the four parameters this handler reads, never forwarded whole.
+ * Two reasons, and the second is the one that matters:
+ *
+ * 1. Everything else is inert here — it would only split the CDN cache key
+ *    for a response that is identical either way.
+ * 2. `Location` is a header, and the value would otherwise be caller-supplied
+ *    text. Node rejects a CR or LF in a header value rather than splitting
+ *    the response, so this is a second lock on a door that is already shut —
+ *    which is the right number of locks for a header built from user input.
+ *
+ * `exp` and `sig` ride along because a private asset's signature covers
+ * (scope, mediaId, exp) and never the hash, so it is still valid at the
+ * target. Dropping them would turn a redirect into a 404 for exactly the
+ * assets whose delivery is most sensitive.
+ */
+export declare function mediaCdnForwardedQuery(query: NextApiRequest['query']): string;
+/**
+ * The stable (non-content-hashed) URL's caching contract.
+ *
+ * This was `public, max-age=3600, stale-while-revalidate=86400`, and that
+ * header contradicted the promise the stable URL exists to make. Measured on
+ * production 2026-08-12: Vercel's edge DOES cache this route on a bare
+ * `max-age` (`x-vercel-cache: MISS` then `HIT`, `age` climbing) — so the
+ * saving was never in question. What a browser `max-age` breaks is
+ * *propagation*. `max-age=3600` reaches the client, so a browser holding a
+ * replaced asset will not send a conditional request for a full hour: the
+ * ETag below never gets a chance to answer, and nothing on our side can bust
+ * a browser cache. Every other cacheable route in the repo already uses
+ * `s-maxage` for exactly this reason — see `seo-origin.spec.ts`, "never a
+ * browser `max-age`, which nothing could bust".
+ *
+ * So: a short browser `max-age` that still collapses the burst of repeat
+ * requests within one page view (an image referenced by four `srcSet`
+ * candidates, a tile rendered in a grid and again in a drawer), and the full
+ * hour moved to `s-maxage` where it belongs. Worst stale read is now 60 s of
+ * replaced bytes in one browser rather than an hour, at the cost of one
+ * conditional request per image per minute — answered by the EDGE from its
+ * own copy, so it adds no Storage read and no Firestore read.
+ *
+ * The immutable content-hashed form is untouched: its URL changes with its
+ * bytes, so it can and should be pinned in the browser for a year.
+ *
+ * Since AGL-1515 this policy applies to IMAGE responses only — see
+ * {@link mediaCdnEdgeCacheable}.
+ */
+export declare const MEDIA_CDN_STABLE_CACHE_CONTROL = "public, max-age=60, s-maxage=3600, stale-while-revalidate=86400";
+/**
+ * The stable URL's policy for types the edge must never hold (AGL-1515):
+ * the same 60-second browser window and the same ETag/304 contract, with
+ * `private` in place of `public, s-maxage` so no shared cache stores a
+ * full body.
+ *
+ * Why the edge must never hold one: Vercel's edge, holding a cached
+ * full-body 200, answers a `Range` request FROM that entry as a
+ * spec-violating hybrid — status 200, a `Content-Range` header, and only
+ * the requested slice as the body (`x-vercel-cache: HIT`; reproduced twice
+ * on production, 2026-08-13). A video player seeking into such an asset
+ * adopts a 100-byte slice as the complete file: silent playback corruption.
+ *
+ * The S4 shape below this constant was built on Vercel's documented
+ * cacheable-response criteria ("Request doesn't contain Range header"),
+ * read as "ranged requests bypass the edge". Production falsified that
+ * reading: the criteria govern what the edge STORES, not what it SERVES. A
+ * ranged request is still matched against the URL-keyed entry a previous
+ * plain GET left behind, and the edge's slicing layer rewrites the body
+ * and adds `Content-Range` without rewriting the stored 200 status.
+ *
+ * `private` is the lever because it is in the same documented criteria
+ * list as an absolute storage preventer ("Response doesn't contain the
+ * `private` … directives"), where `Vary: Range` is undocumented on
+ * Vercel, discouraged by RFC 9110, and untestable anywhere but a
+ * production deploy. What it costs: edge caching for non-image assets
+ * under Vercel's 10 MB cacheable-size cap. Real video mostly sits ABOVE
+ * the cap and was never edge-cached — the mangling reproduced on a 186 KB
+ * asset precisely because small ones are the ones that get cached.
+ */
+export declare const MEDIA_CDN_STABLE_EDGE_BYPASS_CACHE_CONTROL = "private, max-age=60";
+/** The immutable content-hashed URL's policy for edge-cacheable (image) types. */
+export declare const MEDIA_CDN_IMMUTABLE_CACHE_CONTROL = "public, max-age=31536000, immutable";
+/**
+ * The immutable URL's policy for edge-bypassing types (AGL-1515): the
+ * browser keeps its year — the URL still changes with the bytes — while
+ * the edge holds nothing it could mangle.
+ */
+export declare const MEDIA_CDN_IMMUTABLE_EDGE_BYPASS_CACHE_CONTROL = "private, max-age=31536000, immutable";
+/**
+ * Whether a response of this content type may be edge-cached (AGL-1515).
+ *
+ * The split is "types no realistic client ranges into": browsers fetch
+ * images with plain GETs (`<img>`, `srcSet`, save-as — all of them), while
+ * every consumer that seeks or resumes — `<video>`/`<audio>` players, PDF
+ * viewers, download managers — operates on the non-image types. Images stay
+ * on the shared edge policy because they are the DAM grid's hot path (4.3 KB
+ * WebP tiles at volume), and pushing them to origin to fix video would trade
+ * a real regression for a theoretical one.
+ *
+ * Accepted residual, recorded here on purpose: a hand-built `Range` request
+ * against an edge-cached IMAGE can still be answered with the hybrid (that
+ * is exactly the AGL-1515 favicon repro). No browser or player issues one,
+ * and the alternative — `private` on images too — costs the hot path an
+ * edge hit rate it measurably has.
+ *
+ * Unknown or absent types return false: correctness over cache.
+ */
+export declare function mediaCdnEdgeCacheable(contentType: unknown): boolean;
+/**
+ * The CDN's OWN Content-Security-Policy (AGL-1474).
+ *
+ * An uploaded `image/svg+xml` is a document, not a picture. It passes the
+ * `image/*` allowlist, it is stored under whatever type the client declared,
+ * and this handler serves it `inline` from the console's own origin — and
+ * from every tenant site's, since the same handler mounts in both apps. So
+ * `<script>alert(document.domain)</script>` inside an uploaded logo executed
+ * on `app.aglyn.com` the moment the asset URL was opened top-level, for
+ * anyone with editor rights.
+ *
+ * Nothing already in place stopped it. `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
+ * blocks HTML *mislabelled* as an image; it says nothing about a file
+ * honestly labelled `image/svg+xml`, which browsers render as a scripted
+ * document. And there was no CSP on this response **at all**: since AGL-523
+ * the policy is built per-response in each app's middleware, and both
+ * middlewares' matchers exclude `api` (`apps/console/middleware.ts`,
+ * `apps/tenant/middleware.ts`), so a directly-navigated CDN URL never passed
+ * through the code that sets one.
+ *
+ * That is precisely why the header is set HERE, on the response, rather than
+ * added to a matcher: a route-level header cannot be lost to a matcher edit,
+ * a rewrite, or a new mount of `serveMediaCdn` in a third app. It is also
+ * what makes this the containment rather than the remediation — it covers
+ * every asset already in the bucket, including the SVGs uploaded before the
+ * sanitizer existed, without rewriting a byte.
+ *
+ * **It does not touch `<img src>`, which is how logos and marks are used
+ * across this product.** A browser loading an SVG as an image neither runs
+ * its script nor applies the response's CSP — CSP governs documents and
+ * workers. The policy only becomes live in the case that is the vector: the
+ * asset opened as a top-level document (or framed via `<object>`/`<iframe>`).
+ */
+export declare const MEDIA_CDN_BASE_CSP: string;
+/**
+ * The policy for a type a browser will treat as an ACTIVE DOCUMENT. Adds
+ * `sandbox` — an opaque origin, so even a hypothetical execution has no
+ * `document.domain`, no cookies and no storage to reach for.
+ *
+ * `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` and the two `data:` allowances are not
+ * concessions to script: with `script-src 'none'` and `sandbox` in force,
+ * nothing in CSS or a data URI can execute. They exist so that opening a
+ * logo's URL directly still shows the logo — `default-src 'none'` alone
+ * would blank an SVG's own `<style>` block and its embedded raster fills,
+ * which is a visible regression on legitimate assets and buys no safety.
+ */
+export declare const MEDIA_CDN_ACTIVE_DOCUMENT_CSP: string;
+/** The `Content-Security-Policy` for a response serving `contentType`. */
+export declare function mediaCdnContentSecurityPolicy(contentType: string): string;
+/**
+ * Lockdown on the delivery path (AGL-1520).
+ *
+ * A security-locked org's SITE stops within seconds (the tenant middleware
+ * 503s, AGL-1501) — but until this gate existed its public media kept
+ * serving worldwide: to hot-links, to third-party embeds, and to the
+ * infected asset's own URL, which for an "infected host" security lock is
+ * the exact thing the lock was pressed to stop.
+ *
+ * **Which reasons stop delivery — decided per reason, not blanket:**
+ *
+ * - `security` — REFUSE. The point of the lock: the org's content, media
+ *   included, must stop serving.
+ * - `manual` — REFUSE. A staff suspension with no reason code (every
+ *   pre-lockdown `suspendedAt` normalizes to `manual`) is "we turned this
+ *   org off"; content continuing to serve would make the kill partial.
+ * - `maintenance` — SERVE. The maintenance notice surface may itself
+ *   reference org assets (a logo on the notice page), the window is
+ *   temporary and non-adversarial, and blanking every image buys no safety.
+ * - `billing` — SERVE. The AGL-1506 principle: billing-locked orgs keep the
+ *   surfaces that let them come back (members can still reach billing to
+ *   pay). The site already 503s, so whether a hot-linked image serves is
+ *   nearly moot — and refusing would punish e.g. an email-signature logo
+ *   for a payment lapse. Serving is the cheap, reversible answer.
+ *
+ * Scopes are checked INDIVIDUALLY against that matrix rather than through
+ * `resolveLockdown`, on purpose: the resolver answers "which notice does a
+ * visitor see" and returns the WIDEST active scope — so a platform
+ * `maintenance` window would mask a concurrent org `security` lock and the
+ * infected asset would keep serving. Delivery has no notice to pick; the
+ * question is only "does ANY active lockdown demand these bytes stop".
+ */
+export declare function lockdownStopsMediaDelivery(state: LockdownState | null | undefined, nowMs: number): boolean;
+/**
+ * Drop the per-scope lock cache. Tests need it between cases; production
+ * convergence is the TTL — the lock is written by the console app and served
+ * by the tenant app, different processes an in-process invalidation can
+ * never reach.
+ */
+export declare function invalidateMediaCdnLockCache(): void;
+/**
+ * THE delivery-policy seam: "may this asset be served at all?" — one
+ * question, one function, consulted once per request before any caching
+ * exit. Distinct from `mediaCdnAllows` (which site may use it under this
+ * URL) and from the signature check (may the public fetch it): this asks
+ * whether the platform is willing to serve the bytes to ANYONE.
+ *
+ * Two independent reasons to refuse, both answered here so the handler
+ * keeps ONE refusal path:
+ *
+ * - `'locked'` — a lockdown covering this SCOPE (AGL-1520): the whole org
+ *   or host is off.
+ * - `'quarantined'` — this ASSET is on the deny list (AGL-1512): one
+ *   infected, abusive or DMCA-noticed file is off while everything else in
+ *   the same workspace keeps serving. That proportionality is the point —
+ *   a single bad object should not cost a customer their whole site.
+ *
+ * Order is scope-then-asset because the scope verdict is the cheaper cached
+ * one and the wider fact; the caller does not distinguish them on the wire
+ * (both are the same neutral 410), so the order is a cost decision only.
+ *
+ * Read cost, since this sits on the hottest unauthenticated path: the scope
+ * verdict is one read per SCOPE per 15s, and the quarantine deny list is
+ * one read per PROCESS per 15s for every asset in existence — it is a
+ * single document. Fifty DAM tiles pay two reads between them, not a
+ * hundred.
+ */
+export declare function mediaCdnServeBlock(scope: MediaCdnScope, asset: {
+    /**
+     * The strong full-width digest (AGL-1614) when the document has one.
+     * Preferred over `contentHash` as a quarantine key — it is one
+     * algorithm at full width, where `contentHash` is a 64-bit truncation
+     * of either sha256 or md5 depending on the ingesting route.
+     */
+    contentSha256?: string;
+    contentHash?: string;
+    /**
+     * The raw URL scope segment and media id — the fallback quarantine key
+     * for the assets that carry no `contentHash` at all (legacy uploads,
+     * and composite objects GCS gives no md5 for). Without it the largest
+     * files in the product would be the ones a takedown could not touch.
+     */
+    scopeSegment?: string;
+    mediaId?: string;
+}): Promise<'locked' | 'quarantined' | null>;
+/**
+ * Whether `?download=1` was asked for (AGL-1411). Strictly opt-in: absent,
+ * `0`, `false` or junk all keep the historical `inline`, because the default
+ * is what every `<img src>` in every published site relies on.
+ *
+ * Only `1` and `true` count, rather than "any truthy-looking string". The
+ * query string is part of the CDN cache key, so every accepted spelling is a
+ * separate edge entry for identical bytes; two is enough.
+ */
+export declare function wantsMediaDownload(value: unknown): boolean;
+/**
+ * Whether `?poster=1` was asked for (AGL-2743).
+ *
+ * Deliberately the same two-spelling rule as {@link wantsMediaDownload},
+ * and for the same reason rather than out of symmetry: the query string is
+ * part of the CDN cache key, so every accepted spelling of "yes" is another
+ * edge entry holding identical bytes. A poster is the response most likely
+ * to be requested at volume from a grid, which makes cache-key discipline
+ * worth more here than anywhere else on the route.
+ */
+export declare function mediaCdnWantsPoster(value: unknown): boolean;
+/**
+ * Which rendition `?r=auto` resolves to, or undefined for "serve the master"
+ * (AGL-2753).
+ *
+ * ## Why the CDN chooses at all
+ *
+ * Because it is the only participant holding the media document when the
+ * bytes are asked for. A page cannot name a rendition — the encodings are
+ * produced out of band, after the placement, and the page is ISR-cached HTML
+ * that neither regenerates when one lands nor varies on a visitor's `Accept`.
+ * The composition does read a placed film's document for its length and
+ * shape (AGL-2807), but that answer is frozen into the cached page. The
+ * alternatives were a node backfill that rewrites published screens nobody
+ * edited, or naming encodings in that same frozen page. This costs neither:
+ * the document is already in hand on this request.
+ *
+ * ## Why the stored order is not simply obeyed
+ *
+ * The producer writes most-efficient-codec first, which is the right order for
+ * `<source>` elements — there the BROWSER picks, using what it actually knows
+ * about its own decoders. A single negotiated URL has no such luxury, so
+ * taking the head of the list would hand a WebM to anything that could not
+ * decode one and turn a saving into a black player.
+ *
+ * So an entry is selected on an EXPLICIT type match, and everything else falls
+ * to the MP4 baseline the producer always emits. A client that names
+ * `video/webm` gets the 30%-smaller file; a client that says `*\/*` gets the
+ * universally decodable one; a client that refused every candidate gets the
+ * master. Every outcome is a video that plays.
+ *
+ * ## Why negotiating here is safe under a cache
+ *
+ * A rendition response is `video/*`, so `mediaCdnEdgeCacheable` is false and
+ * it is served `private` (AGL-1515) — no shared cache stores it, which is the
+ * invariant `serve-media-cdn.video.spec.ts` pins. The only cache that can hold
+ * one is the requesting browser's own, and a browser's `Accept` for media does
+ * not change between the first request and the Range requests that follow it.
+ * That matters more than it looks: negotiation on a RANGEABLE resource that
+ * could flip mid-playback would stitch byte ranges from two different files
+ * together, which is the AGL-1515 corruption reached by a new road.
+ */
+export declare function selectAutoRendition(renditions: readonly MediaVideoRendition[], acceptHeader: unknown): MediaVideoRendition | undefined;
+/**
+ * The download name for an asset: the stored `fileName`, reduced to its
+ * basename, falling back to the media id (the URL is id-keyed and
+ * extensionless, so without a name a "save as" lands as a nameless blob).
+ */
+export declare function mediaDownloadName(fileName: unknown, mediaId: string): string;
+/**
+ * A `Content-Disposition` value for `name` (AGL-1411).
+ *
+ * A filename is attacker-adjacent data — it is whatever the uploader typed —
+ * and it is being pasted into a header, so a quote or a CRLF in it is a
+ * header-injection vector. The old code stripped `["\\\r\n]` and left
+ * everything else, which is safe against injection but silently mangles the
+ * name and passes non-ASCII through raw: a byte above 0x7e in a header is
+ * either mojibake at the client or, on a stricter encoder than ours, a
+ * throw. So both forms of RFC 6266 §4.1 are emitted:
+ *
+ * - `filename="…"` — ASCII only, every unrepresentable character replaced
+ *   (not dropped) so the extension and the shape of the name survive. This
+ *   is the fallback, and it always exists.
+ * - `filename*=UTF-8''…` — RFC 8187 percent-encoding of the real name, added
+ *   only when the ASCII form actually lost something. Every current browser
+ *   prefers it, so a non-ASCII name arrives intact.
+ */
+export declare function mediaContentDisposition(name: string, options: {
+    download: boolean;
+}): string;
+/**
+ * A parsed `Range` request (AGL-1442 S4). Three answers, and the difference
+ * between the last two is the whole game:
+ *
+ * - `{ start, end }` — a single satisfiable byte range, both ends INCLUSIVE
+ *   (matching `createReadStream`, which is where the numbers go).
+ * - `'unsatisfiable'` — syntactically a range, but nothing in it can be
+ *   served (`start` past EOF, `-0`, an empty object). RFC 9110 §14.1.2 says
+ *   this one earns a 416.
+ * - `null` — everything else: no header, another unit, a multi-range, or
+ *   malformed syntax. RFC 9110 §14.2 lets a server ignore a Range header
+ *   outright, and ignoring means a full 200 — which is both the safe answer
+ *   and the pre-S4 behavior, so every shape this parser does not positively
+ *   recognise degrades to exactly what shipped before it existed.
+ *
+ * Multi-range requests land in `null` DELIBERATELY. Serving them needs a
+ * `multipart/byteranges` body with generated boundaries; no browser sends
+ * them for media (a `<video>` seek is always one range), and a 416 would be
+ * wrong because a multi-range over a real file is satisfiable. A full 200
+ * is the RFC-sanctioned refusal that no client can misread.
+ */
+export type MediaCdnRange = {
+    start: number;
+    end: number;
+} | 'unsatisfiable' | null;
+export declare function parseMediaCdnRange(header: unknown, size: number): MediaCdnRange;
+/**
+ * CDN media delivery (AGL-175 / AGL-829). Two URL shapes resolve the same
+ * asset by `mediaId`, so delivery never depends on the object's storage
+ * location (folder moves don't change the URL):
+ *
+ * - **Stable** `/api/media/cdn/[scope]/[mediaId]` — always serves the
+ *   asset's CURRENT bytes, so it survives a **replace** too. Revalidated
+ *   with an ETag (the content hash) + `stale-while-revalidate`, so a
+ *   replaced asset propagates without ever breaking references. This is
+ *   the URL the console hands out.
+ * - **Immutable** `/api/media/cdn/[scope]/[mediaId]/[contentHash]` —
+ *   year-long `immutable` cache; bytes are served only while the hash
+ *   matches the current content, and a stale hash 302s to the stable URL
+ *   (AGL-2685). No renderer names this form (AGL-2798): an edge or a browser
+ *   holding an immutable response never asks again, so a replace could not
+ *   reach a page that did. It is answered for the URLs already handed out.
+ *
+ * `?w=[width]` selects a generated WebP variant. `?download=1` swaps the
+ * `Content-Disposition` from `inline` to `attachment` (AGL-1411) — the press
+ * kit hands out links that must SAVE rather than open a tab. Both are read
+ * only after every access gate, so neither can widen what is served; both
+ * are part of the CDN cache key, so neither variant can poison the other.
+ * The same handler mounts in both the tenant and console apps; raw storage
+ * URLs already embedded in screens keep working unchanged.
+ *
+ * Single byte-range requests are honored with a 206 (AGL-1442 S4) — see
+ * {@link parseMediaCdnRange} and the block below `Accept-Ranges` for the
+ * exact semantics. This is the capability whose absence kept video on raw
+ * `firebasestorage.googleapis.com` URLs (S8): a `<video>` seek is a Range
+ * request, and a server that ignores it forces the player to re-download
+ * the whole file.
+ *
+ * The body streams (AGL-2810): each chunk leaves as Storage produces it, so no
+ * file is held whole in function memory. A GET that will read the file is
+ * first counted against its caller (AGL-2812); see
+ * {@link mediaCdnRateLimitRefusal}.
+ */
+export declare function serveMediaCdn(req: NextApiRequest, res: NextApiResponse): Promise<void>;