@agirails/sdk 2.5.2 → 2.5.4

package/src/utils/validation.ts

@@ -1,540 +0,0 @@
-import { isAddress, getAddress } from 'ethers';
-import {
-  InvalidAddressError,
-  InvalidAmountError,
-  ValidationError,
-  InvalidCIDError,
-  InvalidArweaveTxIdError
-} from '../errors';
-
-/**
- * Input validation utilities
- */
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Shared Validation Patterns (AIP-7 Storage)
-// ============================================================================
-
-/** Ethereum address validation pattern */
-export const ADDRESS_PATTERN = /^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{40}$/;
-
-/** Transaction ID (bytes32) validation pattern */
-export const TX_ID_PATTERN = /^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}$/;
-
-/** Hash (bytes32) validation pattern */
-export const HASH_PATTERN = /^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}$/;
-
-/** Signature (65 bytes = 130 hex chars) validation pattern */
-export const SIGNATURE_PATTERN = /^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{130}$/;
-
-/** CID validation pattern (CIDv0 or CIDv1) */
-export const CID_PATTERN = /^(Qm[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{44}|b[a-z2-7]{58,})$/;
-
-/** Arweave TX ID pattern (43 characters, base64url) */
-export const ARWEAVE_TX_ID_PATTERN = /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{43}$/;
-
-/** Semver pattern for version validation */
-export const SEMVER_PATTERN = /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/;
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Gateway URL Whitelist (SSRF Protection - P0-1)
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Allowed IPFS gateway domains
- * Only whitelisted gateways are allowed for downloads
- */
-export const ALLOWED_IPFS_GATEWAYS = [
-  'ipfs.filebase.io',
-  'gateway.pinata.cloud',
-  'cloudflare-ipfs.com',
-  'ipfs.io',
-  'dweb.link',
-  'w3s.link',
-  'nftstorage.link'
-] as const;
-
-/**
- * Allowed Arweave gateway domains
- * Only whitelisted gateways are allowed for downloads
- */
-export const ALLOWED_ARWEAVE_GATEWAYS = [
-  'arweave.net',
-  'gateway.irys.xyz',
-  'arweave.dev'
-] as const;
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Validation Functions
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Validate Ethereum address
- */
-export function validateAddress(address: string, fieldName: string = 'address'): void {
-  if (!address || !isAddress(address)) {
-    throw new InvalidAddressError(address);
-  }
-
-  if (address === getAddress('0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000')) {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Address cannot be zero address');
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate amount (must be > 0)
- */
-export function validateAmount(amount: bigint, _fieldName: string = 'amount'): void {
-  // Handle null/undefined before calling toString()
-  if (!amount) {
-    throw new InvalidAmountError(String(amount)); // Convert safely to string
-  }
-
-  if (amount <= 0n) {
-    throw new InvalidAmountError(amount.toString());
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate deadline (must be future timestamp)
- */
-export function validateDeadline(deadline: number, fieldName: string = 'deadline'): void {
-  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-  
-  if (deadline <= now) {
-    throw new ValidationError(
-      fieldName,
-      `Deadline must be in the future (now: ${now}, deadline: ${deadline})`
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate dispute window (max 30 days per spec)
- */
-export function validateDisputeWindow(
-  disputeWindow: number,
-  fieldName: string = 'disputeWindow'
-): void {
-  const MAX_DISPUTE_WINDOW = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60; // 30 days in seconds
-  
-  if (disputeWindow < 0) {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Dispute window cannot be negative');
-  }
-  
-  if (disputeWindow > MAX_DISPUTE_WINDOW) {
-    throw new ValidationError(
-      fieldName,
-      `Dispute window exceeds maximum (${MAX_DISPUTE_WINDOW}s = 30 days)`
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate transaction ID format
- */
-export function validateTxId(txId: string, fieldName: string = 'txId'): void {
-  if (!txId || !txId.match(/^0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}$/)) {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Invalid transaction ID format (expected bytes32)');
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Check if IP address is private/local (SSRF protection)
- *
- * SECURITY FIX (H-1): Comprehensive private IP detection
- * - IPv4: 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16
- * - IPv6: ::1, fc00::/7, fd00::/8, fe80::/10
- * - IPv4-mapped IPv6: ::ffff:127.0.0.0/8, ::ffff:10.0.0.0/8, etc.
- *
- * @param ip - IP address (v4 or v6, no brackets)
- * @returns true if IP is private/local
- */
-function isPrivateIP(ip: string): boolean {
-  // Remove IPv6 brackets if present
-  const cleanIP = ip.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '');
-
-  // IPv4 patterns
-  const ipv4PrivatePatterns = [
-    /^127\./,                      // Loopback
-    /^10\./,                       // Private class A
-    /^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\./,  // Private class B (172.16-172.31)
-    /^192\.168\./,                 // Private class C
-    /^169\.254\./,                 // Link-local / AWS metadata
-    /^0\./,                        // Invalid source
-    /^localhost$/i                 // Localhost hostname
-  ];
-
-  for (const pattern of ipv4PrivatePatterns) {
-    if (pattern.test(cleanIP)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // IPv6 patterns (without brackets)
-  // Includes both standard ::ffff: and alternative ::ffff:0: notation (NEW-2 fix)
-  const ipv6PrivatePatterns = [
-    /^::1$/,                       // IPv6 loopback
-    /^::ffff:127\./,               // IPv4-mapped localhost
-    /^::ffff:0:127\./,             // Alternative IPv4-mapped localhost
-    /^::ffff:10\./,                // IPv4-mapped private 10.x
-    /^::ffff:0:10\./,              // Alternative IPv4-mapped private 10.x
-    /^::ffff:192\.168\./,          // IPv4-mapped private 192.168.x
-    /^::ffff:0:192\.168\./,        // Alternative IPv4-mapped private 192.168.x
-    /^::ffff:172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\./,  // IPv4-mapped private 172.16-31.x
-    /^::ffff:0:172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\./,// Alternative IPv4-mapped private 172.16-31.x
-    /^::ffff:169\.254\./,          // IPv4-mapped link-local (CRITICAL: AWS metadata)
-    /^::ffff:0:169\.254\./,        // Alternative IPv4-mapped link-local
-    /^fc00:/i,                     // IPv6 ULA fc00::/7
-    /^fd/i,                        // IPv6 ULA fd00::/8
-    /^fe80:/i                      // IPv6 link-local fe80::/10
-  ];
-
-  for (const pattern of ipv6PrivatePatterns) {
-    if (pattern.test(cleanIP)) {
-      return true;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate endpoint URL (for AgentRegistry)
- *
- * SECURITY FIX (H-1): Enhanced SSRF protection with DNS resolution
- *
- * Security checks:
- * - Valid URL format
- * - HTTPS or IPFS protocols only
- * - Maximum length 256 characters
- * - DNS resolution check (hostname → IP validation)
- * - No private/local IP addresses (SSRF protection)
- * - Blocks AWS metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254)
- * - Fail-secure: if DNS lookup fails, reject
- *
- * **CRITICAL**: This function is now ASYNC due to DNS resolution.
- * All callers MUST await this function.
- *
- * @param endpoint - URL to validate
- * @param fieldName - Field name for error messages
- * @throws {ValidationError} If endpoint is invalid or points to private IP
- */
-export async function validateEndpointURL(endpoint: string, fieldName: string = 'endpoint'): Promise<void> {
-  if (!endpoint || endpoint.length === 0) {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Endpoint is required');
-  }
-
-  const MAX_LENGTH = 256;
-  if (endpoint.length > MAX_LENGTH) {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, `Endpoint exceeds maximum length (${MAX_LENGTH})`);
-  }
-
-  let parsedUrl: URL;
-  try {
-    parsedUrl = new URL(endpoint);
-  } catch (e) {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Endpoint must be a valid URL');
-  }
-
-  const allowedProtocols = ['https:', 'ipfs:'];
-  if (!allowedProtocols.includes(parsedUrl.protocol)) {
-    throw new ValidationError(
-      fieldName,
-      `Endpoint protocol must be one of: ${allowedProtocols.join(', ')}`
-    );
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY FIX (H-1): First check hostname syntax
-  // URL().hostname strips brackets from IPv6 addresses
-  const hostname = parsedUrl.hostname;
-
-  // Check if hostname itself looks like a private IP (bypass DNS for direct IPs)
-  if (isPrivateIP(hostname)) {
-    throw new ValidationError(
-      fieldName,
-      `Endpoint hostname "${hostname}" is a private/local address (SSRF protection)`
-    );
-  }
-
-  // SECURITY FIX (H-1): DNS resolution check
-  // Resolve hostname to IP address(es) and validate each resolved IP
-  // This prevents DNS rebinding attacks where hostname resolves to private IP
-  if (parsedUrl.protocol === 'https:') {
-    try {
-      // Dynamic import for Node.js dns module (not available in browser)
-      // If running in browser, skip DNS check (browsers have their own SSRF protection)
-      const dns = await import('dns').catch(() => null);
-
-      if (dns) {
-        // Resolve hostname to ALL IP addresses and validate each (prevents AAAA/A bypass)
-        const results = await dns.promises.lookup(hostname, { all: true });
-
-        for (const { address, family } of results) {
-          // Validate resolved IP is not private
-          if (isPrivateIP(address)) {
-            throw new ValidationError(
-              fieldName,
-              `Endpoint hostname "${hostname}" resolves to private IP address ${address} (SSRF protection). ` +
-                `This could be an attempt to access internal services. ` +
-                `IP family: IPv${family}`
-            );
-          }
-
-          // SECURITY FIX (H-1): CRITICAL - Block AWS metadata endpoint explicitly
-          if (address === '169.254.169.254') {
-            throw new ValidationError(
-              fieldName,
-              `Endpoint resolves to AWS metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254). ` +
-                `This is blocked for security reasons (credential theft prevention).`
-            );
-          }
-        }
-      }
-    } catch (error: any) {
-      // SECURITY FIX (H-1): Fail-secure - if DNS lookup fails, reject
-      // Don't allow requests to unresolvable hostnames (could be DNS rebinding setup)
-      if (error instanceof ValidationError) {
-        throw error; // Re-throw validation errors
-      }
-
-      throw new ValidationError(
-        fieldName,
-        `Failed to resolve hostname "${hostname}": ${error.message}. ` +
-        `DNS resolution is required for SSRF protection (fail-secure mode).`
-      );
-    }
-  }
-
-  // IPFS endpoints skip DNS check (no DNS resolution for IPFS CIDs)
-}
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Storage Validation Functions (AIP-7)
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Validate IPFS CID format
- *
- * @param cid - IPFS CID to validate
- * @param fieldName - Field name for error messages
- * @throws {InvalidCIDError} If CID is invalid
- */
-export function validateCID(cid: string, _fieldName: string = 'cid'): void {
-  if (!cid || typeof cid !== 'string') {
-    throw new InvalidCIDError(String(cid), 'CID is required');
-  }
-
-  if (!CID_PATTERN.test(cid)) {
-    throw new InvalidCIDError(cid, 'Invalid CID format (expected CIDv0 Qm... or CIDv1 bafy...)');
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate Arweave transaction ID format
- *
- * @param txId - Arweave TX ID to validate
- * @param fieldName - Field name for error messages
- * @throws {InvalidArweaveTxIdError} If TX ID is invalid
- */
-export function validateArweaveTxId(txId: string, _fieldName: string = 'txId'): void {
-  if (!txId || typeof txId !== 'string') {
-    throw new InvalidArweaveTxIdError(String(txId), 'TX ID is required');
-  }
-
-  if (!ARWEAVE_TX_ID_PATTERN.test(txId)) {
-    throw new InvalidArweaveTxIdError(
-      txId,
-      'Invalid format (expected 43 character base64url string)'
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate gateway URL against whitelist (SSRF Protection - P0-1)
- *
- * SECURITY FIX: Only allow downloads from whitelisted gateway domains.
- * This prevents SSRF attacks where attacker controls the gateway URL.
- *
- * @param url - Full gateway URL to validate
- * @param allowedGateways - List of allowed gateway domains
- * @param fieldName - Field name for error messages
- * @throws {ValidationError} If gateway is not whitelisted
- */
-export function validateGatewayURL(
-  url: string,
-  allowedGateways: readonly string[],
-  fieldName: string = 'gatewayUrl'
-): void {
-  if (!url || typeof url !== 'string') {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Gateway URL is required');
-  }
-
-  let parsedUrl: URL;
-  try {
-    parsedUrl = new URL(url);
-  } catch {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Invalid URL format');
-  }
-
-  // Must be HTTPS
-  if (parsedUrl.protocol !== 'https:') {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Gateway URL must use HTTPS');
-  }
-
-  // NEW-3: Validate port (must be 443 or default, prevents port bypass attacks)
-  const port = parsedUrl.port;
-  if (port && !['443', ''].includes(port)) {
-    throw new ValidationError(
-      fieldName,
-      `Gateway URL must use standard HTTPS port (443). Found port: ${port}. ` +
-      `Non-standard ports may bypass whitelist intent.`
-    );
-  }
-
-  // Check hostname against whitelist
-  const hostname = parsedUrl.hostname.toLowerCase();
-  const isAllowed = allowedGateways.some(gateway =>
-    hostname === gateway.toLowerCase() ||
-    hostname.endsWith('.' + gateway.toLowerCase())
-  );
-
-  if (!isAllowed) {
-    throw new ValidationError(
-      fieldName,
-      `Gateway "${hostname}" is not in the allowed list. ` +
-      `Allowed gateways: ${allowedGateways.join(', ')}. ` +
-      `This restriction prevents SSRF attacks.`
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate semver version string
- *
- * @param version - Version string to validate
- * @param fieldName - Field name for error messages
- * @throws {ValidationError} If version is invalid
- */
-export function validateSemver(version: string, fieldName: string = 'version'): void {
-  if (!version || typeof version !== 'string') {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Version is required');
-  }
-
-  if (!SEMVER_PATTERN.test(version)) {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Must be semver format (e.g., 1.0.0)');
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate hash (bytes32) format
- *
- * @param hash - Hash to validate
- * @param fieldName - Field name for error messages
- * @throws {ValidationError} If hash is invalid
- */
-export function validateHash(hash: string, fieldName: string = 'hash'): void {
-  if (!hash || typeof hash !== 'string') {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Hash is required');
-  }
-
-  if (!HASH_PATTERN.test(hash)) {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Invalid hash format (expected bytes32 hex string)');
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Validate signature format (65 bytes)
- *
- * @param signature - Signature to validate
- * @param fieldName - Field name for error messages
- * @throws {ValidationError} If signature is invalid
- */
-export function validateSignature(signature: string, fieldName: string = 'signature'): void {
-  if (!signature || typeof signature !== 'string') {
-    throw new ValidationError(fieldName, 'Signature is required');
-  }
-
-  if (!SIGNATURE_PATTERN.test(signature)) {
-    throw new ValidationError(
-      fieldName,
-      'Invalid signature format (expected 65 bytes = 0x + 130 hex chars)'
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Error Sanitization (P0-2)
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Sanitize error messages to remove sensitive data
- *
- * SECURITY FIX (P0-2): Removes credentials, private keys, and other
- * sensitive data from error messages before logging/returning.
- *
- * @param error - Error to sanitize
- * @returns Sanitized error message
- */
-export function sanitizeErrorMessage(error: unknown): string {
-  if (!error) return 'Unknown error';
-
-  let message = '';
-  if (error instanceof Error) {
-    message = error.message;
-  } else if (typeof error === 'string') {
-    message = error;
-  } else {
-    message = String(error);
-  }
-
-  // Patterns to redact
-  const sensitivePatterns = [
-    // Private keys (hex)
-    /0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}/g,
-    // AWS access key IDs
-    /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/g,
-    // AWS secret keys (40 chars)
-    /[a-zA-Z0-9/+=]{40}/g,
-    // Bearer tokens
-    /Bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+/gi,
-    // API keys (generic pattern)
-    /api[_-]?key[=:]\s*["']?[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+["']?/gi,
-    // Secret in URL query params
-    /secret[=][^&\s]+/gi,
-    // Password in URL
-    /password[=][^&\s]+/gi,
-    // Authorization headers
-    /authorization[=:]\s*["']?[^"'\s]+["']?/gi
-  ];
-
-  let sanitized = message;
-  for (const pattern of sensitivePatterns) {
-    sanitized = sanitized.replace(pattern, '[REDACTED]');
-  }
-
-  return sanitized;
-}
-
-/**
- * Create a safe error object for external consumption
- *
- * SECURITY FIX (P0-2): Returns error without stack trace or sensitive details
- *
- * @param error - Original error
- * @param operation - What operation failed
- * @returns Safe error object
- */
-export function createSafeError(
-  error: unknown,
-  operation: string
-): { message: string; code: string; operation: string } {
-  const sanitizedMessage = sanitizeErrorMessage(error);
-
-  // Don't expose internal details - generic message with operation context
-  return {
-    message: `Operation failed: ${operation}. ${sanitizedMessage}`,
-    code: (error as any)?.code || 'UNKNOWN_ERROR',
-    operation
-  };
-}