@agimon-ai/po-web-security 0.0.0-alpha.0

package/dist/services/deviceSignature/index.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import{attestationBytes as e}from"../../types/bundleManifest.mjs";import{createPublicKey as t,verify as n}from"node:crypto";const r=/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/u;function i(e,t){return typeof e==`string`&&e.length>0&&e.length<=t&&r.test(e)}function a(e){try{let n=t({key:Buffer.from(e,`base64url`),format:`der`,type:`spki`});return n.asymmetricKeyType!==`ec`||n.asymmetricKeyDetails?.namedCurve!==`prime256v1`?void 0:n}catch{return}}function o(t,r,o,s){let c=e(r,o);if(!i(t,512)||!i(s,86)||s.length!==86)return!1;let l=a(t);if(l===void 0)return!1;try{return n(`sha256`,c,{key:l,dsaEncoding:`ieee-p1363`},Buffer.from(s,`base64url`))}catch{return!1}}export{o as verifyDeviceSignature};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map

package/dist/services/deviceSignature/index.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":["BASE64URL","isBase64Url","value","maximum","p256Key","key","createPublicKey","spki","verifyDeviceSignature","message","attestationBytes","tag","fields","signature","verify"],"sources":["../../../src/services/deviceSignature/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { type KeyObject, createPublicKey, verify } from 'node:crypto';\n\nimport { attestationBytes } from '../../types/bundleManifest';\n\nconst CURVE = 'prime256v1';\nconst SIGN_ALGORITHM = 'sha256';\nconst P1363_SIGNATURE_LENGTH = 86;\nconst MAX_SPKI_LENGTH = 512;\nconst BASE64URL = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/u;\n\nfunction isBase64Url(value: unknown, maximum: number): value is string {\n  return typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0 && value.length <= maximum && BASE64URL.test(value);\n}\n\n/** The key for a base64url SPKI only when it is an EC P-256 public key. */\nfunction p256Key(spki: string): KeyObject | undefined {\n  try {\n    const key = createPublicKey({ key: Buffer.from(spki, 'base64url'), format: 'der', type: 'spki' });\n    if (key.asymmetricKeyType !== 'ec' || key.asymmetricKeyDetails?.namedCurve !== CURVE) return undefined;\n    return key;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a tagged device signature with `node:crypto`. The key must be an EC `prime256v1` SPKI and the\n * signature a base64url IEEE P1363 ECDSA SHA-256 signature over `attestationBytes(tag, fields)`.\n * False for any malformed key or signature and for a mismatch; throws only on a malformed tag.\n */\nexport function verifyDeviceSignature(\n  spki: string,\n  tag: string,\n  fields: readonly string[],\n  signature: string,\n): boolean {\n  const message = attestationBytes(tag, fields);\n  if (!isBase64Url(spki, MAX_SPKI_LENGTH)) return false;\n  if (!isBase64Url(signature, P1363_SIGNATURE_LENGTH) || signature.length !== P1363_SIGNATURE_LENGTH) return false;\n  const key = p256Key(spki);\n  if (key === undefined) return false;\n  try {\n    return verify(SIGN_ALGORITHM, message, { key, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }, Buffer.from(signature, 'base64url'));\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"4HAIA,MAIMA,EAAY,oBAElB,SAASC,EAAY,EAAgB,EAAkC,CACrE,OAAO,OAAOC,GAAU,UAAYA,EAAM,OAAS,GAAKA,EAAM,QAAUC,GAAWH,EAAU,KAAKE,CAAK,CACzG,CAGA,SAASE,EAAQ,EAAqC,CACpD,GAAI,CACF,IAAMC,EAAMC,EAAgB,CAAE,IAAK,OAAO,KAAKC,EAAM,WAAW,EAAG,OAAQ,MAAO,KAAM,MAAO,CAAC,EAEhG,OADIF,EAAI,oBAAsB,MAAQA,EAAI,sBAAsB,aAAe,aAAO,OAC/EA,CACT,MAAQ,CACN,MACF,CACF,CAOA,SAAgBG,EACd,EACA,EACA,EACA,EACS,CACT,IAAMC,EAAUC,EAAiBC,EAAKC,CAAM,EAE5C,GADI,CAACX,EAAYM,EAAM,GAAe,GAClC,CAACN,EAAYY,EAAW,EAAsB,GAAKA,EAAU,SAAW,GAAwB,MAAO,GAC3G,IAAMR,EAAMD,EAAQG,CAAI,EACxB,GAAIF,IAAQ,IAAA,GAAW,MAAO,GAC9B,GAAI,CACF,OAAOS,EAAO,SAAgBL,EAAS,CAAE,MAAK,YAAa,YAAa,EAAG,OAAO,KAAKI,EAAW,WAAW,CAAC,CAChH,MAAQ,CACN,MAAO,EACT,CACF"}

package/dist/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+const e=require("../../types/sealedChannel.cjs");let t=require("node:crypto");const n=`prime256v1`,r=`aes-256-gcm`,i=Buffer.from(`po/sealed/v1`);function a(n,r){return Buffer.from((0,t.hkdfSync)(`sha256`,n,i,Buffer.from(e.infoFor(r)),32))}function o(e,t){let n=Buffer.alloc(12);return e.copy(n,0,0,4),n.writeBigUInt64BE(t,4),n}function s(n,i,s){let c=a(n,i),l=a(n,i===`c2s`?`s2c`:`c2s`),u=0n,d=-1n;return{seal(n){if(u>=BigInt(e.MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY))return{ok:!1,failure:`exhausted`};let i=o(s,u),a=(0,t.createCipheriv)(r,c,i),l=Buffer.concat([a.update(n),a.final(),a.getAuthTag()]);return u+=1n,{ok:!0,envelope:{v:1,n:i.toString(`base64url`),c:l.toString(`base64url`)}}},open(n){let i=n;if(typeof i?.n!=`string`||typeof i.c!=`string`)return{ok:!1,failure:`malformed`};if(i.v!==1)return{ok:!1,failure:`version`};if(!e.isSealedEnvelope(n))return{ok:!1,failure:`malformed`};let a=Buffer.from(n.n,`base64url`),o=Buffer.from(n.c,`base64url`);if(a.length!==12||o.length<16)return{ok:!1,failure:`malformed`};let s=a.readBigUInt64BE(4);if(s<=d)return{ok:!1,failure:`replay`};let c=(0,t.createDecipheriv)(r,l,a);c.setAuthTag(o.subarray(o.length-16));let u;try{u=Buffer.concat([c.update(o.subarray(0,o.length-16)),c.final()])}catch{return{ok:!1,failure:`auth`}}return d=s,{ok:!0,plaintext:new Uint8Array(u)}}}}function c(e){if(e.length>128||!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(e))return;let r;try{r=Buffer.from(e,`base64url`)}catch{return}if(!(r.length!==65&&r.length!==33||(r.length===65?r[0]!==4:r[0]!==2&&r[0]!==3)||r.toString(`base64url`)!==e))try{return t.ECDH.convertKey(r,n,void 0,void 0,`uncompressed`)}catch{return}}function l(){let e=(0,t.createECDH)(n);e.generateKeys();let r=/* @__PURE__ */ new Set;return{publicKey:e.getPublicKey().toString(`base64url`),accept(n){let i=c(n);if(i===void 0||r.has(i.toString(`base64url`)))return;let a;try{a=e.computeSecret(i)}catch{return}return r.add(i.toString(`base64url`)),s(a,`s2c`,(0,t.randomBytes)(4))}}}function u(){let e=(0,t.createECDH)(n);e.generateKeys();let r=!1;return{publicKey:e.getPublicKey().toString(`base64url`),accept(n){if(r)return;let i=c(n);if(i===void 0)return;let a;try{a=e.computeSecret(i)}catch{return}return r=!0,s(a,`c2s`,(0,t.randomBytes)(4))}}}exports.createClientHandshake=u,exports.createHostHandshake=l;
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","names":["hkdfSync","infoFor","MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY","createCipheriv","isSealedEnvelope","createDecipheriv","ECDH","createECDH","randomBytes","require_sealedChannel","node_crypto","CURVE","CIPHER","HKDF_SALT","derive","secret","direction","nonceFor","nonce","prefix","counter","createChannel","sendKey","sendDirection","receiveKey","sendCounter","highestReceived","noncePrefix","cipher","body","plaintext","shape","envelope","decipher","ecdhPoint","value","encoded","createHostHandshake","exchange","acceptedPeers","peer","peerPublicKey","createClientHandshake","accepted","host","hostPublicKey"],"sources":["../../../src/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ECDH, createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createECDH, hkdfSync, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';\n\nimport {\n  MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY,\n  NONCE_BYTES,\n  NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES,\n  SEALED_VERSION,\n  type SealedDirection,\n  type SealedEnvelope,\n  type SealedFailure,\n  infoFor,\n  isSealedEnvelope,\n} from '../../types/sealedChannel';\n\nconst CURVE = 'prime256v1';\nconst CIPHER = 'aes-256-gcm';\nconst KEY_BYTES = 32;\nconst TAG_BYTES = 16;\nconst HKDF_HASH = 'sha256';\n/** Fixed and public: HKDF's salt need not be secret, and a constant keeps both sides in step. */\nconst HKDF_SALT = Buffer.from('po/sealed/v1');\n\nexport type SealResult = { ok: true; envelope: SealedEnvelope } | { ok: false; failure: SealedFailure };\nexport type OpenResult = { ok: true; plaintext: Uint8Array } | { ok: false; failure: SealedFailure };\n\nexport interface SealedChannel {\n  /** Seals one message. Counters advance only on success. */\n  seal(plaintext: Uint8Array): SealResult;\n  open(envelope: unknown): OpenResult;\n}\n\nexport interface HostHandshake {\n  /** Base64url uncompressed P-256 point, printed in the QR. */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /** Completes the exchange against the peer's key and yields the channel. */\n  accept(peerPublicKey: string): SealedChannel | undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface ClientHandshake {\n  /** Base64url uncompressed P-256 point sent to the host. */\n  publicKey: string;\n  /** Completes the exchange against the host's fresh key and yields the channel. */\n  accept(hostPublicKey: string): SealedChannel | undefined;\n}\n\nfunction derive(secret: Buffer, direction: SealedDirection): Buffer {\n  return Buffer.from(hkdfSync(HKDF_HASH, secret, HKDF_SALT, Buffer.from(infoFor(direction)), KEY_BYTES));\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds the nonce for one message.\n *\n * A random per-channel prefix plus a monotonic counter, rather than a random\n * nonce per message: 96 bits is small enough that random nonces collide at a\n * rate worth caring about, and a repeated nonce under one AES-GCM key is\n * catastrophic rather than merely weak.\n */\nfunction nonceFor(prefix: Buffer, counter: bigint): Buffer {\n  const nonce = Buffer.alloc(NONCE_BYTES);\n  prefix.copy(nonce, 0, 0, NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES);\n  nonce.writeBigUInt64BE(counter, NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES);\n  return nonce;\n}\n\n/**\n * One direction's sealing state.\n *\n * Send and receive are separate keys and separate counters, so a message the\n * server sent can never be replayed back at it as though the client had sent it.\n */\nfunction createChannel(secret: Buffer, sendDirection: SealedDirection, noncePrefix: Buffer): SealedChannel {\n  const sendKey = derive(secret, sendDirection);\n  const receiveKey = derive(secret, sendDirection === 'c2s' ? 's2c' : 'c2s');\n  let sendCounter = 0n;\n  /** Strictly increasing: anything at or below what has been seen is a replay. */\n  let highestReceived = -1n;\n\n  return {\n    seal(plaintext) {\n      if (sendCounter >= BigInt(MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY)) return { ok: false, failure: 'exhausted' };\n      const nonce = nonceFor(noncePrefix, sendCounter);\n      const cipher = createCipheriv(CIPHER, sendKey, nonce);\n      const body = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final(), cipher.getAuthTag()]);\n      sendCounter += 1n;\n      return {\n        ok: true,\n        envelope: { v: SEALED_VERSION, n: nonce.toString('base64url'), c: body.toString('base64url') },\n      };\n    },\n\n    open(envelope) {\n      // Shape before version: something with no `v` at all is malformed, and\n      // calling it a version mismatch would send a reader hunting for a\n      // protocol skew that is not there.\n      const shape = envelope as { v?: unknown; n?: unknown; c?: unknown } | null | undefined;\n      if (typeof shape?.n !== 'string' || typeof shape.c !== 'string') return { ok: false, failure: 'malformed' };\n      if (shape.v !== SEALED_VERSION) return { ok: false, failure: 'version' };\n      if (!isSealedEnvelope(envelope)) return { ok: false, failure: 'malformed' };\n      const nonce = Buffer.from(envelope.n, 'base64url');\n      const body = Buffer.from(envelope.c, 'base64url');\n      if (nonce.length !== NONCE_BYTES || body.length < TAG_BYTES) return { ok: false, failure: 'malformed' };\n      const counter = nonce.readBigUInt64BE(NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES);\n      if (counter <= highestReceived) return { ok: false, failure: 'replay' };\n      const decipher = createDecipheriv(CIPHER, receiveKey, nonce);\n      decipher.setAuthTag(body.subarray(body.length - TAG_BYTES));\n      let plaintext: Buffer;\n      try {\n        plaintext = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(body.subarray(0, body.length - TAG_BYTES)), decipher.final()]);\n      } catch {\n        // A failed tag means the message was altered, which is the whole point\n        // of having one. Never fall back to the ciphertext.\n        return { ok: false, failure: 'auth' };\n      }\n      // Advanced only after the tag verified, so a forged high counter cannot\n      // lock out the messages that follow it.\n      highestReceived = counter;\n      return { ok: true, plaintext: new Uint8Array(plaintext) };\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nfunction ecdhPoint(value: string): Buffer | undefined {\n  if (value.length > 128 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(value)) return undefined;\n  let encoded: Buffer;\n  try {\n    encoded = Buffer.from(value, 'base64url');\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  if (\n    (encoded.length !== 65 && encoded.length !== 33) ||\n    (encoded.length === 65 ? encoded[0] !== 4 : encoded[0] !== 2 && encoded[0] !== 3) ||\n    encoded.toString('base64url') !== value\n  )\n    return undefined;\n  try {\n    return ECDH.convertKey(encoded, CURVE, undefined, undefined, 'uncompressed');\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The host half of the handshake.\n *\n * The ephemeral key pair is generated per tunnel and its public half goes in the\n * QR, which is the out-of-band channel that makes this authenticated. 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package/dist/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import { SealedEnvelope, SealedFailure } from "../../types/sealedChannel.mjs";
+//#region src/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.d.ts
+export type SealResult = {
+  ok: true;
+  envelope: SealedEnvelope;
+} | {
+  ok: false;
+  failure: SealedFailure;
+};
+export type OpenResult = {
+  ok: true;
+  plaintext: Uint8Array;
+} | {
+  ok: false;
+  failure: SealedFailure;
+};
+export interface SealedChannel {
+  /** Seals one message. Counters advance only on success. */
+  seal(plaintext: Uint8Array): SealResult;
+  open(envelope: unknown): OpenResult;
+}
+export interface HostHandshake {
+  /** Base64url uncompressed P-256 point, printed in the QR. */
+  publicKey: string;
+  /** Completes the exchange against the peer's key and yields the channel. */
+  accept(peerPublicKey: string): SealedChannel | undefined;
+}
+export interface ClientHandshake {
+  /** Base64url uncompressed P-256 point sent to the host. */
+  publicKey: string;
+  /** Completes the exchange against the host's fresh key and yields the channel. */
+  accept(hostPublicKey: string): SealedChannel | undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * The host half of the handshake.
+ *
+ * The ephemeral key pair is generated per tunnel and its public half goes in the
+ * QR, which is the out-of-band channel that makes this authenticated. A relay
+ * that swaps the client's key gets a channel with itself and nothing from the
+ * host, because the host only ever derives against the key the client presents
+ * and the client only ever derives against the key it read off the screen.
+ */
+export declare function createHostHandshake(): HostHandshake;
+/** Creates the client half for a single fresh peer handshake. */
+export declare function createClientHandshake(): ClientHandshake;
+//#endregion
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.mts.map

package/dist/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.d.mts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import{MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY as e,infoFor as t,isSealedEnvelope as n}from"../../types/sealedChannel.mjs";import{ECDH as r,createCipheriv as i,createDecipheriv as a,createECDH as o,hkdfSync as s,randomBytes as c}from"node:crypto";const l=`prime256v1`,u=`aes-256-gcm`,d=Buffer.from(`po/sealed/v1`);function f(e,n){return Buffer.from(s(`sha256`,e,d,Buffer.from(t(n)),32))}function p(e,t){let n=Buffer.alloc(12);return e.copy(n,0,0,4),n.writeBigUInt64BE(t,4),n}function m(t,r,o){let s=f(t,r),c=f(t,r===`c2s`?`s2c`:`c2s`),l=0n,d=-1n;return{seal(t){if(l>=BigInt(e))return{ok:!1,failure:`exhausted`};let n=p(o,l),r=i(u,s,n),a=Buffer.concat([r.update(t),r.final(),r.getAuthTag()]);return l+=1n,{ok:!0,envelope:{v:1,n:n.toString(`base64url`),c:a.toString(`base64url`)}}},open(e){let t=e;if(typeof t?.n!=`string`||typeof t.c!=`string`)return{ok:!1,failure:`malformed`};if(t.v!==1)return{ok:!1,failure:`version`};if(!n(e))return{ok:!1,failure:`malformed`};let r=Buffer.from(e.n,`base64url`),i=Buffer.from(e.c,`base64url`);if(r.length!==12||i.length<16)return{ok:!1,failure:`malformed`};let o=r.readBigUInt64BE(4);if(o<=d)return{ok:!1,failure:`replay`};let s=a(u,c,r);s.setAuthTag(i.subarray(i.length-16));let l;try{l=Buffer.concat([s.update(i.subarray(0,i.length-16)),s.final()])}catch{return{ok:!1,failure:`auth`}}return d=o,{ok:!0,plaintext:new Uint8Array(l)}}}}function h(e){if(e.length>128||!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(e))return;let t;try{t=Buffer.from(e,`base64url`)}catch{return}if(!(t.length!==65&&t.length!==33||(t.length===65?t[0]!==4:t[0]!==2&&t[0]!==3)||t.toString(`base64url`)!==e))try{return r.convertKey(t,l,void 0,void 0,`uncompressed`)}catch{return}}function g(){let e=o(l);e.generateKeys();let t=/* @__PURE__ */ new Set;return{publicKey:e.getPublicKey().toString(`base64url`),accept(n){let r=h(n);if(r===void 0||t.has(r.toString(`base64url`)))return;let i;try{i=e.computeSecret(r)}catch{return}return t.add(r.toString(`base64url`)),m(i,`s2c`,c(4))}}}function _(){let e=o(l);e.generateKeys();let t=!1;return{publicKey:e.getPublicKey().toString(`base64url`),accept(n){if(t)return;let r=h(n);if(r===void 0)return;let i;try{i=e.computeSecret(r)}catch{return}return t=!0,m(i,`c2s`,c(4))}}}export{_ as createClientHandshake,g as createHostHandshake};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map

package/dist/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":["CURVE","CIPHER","HKDF_SALT","derive","hkdfSync","secret","infoFor","direction","nonceFor","nonce","prefix","counter","createChannel","sendKey","sendDirection","receiveKey","sendCounter","highestReceived","MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY","noncePrefix","cipher","createCipheriv","body","plaintext","shape","envelope","isSealedEnvelope","decipher","createDecipheriv","ecdhPoint","value","encoded","ECDH","createHostHandshake","exchange","createECDH","acceptedPeers","peer","peerPublicKey","randomBytes","createClientHandshake","accepted","host","hostPublicKey"],"sources":["../../../src/services/nodeSealedChannel/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ECDH, createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createECDH, hkdfSync, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';\n\nimport {\n  MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY,\n  NONCE_BYTES,\n  NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES,\n  SEALED_VERSION,\n  type SealedDirection,\n  type SealedEnvelope,\n  type SealedFailure,\n  infoFor,\n  isSealedEnvelope,\n} from '../../types/sealedChannel';\n\nconst CURVE = 'prime256v1';\nconst CIPHER = 'aes-256-gcm';\nconst KEY_BYTES = 32;\nconst TAG_BYTES = 16;\nconst HKDF_HASH = 'sha256';\n/** Fixed and public: HKDF's salt need not be secret, and a constant keeps both sides in step. */\nconst HKDF_SALT = Buffer.from('po/sealed/v1');\n\nexport type SealResult = { ok: true; envelope: SealedEnvelope } | { ok: false; failure: SealedFailure };\nexport type OpenResult = { ok: true; plaintext: Uint8Array } | { ok: false; failure: SealedFailure };\n\nexport interface SealedChannel {\n  /** Seals one message. 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's2c' : 'c2s');\n  let sendCounter = 0n;\n  /** Strictly increasing: anything at or below what has been seen is a replay. */\n  let highestReceived = -1n;\n\n  return {\n    seal(plaintext) {\n      if (sendCounter >= BigInt(MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY)) return { ok: false, failure: 'exhausted' };\n      const nonce = nonceFor(noncePrefix, sendCounter);\n      const cipher = createCipheriv(CIPHER, sendKey, nonce);\n      const body = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final(), cipher.getAuthTag()]);\n      sendCounter += 1n;\n      return {\n        ok: true,\n        envelope: { v: SEALED_VERSION, n: nonce.toString('base64url'), c: body.toString('base64url') },\n      };\n    },\n\n    open(envelope) {\n      // Shape before version: something with no `v` at all is malformed, and\n      // calling it a version mismatch would send a reader hunting for a\n      // protocol skew that is not there.\n      const shape = envelope as { v?: unknown; n?: unknown; c?: unknown } | null | undefined;\n      if (typeof shape?.n !== 'string' || typeof shape.c !== 'string') return { ok: false, failure: 'malformed' };\n      if (shape.v !== SEALED_VERSION) return { ok: false, failure: 'version' };\n      if (!isSealedEnvelope(envelope)) return { ok: false, failure: 'malformed' };\n      const nonce = Buffer.from(envelope.n, 'base64url');\n      const body = Buffer.from(envelope.c, 'base64url');\n      if (nonce.length !== NONCE_BYTES || body.length < TAG_BYTES) return { ok: false, failure: 'malformed' };\n      const counter = nonce.readBigUInt64BE(NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES);\n      if (counter <= highestReceived) return { ok: false, failure: 'replay' };\n      const decipher = createDecipheriv(CIPHER, receiveKey, nonce);\n      decipher.setAuthTag(body.subarray(body.length - TAG_BYTES));\n      let plaintext: Buffer;\n      try {\n        plaintext = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(body.subarray(0, body.length - TAG_BYTES)), decipher.final()]);\n      } catch {\n        // A failed tag means the message was altered, which is the whole point\n        // of having one. 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package/dist/services/sealedTransport/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+const e=require("../../types/sealedChannel.cjs"),t=require("../browserSealedChannel/index.cjs"),n=require("../serialQueue/index.cjs"),r=new TextEncoder,i=new TextDecoder;function a(e){let t=``;for(let n of e)t+=String.fromCharCode(n);return btoa(t)}function o(e){let t=atob(e);return Uint8Array.from(t,e=>e.charCodeAt(0))}async function s(e){if(e!=null){if(typeof e==`string`)return r.encode(e);if(e instanceof URLSearchParams)return r.encode(e.toString());if(e instanceof Blob)return new Uint8Array(await e.arrayBuffer());if(e instanceof ArrayBuffer)return new Uint8Array(e);if(ArrayBuffer.isView(e))return new Uint8Array(e.buffer,e.byteOffset,e.byteLength);throw Error(`The sealed HTTP transport does not support this request body type.`)}}function c(e){if(!e.startsWith(`/`))throw Error(`A sealed HTTP request must use a root-relative URL.`);return e}function l(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e)return!1;let t=e;return t.v===1&&typeof t.status==`number`&&Array.isArray(t.headers)&&t.headers.every(e=>Array.isArray(e)&&e.length===2&&e.every(e=>typeof e==`string`))&&typeof t.body==`string`}function u(){let u,d,f=n.createSerialQueue(),p=n.createSerialQueue(),m=n.createSerialQueue(),h,g=t=>{d=e.describeSealedFailure(t)},_=async e=>{if(u===void 0)return;let t=await u.seal(e);return t.ok?JSON.stringify(t.envelope):g(t.failure)},v=async e=>{if(u===void 0)return;let t;try{t=JSON.parse(e)}catch{return g(`malformed`)}let n=await u.open(t);return n.ok?n.plaintext:g(n.failure)};return{active:()=>u!==void 0,lastFailure:()=>d,async connect(e){let n=await t.connectSealedChannel(e);if(n===void 0){d=`This browser could not establish a sealed channel.`;return}return u=n.channel,d=void 0,n.clientPublicKey},relayRequestsThrough(e){h=e},reset(){u=void 0,d=void 0},async sealText(e){return u===void 0?e:await f.run(async()=>{let t=await _(r.encode(e));if(t===void 0)throw Error(d??`The active sealed channel could not encrypt a message.`);return t})},async openText(e){return u===void 0?e:await p.run(async()=>{let t=await v(e);return t===void 0?void 0:i.decode(t)})},async sealBinary(e){return u===void 0?e:await f.run(async()=>{let t=await _(e);if(t===void 0)throw Error(d??`The active sealed channel could not encrypt a message.`);return r.encode(t)})},async openBinary(e){return u===void 0?e:await p.run(async()=>await v(i.decode(e)))},async fetch(e,t){let n=h;return u===void 0||n===void 0?await fetch(e,t):await m.run(async()=>{let u=await s(t?.body),f={v:1,method:(t?.method??`GET`).toUpperCase(),target:c(e),headers:Array.from(new Headers(t?.headers).entries()),...u===void 0?{}:{body:a(u)}},p=await _(r.encode(JSON.stringify(f)));if(p===void 0)return new Response(JSON.stringify({error:d}),{status:502});let m=await fetch(n,{method:`POST`,credentials:`same-origin`,headers:{"content-type":`application/json`},body:p}),h=await v(await m.text());if(h===void 0)return new Response(JSON.stringify({error:d}),{status:502});let g;try{g=JSON.parse(i.decode(h))}catch{g=void 0}if(!l(g))return d=`The sealed HTTP response was malformed.`,new Response(JSON.stringify({error:d}),{status:502});let y=o(g.body);return new Response(g.status===204||g.status===205||g.status===304?null:y,{status:g.status,headers:g.headers})})}}}const d=u();exports.createSealedTransport=u,exports.sealedTransport=d;
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/services/sealedTransport/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","names":["createSerialQueue","describeSealedFailure","connectSealedChannel","require_sealedChannel","require_index","require_index$1","encoder","decoder","encodeBase64","binary","byte","bytes","decodeBase64","value","character","bodyBytes","body","requestTarget","input","isSealedHttpResponse","candidate","header","part","createSealedTransport","channel","failure","outbound","inbound","exchange","relayPath","note","reason","sealBytes","sealed","openBytes","envelope","text","opened","connected","hostPublicKey","path","gateway","init","request","relayResponse","decoded","sealedTransport"],"sources":["../../../src/services/sealedTransport/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { describeSealedFailure, type SealedFailure } from '../../types/sealedChannel';\nimport { connectSealedChannel, type SealedChannel } from '../browserSealedChannel';\nimport { createSerialQueue } from '../serialQueue';\n\n/**\n * The one object the cockpit and every plugin use to talk over a sealed tunnel.\n *\n * Two things make this worth having rather than each caller reaching for the\n * channel directly. First, ordering: sealing advances a nonce counter and\n * opening enforces that it strictly increases, so both directions are pushed\n * through a serial queue and overlapping calls can never reorder into a\n * self-inflicted replay. Second, reach: a plugin that calls `fetch` itself\n * sends plaintext to whoever is relaying the tunnel, and the host cannot stop\n * it. Giving every caller one obvious helper is the only enforcement available.\n *\n * When no channel is established every method is a pass-through, so the same\n * code runs unchanged on the loopback listener where there is nothing to seal.\n */\n\nconst JSON_CONTENT_TYPE = 'application/json';\n\nexport interface SealedTransport {\n  /** False on loopback and before the handshake completes, where everything passes through. */\n  active(): boolean;\n  sealText(text: string): Promise<string>;\n  /** Undefined when the message could not be opened; `lastFailure` says why. */\n  openText(text: string): Promise<string | undefined>;\n  sealBinary(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;\n  openBinary(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array | undefined>;\n  /** Drop-in for `fetch`, relaying the complete request through the sealed channel when configured. */\n  fetch(input: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;\n  lastFailure(): string | undefined;\n}\n\nconst encoder = new TextEncoder();\nconst decoder = new TextDecoder();\n\ninterface SealedHttpRequest {\n  v: 1;\n  method: string;\n  target: string;\n  headers: Array<[string, string]>;\n  body?: string;\n}\n\ninterface SealedHttpResponse {\n  v: 1;\n  status: number;\n  headers: Array<[string, string]>;\n  body: string;\n}\n\nfunction encodeBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = '';\n  for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n  return btoa(binary);\n}\n\nfunction decodeBase64(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(value);\n  return Uint8Array.from(binary, (character) => character.charCodeAt(0));\n}\n\nasync function bodyBytes(body: RequestInit['body']): Promise<Uint8Array | undefined> {\n  if (body === undefined || body === null) return undefined;\n  if (typeof body === 'string') return encoder.encode(body);\n  if (body instanceof URLSearchParams) return encoder.encode(body.toString());\n  if (body instanceof Blob) return new Uint8Array(await 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(channel === undefined) return undefined;\n    const sealed = await channel.seal(bytes);\n    if (!sealed.ok) return note(sealed.failure);\n    return JSON.stringify(sealed.envelope);\n  };\n\n  const openBytes = async (text: string): Promise<Uint8Array | undefined> => {\n    if (channel === undefined) return undefined;\n    let envelope: unknown;\n    try {\n      envelope = JSON.parse(text);\n    } catch {\n      return note('malformed');\n    }\n    const opened = await channel.open(envelope);\n    if (!opened.ok) return note(opened.failure);\n    return opened.plaintext;\n  };\n\n  return {\n    active: () => channel !== undefined,\n    lastFailure: () => failure,\n\n    async connect(hostPublicKey) {\n      const connected = await connectSealedChannel(hostPublicKey);\n      if (connected === undefined) {\n        failure = 'This browser could not establish a sealed channel.';\n        return undefined;\n      }\n      channel = connected.channel;\n      failure = undefined;\n      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'The active sealed channel could not encrypt a message.');\n        return sealed;\n      });\n    },\n\n    async openText(text) {\n      if (channel === undefined) return text;\n      return await inbound.run(async () => {\n        const opened = await openBytes(text);\n        return opened === undefined ? undefined : decoder.decode(opened);\n      });\n    },\n\n    async sealBinary(bytes) {\n      if (channel === undefined) return bytes;\n      return await outbound.run(async () => {\n        const sealed = await sealBytes(bytes);\n        if (sealed === undefined) throw new Error(failure ?? 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package/dist/services/sealedTransport/index.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+//#region src/services/sealedTransport/index.d.ts
+export interface SealedTransport {
+  /** False on loopback and before the handshake completes, where everything passes through. */
+  active(): boolean;
+  sealText(text: string): Promise<string>;
+  /** Undefined when the message could not be opened; `lastFailure` says why. */
+  openText(text: string): Promise<string | undefined>;
+  sealBinary(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+  openBinary(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array | undefined>;
+  /** Drop-in for `fetch`, relaying the complete request through the sealed channel when configured. */
+  fetch(input: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;
+  lastFailure(): string | undefined;
+}
+export declare function createSealedTransport(): SealedTransport & {
+  /** Completes the handshake against the host key from the QR. */
+  connect: (hostPublicKey: string) => Promise<string | undefined>;
+  /** Drops the channel, so everything falls back to pass-through. */
+  reset: () => void;
+  /** Selects the same-origin endpoint that carries sealed HTTP exchanges. */
+  relayRequestsThrough: (path: string) => void;
+};
+/**
+ * The page's one sealed channel.
+ *
+ * A module singleton rather than an instance per caller, because the cockpit
+ * and every plugin are bundled into the same page and all of them must share
+ * one pair of nonce counters. Two transports over one handshake would each
+ * start counting at zero and the receiver would reject the second as a replay.
+ *
+ * Inactive until a handshake completes, and inactive forever on the loopback
+ * listener, so `sealedTransport.fetch` is a plain `fetch` there.
+ */
+export declare const sealedTransport: SealedTransport & {
+  /** Completes the handshake against the host key from the QR. */
+  connect: (hostPublicKey: string) => Promise<string | undefined>;
+  /** Drops the channel, so everything falls back to pass-through. */
+  reset: () => void;
+  /** Selects the same-origin endpoint that carries sealed HTTP exchanges. */
+  relayRequestsThrough: (path: string) => void;
+};
+//#endregion
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.mts.map

package/dist/services/sealedTransport/index.d.mts.map

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package/dist/services/sealedTransport/index.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+import{describeSealedFailure as e}from"../../types/sealedChannel.mjs";import{connectSealedChannel as t}from"../browserSealedChannel/index.mjs";import{createSerialQueue as n}from"../serialQueue/index.mjs";const r=new TextEncoder,i=new TextDecoder;function a(e){let t=``;for(let n of e)t+=String.fromCharCode(n);return btoa(t)}function o(e){let t=atob(e);return Uint8Array.from(t,e=>e.charCodeAt(0))}async function s(e){if(e!=null){if(typeof e==`string`)return r.encode(e);if(e instanceof URLSearchParams)return r.encode(e.toString());if(e instanceof Blob)return new Uint8Array(await e.arrayBuffer());if(e instanceof ArrayBuffer)return new Uint8Array(e);if(ArrayBuffer.isView(e))return new Uint8Array(e.buffer,e.byteOffset,e.byteLength);throw Error(`The sealed HTTP transport does not support this request body type.`)}}function c(e){if(!e.startsWith(`/`))throw Error(`A sealed HTTP request must use a root-relative URL.`);return e}function l(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e)return!1;let t=e;return t.v===1&&typeof t.status==`number`&&Array.isArray(t.headers)&&t.headers.every(e=>Array.isArray(e)&&e.length===2&&e.every(e=>typeof e==`string`))&&typeof t.body==`string`}function u(){let u,d,f=n(),p=n(),m=n(),h,g=t=>{d=e(t)},_=async e=>{if(u===void 0)return;let t=await u.seal(e);return t.ok?JSON.stringify(t.envelope):g(t.failure)},v=async e=>{if(u===void 0)return;let t;try{t=JSON.parse(e)}catch{return g(`malformed`)}let n=await u.open(t);return n.ok?n.plaintext:g(n.failure)};return{active:()=>u!==void 0,lastFailure:()=>d,async connect(e){let n=await t(e);if(n===void 0){d=`This browser could not establish a sealed channel.`;return}return u=n.channel,d=void 0,n.clientPublicKey},relayRequestsThrough(e){h=e},reset(){u=void 0,d=void 0},async sealText(e){return u===void 0?e:await f.run(async()=>{let t=await _(r.encode(e));if(t===void 0)throw Error(d??`The active sealed channel could not encrypt a message.`);return t})},async openText(e){return u===void 0?e:await p.run(async()=>{let t=await v(e);return t===void 0?void 0:i.decode(t)})},async sealBinary(e){return u===void 0?e:await f.run(async()=>{let t=await _(e);if(t===void 0)throw Error(d??`The active sealed channel could not encrypt a message.`);return r.encode(t)})},async openBinary(e){return u===void 0?e:await p.run(async()=>await v(i.decode(e)))},async fetch(e,t){let n=h;return u===void 0||n===void 0?await fetch(e,t):await m.run(async()=>{let u=await s(t?.body),f={v:1,method:(t?.method??`GET`).toUpperCase(),target:c(e),headers:Array.from(new Headers(t?.headers).entries()),...u===void 0?{}:{body:a(u)}},p=await _(r.encode(JSON.stringify(f)));if(p===void 0)return new Response(JSON.stringify({error:d}),{status:502});let m=await fetch(n,{method:`POST`,credentials:`same-origin`,headers:{"content-type":`application/json`},body:p}),h=await v(await m.text());if(h===void 0)return new Response(JSON.stringify({error:d}),{status:502});let g;try{g=JSON.parse(i.decode(h))}catch{g=void 0}if(!l(g))return d=`The sealed HTTP response was malformed.`,new Response(JSON.stringify({error:d}),{status:502});let y=o(g.body);return new Response(g.status===204||g.status===205||g.status===304?null:y,{status:g.status,headers:g.headers})})}}}const d=u();export{u as createSealedTransport,d as sealedTransport};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map

package/dist/services/sealedTransport/index.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":["encoder","decoder","encodeBase64","binary","byte","bytes","decodeBase64","value","character","bodyBytes","body","requestTarget","input","isSealedHttpResponse","candidate","header","part","createSealedTransport","channel","failure","outbound","createSerialQueue","inbound","exchange","relayPath","note","describeSealedFailure","reason","sealBytes","sealed","openBytes","envelope","text","opened","connected","connectSealedChannel","hostPublicKey","path","gateway","init","request","relayResponse","decoded","sealedTransport"],"sources":["../../../src/services/sealedTransport/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { describeSealedFailure, type SealedFailure } from '../../types/sealedChannel';\nimport { connectSealedChannel, type SealedChannel } from '../browserSealedChannel';\nimport { createSerialQueue } from '../serialQueue';\n\n/**\n * The one object the cockpit and every plugin use to talk over a sealed tunnel.\n *\n * Two things make this worth having rather than each caller reaching for the\n * channel directly. First, ordering: sealing advances a nonce counter and\n * opening enforces that it strictly increases, so both directions are pushed\n * through a serial queue and overlapping calls can never reorder into a\n * self-inflicted replay. Second, reach: a plugin that calls `fetch` itself\n * sends plaintext to whoever is relaying the tunnel, and the host cannot stop\n * it. Giving every caller one obvious helper is the only enforcement available.\n *\n * When no channel is established every method is a pass-through, so the same\n * code runs unchanged on the loopback listener where there is nothing to seal.\n */\n\nconst JSON_CONTENT_TYPE = 'application/json';\n\nexport interface SealedTransport {\n  /** False on loopback and before the handshake completes, where everything passes through. */\n  active(): boolean;\n  sealText(text: string): Promise<string>;\n  /** Undefined when the message could not be opened; `lastFailure` says why. */\n  openText(text: string): Promise<string | undefined>;\n  sealBinary(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;\n  openBinary(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array | undefined>;\n  /** Drop-in for `fetch`, relaying the complete request through the sealed channel when configured. */\n  fetch(input: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response>;\n  lastFailure(): string | undefined;\n}\n\nconst encoder = new TextEncoder();\nconst decoder = new TextDecoder();\n\ninterface SealedHttpRequest {\n  v: 1;\n  method: string;\n  target: string;\n  headers: Array<[string, string]>;\n  body?: string;\n}\n\ninterface SealedHttpResponse {\n  v: 1;\n  status: number;\n  headers: Array<[string, string]>;\n  body: string;\n}\n\nfunction encodeBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = '';\n  for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);\n  return btoa(binary);\n}\n\nfunction decodeBase64(value: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(value);\n  return Uint8Array.from(binary, (character) => character.charCodeAt(0));\n}\n\nasync function bodyBytes(body: RequestInit['body']): Promise<Uint8Array | undefined> {\n  if (body === undefined || body === null) return undefined;\n  if (typeof body === 'string') return encoder.encode(body);\n  if (body instanceof URLSearchParams) return encoder.encode(body.toString());\n  if (body instanceof Blob) return new Uint8Array(await 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package/dist/services/serialQueue/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+function e(){let e=Promise.resolve();return{run(t){let n=e.then(t,t);return e=n.catch(()=>void 0),n}}}exports.createSerialQueue=e;
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/services/serialQueue/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.cjs","names":["createSerialQueue","tail","result","task"],"sources":["../../../src/services/serialQueue/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runs async work strictly one at a time, in the order it was handed over.\n *\n * The sealed channel needs this on both directions and it is not an\n * optimisation. Sealing increments a nonce counter and opening enforces that\n * the counter strictly increases, so two overlapping operations are a\n * correctness bug rather than a race worth tolerating: two concurrent seals can\n * resolve out of order and reach the wire with descending counters, and two\n * concurrent opens can advance the high-water mark past a message that has not\n * been read yet, which the receiver then rejects as a replay.\n *\n * Deliberately not a general work pool. A pool with any concurrency above one\n * reintroduces exactly the reordering this exists to prevent.\n */\nexport interface SerialQueue {\n  /** Resolves with the task's result once every task queued before it has settled. */\n  run<T>(task: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;\n}\n\nexport function createSerialQueue(): SerialQueue {\n  /** The tail of the chain. Rejections are absorbed so one failure cannot stall the rest. */\n  let tail: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();\n\n  return {\n    run<T>(task: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n      const result = tail.then(task, task);\n      tail = result.catch(() => undefined);\n      return result;\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAmBA,SAAgBA,GAAiC,CAE/C,IAAIC,EAAyB,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAE7C,MAAO,CACL,IAAO,EAAoC,CACzC,IAAMC,EAASD,EAAK,KAAKE,EAAMA,CAAI,EAEnC,MADA,GAAOD,EAAO,UAAY,IAAA,EAAS,EAC5BA,CACT,CACF,CACF"}

package/dist/services/serialQueue/index.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+//#region src/services/serialQueue/index.d.ts
+/**
+ * Runs async work strictly one at a time, in the order it was handed over.
+ *
+ * The sealed channel needs this on both directions and it is not an
+ * optimisation. Sealing increments a nonce counter and opening enforces that
+ * the counter strictly increases, so two overlapping operations are a
+ * correctness bug rather than a race worth tolerating: two concurrent seals can
+ * resolve out of order and reach the wire with descending counters, and two
+ * concurrent opens can advance the high-water mark past a message that has not
+ * been read yet, which the receiver then rejects as a replay.
+ *
+ * Deliberately not a general work pool. A pool with any concurrency above one
+ * reintroduces exactly the reordering this exists to prevent.
+ */
+export interface SerialQueue {
+  /** Resolves with the task's result once every task queued before it has settled. */
+  run<T>(task: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;
+}
+export declare function createSerialQueue(): SerialQueue;
+//#endregion
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.d.mts.map

package/dist/services/serialQueue/index.d.mts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.mts","names":[],"sources":["../../../src/services/serialQueue/index.ts"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;iBAciB;;EAEf,IAAI,GAAG,YAAY,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ;;wBAG1B,qBAAqB"}

package/dist/services/serialQueue/index.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+function e(){let e=Promise.resolve();return{run(t){let n=e.then(t,t);return e=n.catch(()=>void 0),n}}}export{e as createSerialQueue};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map

package/dist/services/serialQueue/index.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"index.mjs","names":["createSerialQueue","tail","result","task"],"sources":["../../../src/services/serialQueue/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runs async work strictly one at a time, in the order it was handed over.\n *\n * The sealed channel needs this on both directions and it is not an\n * optimisation. Sealing increments a nonce counter and opening enforces that\n * the counter strictly increases, so two overlapping operations are a\n * correctness bug rather than a race worth tolerating: two concurrent seals can\n * resolve out of order and reach the wire with descending counters, and two\n * concurrent opens can advance the high-water mark past a message that has not\n * been read yet, which the receiver then rejects as a replay.\n *\n * Deliberately not a general work pool. A pool with any concurrency above one\n * reintroduces exactly the reordering this exists to prevent.\n */\nexport interface SerialQueue {\n  /** Resolves with the task's result once every task queued before it has settled. */\n  run<T>(task: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T>;\n}\n\nexport function createSerialQueue(): SerialQueue {\n  /** The tail of the chain. Rejections are absorbed so one failure cannot stall the rest. */\n  let tail: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();\n\n  return {\n    run<T>(task: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {\n      const result = tail.then(task, task);\n      tail = result.catch(() => undefined);\n      return result;\n    },\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAmBA,SAAgBA,GAAiC,CAE/C,IAAIC,EAAyB,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAE7C,MAAO,CACL,IAAO,EAAoC,CACzC,IAAMC,EAASD,EAAK,KAAKE,EAAMA,CAAI,EAEnC,MADA,GAAOD,EAAO,UAAY,IAAA,EAAS,EAC5BA,CACT,CACF,CACF"}

package/dist/types/bundleManifest.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+const e=`/index.html`,t=/^po\/[a-z0-9-]+\/v[1-9][0-9]*$/u,n=/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/u,r=/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/u,i=/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/u;function a(e,t){let n=Object.keys(e).sort();return n.length===t.length&&n.every((e,n)=>e===t[n])}function o(e,t){return typeof e==`number`&&Number.isSafeInteger(e)&&e>=t}function s(e){return typeof e!=`string`||e.length<2||!e.startsWith(`/`)||e.includes(`\\`)||e.includes(`\0`)||e.includes(`?`)||e.includes(`#`)||/[^\x21-\x7e]/u.test(e)||e.includes(`//`)||/%(?![0-9a-f]{2})/iu.test(e)||/%(?:2e|2f|5c)/iu.test(e)?!1:e.split(`/`).slice(1).every(e=>e!==``&&e!==`.`&&e!==`..`)}function c(e){let t=[...e.assets].sort((e,t)=>e.path<t.path?-1:+(e.path>t.path)).map(e=>`${e.path}\0${e.sha256}\0${String(e.byteLength)}\0${e.contentType}`);return[String(e.version),String(e.revision),String(e.builtAt),...t].join(`
+`)}function l(e,n){if(!t.test(e))throw Error(`invalid attestation tag: ${e}`);if(!Array.isArray(n)||!n.every(e=>typeof e==`string`))throw Error(`invalid attestation fields for ${e}`);return new TextEncoder().encode(`${e}\n${JSON.stringify(n)}`)}function u(t,n,r){if(r===`web`)return n.has(e);if(r!==`native`||t.length!==1)return!1;let[i]=t;return i!==void 0&&i.path===`/composition.js`&&i.contentType===`text/javascript`&&i.byteLength<=4194304}function d(e,t=`web`){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||!a(e,[`assets`,`builtAt`,`revision`,`version`]))return!1;let r=e;if(r.version!==2||!o(r.revision,1)||!o(r.builtAt,0)||!Array.isArray(r.assets)||r.assets.length===0)return!1;let c=/* @__PURE__ */ new Set;for(let e of r.assets){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||!a(e,[`byteLength`,`contentType`,`path`,`sha256`]))return!1;let t=e;if(!s(t.path)||c.has(t.path)||typeof t.sha256!=`string`||!n.test(t.sha256)||!o(t.byteLength,0)||typeof t.contentType!=`string`||!i.test(t.contentType))return!1;c.add(t.path)}return u(r.assets,c,t)}function f(e,t=`web`){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||!a(e,[`manifest`,`publicKey`,`signature`]))return!1;let n=e;return d(n.manifest,t)&&typeof n.signature==`string`&&n.signature.length===86&&r.test(n.signature)&&typeof n.publicKey==`string`&&n.publicKey.length<=512&&r.test(n.publicKey)}function p(e,t){return e.assets.find(e=>e.path===t)}function m(e,t){return p(e,t)?.sha256}exports.ATTESTATION_TAG=t,exports.BUNDLE_MANIFEST_ROUTE=`/bundle-manifest.json`,exports.BUNDLE_MANIFEST_VERSION=2,exports.NATIVE_COMPOSITION_MAX_BYTES=4194304,exports.NATIVE_ENTRY_CONTENT_TYPE=`text/javascript`,exports.NATIVE_ENTRY_PATH=`/composition.js`,exports.WEB_ENTRY_PATH=e,exports.assetFor=p,exports.attestationBytes=l,exports.canonicalManifest=c,exports.digestFor=m,exports.isBundleManifest=d,exports.isSignedBundleManifest=f;
+//# sourceMappingURL=bundleManifest.cjs.map

package/dist/types/bundleManifest.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"bundleManifest.cjs","names":["WEB_ENTRY_PATH","ATTESTATION_TAG","SHA256","BASE64URL","CONTENT_TYPE","hasExactKeys","keys","value","expected","key","index","isSafeInteger","minimum","isSafeAssetPath","segment","canonicalManifest","lines","manifest","left","right","asset","attestationBytes","tag","fields","field","matchesProfile","profile","paths","assets","entry","isBundleManifest","candidate","valueAsset","isSignedBundleManifest","assetFor","path","digestFor"],"sources":["../../src/types/bundleManifest.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * A signed description of cockpit assets for an independently trusted verifier.\n *\n * A manifest does not let a browser SPA defend itself against the server or TLS\n * edge that supplied its executable code. Consumers need a separately trusted\n * bootstrap and key before these signatures become a delivery guarantee.\n */\n\nexport const BUNDLE_MANIFEST_ROUTE = '/bundle-manifest.json';\nexport const BUNDLE_MANIFEST_VERSION = 2;\n\n/**\n * Which asset shape a manifest must have. A web bundle always serves `/index.html`; a native bundle is\n * exactly one composition module and never serves `/index.html`, so no manifest can pass both.\n */\nexport type BundleProfile = 'web' | 'native';\nexport const WEB_ENTRY_PATH = '/index.html';\nexport const NATIVE_ENTRY_PATH = '/composition.js';\nexport const NATIVE_ENTRY_CONTENT_TYPE = 'text/javascript';\n/** Largest native composition a sealed response can carry. */\nexport const NATIVE_COMPOSITION_MAX_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;\n/** Domain-separation tag for an attestation. Starts with `p`, so it can never collide with a `2\\n` manifest. */\nexport const ATTESTATION_TAG = /^po\\/[a-z0-9-]+\\/v[1-9][0-9]*$/u;\n\nconst SHA256 = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/u;\nconst BASE64URL = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/u;\nconst CONTENT_TYPE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/u;\n\nexport interface BundleAsset {\n  /** Normalized absolute URL path, without a query or fragment. */\n  path: string;\n  /** Lowercase hex SHA-256 of the served bytes. */\n  sha256: string;\n  byteLength: number;\n  /** MIME type of the response, without parameters. */\n  contentType: string;\n}\n\nexport interface BundleManifest {\n  version: typeof BUNDLE_MANIFEST_VERSION;\n  /** Monotonically increasing persistent signer revision. */\n  revision: number;\n  /** Unix time in milliseconds. */\n  builtAt: number;\n  assets: BundleAsset[];\n}\n\nexport interface SignedBundleManifest {\n  manifest: BundleManifest;\n  /** Base64url IEEE P1363 ECDSA P-256 signature over the canonical serialization. */\n  signature: string;\n  /** Base64url SPKI of the signing key. Trust must be established out of band. */\n  publicKey: string;\n}\n\nfunction hasExactKeys(value: object, expected: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  const keys = Object.keys(value).sort();\n  return keys.length === expected.length && keys.every((key, index) => key === expected[index]);\n}\n\nfunction isSafeInteger(value: unknown, minimum: number): value is number {\n  return typeof value === 'number' && Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value >= minimum;\n}\n\nfunction isSafeAssetPath(value: unknown): value is string {\n  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.length < 2 || !value.startsWith('/')) return false;\n  if (value.includes('\\\\') || value.includes('\\0') || value.includes('?') || value.includes('#')) return false;\n  if (/[^\\x21-\\x7e]/u.test(value) || value.includes('//') || /%(?![0-9a-f]{2})/iu.test(value)) return false;\n  if (/%(?:2e|2f|5c)/iu.test(value)) return false;\n  return value\n    .split('/')\n    .slice(1)\n    .every((segment) => segment !== '' && segment !== '.' && segment !== '..');\n}\n\n/** The exact bytes signed by Node and verified by WebCrypto. */\nexport function canonicalManifest(manifest: BundleManifest): string {\n  const assets = [...manifest.assets].sort((left, right) =>\n    left.path < right.path ? -1 : left.path > right.path ? 1 : 0,\n  );\n  const lines = assets.map(\n    (asset) => `${asset.path}\\0${asset.sha256}\\0${String(asset.byteLength)}\\0${asset.contentType}`,\n  );\n  return [String(manifest.version), String(manifest.revision), String(manifest.builtAt), ...lines].join('\\n');\n}\n\n/**\n * The exact bytes of a tagged attestation: `UTF-8(tag + \"\\n\" + JSON.stringify(fields))`. Fields are an\n * ordered list of strings, so both sides build the same bytes without relying on object key order.\n * Throws on a malformed tag or a non-string field.\n */\nexport function attestationBytes(tag: string, fields: readonly string[]): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n  if (!ATTESTATION_TAG.test(tag)) throw new Error(`invalid attestation tag: ${tag}`);\n  if (!Array.isArray(fields) || !fields.every((field) => typeof field === 'string')) {\n    throw new Error(`invalid attestation fields for ${tag}`);\n  }\n  return new TextEncoder().encode(`${tag}\\n${JSON.stringify(fields)}`);\n}\n\nfunction matchesProfile(assets: readonly BundleAsset[], paths: ReadonlySet<string>, profile: BundleProfile): boolean {\n  if (profile === 'web') return paths.has(WEB_ENTRY_PATH);\n  if (profile !== 'native' || assets.length !== 1) return false;\n  const [entry] = assets;\n  return (\n    entry !== undefined &&\n    entry.path === NATIVE_ENTRY_PATH &&\n    entry.contentType === NATIVE_ENTRY_CONTENT_TYPE &&\n    entry.byteLength <= NATIVE_COMPOSITION_MAX_BYTES\n  );\n}\n\nexport function isBundleManifest(value: unknown, profile: BundleProfile = 'web'): value is BundleManifest {\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;\n  if (!hasExactKeys(value, ['assets', 'builtAt', 'revision', 'version'])) return false;\n  const candidate = value as Partial<BundleManifest>;\n  if (candidate.version !== BUNDLE_MANIFEST_VERSION) return false;\n  if (!isSafeInteger(candidate.revision, 1) || !isSafeInteger(candidate.builtAt, 0)) return false;\n  if (!Array.isArray(candidate.assets) || candidate.assets.length === 0) return false;\n\n  const paths = new Set<string>();\n  for (const valueAsset of candidate.assets) {\n    if (typeof valueAsset !== 'object' || valueAsset === null) return false;\n    if (!hasExactKeys(valueAsset, ['byteLength', 'contentType', 'path', 'sha256'])) return false;\n    const asset = valueAsset as Partial<BundleAsset>;\n    if 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package/dist/types/bundleManifest.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+//#region src/types/bundleManifest.d.ts
+/**
+ * A signed description of cockpit assets for an independently trusted verifier.
+ *
+ * A manifest does not let a browser SPA defend itself against the server or TLS
+ * edge that supplied its executable code. Consumers need a separately trusted
+ * bootstrap and key before these signatures become a delivery guarantee.
+ */
+export declare const BUNDLE_MANIFEST_ROUTE = "/bundle-manifest.json";
+export declare const BUNDLE_MANIFEST_VERSION = 2;
+/**
+ * Which asset shape a manifest must have. A web bundle always serves `/index.html`; a native bundle is
+ * exactly one composition module and never serves `/index.html`, so no manifest can pass both.
+ */
+export type BundleProfile = 'web' | 'native';
+export declare const WEB_ENTRY_PATH = "/index.html";
+export declare const NATIVE_ENTRY_PATH = "/composition.js";
+export declare const NATIVE_ENTRY_CONTENT_TYPE = "text/javascript";
+/** Largest native composition a sealed response can carry. */
+export declare const NATIVE_COMPOSITION_MAX_BYTES: number;
+/** Domain-separation tag for an attestation. Starts with `p`, so it can never collide with a `2\n` manifest. */
+export declare const ATTESTATION_TAG: RegExp;
+export interface BundleAsset {
+  /** Normalized absolute URL path, without a query or fragment. */
+  path: string;
+  /** Lowercase hex SHA-256 of the served bytes. */
+  sha256: string;
+  byteLength: number;
+  /** MIME type of the response, without parameters. */
+  contentType: string;
+}
+export interface BundleManifest {
+  version: typeof BUNDLE_MANIFEST_VERSION;
+  /** Monotonically increasing persistent signer revision. */
+  revision: number;
+  /** Unix time in milliseconds. */
+  builtAt: number;
+  assets: BundleAsset[];
+}
+export interface SignedBundleManifest {
+  manifest: BundleManifest;
+  /** Base64url IEEE P1363 ECDSA P-256 signature over the canonical serialization. */
+  signature: string;
+  /** Base64url SPKI of the signing key. Trust must be established out of band. */
+  publicKey: string;
+}
+/** The exact bytes signed by Node and verified by WebCrypto. */
+export declare function canonicalManifest(manifest: BundleManifest): string;
+/**
+ * The exact bytes of a tagged attestation: `UTF-8(tag + "\n" + JSON.stringify(fields))`. Fields are an
+ * ordered list of strings, so both sides build the same bytes without relying on object key order.
+ * Throws on a malformed tag or a non-string field.
+ */
+export declare function attestationBytes(tag: string, fields: readonly string[]): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
+export declare function isBundleManifest(value: unknown, profile?: BundleProfile): value is BundleManifest;
+export declare function isSignedBundleManifest(value: unknown, profile?: BundleProfile): value is SignedBundleManifest;
+/** The recorded asset for one path, or undefined if the manifest does not cover it. */
+export declare function assetFor(manifest: BundleManifest, path: string): BundleAsset | undefined;
+/** The recorded digest for one asset, or undefined if the manifest does not cover it. */
+export declare function digestFor(manifest: BundleManifest, path: string): string | undefined;
+//#endregion
+//# sourceMappingURL=bundleManifest.d.mts.map

package/dist/types/bundleManifest.d.mts.map

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package/dist/types/bundleManifest.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+const e=`/bundle-manifest.json`,t=2,n=`/index.html`,r=`/composition.js`,i=`text/javascript`,a=4194304,o=/^po\/[a-z0-9-]+\/v[1-9][0-9]*$/u,s=/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/u,c=/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/u,l=/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9!#$&^_.+-]*$/u;function u(e,t){let n=Object.keys(e).sort();return n.length===t.length&&n.every((e,n)=>e===t[n])}function d(e,t){return typeof e==`number`&&Number.isSafeInteger(e)&&e>=t}function f(e){return typeof e!=`string`||e.length<2||!e.startsWith(`/`)||e.includes(`\\`)||e.includes(`\0`)||e.includes(`?`)||e.includes(`#`)||/[^\x21-\x7e]/u.test(e)||e.includes(`//`)||/%(?![0-9a-f]{2})/iu.test(e)||/%(?:2e|2f|5c)/iu.test(e)?!1:e.split(`/`).slice(1).every(e=>e!==``&&e!==`.`&&e!==`..`)}function p(e){let t=[...e.assets].sort((e,t)=>e.path<t.path?-1:+(e.path>t.path)).map(e=>`${e.path}\0${e.sha256}\0${String(e.byteLength)}\0${e.contentType}`);return[String(e.version),String(e.revision),String(e.builtAt),...t].join(`
+`)}function m(e,t){if(!o.test(e))throw Error(`invalid attestation tag: ${e}`);if(!Array.isArray(t)||!t.every(e=>typeof e==`string`))throw Error(`invalid attestation fields for ${e}`);return new TextEncoder().encode(`${e}\n${JSON.stringify(t)}`)}function h(e,t,r){if(r===`web`)return t.has(n);if(r!==`native`||e.length!==1)return!1;let[i]=e;return i!==void 0&&i.path===`/composition.js`&&i.contentType===`text/javascript`&&i.byteLength<=4194304}function g(e,t=`web`){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||!u(e,[`assets`,`builtAt`,`revision`,`version`]))return!1;let n=e;if(n.version!==2||!d(n.revision,1)||!d(n.builtAt,0)||!Array.isArray(n.assets)||n.assets.length===0)return!1;let r=/* @__PURE__ */ new Set;for(let e of n.assets){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||!u(e,[`byteLength`,`contentType`,`path`,`sha256`]))return!1;let t=e;if(!f(t.path)||r.has(t.path)||typeof t.sha256!=`string`||!s.test(t.sha256)||!d(t.byteLength,0)||typeof t.contentType!=`string`||!l.test(t.contentType))return!1;r.add(t.path)}return h(n.assets,r,t)}function _(e,t=`web`){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e||!u(e,[`manifest`,`publicKey`,`signature`]))return!1;let n=e;return g(n.manifest,t)&&typeof n.signature==`string`&&n.signature.length===86&&c.test(n.signature)&&typeof n.publicKey==`string`&&n.publicKey.length<=512&&c.test(n.publicKey)}function v(e,t){return e.assets.find(e=>e.path===t)}function y(e,t){return v(e,t)?.sha256}export{o as ATTESTATION_TAG,e as BUNDLE_MANIFEST_ROUTE,t as BUNDLE_MANIFEST_VERSION,a as NATIVE_COMPOSITION_MAX_BYTES,i as NATIVE_ENTRY_CONTENT_TYPE,r as NATIVE_ENTRY_PATH,n as WEB_ENTRY_PATH,v as assetFor,m as attestationBytes,p as canonicalManifest,y as digestFor,g as isBundleManifest,_ as isSignedBundleManifest};
+//# sourceMappingURL=bundleManifest.mjs.map

package/dist/types/bundleManifest.mjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/types/sealedChannel.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+const e=2**32,t=`po/sealed/c2s/v1`,n=`po/sealed/s2c/v1`;function r(e){return e===`c2s`?t:n}function i(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e)return!1;let t=e;return t.v===1&&typeof t.n==`string`&&typeof t.c==`string`}function a(e){switch(e){case`version`:return`The other end is speaking a different envelope version.`;case`malformed`:return`A sealed message was not shaped like one.`;case`replay`:return`A sealed message arrived out of order or twice.`;case`auth`:return`A sealed message failed its authentication tag, so it was altered in transit.`;case`exhausted`:return`This channel reached its message limit and must be re-established.`}}exports.CLIENT_TO_SERVER_INFO=t,exports.MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY=e,exports.NONCE_BYTES=12,exports.NONCE_COUNTER_BYTES=8,exports.NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES=4,exports.SEALED_BODY_HEADER=`x-po-sealed`,exports.SEALED_CLIENT_KEY_HEADER=`x-po-channel-key`,exports.SEALED_KEY_PARAM=`k`,exports.SEALED_VERSION=1,exports.SERVER_TO_CLIENT_INFO=n,exports.describeSealedFailure=a,exports.infoFor=r,exports.isSealedEnvelope=i;
+//# sourceMappingURL=sealedChannel.cjs.map

package/dist/types/sealedChannel.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"sealedChannel.cjs","names":["MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY","CLIENT_TO_SERVER_INFO","SERVER_TO_CLIENT_INFO","infoFor","direction","isSealedEnvelope","value","candidate","describeSealedFailure","failure"],"sources":["../../src/types/sealedChannel.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The envelope that keeps the tunnel provider out of the payload.\n *\n * Cloudflare terminates TLS at its edge, so everything the cockpit carries\n * (prompts, file previews, model output) is plaintext to them. Sealing the\n * payload underneath their TLS leaves them a relay that can see timing and\n * sizes but not content.\n *\n * The key exchange is anchored on the QR rather than negotiated in band: the\n * host's ephemeral public key is printed on a screen the user is holding, so\n * there is no moment at which a relay could substitute its own. That is the\n * same job Telegram's emoji comparison does for a secret chat, except it\n * happens automatically instead of depending on two people comparing pictures.\n *\n * Declared here because the server seals with `node:crypto` and the browser\n * unseals with WebCrypto, and an envelope is only an envelope if both sides\n * read it identically.\n */\n\n/** Bumped when the envelope layout changes; a mismatch is refused, never guessed at. */\nexport const SEALED_VERSION = 1;\n\n/** Fragment key in the pairing URL carrying the host's ephemeral public key. */\nexport const SEALED_KEY_PARAM = 'k';\n\n/** AES-GCM standard nonce length. Longer is non-standard, shorter is unsafe. */\nexport const NONCE_BYTES = 12;\n/** Random per-channel prefix, so two channels never share a nonce space. */\nexport const NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES = 4;\n/** Monotonic per-direction counter filling the rest of the nonce. */\nexport const NONCE_COUNTER_BYTES = NONCE_BYTES - NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES;\n\n/**\n * Rekey well before the counter could wrap.\n *\n * A repeated nonce under one AES-GCM key is catastrophic, not merely weak: it\n * leaks the XOR of two plaintexts and the authentication subkey. 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CLIENT_TO_SERVER_INFO : SERVER_TO_CLIENT_INFO;\n}\n\n/**\n * One sealed message, as it travels.\n *\n * Base64url rather than binary so the same envelope works on a JSON body and a\n * text WebSocket frame without a second encoding path to get wrong.\n */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope {\n  v: number;\n  /** Base64url, 4-byte prefix plus 8-byte counter. */\n  n: string;\n  /** Base64url ciphertext with the GCM tag appended. */\n  c: string;\n}\n\nexport function isSealedEnvelope(value: unknown): value is SealedEnvelope {\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;\n  const candidate = value as Partial<SealedEnvelope>;\n  return candidate.v === SEALED_VERSION && typeof candidate.n === 'string' && typeof candidate.c === 'string';\n}\n\n/** Header naming the client's ephemeral public key during the handshake. */\nexport const SEALED_CLIENT_KEY_HEADER = 'x-po-channel-key';\n/** Header carrying a sealed request body's envelope on a non-JSON request. */\nexport const SEALED_BODY_HEADER = 'x-po-sealed';\n\nexport type SealedFailure = 'version' | 'malformed' | 'replay' | 'auth' | 'exhausted';\n\n/**\n * Why an unseal failed, in words a diagnostic can show.\n *\n * A decryption failure means a blank cockpit, so every one of these has to name\n * its cause rather than leaving a dead page and no explanation.\n */\nexport function describeSealedFailure(failure: SealedFailure): string {\n  switch (failure) {\n    case 'version':\n      return 'The other end is speaking a different envelope version.';\n    case 'malformed':\n      return 'A sealed message was not shaped like one.';\n    case 'replay':\n      return 'A sealed message arrived out of order or twice.';\n    case 'auth':\n      return 'A sealed message failed its authentication tag, so it was altered in transit.';\n    case 'exhausted':\n      return 'This channel reached its message limit and must be re-established.';\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAoBA,MAoBaA,EAAuB,GAAK,GAQ5BC,EAAwB,mBACxBC,EAAwB,mBAIrC,SAAgBC,EAAQ,EAAoC,CAC1D,OAAOC,IAAc,MAAQH,EAAwBC,CACvD,CAgBA,SAAgBG,EAAiB,EAAyC,CACxE,GAAI,OAAOC,GAAU,WAAYA,EAAgB,MAAO,GACxD,IAAMC,EAAYD,EAClB,OAAOC,EAAU,IAAA,GAAwB,OAAOA,EAAU,GAAM,UAAY,OAAOA,EAAU,GAAM,QACrG,CAeA,SAAgBC,EAAsB,EAAgC,CACpE,OAAQC,EAAR,CACE,IAAK,UACH,MAAO,0DACT,IAAK,YACH,MAAO,4CACT,IAAK,SACH,MAAO,kDACT,IAAK,OACH,MAAO,gFACT,IAAK,YACH,MAAO,oEACX,CACF"}

package/dist/types/sealedChannel.d.mts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+//#region src/types/sealedChannel.d.ts
+/**
+ * The envelope that keeps the tunnel provider out of the payload.
+ *
+ * Cloudflare terminates TLS at its edge, so everything the cockpit carries
+ * (prompts, file previews, model output) is plaintext to them. Sealing the
+ * payload underneath their TLS leaves them a relay that can see timing and
+ * sizes but not content.
+ *
+ * The key exchange is anchored on the QR rather than negotiated in band: the
+ * host's ephemeral public key is printed on a screen the user is holding, so
+ * there is no moment at which a relay could substitute its own. That is the
+ * same job Telegram's emoji comparison does for a secret chat, except it
+ * happens automatically instead of depending on two people comparing pictures.
+ *
+ * Declared here because the server seals with `node:crypto` and the browser
+ * unseals with WebCrypto, and an envelope is only an envelope if both sides
+ * read it identically.
+ */
+/** Bumped when the envelope layout changes; a mismatch is refused, never guessed at. */
+export declare const SEALED_VERSION = 1;
+/** Fragment key in the pairing URL carrying the host's ephemeral public key. */
+export declare const SEALED_KEY_PARAM = "k";
+/** AES-GCM standard nonce length. Longer is non-standard, shorter is unsafe. */
+export declare const NONCE_BYTES = 12;
+/** Random per-channel prefix, so two channels never share a nonce space. */
+export declare const NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES = 4;
+/** Monotonic per-direction counter filling the rest of the nonce. */
+export declare const NONCE_COUNTER_BYTES: number;
+/**
+ * Rekey well before the counter could wrap.
+ *
+ * A repeated nonce under one AES-GCM key is catastrophic, not merely weak: it
+ * leaks the XOR of two plaintexts and the authentication subkey. The counter is
+ * 64 bits, so this bound is nowhere near it; the point is that the bound exists
+ * and is enforced rather than assumed.
+ */
+export declare const MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY: number;
+/**
+ * HKDF info strings, one per direction.
+ *
+ * Separate keys per direction, not one shared key, so a message the server sent
+ * can never be replayed back at it as though the client had sent it.
+ */
+export declare const CLIENT_TO_SERVER_INFO = "po/sealed/c2s/v1";
+export declare const SERVER_TO_CLIENT_INFO = "po/sealed/s2c/v1";
+export type SealedDirection = 'c2s' | 's2c';
+export declare function infoFor(direction: SealedDirection): string;
+/**
+ * One sealed message, as it travels.
+ *
+ * Base64url rather than binary so the same envelope works on a JSON body and a
+ * text WebSocket frame without a second encoding path to get wrong.
+ */
+export interface SealedEnvelope {
+  v: number;
+  /** Base64url, 4-byte prefix plus 8-byte counter. */
+  n: string;
+  /** Base64url ciphertext with the GCM tag appended. */
+  c: string;
+}
+export declare function isSealedEnvelope(value: unknown): value is SealedEnvelope;
+/** Header naming the client's ephemeral public key during the handshake. */
+export declare const SEALED_CLIENT_KEY_HEADER = "x-po-channel-key";
+/** Header carrying a sealed request body's envelope on a non-JSON request. */
+export declare const SEALED_BODY_HEADER = "x-po-sealed";
+export type SealedFailure = 'version' | 'malformed' | 'replay' | 'auth' | 'exhausted';
+/**
+ * Why an unseal failed, in words a diagnostic can show.
+ *
+ * A decryption failure means a blank cockpit, so every one of these has to name
+ * its cause rather than leaving a dead page and no explanation.
+ */
+export declare function describeSealedFailure(failure: SealedFailure): string;
+//#endregion
+//# sourceMappingURL=sealedChannel.d.mts.map

package/dist/types/sealedChannel.d.mts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/types/sealedChannel.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+const e=1,t=`k`,n=12,r=4,i=8,a=2**32,o=`po/sealed/c2s/v1`,s=`po/sealed/s2c/v1`;function c(e){return e===`c2s`?o:s}function l(e){if(typeof e!=`object`||!e)return!1;let t=e;return t.v===1&&typeof t.n==`string`&&typeof t.c==`string`}const u=`x-po-channel-key`,d=`x-po-sealed`;function f(e){switch(e){case`version`:return`The other end is speaking a different envelope version.`;case`malformed`:return`A sealed message was not shaped like one.`;case`replay`:return`A sealed message arrived out of order or twice.`;case`auth`:return`A sealed message failed its authentication tag, so it was altered in transit.`;case`exhausted`:return`This channel reached its message limit and must be re-established.`}}export{o as CLIENT_TO_SERVER_INFO,a as MAX_MESSAGES_PER_KEY,n as NONCE_BYTES,i as NONCE_COUNTER_BYTES,r as NONCE_PREFIX_BYTES,d as SEALED_BODY_HEADER,u as SEALED_CLIENT_KEY_HEADER,t as SEALED_KEY_PARAM,e as SEALED_VERSION,s as SERVER_TO_CLIENT_INFO,f as describeSealedFailure,c as infoFor,l as isSealedEnvelope};
+//# sourceMappingURL=sealedChannel.mjs.map