@agentvault/claude-bridge 0.5.4 → 0.5.5

package/dist/index.js

@@ -65502,7 +65502,7 @@ var init_channel = __esm2({
        */
       sendActivitySpan(spanData) {
         if (!this._ws || this._ws.readyState !== WebSocket2.OPEN) return;
-        const pluginVersion = true ? "0.23.0" : "0.0.0-dev";
+        const pluginVersion = true ? "0.23.2" : "0.0.0-dev";
         const agentName = this.config.agentName ?? "Agent";
         const resource = {
           "service.name": "agentvault-agent",
@@ -67119,7 +67119,7 @@ var init_channel = __esm2({
                 agentVersion: this.config.agentVersion ?? "0.0.0",
                 // __AV_VERSION__ is injected by esbuild from package.json at build time.
                 // Falls back to "0.0.0-dev" in non-bundled contexts (tests).
-                pluginVersion: true ? "0.23.0" : "0.0.0-dev"
+                pluginVersion: true ? "0.23.2" : "0.0.0-dev"
               });
               this._telemetryReporter.startAutoFlush(3e4);
             }
@@ -67195,7 +67195,7 @@ var init_channel = __esm2({
               return;
             }
             if (data.event === "device_revoked") {
-              this._handleDeviceRevoked();
+              await this._handleDeviceRevoked();
               return;
             }
             if (data.event === "device_linked") {
@@ -67429,7 +67429,7 @@ var init_channel = __esm2({
                     agentVersion: this.config.agentVersion ?? "0.0.0",
                     // __AV_VERSION__ is injected by esbuild from package.json at build time.
                     // Falls back to "0.0.0-dev" in non-bundled contexts (tests).
-                    pluginVersion: true ? "0.23.0" : "0.0.0-dev"
+                    pluginVersion: true ? "0.23.2" : "0.0.0-dev"
                   });
                   this._telemetryReporter.startAutoFlush(3e4);
                 }
@@ -70594,22 +70594,74 @@ ${messageText}`;
         this._setState("error");
         this.emit("error", err);
       }
+      // Phase 2 — rolling-window timestamps of device_revoked self-heal reconnects,
+      // used as a war cap so a takeover war or a server status/WS inconsistency can't
+      // thrash forever.
+      _revokeRecoveries = [];
+      static REVOKE_RECOVERY_MAX = 3;
+      static REVOKE_RECOVERY_WINDOW_MS = 12e4;
       /**
-       * Handle a WS `device_revoked` event. Surfaces a terminal error so
-       * attachLifecycle stops the channel — but does NOT delete credentials.
+       * Handle a WS `device_revoked` event.
        *
-       * This signal fires both for a genuine owner revoke AND for a transient
-       * session-takeover of a device that is still ACTIVE on the server (the error
-       * text even reads "or another session has taken over"). Deleting
-       * agentvault.json here — as this path used to via clearState() — strands a
-       * still-valid identity: the primary creds vanish, only the .bak survives, and
-       * the bridge's token-gate then demands a fresh invite token to restart.
-       * Keeping the creds means a restart reconnects via restoreState() when the
-       * device is still valid, and fails cleanly (device_revoked again, no data
-       * lost) when it isn't. Re-enrollment, which SHOULD wipe creds, goes through
-       * the explicit setup --force / _forceReEnroll path in start().
+       * The signal is ambiguous: the server sends it both for a genuine owner revoke
+       * AND for a transient/racy session-takeover of a device that is still ACTIVE
+       * (the error text even reads "or another session has taken over" — loopita's
+       * case, where the device stayed ACTIVE on the server). So we do NOT terminate
+       * blindly. We ask the PUBLIC /devices/{id}/status endpoint (no JWT needed, so
+       * it answers even when our device JWT is being rejected):
+       *   - ACTIVE          -> reconnect in place (transient); stay online.
+       *   - non-ACTIVE      -> terminal (genuinely revoked; operator must re-enroll).
+       *   - unreachable/429  -> reconnect (inconclusive; a network blip shouldn't
+       *                         permanently kill a healthy agent — the WS is down too,
+       *                         so normal backoff handles it, and the war cap bounds
+       *                         thrash if the device really is dead).
+       *
+       * A rolling-window cap (REVOKE_RECOVERY_MAX self-heals per WINDOW_MS) gives up
+       * (terminal) on a repeating loop. Never clears credentials in any branch —
+       * re-enrollment, which SHOULD wipe creds, goes through setup --force /
+       * _forceReEnroll in start().
        */
-      _handleDeviceRevoked() {
+      async _handleDeviceRevoked() {
+        const now = Date.now();
+        this._revokeRecoveries = this._revokeRecoveries.filter(
+          (t22) => now - t22 < _SecureChannel.REVOKE_RECOVERY_WINDOW_MS
+        );
+        if (this._revokeRecoveries.length >= _SecureChannel.REVOKE_RECOVERY_MAX) {
+          console.warn(
+            "[SecureChannel] device_revoked self-healed too many times in a short window \u2014 giving up (terminal)"
+          );
+          this._handleError(new Error("Device was revoked"));
+          return;
+        }
+        const deviceId = this._deviceId ?? this._persisted?.deviceId;
+        if (!deviceId) {
+          this._handleError(new Error("Device was revoked"));
+          return;
+        }
+        let reconnect;
+        try {
+          const status = await pollDeviceStatus(this.config.apiUrl, deviceId);
+          reconnect = status.rateLimited === true || status.status === "ACTIVE";
+          if (!reconnect) {
+            console.warn(
+              `[SecureChannel] device_revoked confirmed by server (status=${status.status}) \u2014 terminal`
+            );
+          }
+        } catch (err) {
+          console.warn(
+            "[SecureChannel] device_revoked status check failed; reconnecting (inconclusive):",
+            err
+          );
+          reconnect = true;
+        }
+        if (reconnect) {
+          this._revokeRecoveries.push(now);
+          console.log(
+            "[SecureChannel] device_revoked but device not confirmed dead \u2014 reconnecting (self-heal)"
+          );
+          this._scheduleReconnect();
+          return;
+        }
         this._handleError(new Error("Device was revoked"));
       }
       /**
@@ -97124,7 +97176,7 @@ var init_index = __esm2({
     init_skill_invoker();
     await init_skill_telemetry();
     await init_policy_enforcer();
-    VERSION = true ? "0.23.0" : "0.0.0-dev";
+    VERSION = true ? "0.23.2" : "0.0.0-dev";
   }
 });
 await init_index();
@@ -132866,7 +132918,7 @@ async function main() {
       "[bridge] warning: passing the invite token on the command line is visible to other local users via 'ps'. Prefer: AV_INVITE_TOKEN=\u2026 npx @agentvault/claude-bridge"
     );
   }
-  console.error(`[bridge] version: ${true ? "0.5.4" : "dev"}`);
+  console.error(`[bridge] version: ${true ? "0.5.5" : "dev"}`);
   console.error(`[bridge] data dir: ${cfg.dataDir} (${cfg.dataDirSource})`);
   if (cfg.worker) {
     console.error(`[bridge] WORKER MODE \u2014 workspace: ${cfg.workspaceDir} \xB7 permissions: ${cfg.permissionMode} \xB7 enclave dir fenced`);

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@agentvault/claude-bridge",
-  "version": "0.5.4",
+  "version": "0.5.5",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "AgentVault Claude Bridge — daemon for bridging a Claude agent into secure E2E-encrypted AgentVault 1:1 direct messages and rooms.",
   "main": "dist/index.js",