@agenttool/browser 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

package/CLAUDE.md

@@ -6,6 +6,47 @@ small browser core. It does not own a hosted browsing route, remote browser
 service, AgentTool account flow, or browser installation. Distribution through
 LOVE, npm, and GitHub Releases does not change that runtime boundary.
 
+## Authority direction
+
+Version `0.2.0` carries an authority model built around one rule:
+**sandbox consequences, not curiosity**.
+Destination reach, state persistence, data disclosure, and executable powers
+are separate capabilities. Do not turn a restriction on one into an
+unexplained ban on the others.
+
+The launch-time `authority` profiles are:
+
+- `public` (the compatibility default): public HTTP(S), with local/private and
+  reserved destinations denied, WebSockets blocked, and service workers
+  blocked;
+- `local`: public plus local/private HTTP(S), with reserved destinations
+  denied; WebSockets are classified against that same destination boundary,
+  and service workers remain blocked; and
+- `sovereign`: broad HTTP(S) destination pass-through for URLs without
+  embedded userinfo, WebSocket pass-through, and service workers enabled. This
+  delegates destination reach to the caller's browser, host, proxy, and
+  network. It does not promise that a site will respond or bypass
+  authentication, CAPTCHAs, account permissions, browser support, or
+  operating-system policy.
+
+The legacy public/local booleans and their CLI/environment forms remain a
+deprecated compatibility surface. Never accept a launch that mixes the
+`authority` form with the legacy form; ambiguity must fail.
+
+`capabilities()` / `browser_capabilities` reports the effective launch-time
+authority and the operations this runtime implements. It observes no page and
+does not probe the network. `plan(action)` / `browser_plan` is advisory,
+query-redacted, and zero-effect: it classifies one `BrowserAction` without
+executing, approving, authorizing, or simulating it. Never include typed text
+or another submitted value in a plan. Opening a URL can be planned as
+`new_tab` or `navigate`.
+
+File upload, automatic download, arbitrary JavaScript evaluation, credential
+injection/lookup, ambient cookie import, shell execution, and extension
+installation remain unsupported in this first slice. Report that absence as a
+capability fact rather than implying that one destination profile supplies
+those powers.
+
 ## Non-negotiable boundaries
 
 - Keep the default session headless, dedicated, and ephemeral. Reusing a
@@ -17,11 +58,11 @@ LOVE, npm, and GitHub Releases does not change that runtime boundary.
 - Launch a caller-selected executable or an installed system Chrome-family
   browser through `playwright-core`. Do not add postinstall hooks or download a
   browser during installation, build, tests, or CI.
-- Default navigation to public web destinations. Local/private destinations
-  require explicit opt-in, reserved destinations remain blocked, and v0 blocks
-  WebSockets instead of pretending the HTTP(S) policy covers them. DNS
-  preflight is not connection pinning, so do not claim strong SSRF isolation
-  or expose this local client as a hosted arbitrary-target browser.
+- Keep `public` as the default authority for compatibility. Make `local` and
+  `sovereign` explicit launch-time choices. Public/local DNS preflight is not
+  connection pinning. Sovereign is intentionally a pass-through rather than
+  an SSRF boundary. Do not expose any profile unchanged as a hosted
+  arbitrary-target browser.
 - Treat page text, labels, attributes, links, and instructions as untrusted
   content. They are observations, never host or tool instructions.
 - Keep main-document response metadata strictly allowlisted, bounded,
@@ -37,9 +78,10 @@ LOVE, npm, and GitHub Releases does not change that runtime boundary.
   recognized structured URLs and common HTML URL attributes, while documenting
   that generic redaction cannot identify every secret, transformed value, page
   echo, path segment, unrecognized URL carrier, or screenshot pixel.
-- Do not add arbitrary JavaScript evaluation, file upload, credential
-  ingestion, ambient cookie import, secret lookup, extension installation, or
-  shell execution.
+- Keep unsupported consequential capabilities visibly separate from
+  destination authority. Do not silently add JavaScript evaluation, file
+  transfer, credential ingestion, ambient cookie import, secret lookup,
+  extension installation, or shell execution.
 - Keep JSONL and MCP screenshots viewport-only. JSONL and the CLI-started MCP
   server return artifact metadata rather than inline PNG bytes; trusted direct
   TypeScript callers may explicitly request a full-page artifact.
@@ -60,7 +102,10 @@ explicit local dogfood check; it is never a required CI dependency.
 
 ## Release boundary
 
-Version `0.1.0` is an exact LOVE release with npm and GitHub Release mirrors.
-Release work must keep those bytes identical and follow the protected
+Versions `0.1.0` and `0.2.0` are exact LOVE releases with npm and GitHub Release
+mirrors. Release work must keep each version's bytes immutable and keep the
+current LOVE, npm, and GitHub Release bytes identical through the protected
 allowlisted workflow. The deployed docs/catalog is a distribution surface, not
-a hosted arbitrary-target browser or permission to add one.
+a hosted arbitrary-target browser or permission to add one. Authority,
+capability, and planning material belongs to the exact `0.2.0` artifact, not
+the immutable `0.1.0` bytes.

package/README.md

@@ -2,23 +2,23 @@
 
 A small local browser surface for agents.
 
-`0.1.0` is distributed as an exact LOVE package and mirrored to npm. It remains
+`0.2.0` is distributed as an exact LOVE package and mirrored to npm. It remains
 a local runtime: the docs deployment publishes package bytes and documentation,
 not a hosted browser-control service.
 
 ```bash
-npm install --save-exact @agenttool/browser@0.1.0
+npm install --save-exact @agenttool/browser@0.2.0
 ```
 
 Registry-neutral exact artifact:
 
 ```bash
 npm install --save-exact \
-  https://docs.agenttool.dev/packages/v1/@agenttool/browser/0.1.0/agenttool-browser-0.1.0.tgz
+  https://docs.agenttool.dev/packages/v1/@agenttool/browser/0.2.0/agenttool-browser-0.2.0.tgz
 ```
 
 The sibling
-[LOVE manifest](https://docs.agenttool.dev/packages/v1/@agenttool/browser/0.1.0/manifest.json)
+[LOVE manifest](https://docs.agenttool.dev/packages/v1/@agenttool/browser/0.2.0/manifest.json)
 names the artifact size and SHA-256. A URL install does not compare those
 values automatically; verify them first when that boundary matters.
 
@@ -30,10 +30,11 @@ One browser core is available through three local interfaces:
 - one-request/one-response line-delimited JSON over stdin/stdout; and
 - a stdio MCP server.
 
-The core exposes the essential loop: `open`, `observe`, `act`, `extract`,
-`screenshot`, `tabs`, and `close`. `observe` produces a bounded semantic view
-with snapshot-scoped ARIA references, so actions target observed accessible
-elements rather than invented selectors.
+The core exposes the essential loop: inspect `capabilities`, create a
+zero-effect `plan`, then `open`, `observe`, `act`, `extract`, `screenshot`,
+inspect `tabs`, and `close`. `observe` produces a bounded semantic view with
+snapshot-scoped ARIA references, so actions target observed accessible elements
+rather than invented selectors.
 
 This package uses `playwright-core` with a Chrome-family browser already
 installed on the machine. It has no postinstall script and does not download a
@@ -52,6 +53,12 @@ Chrome-family browser.
 agenttool-browser doctor
 ```
 
+If launch fails, `doctor` keeps the launch error generic and writes an
+actionable hint to stderr. The hint names the configured channel, or only the
+configured executable's file name with its parent path omitted, then points to
+`--channel`, `--executable`, or installing a compatible Chrome-family browser.
+It never discovers or downloads a browser.
+
 Start the minimal JSONL process:
 
 ```bash
@@ -70,12 +77,55 @@ Or start the local MCP server:
 agenttool-browser mcp
 ```
 
+For a persistent MCP host, install the package in that host's project and use
+the absolute project-local binary path rather than an `npx` command that may
+fetch at startup:
+
+```json
+{
+  "command": "/absolute/path/to/project/node_modules/.bin/agenttool-browser",
+  "args": ["mcp", "--authority", "sovereign"]
+}
+```
+
+Run the same binary with `doctor --authority sovereign` first. After startup,
+call `browser_capabilities` to verify the effective profile; that report does
+not probe whether a destination is reachable. Ephemeral profiles need no
+shared state. Give concurrent persistent hosts separate dedicated profile
+directories.
+
 Both keep protocol traffic on stdout and operational diagnostics on stderr.
 Use `agenttool-browser help` for the current command and options.
 
-The JSONL methods and MCP tool names are `browser_open`, `browser_observe`,
-`browser_act`, `browser_extract`, `browser_screenshot`, `browser_tabs`, and
-`browser_close`.
+The JSONL methods and MCP tool names are `browser_capabilities`,
+`browser_plan`, `browser_open`, `browser_observe`, `browser_act`,
+`browser_extract`, `browser_screenshot`, `browser_tabs`, and `browser_close`.
+
+### Capabilities and planning
+
+The direct API aligns `capabilities()` with `browser_capabilities`, and
+`plan(action)` with `browser_plan`. `browser_capabilities` reports effective
+launch-time authority and implemented operations; it does not visit or probe a
+destination. `browser_plan` accepts `{ "action": ... }` only. It produces an
+advisory, redacted classification for one existing `BrowserAction` without
+executing, approving, authorizing, or simulating it.
+
+Planning a typed action never echoes its `text` or selected values. URL query
+values are redacted. A URL-opening intention can be represented by a
+`new_tab` or `navigate` action:
+
+```ts
+const capabilities = browser.capabilities();
+const plan = browser.plan({
+  kind: "navigate",
+  url: "https://example.com/search?q=private",
+});
+```
+
+Planning has zero browser effect: it does not inspect the live page, resolve a
+reference, make a network request, or reserve a later action. Its output is not
+permission, an approval token, a side-effect guarantee, or evidence that a
+click will do what its label suggests.
 
 Both agent-facing transports intentionally narrow extraction to the whole page
 or an observed `ref` plus its `snapshot_id`; they do not accept a free-form
@@ -164,7 +214,47 @@ including one that emits `X-Kingdom`, never starts `/v1/real` or
 stdout stays quiet and deterministic; playful human docs or demos are opt-in
 and cannot alter the same underlying facts or widen authority.
 
-## Safe defaults
+## Authority profiles
+
+Version `0.2.0` names the compatibility default explicitly as
+`authority: "public"` and provides three launch-time profiles:
+
+| Profile | HTTP(S) destinations | WebSockets | Service workers |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `public` (default) | Public only | Blocked | Blocked |
+| `local` | Public plus local/private; reserved denied | Classified by the same boundary | Blocked |
+| `sovereign` | Broad pass-through, including local/private/reserved; URL-embedded userinfo remains blocked | Passed through | Enabled |
+
+Sovereign means AgentTool does not apply destination-class blocking to valid
+HTTP(S) requests or WebSockets; URL-embedded userinfo remains blocked. The
+browser, operating system, DNS/proxy configuration, network, and destination
+still determine what is reachable. It does not bypass authentication,
+CAPTCHAs, account permissions, site policy, browser support, or host controls.
+
+This profile deliberately allows a page and its service worker to reach
+destinations available to the host, including local services. In a persistent
+profile, service-worker and site state can outlive the process. Sovereign is
+therefore broad local process authority, not an isolation or SSRF claim.
+
+Destination authority does not imply every other browser power. In `0.2.0`,
+file upload, automatic download, arbitrary JavaScript evaluation, credential
+injection/lookup, ambient profile import, shell execution, and extension
+installation remain unsupported and are reported as such by `capabilities()`.
+
+Select authority at launch:
+
+```ts
+const browser = await AgentBrowser.launch({ authority: "sovereign" });
+```
+
+```bash
+agenttool-browser jsonl --authority sovereign
+```
+
+or set `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_AUTHORITY=sovereign`. Authority cannot be widened by
+a tool call after launch.
+
+### Compatibility defaults
 
 The default process is:
 
@@ -211,13 +301,20 @@ Do this only for a caller-controlled development network. Tool calls cannot
 widen either profile or network authority after launch. Reserved destinations
 remain blocked even with this opt-in.
 
+Version `0.2.0` retains `allowPublicWeb` / `allowLocalNetwork`,
+`--public-web` / `--local-network`, and their environment variables as a
+deprecated `0.1.0` compatibility surface. Do not combine the `authority` form
+with any legacy authority option in one launch; mixed configuration is
+rejected rather than guessed.
+
 ## Configuration
 
 | Purpose | CLI | Environment |
 |---|---|---|
+| Authority profile | `--authority public|local|sovereign` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_AUTHORITY` |
 | Headless or visible | `--headless` / `--headed` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_HEADLESS` |
-| Public web | `--public-web` / `--no-public-web` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_PUBLIC_WEB` |
-| Local/private network | `--local-network` / `--no-local-network` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_LOCAL_NETWORK` |
+| Public web (deprecated compatibility) | `--public-web` / `--no-public-web` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_PUBLIC_WEB` |
+| Local/private network (deprecated compatibility) | `--local-network` / `--no-local-network` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_LOCAL_NETWORK` |
 | Ephemeral profile | `--ephemeral` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_PROFILE=ephemeral` |
 | Persistent profile | `--profile <directory>` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_PROFILE=persistent` and `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_PROFILE_DIR` |
 | Installed channel | `--channel <name>` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_CHANNEL` |
@@ -225,7 +322,8 @@ remain blocked even with this opt-in.
 | Artifact directory | `--output-dir <path>` | `AGENTOOL_BROWSER_OUTPUT_DIR` |
 
 Environment booleans accept `1/0`, `true/false`, `yes/no`, or `on/off`.
-Unknown flags and malformed values fail rather than silently broadening policy.
+Unknown flags, malformed values, and mixed named/legacy authority
+configuration fail rather than silently broadening policy.
 
 The artifact directory follows the same existing-directory rule. A missing
 directory is created owner-only; on POSIX, an existing directory with any
@@ -250,7 +348,7 @@ unrecognized carriers such as `srcset`, meta refresh, CSS `url()`, or malformed
 markup, browser storage, canvas/image content, or screenshot pixels. It cannot
 undo data already submitted to a site.
 
-The package intentionally has no:
+The published `0.2.0` package intentionally has no:
 
 - arbitrary JavaScript evaluation;
 - file-upload operation;
@@ -259,24 +357,30 @@ The package intentionally has no:
 - browser-extension installation; or
 - automatic import of a person's normal browser profile.
 
-Use a separate trusted credential boundary if authenticated browsing is
-required. Do not place secrets in JSONL, MCP arguments, or model-visible state.
+Use a separate caller-controlled credential boundary if authenticated
+browsing is required. Do not place secrets in JSONL, MCP arguments,
+model-visible state, or advisory plans.
 
 ## Network limitation
 
-The public-web policy checks destinations before navigation, including DNS
-answers. Playwright then owns the browser connection. The package cannot pin
-the checked DNS answer to the later socket or verify the connected peer
-address, and ambient proxies or browser routing can change the path.
+The `0.2.0` `public` and `local` profiles—and the historical `0.1.0`
+policy—check destinations before navigation, including DNS answers.
+Playwright then owns the browser connection. The package cannot pin the
+checked DNS answer to the later socket or verify the connected peer address,
+and ambient proxies or browser routing can change the path.
 
 This is therefore not a strong SSRF isolation boundary and must not be exposed
-unchanged as a hosted arbitrary-target browser. `--local-network` is an
-explicit widening of local process authority, not a sandbox.
-
-The documented check is an HTTP(S) browser-request boundary, not generic
-process egress isolation. Do not infer protection for another browser protocol
-or process channel unless it is named and tested by this version. V0
-separately blocks WebSockets instead of applying the HTTP(S) DNS claim to them.
+unchanged as a hosted arbitrary-target browser. `local` is an explicit
+widening of local process authority, not a sandbox.
+
+The public/local check is an HTTP(S) browser-request boundary, not generic
+process egress isolation. `public` blocks WebSockets; `local` classifies them
+against its public-plus-local destination boundary rather than extending the
+HTTP(S) DNS claim to WebSocket transport. The `sovereign` profile intentionally
+removes that destination-class boundary, passes WebSockets
+through, and enables service workers. Its capability report makes that
+authority legible; it does not make the resulting traffic isolated, harmless,
+or guaranteed to succeed.
 
 ## Development
 

package/dist/src/browser.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import { type BrowserCapabilitySet } from "./capabilities.js";
+import { type BrowserConsequencePlan } from "./planning.js";
 import { BrowserNetworkPolicy } from "./policy.js";
 import { type ActionResult, type ActAndObserveResult, type AgentBrowserOptions, type BrowserAction, type BrowserLimits, type ExtractInput, type ExtractResult, type Observation, type ObserveOptions, type ScreenshotInput, type ScreenshotResult, type TabSummary } from "./types.js";
 export declare const DEFAULT_BROWSER_LIMITS: Readonly<BrowserLimits>;
@@ -21,6 +23,13 @@ export declare class AgentBrowser {
     observe(options?: ObserveOptions): Promise<Observation>;
     private observeUnlocked;
     act(action: BrowserAction): Promise<ActionResult>;
+    /** Return the immutable authority manifest selected when this session launched. */
+    capabilities(): Readonly<BrowserCapabilitySet>;
+    /**
+     * Forecast possible consequences without touching the page or executing the
+     * action. Planning is advisory and never widens launch-time authority.
+     */
+    plan(action: BrowserAction): Readonly<BrowserConsequencePlan>;
     /**
      * Atomic convenience for process adapters: no other session operation can
      * interleave between the one action attempt and its read-only observation.

package/dist/src/browser.d.ts.map

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package/dist/src/browser.js

@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@ import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
 import { chmod, lstat, mkdir, realpath } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { homedir } from "node:os";
 import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { resolveBrowserCapabilities, } from "./capabilities.js";
 import { asBrowserError, BrowserError } from "./errors.js";
+import { planBrowserAction, } from "./planning.js";
 import { BrowserNetworkPolicy, redactHtmlUrlAttributes, redactUrlReferenceForOutput, redactUrlForOutput, redactUrlsInText, } from "./policy.js";
 import { boundText, compactAriaSnapshot, intersectsViewport, looksLikeSensitiveControl, parseAriaCandidates, redactAriaSecrets, redactSensitiveInputValues, } from "./snapshot.js";
 import { OBSERVATION_SCHEMA, } from "./types.js";
@@ -49,8 +51,7 @@ export class AgentBrowser {
         this.context = context;
         this.browser = browser;
         this.policy = new BrowserNetworkPolicy({
-            allowPublicWeb: options.allowPublicWeb,
-            allowLocalNetwork: options.allowLocalNetwork,
+            capabilities: options.capabilities,
             ...(options.resolveHostname
                 ? { resolveHostname: options.resolveHostname }
                 : {}),
@@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ export class AgentBrowser {
                 viewport: normalized.viewport,
                 acceptDownloads: false,
                 ignoreHTTPSErrors: false,
-                serviceWorkers: "block",
+                serviceWorkers: normalized.capabilities.runtime.serviceWorkers,
             };
             if (normalized.profile.mode === "persistent") {
                 context = await runtime.launchPersistentContext(normalized.profile.directory, { ...launchOptions, ...contextOptions });
@@ -273,6 +274,19 @@ export class AgentBrowser {
     async act(action) {
         return this.withLock(() => this.actUnlocked(action));
     }
+    /** Return the immutable authority manifest selected when this session launched. */
+    capabilities() {
+        return this.options.capabilities;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Forecast possible consequences without touching the page or executing the
+     * action. Planning is advisory and never widens launch-time authority.
+     */
+    plan(action) {
+        this.assertOpen();
+        validateAction(action, this.options);
+        return planBrowserAction(action, this.options.capabilities);
+    }
     /**
      * Atomic convenience for process adapters: no other session operation can
      * interleave between the one action attempt and its read-only observation.
@@ -548,13 +562,20 @@ export class AgentBrowser {
                 await route.abort("blockedbyclient");
             }
         });
-        // HTTP routing does not cover WebSockets. V0 blocks every WebSocket
-        // connection instead of claiming the HTTP(S) DNS policy covers it.
         await this.context.routeWebSocket("**/*", async (route) => {
-            await route.close({
-                code: 1008,
-                reason: "WebSockets are blocked by AgentBrowser policy",
-            });
+            try {
+                await this.policy.assertWebSocketAllowed(route.url());
+                if (typeof route.connectToServer !== "function") {
+                    throw new BrowserError("invalid_options", "Browser runtime cannot pass an allowed WebSocket to its server.");
+                }
+                route.connectToServer();
+            }
+            catch {
+                await route.close({
+                    code: 1008,
+                    reason: "WebSocket destination is outside this browser authority",
+                });
+            }
         });
     }
     refreshPages() {
@@ -924,11 +945,7 @@ async function loadDefaultRuntime() {
     return playwright.chromium;
 }
 function normalizeOptions(options) {
-    for (const [name, value] of [
-        ["headless", options.headless],
-        ["allowPublicWeb", options.allowPublicWeb],
-        ["allowLocalNetwork", options.allowLocalNetwork],
-    ]) {
+    for (const [name, value] of [["headless", options.headless]]) {
         if (value !== undefined && typeof value !== "boolean") {
             throw new BrowserError("invalid_options", `${name} must be a boolean.`);
         }
@@ -995,10 +1012,19 @@ function normalizeOptions(options) {
     if (profile.mode === "persistent") {
         validateDedicatedProfileDirectory(profile.directory, outputDir);
     }
+    const capabilities = resolveBrowserCapabilities({
+        ...(options.authority ? { authority: options.authority } : {}),
+        ...(options.allowPublicWeb !== undefined
+            ? { allowPublicWeb: options.allowPublicWeb }
+            : {}),
+        ...(options.allowLocalNetwork !== undefined
+            ? { allowLocalNetwork: options.allowLocalNetwork }
+            : {}),
+        profileMode: profile.mode,
+    });
     return {
         headless: options.headless ?? true,
-        allowPublicWeb: options.allowPublicWeb ?? true,
-        allowLocalNetwork: options.allowLocalNetwork ?? false,
+        capabilities,
         profile,
         ...(channel ? { channel } : {}),
         ...(executablePath ? { executablePath } : {}),