@agentproto/governance 0.1.0-alpha.0

package/AGENTGOVERNANCE.md

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+# agentgovernance/v1
+
+**Status:** alpha (1.0.0-alpha) · **Domain:** governance.sh · **License:** MIT
+**Reference implementation:**
+[@agentproto/governance](https://npmjs.com/package/@agentproto/governance)
+**Repository:** https://github.com/agentproto/agentproto
+
+---
+
+## 1. Introduction
+
+`agentgovernance/v1` is an **open file-format standard** for recording
+approvals, audit logs, and autonomy policies as workspace files. It provides a
+**vendor-neutral**, **filesystem-first**, **third-party-verifiable** primitive
+for any system — human, agentic, or hybrid — that needs auditable decisions.
+
+Three doctypes:
+
+| Doctype       | File path                                                    | Purpose                                                     |
+| ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `signature`   | `<artifact>/../signatures/<signer>-<isoDate>.signature.json` | Universal approval primitive (one signature event per file) |
+| `audit-event` | `<scope>/audit/audit-log.jsonl` (one line per event)         | Append-only hash-chained event log                          |
+| `policy`      | `<scope>/policies/<slug>/POLICY.md`                          | Declarative autonomy rule                                   |
+
+A workspace receiving these files can validate every doctype + verify the audit
+chain end-to-end **without our infrastructure** using the published
+[hash-chain protocol](./src/spec/hash-chain/protocol.md). Third-party verifiers
+can be implemented in any language.
+
+### 1.1 Why this is its own standard
+
+The doctypes are **domain-agnostic**: `signature.json`, `audit-log.jsonl`,
+`POLICY.md` reference no business concepts (no services, no engagements, no
+counterparties). They describe pure governance primitives. Any workflow that
+needs auditable approvals — clinician overrides, approve-to-publish flows,
+AI-agent action gates, board votes — adopts `agentgovernance/v1` directly.
+
+`agentgovernance/v1` is a **peer standard** to `agentcompanies/v1`
+(companies.sh) and is **extended by** `agentagencies/v1` (agencies.sh).
+
+### 1.2 Conventions
+
+All `agentgovernance/v1` files follow the conventions established by
+[`agentcompanies/v1`](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/master/docs/companies/companies-spec.md):
+
+- **Markdown canonical** with YAML frontmatter (for `POLICY.md`).
+- **JSON canonical** for `signature.json` and `audit-log.jsonl` lines.
+- **Slug-based references**, never database IDs.
+- **`schema: agentgovernance/v1`** field on every doctype frontmatter / object.
+- **Vendor-specific extensions** under `metadata.<vendor>.*`.
+- **Git-native**: any git repository hosting these files is a valid governance
+  package.
+
+A workspace using `agentgovernance/v1` doctypes does not need to be an
+`agentcompanies/v1` package — it can be any folder containing the doctypes.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Doctype: `signature`
+
+A signature is the universal approval primitive. Every approval — of an
+agreement, a deliverable, an invoice, a policy override, an agent-issued action
+— is a signature on an artifact, recorded as a JSON file alongside the artifact
+being signed.
+
+### 2.1 File location
+
+```
+<artifact-parent-dir>/signatures/<signer-kind>-<signer-slug>-<YYYY-MM-DD>.signature.json
+```
+
+Example:
+
+```
+engagements/2026-acme-website-redesign/signatures/operator-jeremy-2026-04-15.signature.json
+```
+
+Multiple signatures by the same signer on the same artifact (e.g., re-issuance
+after revocation) MUST use distinct timestamps. Append-only — files are not
+deleted; revocation is a frontmatter mutation (`revokedAt`, `revokedReason`) or
+a fresh file with `evidence` referencing the prior.
+
+### 2.2 Schema
+
+```typescript
+{
+  "schema": "agentgovernance/v1",
+  "doctype": "signature",
+  "signer": "<kind>:<slug>",          // canonical: "operator:jeremy", "counterparty:acme-corp", "agent:ai-paralegal"
+  "signerKind": "operator" | "user" | "counterparty" | "agent" | "external",
+  "signerEmail"?: string,
+  "artifactPath": "engagements/2026-acme/AGREEMENT.md",  // workspace-relative
+  "documentHash": "<64-char hex SHA-256 of artifact bytes>",
+  "method": "typed_name" | "agent_confirm" | "click_through" | "esign_external",
+  "evidence": <method-specific shape>,
+  "signedAt": "2026-04-15T10:23:45.000Z",
+  "revokedAt"?: string,
+  "revokedReason"?: string,
+  "metadata"?: { ... }
+}
+```
+
+`evidence.kind` MUST equal `method` (enforced at validation time).
+
+### 2.3 Signing methods
+
+#### 2.3.1 `typed_name`
+
+Human types name + nonce on a tokenized portal page. Captures IP + UA +
+timestamp + nonce.
+
+```json
+{
+  "evidence": {
+    "kind": "typed_name",
+    "signerName": "Jeremy Doe",
+    "ipAddress": "192.0.2.1",
+    "userAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 …",
+    "nonce": "<one-shot URL token>",
+    "signedUrlToken": "<optional>"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### 2.3.2 `agent_confirm`
+
+Agent records explicit confirmation. Evidence carries `modelId` +
+`promptContextHash` + optional reasoning summary + conversation turn id. Agents
+MUST have the `governance.sign_as_agent` skill (or app-level equivalent) granted
+by a `POLICY.md`.
+
+```json
+{
+  "evidence": {
+    "kind": "agent_confirm",
+    "modelId": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
+    "promptContextHash": "<64-char hex>",
+    "reasoningSummary": "Cap policy satisfied; under threshold.",
+    "conversationTurnId": "t_abc123",
+    "authorizedByPolicy": "auto-approve-quotes-under-200eur"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### 2.3.3 `click_through`
+
+Single-click confirmation from a signed URL. Lightweight; suitable for
+low-stakes approvals.
+
+```json
+{
+  "evidence": {
+    "kind": "click_through",
+    "ipAddress": "192.0.2.1",
+    "userAgent": "Mozilla/5.0 …",
+    "signedUrlToken": "<one-shot>"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+#### 2.3.4 `esign_external`
+
+Wraps an external e-signature provider (DocuSeal, HelloSign, etc.). The signed
+PDF MUST be archived alongside the agreement.
+
+```json
+{
+  "evidence": {
+    "kind": "esign_external",
+    "provider": "docuseal",
+    "externalRef": "<envelope-id>",
+    "signedPdfRef": "engagements/2026-acme/AGREEMENT.signed.pdf"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+## 3. Doctype: `audit-event` (audit-log.jsonl)
+
+Each line of `<scope>/audit/audit-log.jsonl` is one audit event, encoded as a
+single JSON object on one line. Lines are linked by an HMAC-SHA256 chain.
+
+### 3.1 Scope
+
+The `<scope>` directory determines the chain's scope. Common scopes:
+
+- `audit/audit-log.jsonl` — workspace / company-level events.
+- `engagements/<slug>/audit/audit-log.jsonl` — engagement-scoped events
+  (recommended for `agentagencies/v1`).
+- Any other folder may host its own log — there is no global registry.
+
+Each scope has its own chain, its own genesis seed, and its own anchor cadence.
+
+### 3.2 Schema
+
+```typescript
+{
+  "schema": "agentgovernance/v1",
+  "doctype": "audit-event",
+  "actorKind": "operator" | "user" | "counterparty" | "agent" | "system",
+  "actorId": <slug | null>,                 // null for actorKind=system
+  "entityType": "<known type or extension>",
+  "entityId": "<workspace path or governance-internal id>",
+  "action": "<entity>.<verb>",              // lowercase, e.g., "signature.created"
+  "payload"?: { ... },                      // action-specific
+  "prevSignature": "<64-char hex>",         // chain link
+  "signature": "<64-char hex>",             // chain link
+  "requestId"?: string,
+  "traceId"?: string,
+  "ipAddress"?: string,
+  "userAgent"?: string,
+  "createdAt": "<ISO-8601 UTC>",
+  "metadata"?: { ... }
+}
+```
+
+Implementations SHOULD use known `entityType` values (`signature`,
+`audit-event`, `policy`, `approval`, plus any from `agentagencies/v1` or
+`agentcompanies/v1` if those specs are in use). Implementations SHOULD NOT
+introduce new types ad-hoc — vendor-specific events go under
+`metadata.<vendor>.*`.
+
+### 3.3 Hash-chain protocol
+
+See [`src/spec/hash-chain/protocol.md`](./src/spec/hash-chain/protocol.md) for
+the full specification with reference test vectors.
+
+Summary:
+
+```
+signature_n = HMAC-SHA256(
+  key  = secret_bytes,
+  data = prev_signature_hex_utf8 ‖ canonical_bytes(row_n_minus_signature)
+)
+```
+
+The first line uses the workspace genesis seed as `prev_signature`.
+
+### 3.4 External anchors
+
+Periodically (default: every 1000 lines), the latest `signature` is published to
+an external sink (S3 with object-lock, transparency log, public Git). A
+workspace cannot rewrite history without invalidating an external anchor.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Doctype: `policy` (POLICY.md)
+
+A POLICY.md is a declarative autonomy rule with YAML frontmatter and a markdown
+body. Frontmatter is used by the policy engine; body is human/agent-readable
+narrative.
+
+### 4.1 File location
+
+```
+<scope>/policies/<slug>/POLICY.md
+```
+
+### 4.2 Frontmatter schema
+
+```yaml
+schema: agentgovernance/v1
+doctype: policy
+slug: invoice-cap-500eur
+name: Invoice cap 500 EUR
+description:
+  Operators may issue invoices ≤ 500 EUR autonomously; founder signature
+  required above.
+appliesTo:
+  - actorKind: operator
+    actionType: agency.issue_invoice
+caps:
+  - field: amount
+    max: 500
+    currency: EUR
+threshold: single # auto | single | all_of | any_of | weighted_threshold
+requiredWeight: 0 # required when threshold=weighted_threshold
+requiredSignatures:
+  - signer: operator:founder
+    method: typed_name
+    weight: 1 # only used by weighted_threshold
+deadline: PT24H # ISO-8601 duration
+escalation:
+  leadTime: PT2H
+  escalateTo: [operator:cofounder]
+metadata:
+  agency:
+    appliesToServices: [emergency-callout, drain-cleaning]
+```
+
+### 4.3 Threshold semantics
+
+| `threshold`          | Resume condition                                                     |
+| -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `auto`               | Tool may proceed without signatures (action is logged but not gated) |
+| `single` / `any_of`  | Any one signature from `requiredSignatures` suffices                 |
+| `all_of`             | Every entry in `requiredSignatures` must sign                        |
+| `weighted_threshold` | Sum of `weight` of collected signatures must reach `requiredWeight`  |
+
+### 4.4 Wildcard signers
+
+A `requiredSignatures` entry may use `*` as the slug to mean "any signer of this
+kind":
+
+```yaml
+requiredSignatures:
+  - signer: operator:*
+    method: typed_name
+```
+
+This is satisfied by any operator's signature.
+
+---
+
+## 5. Contractual approval framework
+
+The framework unifies what would otherwise be three concepts (signing legal
+documents, approval gates, audit decisions) into one: **every approval is a
+signature on an artifact**.
+
+### 5.1 Standard flow
+
+A tool that needs approval for an action:
+
+1. **Drafts** the artifact representing the action (e.g., an `INVOICE.md` with
+   `status: pending_approval`).
+2. **Looks up** the matching `POLICY.md` (by `appliesTo.actorKind` +
+   `appliesTo.actionType`).
+3. **Sets** `requiredSignatures` on the artifact frontmatter from the policy.
+4. **Suspends** (workflow primitive — runtime-specific; see adapter packages).
+5. **Notifies** required signers (channel dispatcher — see
+   `agentagencies/v1.channels` or app-level equivalent).
+
+When a signer (human OR agent) signs:
+
+1. The runtime writes a `signature.json` next to the artifact.
+2. The runtime appends an `audit-event` to the relevant `audit-log.jsonl` (with
+   `action: signature.created`).
+3. The runtime checks if all `requiredSignatures` are now collected per the
+   policy threshold.
+4. If yes, the suspended workflow resumes; the originally-suspended tool
+   finishes (artifact is finalized, side-effects fire).
+
+### 5.2 Pending-signature index
+
+Implementations SHOULD maintain a regeneratable index file
+`<workspace>/_index/pending-signatures.json` keyed by signer:
+
+```json
+{
+  "version": "1",
+  "updatedAt": "2026-04-26T15:00:00.000Z",
+  "bySigner": {
+    "operator:founder": [
+      {
+        "artifactPath": "engagements/2026-acme/INVOICE.md",
+        "deadline": "2026-05-15T17:00:00.000Z",
+        "requestedAt": "2026-04-26T14:00:00.000Z",
+        "method": "typed_name",
+        "weight": 1
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+The index is **not authoritative** — it can be rebuilt at any time by walking
+the workspace for artifacts with `requiredSignatures`. Its sole purpose is fast
+operator-inbox queries.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Composition with other specs
+
+`agentgovernance/v1` is independent. It can be adopted by any app:
+
+```
+my-app/
+├── audit/audit-log.jsonl
+├── policies/<slug>/POLICY.md
+├── <some-artifact>.md
+└── <some-artifact>.signatures/
+    └── operator-jeremy-2026-04-15.signature.json
+```
+
+When composed with `agentcompanies/v1` (companies.sh):
+
+- `actorKind: operator` corresponds to the org's `AGENTS.md` entries.
+- Policies may reference operator slugs from the company package.
+
+When composed with `agentagencies/v1` (agencies.sh):
+
+- Engagement / agreement / deliverable / invoice artifacts use
+  `agentgovernance/v1.signature.json` for signing.
+- Per-engagement audit logs become the canonical record of the engagement.
+
+A workspace using `agentagencies/v1` MUST validate as a valid
+`agentgovernance/v1` workspace wherever `signature.json`, `audit-log.jsonl`, or
+`POLICY.md` files appear (SHALL clause).
+
+---
+
+## 7. SHALL / SHOULD / MAY
+
+- **SHALL** Every `signature.json` MUST have `evidence.kind === method` (or
+  validators reject).
+- **SHALL** Every `audit-log.jsonl` line MUST chain correctly per the hash-chain
+  protocol — verifiers report the first mismatch.
+- **SHALL** `documentHash` MUST be lowercase 64-character hex of SHA-256 over
+  the artifact bytes at signing time.
+- **SHALL** `signedAt` MUST be ISO-8601 with UTC timezone.
+- **SHOULD** `audit-event.entityType` SHOULD use known values (no ad-hoc
+  strings).
+- **SHOULD** `policies/<slug>/` SHOULD contain only `POLICY.md` and supporting
+  docs (no executable code).
+- **MAY** Vendor-specific fields MAY appear under `metadata.<vendor>.*`.
+- **MAY** Implementations MAY add fields to `payload`, `evidence`, `metadata`
+  objects for forward compatibility — readers MUST ignore unknown fields.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Vendor extensions
+
+Vendor-specific runtime data goes under `metadata.<vendor>.*`. Examples:
+
+```yaml
+# In a POLICY.md frontmatter
+metadata:
+  mastra:
+    workflowId: "issue-invoice-with-cap"
+  guilde:
+    appliesToOperatorTeams: [billing, sales]
+```
+
+Adapter packages (`@agentproto/governance-mastra`, etc.) are the consumer-facing
+API for vendor-specific orchestration. The core spec stays vendor-neutral.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Versioning
+
+This document specifies `agentgovernance/v1`, version 1.0.0-alpha.
+
+Future minor versions (1.x) MAY add fields and methods (with non-breaking
+semantics). Major versions (2.x) MAY change the chain protocol or doctype
+shapes. Workspaces MUST emit the same version per file; mixing versions in one
+chain is forbidden.
+
+When version 1.0 stabilizes, this spec moves to https://agentproto.sh/docs/gov-1/v1.
+
+---
+
+## 10. Reference implementation
+
+[@agentproto/governance](https://npmjs.com/package/@agentproto/governance) is the
+reference TypeScript implementation, MIT-licensed. It ships:
+
+- Zod schemas for all doctypes (`./doctypes`)
+- Validators (`./validators`)
+- Hash-chain protocol — compute + verify (`./hash-chain`)
+- Canvakit renderers + templates for signing-portal / signature-card /
+  audit-timeline (`./renderers` after Phase 1)
+- FS-only runtime helpers — `recordAuditEvent`, `signArtifact`,
+  `listPendingSignatures` (`./runtime`)
+
+Test corpus lives in `test/fixtures/` and includes hash-chain test vectors that
+any implementation MUST reproduce byte-for-byte.
+
+---
+
+## 11. Compatibility test corpus (TBD — Phase 1)
+
+A frozen set of test vectors (input artifact bytes + secret + genesis seed →
+expected canonical bytes + expected signature) will be published with v1.0
+stable. Any implementation passing these vectors is interoperable with the
+reference.
+
+For alpha, integration tests in `src/spec/hash-chain/{compute,verify}.test.ts`
+and `src/runtime/runtime.e2e.test.ts` document the expected behavior.
+
+---
+
+## 12. Acknowledgments
+
+This spec extends the conventions of
+[agentcompanies/v1](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/master/docs/companies/companies-spec.md)
+(paperclipai). Hash-chain construction draws on RFC 8785 (JCS), classic
+Merkle/append-only log designs, and transparency log practice.

package/LICENSE

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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 Jeremy (governance.sh)
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

package/README.md

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+# @agentproto/governance
+
+`agentgovernance/v1` — the universal contractual approval framework, published
+as the open standard at [governance.sh](https://agentproto.sh/docs/gov-1).
+
+> ⚠️ **Alpha (v0.1).** Spec stabilizing. APIs may change pre-1.0.
+
+## Trust boundary (read this first)
+
+`v0.1` ships an **honest internal building block**, not a fully-credible
+contractual-approval product. Three pillars distinguish a credible standard from
+this alpha; v0.1 has the first only:
+
+| Pillar                                                                                                | v0.1                                                                                                                                                | Provided by                                                                            |
+| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Bytes integrity** — "this artifact has not changed since signing"                                   | ✅ SHA-256 of artifact bytes recorded in `signature.json`; runtime always re-hashes from disk                                                       | `@agentproto/governance-engine`                                                         |
+| **Identity authenticity** — "the signer was actually who the file says"                               | ❌ The `signer` field is a declarative string. Anyone with FS write access can author a `signature.json` claiming any signer.                       | Cryptographic JWS over the signature payload, bound to a per-identity key. Roadmap M4. |
+| **History integrity vs. workspace owner** — "the workspace owner cannot rewrite the chain undetected" | ❌ The hash chain is verifiable by anyone who has the file, but the workspace owner can rewrite the file and re-chain. No external witness in v0.1. | OpenTimestamps / RFC 3161 / on-chain anchor sink. Roadmap M5.                          |
+
+**Use v0.1 in trusted contexts only**: an internal workspace where everyone with
+FS write is already inside your trust boundary, and you want a structured record
+of approvals that's portable, type-checkable, and machine-verifiable (within
+that trust boundary). Do **not** use v0.1 where any of the following is true:
+
+- The workspace owner is one of the parties whose signature you need to trust.
+- Counterparties outside your trust boundary author `signature.json` files.
+- A regulator, court, or external auditor will be asked to rely on the chain.
+
+The roadmap to close all three pillars (cryptographic identity in M4, external
+anchoring in M5, RFC 8785 / cross-language conformance in M6) is published in
+[the agentproto spec series](https://agentik.net/docs/aip-7). v1.0 of the
+package will not ship until those three are in place.
+
+## What this is
+
+A small, vendor-neutral, filesystem-first standard for **recording approvals as
+signatures, appending tamper-evident audit logs, and declaring autonomy
+policies** — usable by any AI agent system that needs auditable decisions.
+
+Three doctypes:
+
+| Doctype           | File                                                   | Purpose                                                                                 |
+| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `signature.json`  | `<artifact>/signatures/<signer>-<date>.signature.json` | Universal approval primitive (typed_name, agent_confirm, click_through, esign_external) |
+| `audit-log.jsonl` | `<scope>/audit/audit-log.jsonl`                        | Append-only, hash-chained event log                                                     |
+| `POLICY.md`       | `<scope>/policies/<slug>/POLICY.md`                    | Declarative autonomy rule (caps, thresholds, requiredSignatures-when-exceeded)          |
+
+The full spec is in [`AGENTGOVERNANCE.md`](./AGENTGOVERNANCE.md).
+
+## Why a peer standard
+
+Governance doctypes are **domain-agnostic**: `signature.json`,
+`audit-log.jsonl`, `POLICY.md` don't reference services, engagements, or
+counterparties. Any workflow that needs an auditable approval — clinician
+overrides, approve-to-publish flows, board votes, AI-agent actions — uses the
+same files.
+
+## Why filesystem
+
+A client receiving a workspace folder can verify every signature + the entire
+audit chain **without our infrastructure** using the published
+[hash-chain protocol](./src/spec/hash-chain/protocol.md). Third-party verifiers
+can be implemented in any language.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+npm install @agentproto/governance
+```
+
+## Subpath exports
+
+```ts
+import {
+  signatureSchema,
+  auditEventSchema,
+  policySchema,
+} from "@agentproto/governance/doctypes"
+import {
+  computeChainSignature,
+  verifyChain,
+} from "@agentproto/governance/hash-chain"
+import {
+  validateSignature,
+  validateAuditEvent,
+  validatePolicy,
+} from "@agentproto/governance/validators"
+import {
+  recordAuditEvent,
+  signArtifact,
+  listPendingSignatures,
+} from "@agentproto/governance/runtime"
+```
+
+## Vendor neutrality
+
+This package depends only on `zod`, `gray-matter`, `yaml`, and Node's built-in
+`crypto`. There are **zero imports** from Mastra, LangChain, Temporal, or any
+other workflow runtime. Adapters live in separate packages:
+
+- `@agentproto/governance-mastra` — Mastra suspend/resume hooks
+- (future) `@agentproto/governance-langchain`, `@agentproto/governance-temporal`,
+  etc.
+
+## Status
+
+This is the **canonical implementation** of `agentgovernance/v1`. The spec is
+open; alternative implementations are welcome at
+[governance.sh](https://agentproto.sh/docs/gov-1).
+
+## License
+
+MIT

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