@agentlayer.tech/wallet 0.1.64 → 0.1.66

package/.openclaw/extensions/agent-wallet/openclaw.plugin.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "id": "agent-wallet",
   "name": "Agent Wallet",
   "description": "Official OpenClaw plugin bridge for the agent-wallet backends, including Solana, local BTC, and local EVM.",
-  "version": "0.1.64",
+  "version": "0.1.66",
   "contracts": {
     "tools": [
       "agentlayer_autonomous_approve",

package/.openclaw/extensions/agent-wallet/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@agentlayertech/agent-wallet-plugin",
-  "version": "0.1.64",
+  "version": "0.1.66",
   "description": "OpenClaw plugin bridge for the AgentLayer wallet runtime.",
   "type": "module",
   "license": "SEE LICENSE IN ../../../LICENSE",

package/VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.1.64
+0.1.66

package/agent-wallet/agent_wallet/__init__.py

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 # Keep in sync with package.json, pyproject.toml, and the npm installer version.
 # scripts/check_release_version.mjs enforces this on release.
-__version__ = "0.1.64"
+__version__ = "0.1.66"
 
 __all__ = [
     "config",

package/agent-wallet/agent_wallet/config.py

@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ def reload_settings() -> Settings:
     refreshed = Settings()
     for field_name in Settings.model_fields:
         setattr(settings, field_name, getattr(refreshed, field_name))
+    clear_secret_caches()
     return settings
 
 
@@ -385,13 +386,54 @@ def _env_bool(name: str, default: bool) -> bool:
     return raw.strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
 
 
+def envelope_kdf_migration_enabled() -> bool:
+    """Whether argon2id envelopes are lazily rewritten to hkdf-sha256 after a
+    successful decrypt. Disable with AGENT_WALLET_ENVELOPE_KDF_MIGRATION=0
+    (e.g. when a rollback to a pre-hkdf runtime must stay possible)."""
+    return _env_bool("AGENT_WALLET_ENVELOPE_KDF_MIGRATION", True)
+
+
+_boot_key_keystore_cache: dict[str, str] = {}
+
+
+def clear_secret_caches() -> None:
+    """Reset all process-local secret-resolution caches.
+
+    Covers the memoized keystore backend, the boot key read from the OS
+    keystore, unsealed secrets, and derived envelope keys. Wired into
+    ``reload_settings`` so config reloads always observe fresh state; call it
+    directly in tests that rotate keystore contents in-process.
+    """
+    _boot_key_keystore_cache.clear()
+    from agent_wallet.keystore import clear_keystore_cache
+
+    clear_keystore_cache()
+    from agent_wallet.sealed_keys import clear_unseal_cache
+
+    clear_unseal_cache()
+    from agent_wallet.encrypted_storage import clear_derived_key_cache
+
+    clear_derived_key_cache()
+
+
 def read_boot_key_from_keystore() -> str:
-    """Read the boot key from the OS keystore. Never raises; '' on any failure."""
+    """Read the boot key from the OS keystore. Never raises; '' on any failure.
+
+    Successful (non-empty) reads are memoized per keystore service for the
+    process lifetime — every uncached read costs a subprocess call.
+    """
     try:
         from agent_wallet.keystore import BOOT_KEY_ITEM, resolve_keystore
 
+        service_key = os.getenv("AGENT_WALLET_KEYSTORE_SERVICE", "").strip()
+        cached = _boot_key_keystore_cache.get(service_key)
+        if cached:
+            return cached
         value = resolve_keystore().get(BOOT_KEY_ITEM)
-        return value.strip() if isinstance(value, str) else ""
+        text = value.strip() if isinstance(value, str) else ""
+        if text:
+            _boot_key_keystore_cache[service_key] = text
+        return text
     except Exception:
         return ""
 

package/agent-wallet/agent_wallet/encrypted_storage.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import base64
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import json
+import os
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any
 
@@ -17,6 +18,10 @@ ENCRYPTED_WALLET_KIND = "openclaw-agent-wallet-secret"
 ENCRYPTED_WALLET_VERSION = 1
 USER_SCOPED_KEY_SALT = b"openclaw-agent-wallet-user-key-v1"
 
+KDF_ARGON2ID = "argon2id"
+KDF_HKDF_SHA256 = "hkdf-sha256"
+_HKDF_INFO = b"openclaw-agent-wallet-envelope-hkdf-v1"
+
 
 def _load_secretbox():
     try:
@@ -28,11 +33,19 @@ def _load_secretbox():
     return pwhash, secret, utils
 
 
-def _derive_key(master_key: str, salt: bytes) -> bytes:
-    if not master_key.strip():
-        raise WalletBackendError(
-            "Encrypted wallet storage requires AGENT_WALLET_BOOT_KEY and a sealed master_key."
-        )
+# Derived envelope keys are expensive (argon2id ~1s each), so cache them by
+# (kdf, master_key, salt). In-memory only, never serialized; bounded so a
+# pathological caller cannot grow it without limit.
+_derived_key_cache: dict[tuple[str, str, bytes], bytes] = {}
+_DERIVED_KEY_CACHE_MAX = 64
+
+
+def clear_derived_key_cache() -> None:
+    """Drop cached derived keys (wired into config.clear_secret_caches)."""
+    _derived_key_cache.clear()
+
+
+def _kdf_argon2id(master_key: str, salt: bytes) -> bytes:
     pwhash, secret, _ = _load_secretbox()
     return pwhash.argon2id.kdf(
         secret.SecretBox.KEY_SIZE,
@@ -43,6 +56,52 @@ def _derive_key(master_key: str, salt: bytes) -> bytes:
     )
 
 
+def _kdf_hkdf_sha256(master_key: str, salt: bytes) -> bytes:
+    # RFC 5869 extract+expand, one 32-byte block. Only safe because every
+    # caller passes machine-generated high-entropy key material (boot key /
+    # sealed master key) — password-hardness is what argon2id was paying for,
+    # and user passwords never reach this module.
+    prk = hmac.new(salt, master_key.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
+    return hmac.new(prk, _HKDF_INFO + b"\x01", hashlib.sha256).digest()
+
+
+def _default_write_kdf() -> str:
+    raw = os.getenv("AGENT_WALLET_ENVELOPE_KDF", "").strip().lower()
+    return KDF_ARGON2ID if raw == KDF_ARGON2ID else KDF_HKDF_SHA256
+
+
+def envelope_kdf(raw_text: str) -> str:
+    """Return the kdf recorded in an encrypted envelope ('' when not one)."""
+    try:
+        payload = json.loads(raw_text)
+    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+        return ""
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict) or payload.get("kind") != ENCRYPTED_WALLET_KIND:
+        return ""
+    return str(payload.get("kdf") or KDF_ARGON2ID)
+
+
+def _derive_key(master_key: str, salt: bytes, *, kdf: str = KDF_ARGON2ID) -> bytes:
+    if not master_key.strip():
+        raise WalletBackendError(
+            "Encrypted wallet storage requires AGENT_WALLET_BOOT_KEY and a sealed master_key."
+        )
+    if kdf == KDF_HKDF_SHA256:
+        # Cheap enough to skip the cache entirely.
+        return _kdf_hkdf_sha256(master_key, bytes(salt))
+    if kdf != KDF_ARGON2ID:
+        raise WalletBackendError(f"Encrypted wallet file uses an unsupported kdf: {kdf}")
+    cache_key = (kdf, master_key, bytes(salt))
+    cached = _derived_key_cache.get(cache_key)
+    if cached is not None:
+        return cached
+    key = _kdf_argon2id(master_key, salt)
+    if len(_derived_key_cache) >= _DERIVED_KEY_CACHE_MAX:
+        _derived_key_cache.clear()
+    _derived_key_cache[cache_key] = key
+    return key
+
+
 def _derive_user_scoped_key(
     master_key: str,
     *,
@@ -79,19 +138,27 @@ def encrypt_secret_material(
     *,
     master_key: str | None = None,
     metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    kdf: str | None = None,
 ) -> str:
-    """Encrypt wallet secret material into a JSON envelope."""
+    """Encrypt wallet secret material into a JSON envelope.
+
+    ``kdf`` selects the key derivation for this envelope; None resolves the
+    process default (hkdf-sha256 unless AGENT_WALLET_ENVELOPE_KDF=argon2id).
+    """
+    effective_kdf = kdf if kdf is not None else _default_write_kdf()
+    if effective_kdf not in {KDF_ARGON2ID, KDF_HKDF_SHA256}:
+        raise WalletBackendError(f"Unsupported envelope kdf: {effective_kdf}")
     _, secret, utils = _load_secretbox()
     effective_master_key = master_key if master_key is not None else resolve_wallet_master_key()
     salt = utils.random(16)
-    key = _derive_key(effective_master_key, salt)
+    key = _derive_key(effective_master_key, salt, kdf=effective_kdf)
     box = secret.SecretBox(key)
     encrypted = box.encrypt(secret_material.encode("utf-8"))
     payload: dict[str, Any] = {
         "kind": ENCRYPTED_WALLET_KIND,
         "version": ENCRYPTED_WALLET_VERSION,
         "cipher": "secretbox",
-        "kdf": "argon2id",
+        "kdf": effective_kdf,
         "salt_b64": base64.b64encode(salt).decode("ascii"),
         "nonce_b64": base64.b64encode(encrypted.nonce).decode("ascii"),
         "ciphertext_b64": base64.b64encode(encrypted.ciphertext).decode("ascii"),
@@ -124,7 +191,8 @@ def decrypt_secret_material(
         raise WalletBackendError("Encrypted wallet file is malformed.") from exc
 
     effective_master_key = master_key if master_key is not None else resolve_wallet_master_key()
-    key = _derive_key(effective_master_key, salt)
+    kdf = str(payload.get("kdf") or KDF_ARGON2ID)
+    key = _derive_key(effective_master_key, salt, kdf=kdf)
     box = secret.SecretBox(key)
     try:
         plaintext = box.decrypt(ciphertext, nonce)

package/agent-wallet/agent_wallet/keystore.py

@@ -247,7 +247,32 @@ class PlaintextFileStore:
             pass
 
 
+_keystore_cache: dict[tuple[str, str], KeyStore] = {}
+
+
+def clear_keystore_cache() -> None:
+    """Drop the memoized keystore backend (e.g. after env/service changes)."""
+    _keystore_cache.clear()
+
+
 def resolve_keystore() -> KeyStore:
+    """Memoized keystore resolution.
+
+    Resolving probes the OS keystore with subprocess calls (`security`,
+    `secret-tool`, powershell), so cache the winning backend per
+    (preference, service) for the process lifetime. Cleared by
+    ``agent_wallet.config.clear_secret_caches`` / ``reload_settings``.
+    """
+    cache_key = (_backend_preference(), _service())
+    cached = _keystore_cache.get(cache_key)
+    if cached is not None:
+        return cached
+    store = _resolve_keystore_uncached()
+    _keystore_cache[cache_key] = store
+    return store
+
+
+def _resolve_keystore_uncached() -> KeyStore:
     """Return the first available OS-native backend, else the plaintext fallback."""
     preference = _backend_preference()
     if preference in {"plain", "plaintext", "plaintext-file", "file"}:

package/agent-wallet/agent_wallet/openclaw_adapter.py

@@ -3928,6 +3928,9 @@ class OpenClawWalletAdapter:
                     raise WalletBackendError("text_body must be a string when provided.")
                 if not isinstance(purpose, str) or not purpose.strip():
                     raise WalletBackendError("purpose is required.")
+                approved_preview = args.get("_approved_preview")
+                if approved_preview is not None and not isinstance(approved_preview, dict):
+                    raise WalletBackendError("_approved_preview must be an object when provided.")
                 data = await x402.pay_and_fetch(
                     backend=active_backend,
                     url=url.strip(),
@@ -3936,6 +3939,7 @@ class OpenClawWalletAdapter:
                     query=query,
                     json_body=json_body,
                     text_body=text_body,
+                    approved_preview=approved_preview,
                 )
                 data["purpose"] = purpose.strip()
                 data = self._annotate_x402_payload(data, mode="execute")

package/agent-wallet/agent_wallet/openclaw_cli.py

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ def _parse_csv(value: Any) -> str:
 
 
 SECRET_CONFIG_KEYS = {"privateKey", "masterKey", "approvalSecret"}
+# Always-allowed floor kept for compatibility; the live gate is the dynamic
+# set of adapter-declared read-only tools (_read_only_tool_names).
 READ_ONLY_WORKER_TOOLS = frozenset(
     {
         "get_wallet_balance",
@@ -41,6 +43,20 @@ READ_ONLY_WORKER_TOOLS = frozenset(
 )
 
 
+def _read_only_tool_names(context: Any) -> frozenset[str]:
+    """All tools the resident read worker may serve: the adapter's read-only
+    specs for this backend, plus the legacy floor."""
+    names = set(READ_ONLY_WORKER_TOOLS)
+    try:
+        for tool in context.adapter.list_tools():
+            spec = tool.model_dump() if hasattr(tool, "model_dump") else dict(tool)
+            if spec.get("read_only") is True and str(spec.get("name") or "").strip():
+                names.add(str(spec["name"]))
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    return frozenset(names)
+
+
 def _reject_secret_config_json(config: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
     present = sorted(key for key in SECRET_CONFIG_KEYS if str(config.get(key) or "").strip())
     if present:
@@ -180,8 +196,27 @@ async def _run_invoke(
     tool_name: str,
     arguments: dict[str, Any],
     config: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    approval_summary: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    approval_mainnet_confirmed: bool = False,
+    approval_ttl_seconds: int | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     context = _build_runtime_context(user_id, config)
+    # Mint the approval token in-process when the host passed the confirmation
+    # summary along with the execute call: this replaces a second cold
+    # `issue-approval` subprocess (full interpreter boot + onboarding) with a
+    # local HMAC signature. A caller-provided token always wins.
+    if (
+        isinstance(approval_summary, dict)
+        and not str(arguments.get("approval_token") or "").strip()
+    ):
+        arguments = dict(arguments)
+        arguments["approval_token"] = context.issue_execute_approval(
+            tool_name=tool_name,
+            confirmation_summary=approval_summary,
+            mainnet_confirmed=approval_mainnet_confirmed,
+            ttl_seconds=approval_ttl_seconds,
+        )
     result = await context.adapter.invoke(tool_name, arguments)
     return result.model_dump()
 
@@ -253,11 +288,16 @@ def _error_payload_for_exception(exc: Exception) -> dict[str, Any]:
     return payload
 
 
-async def _run_read_worker_tool(context: Any, request: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+async def _run_read_worker_tool(
+    context: Any,
+    request: dict[str, Any],
+    allowed_tools: frozenset[str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
     tool_name = str(request.get("tool") or "").strip()
-    if tool_name not in READ_ONLY_WORKER_TOOLS:
+    effective_allowed = allowed_tools if allowed_tools is not None else READ_ONLY_WORKER_TOOLS
+    if tool_name not in effective_allowed:
         raise WalletBackendError(
-            f"read-worker only allows read-only tools: {', '.join(sorted(READ_ONLY_WORKER_TOOLS))}."
+            f"read-worker only allows read-only tools for this backend; '{tool_name}' is not one."
         )
     arguments = request.get("arguments") or {}
     if not isinstance(arguments, dict):
@@ -268,6 +308,7 @@ async def _run_read_worker_tool(context: Any, request: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[s
 
 async def _serve_read_worker(user_id: str, config: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
     context = _build_runtime_context(user_id, config, read_only=True)
+    allowed_tools = _read_only_tool_names(context)
     while True:
         line = sys.stdin.readline()
         if not line:
@@ -282,7 +323,7 @@ async def _serve_read_worker(user_id: str, config: dict[str, Any]) -> int:
             if request.get("op") == "shutdown":
                 print(json.dumps({"id": request_id, "ok": True, "stopped": True}), flush=True)
                 break
-            payload = await _run_read_worker_tool(context, request)
+            payload = await _run_read_worker_tool(context, request, allowed_tools)
             print(
                 json.dumps(
                     {
@@ -510,6 +551,15 @@ def main() -> int:
     invoke_parser.add_argument("--tool", required=True)
     invoke_parser.add_argument("--arguments-json", default="{}")
     invoke_parser.add_argument("--config-json", default="{}")
+    invoke_parser.add_argument(
+        "--approval-summary-json",
+        help=(
+            "Confirmation summary for execute calls; when provided, the approval "
+            "token is minted in this process instead of a separate issue-approval run."
+        ),
+    )
+    invoke_parser.add_argument("--approval-mainnet-confirmed", action="store_true")
+    invoke_parser.add_argument("--approval-ttl-seconds", type=int)
 
     approval_parser = subparsers.add_parser("issue-approval")
     approval_parser.add_argument("--user-id", required=True)
@@ -726,12 +776,21 @@ def main() -> int:
 
             payload = import_boot_key(_read_stdin_secret("boot key"))
         else:
+            approval_summary = None
+            raw_summary = getattr(args, "approval_summary_json", None)
+            if raw_summary:
+                approval_summary = _load_json(raw_summary)
             payload = asyncio.run(
                 _run_invoke(
                     args.user_id,
                     args.tool,
                     _load_json(args.arguments_json),
                     config,
+                    approval_summary=approval_summary,
+                    approval_mainnet_confirmed=bool(
+                        getattr(args, "approval_mainnet_confirmed", False)
+                    ),
+                    approval_ttl_seconds=getattr(args, "approval_ttl_seconds", None),
                 )
             )
     except Exception as exc: