@agenticprimitives/ontology 1.0.0-alpha.17 → 1.0.0-alpha.19

package/tbox/trust.ttl

@@ -88,3 +88,123 @@ aptrust:hasTrustScore a owl:ObjectProperty ;
   rdfs:domain apdisc:TrustDetermination ;
   rdfs:range aptrust:TrustScore ;
   rdfs:label "hasTrustScore" .
+
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+# T-BOX PROMOTION of the projected trust-fabric terms (facet-registries G1; spec 331)
+# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+#
+# WHAT WAS WRONG. `apps/demo-discovery-indexer/src/ontology.ts` coined a set of `ap:` terms for
+# the relationship and attestation projectors and wrote them into the production graph;
+# `apps/demo-discovery-mcp/src/graphdb.ts` queries them by name (`?e ap:edgeId ?eid ;
+# ap:edgeSubject ?subj ; ap:edgeObject ?obj ; …`). None of them were ever declared in a T-box.
+# `aprel:` is a declared namespace with no module and no terms, and this file typed the EDGE
+# (aptrust:TrustGraphEdge) while declaring nothing about its subject, object, type or status.
+# The result was a live query path over undeclared vocabulary — exactly the read-path-without-a-
+# definition condition ADR-0013 forbids, and the mirror image of gap G5 on the write side.
+#
+# WHY THE `ap:` PREFIX IS RETAINED RATHER THAN RE-MINTED AS `aptrust:` OR `aprel:`.
+# The IRIs are already in the deployed GraphDB and already in the MCP's SPARQL query TEXT.
+# Re-prefixing them is a graph migration plus a coordinated Worker deploy, not an edit — and it
+# would buy nothing semantic, because a T-box term's namespace is not its meaning. This follows
+# the established discipline (facet-registries §7, ADR-0051): IDENTIFIERS KEEP THEIR NAMES, prose
+# and docs use the canonical term. The alternative considered and rejected was declaring `aptrust:`
+# twins as owl:equivalentProperty aliases — that is a SECOND mechanism for one read path, which
+# ADR-0013 forbids more strongly than it forbids an awkward prefix.
+#
+# NOTHING IS MINTED HERE. Every term below is verbatim the IRI the indexer already emits.
+# Promotion is a declaration, not a change; the graph is unaffected.
+#
+# ENDPOINT-RELATIVE vs ABSOLUTE — the invariant that decides which properties sit where.
+# One on-chain AgentRelationship edge is ONE record shared by both endpoints, and the edge node's
+# IRI derives from the deterministic on-chain edgeId, so BOTH agents project the SAME subject.
+# Its properties must therefore be endpoint-INDEPENDENT. `ap:edgeDirection` and `ap:relatedAgent`
+# are meaningful only relative to whoever is looking, so they hang on the AGENT; the shared edge
+# node states subject and object ABSOLUTELY.
+
+@prefix apreg: <https://agenticprimitives.dev/ns/registry#> .
+@prefix xsd:   <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .
+
+# ─── Agent → child-node facet links ─────────────────────────────────────────
+
+ap:hasRelationship a owl:ObjectProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain ap:Agent ; rdfs:range aptrust:TrustGraphEdge ;
+  rdfs:label "hasRelationship" ;
+  rdfs:comment "Agent → a projected AgentRelationship edge it is an endpoint of (either side)." .
+
+ap:hasAttestation a owl:ObjectProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain ap:Agent ; rdfs:range apatt:Attestation ;
+  rdfs:label "hasAttestation" ;
+  rdfs:comment "Agent → an AttestationRegistry row in which it is the SUBJECT. Issuer-side rows are not projected onto the issuer: an attestation is evidence ABOUT its subject." .
+
+# ─── Edge-node properties — ABSOLUTE, endpoint-independent ──────────────────
+
+ap:edgeId a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain aptrust:TrustGraphEdge ; rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+  rdfs:label "edgeId" ;
+  rdfs:comment "The deterministic on-chain edgeId = computeEdgeId(subject, object, relationshipType). The edge node's IRI derives from it, which is why both endpoints project one shared node." .
+
+ap:edgeSubject a owl:ObjectProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain aptrust:TrustGraphEdge ; rdfs:range ap:CanonicalAgentId ;
+  rdfs:label "edgeSubject" ;
+  rdfs:comment "The SA that PROPOSED the edge. On-chain `proposeEdge` requires msg.sender == subject, so this is structurally the proposing party — never inferred, never symmetric with edgeObject." .
+
+ap:edgeObject a owl:ObjectProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain aptrust:TrustGraphEdge ; rdfs:range ap:CanonicalAgentId ;
+  rdfs:label "edgeObject" ;
+  rdfs:comment "The SA that CONFIRMED the edge. An edge reaches ACTIVE only through PROPOSED → CONFIRMED → ACTIVE, so an active edge is bilateral by construction: both parties consented on chain." .
+
+ap:relationshipType a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain aptrust:TrustGraphEdge ; rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+  rdfs:label "relationshipType" ;
+  rdfs:comment "The well-known label ('HAS_MEMBER', 'VALIDATION_TRUST', 'RECOMMENDS', …) when the type hash resolves; absent otherwise. Never a substitute for relationshipTypeId." .
+
+ap:relationshipTypeId a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain aptrust:TrustGraphEdge ; rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+  rdfs:label "relationshipTypeId" ;
+  rdfs:comment "The raw on-chain bytes32 type id, ALWAYS emitted — an unresolved governor-registered type must still be queryable (ADR-0013: no silent gaps)." .
+
+ap:edgeStatus a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain aptrust:TrustGraphEdge ; rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+  rdfs:label "edgeStatus" ;
+  rdfs:comment "'PROPOSED' | 'CONFIRMED' | 'ACTIVE' | 'REVOKED'. Only ACTIVE edges may inform trust scoring — a proposal is one party talking to itself, and revocation is terminal." .
+
+# ─── Agent-level, endpoint-RELATIVE denormalizations ────────────────────────
+
+ap:relatedAgent a owl:ObjectProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain ap:Agent ; rdfs:range ap:CanonicalAgentId ;
+  rdfs:label "relatedAgent" ;
+  rdfs:comment "The COUNTERPARTY as seen from this agent. Endpoint-relative by construction, hence on the agent and never on the shared edge node." .
+
+ap:edgeDirection a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain ap:Agent ; rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+  rdfs:label "edgeDirection" ;
+  rdfs:comment "'subject' | 'object' — which end of the edge THIS agent occupies. Endpoint-relative; see ap:relatedAgent." .
+
+ap:edgeCount a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain ap:Agent ; rdfs:range xsd:integer ; rdfs:label "edgeCount" .
+
+ap:activeEdgeCount a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain ap:Agent ; rdfs:range xsd:integer ;
+  rdfs:label "activeEdgeCount" ;
+  rdfs:comment "Edges in ACTIVE status only. This is the count trustScore reads, and it saturates fast — a public edge is cheap to create, so it is corroboration, never authority." .
+
+# ─── Attestation terms with no apatt: home (the T-box does not model the
+#     on-chain struct's issuer or its isValid(uid) view) ─────────────────────
+
+ap:attestationIssuer a owl:ObjectProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain apatt:Attestation ; rdfs:range ap:CanonicalAgentId ;
+  rdfs:label "attestationIssuer" ;
+  rdfs:comment "The asserting party. AttestationRegistry leaves msg.sender UNCONSTRAINED and derives authority from a recomputed EIP-712 signature, so the issuer here is the SIGNER, never the transaction sender. This is what makes third-party endorsement relayable without the issuer holding gas — the property spec 331's endorsement ceremony depends on." .
+
+ap:attestationValid a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain apatt:Attestation ; rdfs:range xsd:boolean ;
+  rdfs:label "attestationValid" ;
+  rdfs:comment "The contract's isValid(uid) verdict at index time. Note AR-06: there is NO issuer-revoke entrypoint — only the holder or a party may revoke on chain; issuer-side revocation is off-chain via offchainCredentialStatusList and is therefore NOT reflected here." .
+
+ap:attestationCount a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain ap:Agent ; rdfs:range xsd:integer ; rdfs:label "attestationCount" .
+
+ap:validAttestationCount a owl:DatatypeProperty ;
+  rdfs:domain ap:Agent ; rdfs:range xsd:integer ;
+  rdfs:label "validAttestationCount" ;
+  rdfs:comment "Non-revoked attestations where this agent is the SUBJECT. The count trustScore reads." .