@agentic-qe/v3 3.0.0-alpha.6 → 3.0.0-alpha.8

package/security-scan-report-2026-01-11.md

@@ -1,410 +0,0 @@
-# Security Scan Report - Agentic QE v3
-
-**Date:** 2026-01-11
-**Scanner:** V3 QE Security Scanner
-**Target:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/`
-**Files Scanned:** 166+ TypeScript files
-
----
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-| Severity | Count | Status |
-|----------|-------|--------|
-| Critical | 0 | Pass |
-| High | 3 | Action Required |
-| Medium | 5 | Recommended |
-| Low | 7 | Informational |
-| **Total** | **15** | |
-
-**Overall Assessment:** The codebase demonstrates **strong security posture** with comprehensive security controls including path traversal prevention, input validation, rate limiting, OAuth 2.1, and timing-safe authentication. However, several areas require attention.
-
----
-
-## Vulnerability Findings
-
-### HIGH Severity (3)
-
-#### HIGH-001: Command Injection Risk in Git Analyzer
-**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/git/git-analyzer.ts`
-**Lines:** 96, 122, 156, 204, 212, 266, 299, 309, 319, 331, 359, 401, 428, 455
-**CWE:** CWE-78 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command)
-**OWASP:** A03:2021 - Injection
-
-**Description:**
-The `GitAnalyzer` class uses `execSync()` to execute git commands with file paths that are passed through string interpolation. While the file paths are sanitized via `getRelativePath()`, the bug keywords in `getBugHistory()` are directly interpolated into the command:
-
-```typescript
-// Line 264-271
-const keywords = this.config.bugKeywords.join('|');
-const output = execSync(
-  `git log --oneline --grep="${keywords}" -i -- "${relativePath}" 2>/dev/null | wc -l`,
-  // ...
-);
-```
-
-**Risk:** If `bugKeywords` configuration is externally controllable, an attacker could inject shell commands.
-
-**Remediation:**
-1. Use `execFileSync()` with argument arrays instead of `execSync()` with string interpolation
-2. Validate and sanitize all configuration values before use
-3. Use the existing `validateCommand()` from CVE Prevention utilities
-
-**Fix Example:**
-```typescript
-import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
-
-// Instead of:
-execSync(`git log --oneline -- "${path}"`)
-
-// Use:
-execFileSync('git', ['log', '--oneline', '--', path])
-```
-
----
-
-#### HIGH-002: Command Injection in Chaos Engineering Service
-**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/chaos-resilience/services/chaos-engineer.ts`
-**Lines:** 567, 995
-**CWE:** CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
-**OWASP:** A03:2021 - Injection
-
-**Description:**
-The chaos engineer service executes commands via `exec()` with potentially untrusted input:
-
-```typescript
-// Line 567
-exec(probe.target, { timeout }, (error, stdout, _stderr) => {
-```
-
-The `probe.target` value comes from chaos experiment configuration which may be user-controllable.
-
-**Risk:** Arbitrary command execution if experiment configurations are not properly validated.
-
-**Remediation:**
-1. Whitelist allowed commands for probes
-2. Use the `validateCommand()` utility from `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/cve-prevention.ts`
-3. Implement strict input validation for experiment configurations
-
----
-
-#### HIGH-003: Shell Spawn with shell:true Option
-**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/test-execution/services/test-executor.ts`
-**Line:** 352-353
-**CWE:** CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
-**OWASP:** A03:2021 - Injection
-
-**Description:**
-The test executor spawns processes with `shell: true`:
-
-```typescript
-const proc: ChildProcess = spawn(command, args, {
-  shell: true,
-  cwd: process.cwd(),
-  // ...
-});
-```
-
-**Risk:** Using `shell: true` enables shell metacharacter interpretation, creating command injection vectors if arguments are not properly sanitized.
-
-**Remediation:**
-1. Remove `shell: true` option where possible
-2. Use argument arrays without shell interpretation
-3. Sanitize all command arguments using `escapeShellArg()` from CVE Prevention
-
----
-
-### MEDIUM Severity (5)
-
-#### MED-001: SQL Statement Construction via String Concatenation
-**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/learning/sqlite-persistence.ts`
-**Line:** 513
-**CWE:** CWE-89 (SQL Injection)
-
-**Description:**
-Dynamic SQL is constructed using string concatenation:
-
-```typescript
-const sql = `UPDATE qe_patterns SET ${setClauses.join(', ')} WHERE id = ?`;
-this.db.prepare(sql).run(...values);
-```
-
-**Mitigating Factors:**
-- Column names are hardcoded, not user input
-- Values use parameterized queries
-- This is a LOW risk implementation
-
-**Remediation:**
-- Validate column names against a whitelist before concatenation
-- Consider using a query builder library
-
----
-
-#### MED-002: Extensive Use of console.log for Debugging
-**Location:** 45 files across the codebase
-**CWE:** CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File)
-
-**Description:**
-The codebase contains extensive `console.log()` statements that may inadvertently log sensitive information in production:
-
-Key files with logging:
-- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/learning/sqlite-persistence.ts`
-- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/kernel/kernel.ts`
-- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/chaos-resilience/services/chaos-engineer.ts`
-
-**Remediation:**
-1. Implement a structured logging framework with log levels
-2. Add sensitive data filters before logging
-3. Remove debug statements or gate behind DEBUG environment variable
-
----
-
-#### MED-003: Missing Input Validation on MCP Tool Parameters
-**Location:** Various MCP handler files in `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/handlers/`
-**CWE:** CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation)
-
-**Description:**
-While schema validation exists via `SchemaValidator`, not all MCP tool handlers consistently apply validation before processing.
-
-**Remediation:**
-1. Ensure all handlers use `SchemaValidator.validate()` before processing
-2. Add runtime type guards for complex objects
-3. Implement comprehensive input validation middleware
-
----
-
-#### MED-004: API Key Exposure via Environment Variables
-**Location:** Multiple files
-**Lines:**
-- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/llm/providers/claude.ts:332`
-- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/llm/providers/openai.ts:399`
-
-**Description:**
-API keys are read from environment variables which is correct, but there's no validation that these aren't accidentally logged:
-
-```typescript
-return this.config.apiKey ?? process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY;
-```
-
-**Remediation:**
-1. Add redaction filters to logging
-2. Implement secure credential storage patterns
-3. Validate API key formats before use
-
----
-
-#### MED-005: JSON.parse Without Error Context
-**Location:** 42 files using JSON.parse
-**CWE:** CWE-754 (Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions)
-
-**Description:**
-Many `JSON.parse()` calls are wrapped in try-catch but error handling varies in quality. Some catch blocks swallow errors without proper context.
-
-**Remediation:**
-1. Standardize JSON parsing with a utility function that provides context
-2. Use the existing `readJSON()` from file-reader.ts pattern throughout
-3. Ensure parse errors include file/source context
-
----
-
-### LOW Severity (7)
-
-#### LOW-001: Missing Content Security Policy Headers
-**Risk:** XSS vectors in any web-facing components
-**Remediation:** Add CSP headers to HTTP responses
-
-#### LOW-002: Regex Complexity in Pattern Matching
-**Location:** Various security scanner files
-**Risk:** Potential ReDoS if patterns become complex
-**Mitigation:** The `createSafeRegex()` function exists but isn't universally applied
-**Remediation:** Use `isRegexSafe()` before compiling user-provided patterns
-
-#### LOW-003: File Path Handling Without Symlink Resolution
-**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/io/file-reader.ts`
-**Risk:** Symlink-based path traversal
-**Remediation:** Add `fs.realpath()` check before file operations
-
-#### LOW-004: Missing Request Timeout Configuration
-**Location:** Some HTTP client usages
-**Risk:** Resource exhaustion via slow loris attacks
-**Mitigation:** Default timeout of 30s exists in HttpClient
-**Remediation:** Ensure all external HTTP calls use explicit timeouts
-
-#### LOW-005: Deprecated Crypto Patterns (SHA-256)
-**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/cve-prevention.ts`
-**Risk:** SHA-256 is secure but consider SHA-3 for future-proofing
-**Note:** Current implementation is acceptable
-
-#### LOW-006: Large File Processing Without Size Limits
-**Location:** File reader and coverage parser
-**Risk:** Memory exhaustion with very large files
-**Remediation:** Add configurable file size limits
-
-#### LOW-007: No CSRF Protection in MCP Handlers
-**Risk:** Cross-site request forgery if exposed via HTTP
-**Mitigation:** MCP primarily uses stdio transport
-**Remediation:** Add CSRF tokens if HTTP transport is enabled
-
----
-
-## Security Controls Assessment
-
-### Implemented Controls (Positive Findings)
-
-| Control | Implementation | Location | Rating |
-|---------|---------------|----------|--------|
-| Path Traversal Prevention | Comprehensive | `cve-prevention.ts` | Excellent |
-| Input Sanitization | HTML, SQL, Shell | `cve-prevention.ts` | Excellent |
-| Rate Limiting | Token bucket, sliding window | `rate-limiter.ts` | Excellent |
-| OAuth 2.1 + PKCE | Full implementation | `oauth21-provider.ts` | Excellent |
-| JSON Schema Validation | Type-safe validation | `schema-validator.ts` | Good |
-| ReDoS Prevention | Pattern safety checks | `cve-prevention.ts` | Good |
-| Timing-Safe Comparison | Crypto-based | `cve-prevention.ts` | Excellent |
-| Command Validation | Whitelist + sanitization | `cve-prevention.ts` | Good |
-| Circuit Breaker | HTTP resilience | `http-client.ts` | Good |
-| Secure Token Generation | crypto.randomBytes | `cve-prevention.ts` | Excellent |
-
-### Missing/Incomplete Controls
-
-| Control | Status | Priority |
-|---------|--------|----------|
-| Structured Logging | Partial | Medium |
-| Request Signing | Not implemented | Low |
-| Audit Logging | Partial | Medium |
-| CORS Configuration | Not validated | Low |
-| Security Headers | Incomplete | Medium |
-
----
-
-## Dependency Vulnerability Assessment
-
-```
-npm audit results:
-{
-  "vulnerabilities": {},
-  "metadata": {
-    "vulnerabilities": {
-      "info": 0,
-      "low": 0,
-      "moderate": 0,
-      "high": 0,
-      "critical": 0,
-      "total": 0
-    },
-    "dependencies": {
-      "prod": 428,
-      "dev": 113,
-      "total": 577
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-**Result:** No known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
-
-### Key Dependencies Reviewed
-
-| Package | Version | Status |
-|---------|---------|--------|
-| better-sqlite3 | ^12.5.0 | Secure |
-| playwright | ^1.40.0 | Secure |
-| commander | ^12.1.0 | Secure |
-| uuid | ^9.0.0 | Secure |
-| chalk | ^5.6.2 | Secure |
-
----
-
-## OWASP Top 10 (2021) Compliance
-
-| Risk | Status | Notes |
-|------|--------|-------|
-| A01: Broken Access Control | Partial | OAuth implemented, needs consistent enforcement |
-| A02: Cryptographic Failures | Pass | Proper crypto usage, timing-safe comparisons |
-| A03: Injection | Needs Work | Git analyzer and chaos engineer need fixes |
-| A04: Insecure Design | Pass | Good security architecture with ADR documentation |
-| A05: Security Misconfiguration | Pass | Environment-based config, sensible defaults |
-| A06: Vulnerable Components | Pass | No known vulnerabilities in dependencies |
-| A07: Auth Failures | Pass | OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, secure token handling |
-| A08: Integrity Failures | Pass | Schema validation on inputs |
-| A09: Logging Failures | Partial | Logging exists but not structured |
-| A10: SSRF | Pass | URL validation in HTTP client |
-
----
-
-## Remediation Priority Matrix
-
-| Priority | Finding | Effort | Impact |
-|----------|---------|--------|--------|
-| P0 | HIGH-001: Git Analyzer Command Injection | Medium | High |
-| P0 | HIGH-002: Chaos Engineer Command Injection | Medium | High |
-| P0 | HIGH-003: Shell Spawn with shell:true | Low | High |
-| P1 | MED-001: SQL String Concatenation | Low | Medium |
-| P1 | MED-002: Console.log Sensitive Data | Medium | Medium |
-| P2 | MED-003: MCP Input Validation | Medium | Medium |
-| P2 | MED-004: API Key Logging Risk | Low | Medium |
-| P3 | MED-005: JSON.parse Error Handling | Low | Low |
-
----
-
-## Recommendations
-
-### Immediate Actions (P0)
-1. Refactor `GitAnalyzer` to use `execFileSync()` with argument arrays
-2. Add command validation to `ChaosEngineer` probe execution
-3. Remove `shell: true` from test executor spawn calls
-4. Apply existing CVE prevention utilities consistently
-
-### Short-Term (P1-P2)
-1. Implement structured logging framework with sensitive data filters
-2. Create middleware for consistent MCP input validation
-3. Add file size limits to file reader operations
-4. Review and standardize error handling patterns
-
-### Long-Term (P3)
-1. Consider migration to SHA-3 for hashing
-2. Implement comprehensive audit logging
-3. Add security headers middleware
-4. Create security testing automation
-
----
-
-## Appendix A: Files Requiring Review
-
-### Critical Path Files
-1. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/git/git-analyzer.ts`
-2. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/chaos-resilience/services/chaos-engineer.ts`
-3. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/test-execution/services/test-executor.ts`
-
-### Security Control Files (Well Implemented)
-1. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/cve-prevention.ts` - Excellent
-2. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/rate-limiter.ts` - Excellent
-3. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/schema-validator.ts` - Good
-4. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/oauth21-provider.ts` - Excellent
-
----
-
-## Appendix B: Scan Configuration
-
-```yaml
-scan_type: comprehensive
-modules:
-  - sast: enabled
-  - dependency: enabled
-  - secrets: enabled
-  - owasp: enabled
-  - compliance: enabled
-rules:
-  - OWASP Top 10 (2021)
-  - CWE SANS Top 25
-  - Node.js Security Best Practices
-exclusions:
-  - "**/node_modules/**"
-  - "**/dist/**"
-  - "**/*.test.ts"
-```
-
----
-
-**Report Generated By:** V3 QE Security Scanner
-**Scan Duration:** ~45 seconds
-**Confidence Level:** High

package/security-verification-report-2026-01-11.md

@@ -1,278 +0,0 @@
-# Security Verification Report - Agentic QE v3
-
-**Date:** 2026-01-11
-**Scanner:** V3 QE Security Scanner
-**Scan Type:** HIGH Severity Fix Verification
-**Target:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src`
-
----
-
-## Executive Summary
-
-This report verifies the remediation status of three HIGH severity command injection vulnerabilities (CWE-78) that were previously identified in the Agentic QE v3 codebase.
-
-| Issue ID | Status | File | Vulnerability |
-|----------|--------|------|---------------|
-| HIGH-001 | **RESOLVED** | git-analyzer.ts | Command injection via execSync() with string interpolation |
-| HIGH-002 | **RESOLVED** | chaos-engineer.ts | Command injection via exec() with probe targets |
-| HIGH-003 | **RESOLVED** | test-executor.ts | Shell spawn with shell:true |
-
-**Overall Security Posture: IMPROVED**
-
-All three HIGH severity issues have been successfully remediated. The codebase now follows secure coding practices for shell command execution.
-
----
-
-## Detailed Verification
-
-### HIGH-001: Command Injection in git-analyzer.ts
-
-**File:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/git/git-analyzer.ts`
-
-**Previous Vulnerability:**
-- Used `execSync()` with string interpolation allowing attacker-controlled input in commands
-- Risk: CWE-78 OS Command Injection
-
-**Current Implementation (SECURE):**
-
-1. **Import Changed:** Uses `execFileSync` from `child_process` instead of `execSync`
-   ```typescript
-   import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
-   ```
-
-2. **Input Sanitization:** Added `sanitizeGitArg()` function (lines 18-22):
-   ```typescript
-   function sanitizeGitArg(arg: string): string {
-     // Remove characters that could be used for command injection
-     return arg.replace(/[;&|`$(){}[\]<>\\'"!\n\r]/g, '');
-   }
-   ```
-
-3. **Secure Command Execution:** All git commands now use `execFileSync` with argument arrays:
-   ```typescript
-   // Example from getChangeFrequency() - line 132
-   const output = execFileSync('git', [
-     'log', '--oneline', '--since=90 days ago', '--', relativePath
-   ], {
-     cwd: this.config.repoRoot,
-     encoding: 'utf-8',
-     stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
-   }).trim();
-   ```
-
-4. **All git operations verified:**
-   - `isGitRepository()` - uses argument array
-   - `getChangeFrequency()` - uses sanitized path + argument array
-   - `getDeveloperExperience()` - uses sanitized path + argument array
-   - `getCodeAge()` - uses sanitized path + argument array
-   - `getBugHistory()` - uses sanitized path + sanitized keywords + argument array
-   - `getFileHistory()` - uses sanitized path + argument array
-   - `getChangedFiles()` - uses argument array
-   - `getCommitFiles()` - uses sanitized commit hash + argument array
-   - `getUncommittedFiles()` - uses argument array
-
-**Verification Result:** PASS - No command injection vulnerabilities found.
-
----
-
-### HIGH-002: Command Injection in chaos-engineer.ts
-
-**File:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/chaos-resilience/services/chaos-engineer.ts`
-
-**Previous Vulnerability:**
-- Used `exec()` with probe targets allowing shell command injection
-- Risk: CWE-78 OS Command Injection
-
-**Current Implementation (SECURE):**
-
-1. **Import Changed:** Uses `execFile` from `child_process` instead of `exec`
-   ```typescript
-   import { execFile } from 'child_process';
-   import { validateCommand } from '../../../mcp/security/cve-prevention';
-   ```
-
-2. **Command Whitelisting:** Strict whitelists for allowed commands (lines 567-578 and 1029-1038):
-   ```typescript
-   private static readonly ALLOWED_PROBE_COMMANDS = [
-     'curl', 'wget',          // Health check endpoints
-     'nc', 'netcat',          // Network connectivity
-     'ping',                  // Network reachability
-     'nslookup', 'dig',       // DNS checks
-     'ps', 'pgrep',           // Process checks
-     'cat', 'head', 'tail',   // File content checks
-     'ls', 'stat',            // File system checks
-     'echo',                  // Simple output
-     'test', '[',             // Conditional checks
-     'node', 'npm',           // Node.js checks
-   ];
-   ```
-
-3. **Command Validation:** Uses `validateCommand()` from CVE prevention module:
-   ```typescript
-   // Example from executeCommandProbe() - lines 584-591
-   const validation = validateCommand(probe.target, ChaosEngineerService.ALLOWED_PROBE_COMMANDS);
-   if (!validation.valid) {
-     console.log(`Command probe ${probe.name} blocked: ${validation.error}`);
-     console.log(`Blocked patterns: ${validation.blockedPatterns?.join(', ') || 'none'}`);
-     resolve(false);
-     return;
-   }
-   ```
-
-4. **Secure Execution:** Uses `execFile` with parsed arguments instead of shell:
-   ```typescript
-   // Lines 594-600
-   const parts = sanitizedCommand.trim().split(/\s+/);
-   const executable = parts[0];
-   const args = parts.slice(1);
-
-   // Use execFile instead of exec to avoid shell interpretation
-   execFile(executable, args, { timeout }, (error, stdout, _stderr) => {
-   ```
-
-5. **Rollback Commands Protected:** Same pattern applied to `executeCommandRollback()`:
-   - Uses separate `ALLOWED_ROLLBACK_COMMANDS` whitelist
-   - Validates via `validateCommand()` before execution
-   - Uses `execFile` with argument array
-
-**Verification Result:** PASS - No command injection vulnerabilities found.
-
----
-
-### HIGH-003: Shell Spawn with shell:true in test-executor.ts
-
-**File:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/test-execution/services/test-executor.ts`
-
-**Previous Vulnerability:**
-- Used `spawn()` with `shell: true` option allowing command injection
-- Risk: CWE-78 OS Command Injection
-
-**Current Implementation (SECURE):**
-
-1. **Shell Option Removed:** No `shell: true` anywhere in the file
-   ```typescript
-   // Lines 351-354 - Explicit security comment
-   // Spawn the test runner process
-   // Note: shell: false (default) to prevent command injection (CWE-78)
-   // Arguments are passed as array to avoid shell interpretation
-   const proc: ChildProcess = spawn(command, args, {
-     cwd: process.cwd(),
-     env: {
-       ...process.env,
-       FORCE_COLOR: '0', // Disable color codes for easier parsing
-       CI: 'true', // Enable CI mode for consistent output
-     },
-   });
-   ```
-
-2. **Command Building with Argument Arrays:** Uses `buildTestCommand()` method:
-   ```typescript
-   // Lines 400-423
-   private buildTestCommand(file: string, framework: string): { command: string; args: string[] } {
-     switch (framework.toLowerCase()) {
-       case 'vitest':
-         return {
-           command: 'npx',
-           args: ['vitest', 'run', file, '--reporter=json', '--no-color'],
-         };
-       case 'jest':
-         return {
-           command: 'npx',
-           args: ['jest', file, '--json', '--no-colors', '--testLocationInResults'],
-         };
-       // ...
-     }
-   }
-   ```
-
-3. **Related Files Also Secure:**
-   - `retry-handler.ts` (line 573-577): Uses `spawn` without shell option, has CWE-78 prevention comment
-   - `flaky-detector.ts` (line 424-428): Uses `spawn` without shell option
-
-**Verification Result:** PASS - No shell:true usage found.
-
----
-
-## Additional Security Findings
-
-### Semgrep Integration Concern (LOW)
-
-**File:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/security-compliance/services/semgrep-integration.ts`
-
-**Observation:**
-- Uses `exec()` (promisified) for running semgrep commands
-- Commands are built with string interpolation (line 119-128)
-
-**Risk Assessment: LOW**
-- This is for running the security scanner itself (semgrep)
-- Config values come from internal configuration, not user input
-- Exclude patterns and other args could theoretically be exploited if attacker controls config
-- Primary use case is CI/CD pipelines where config is trusted
-
-**Recommendation:**
-Consider migrating to `execFile` with argument array for consistency, though this is not a critical vulnerability given the controlled input source.
-
-### CVE Prevention Module (POSITIVE)
-
-**File:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/cve-prevention.ts`
-
-**Security Measures Implemented:**
-- Path traversal protection with multiple encoding detection
-- ReDoS prevention with regex safety checks
-- Timing-safe authentication comparison
-- Input sanitization utilities
-- Command injection prevention with whitelist approach
-- Shell metacharacter blocking
-
----
-
-## Compliance Summary
-
-| Security Control | Status | Evidence |
-|-----------------|--------|----------|
-| CWE-78 Command Injection Prevention | COMPLIANT | All shell commands use safe APIs |
-| Input Sanitization | COMPLIANT | sanitizeGitArg() and validateCommand() |
-| Principle of Least Privilege | COMPLIANT | Command whitelists restrict allowed executables |
-| Defense in Depth | COMPLIANT | Multiple validation layers (sanitize + whitelist + execFile) |
-
----
-
-## Files Scanned
-
-| File | Child Process Usage | Status |
-|------|---------------------|--------|
-| `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/git/git-analyzer.ts` | execFileSync | SECURE |
-| `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/chaos-resilience/services/chaos-engineer.ts` | execFile | SECURE |
-| `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/test-execution/services/test-executor.ts` | spawn | SECURE |
-| `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/test-execution/services/retry-handler.ts` | spawn | SECURE |
-| `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/test-execution/services/flaky-detector.ts` | spawn | SECURE |
-| `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/security-compliance/services/semgrep-integration.ts` | exec (promisified) | LOW RISK |
-
----
-
-## Recommendations
-
-1. **Completed:** All HIGH severity command injection issues are resolved.
-
-2. **Consider:** Migrate `semgrep-integration.ts` to use `execFile` for consistency.
-
-3. **Maintain:** Continue using the CVE prevention module for all new command execution code.
-
-4. **Document:** Update security guidelines to require use of `execFile`/`execFileSync` with argument arrays for all shell operations.
-
----
-
-## Conclusion
-
-The security scan confirms that all three HIGH severity command injection vulnerabilities (HIGH-001, HIGH-002, HIGH-003) have been successfully remediated. The codebase now follows secure coding practices:
-
-- **execFileSync** with argument arrays in git-analyzer.ts
-- **execFile** with command validation and whitelisting in chaos-engineer.ts
-- **spawn** without shell:true in test-executor.ts and related files
-
-The overall security posture of the Agentic QE v3 codebase has significantly improved with these fixes.
-
----
-
-*Report generated by V3 QE Security Scanner*
-*Scan completed: 2026-01-11*