@agenthippo-ai/agenthippo 1.110.9 → 1.110.19

package/out/auth-broker/store.js

@@ -1,275 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- *  Copyright (c) AgentHippo.ai. All rights reserved.
- *--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
-var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
-    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
-      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
-    }
-    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
-}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    o[k2] = m[k];
-}));
-var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
-    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
-}) : function(o, v) {
-    o["default"] = v;
-});
-var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
-    var ownKeys = function(o) {
-        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
-            var ar = [];
-            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
-            return ar;
-        };
-        return ownKeys(o);
-    };
-    return function (mod) {
-        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
-        var result = {};
-        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
-        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
-        return result;
-    };
-})();
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.AuthBrokerStore = void 0;
-const crypto = __importStar(require("crypto"));
-const fs = __importStar(require("fs"));
-const path = __importStar(require("path"));
-const config_js_1 = require("./config.js");
-const jwt_js_1 = require("./jwt.js");
-class AuthBrokerStore {
-    config;
-    users = new Map();
-    codes = new Map();
-    refreshTokens = new Map();
-    persistPath;
-    constructor(config, persistPath) {
-        this.config = config;
-        this.persistPath = persistPath;
-        if (persistPath) {
-            this.loadFromDisk(persistPath);
-        }
-    }
-    loadFromDisk(filePath) {
-        try {
-            if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
-                return;
-            }
-            const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
-            const data = JSON.parse(raw);
-            for (const user of data.users ?? []) {
-                this.users.set(user.id, user);
-            }
-            const now = Date.now();
-            for (const record of data.refreshTokens ?? []) {
-                // Defensive: skip anything no longer usable so reload can't resurrect a dead token.
-                if (record.revoked || record.expiresAt < now) {
-                    continue;
-                }
-                this.refreshTokens.set(record.token, record);
-            }
-        }
-        catch {
-            // start fresh on corrupt file
-        }
-    }
-    persist() {
-        if (!this.persistPath) {
-            return;
-        }
-        const dir = path.dirname(this.persistPath);
-        fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
-        const now = Date.now();
-        // Only persist live tokens: a revoked/expired token absent from disk is
-        // correctly treated as invalid after restart (rotation + revocation survive).
-        const liveTokens = [...this.refreshTokens.values()].filter((r) => !r.revoked && r.expiresAt > now);
-        const data = { users: [...this.users.values()], refreshTokens: liveTokens };
-        const tmp = `${this.persistPath}.tmp.${process.pid}`;
-        try {
-            fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2), 'utf8');
-            fs.renameSync(tmp, this.persistPath);
-        }
-        catch (e) {
-            try {
-                fs.unlinkSync(tmp);
-            }
-            catch { /* ignore */ }
-            throw e;
-        }
-    }
-    /** Remove revoked and expired refresh tokens to keep the in-memory Map bounded. */
-    pruneRefreshTokens() {
-        const now = Date.now();
-        for (const [token, record] of this.refreshTokens) {
-            if (record.revoked || record.expiresAt < now) {
-                this.refreshTokens.delete(token);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    /** Remove expired unconsumed auth codes so an authorize-without-token flood can't grow memory. */
-    pruneAuthCodes() {
-        const now = Date.now();
-        for (const [code, record] of this.codes) {
-            if (record.expiresAt < now) {
-                this.codes.delete(code);
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    upsertUser(email, displayName) {
-        const normalized = email.trim().toLowerCase();
-        if (!(0, config_js_1.emailDomainAllowed)(normalized, this.config.allowedEmailDomains)) {
-            const err = new Error(`Email domain not allowed for sign-in: ${normalized}`);
-            err.status = 403;
-            throw err;
-        }
-        for (const user of this.users.values()) {
-            if (user.email === normalized) {
-                return user;
-            }
-        }
-        const user = {
-            id: `usr_${crypto.randomBytes(8).toString('hex')}`,
-            email: normalized,
-            displayName: displayName?.trim() || normalized.split('@')[0] || normalized,
-            ...(this.config.teamConfigured ? { teamId: this.config.team.id } : {}),
-        };
-        this.users.set(user.id, user);
-        this.persist();
-        return user;
-    }
-    getUser(userId) {
-        return this.users.get(userId);
-    }
-    createAuthCode(input) {
-        this.pruneAuthCodes();
-        const code = crypto.randomBytes(24).toString('base64url');
-        this.codes.set(code, {
-            code,
-            userId: input.userId,
-            clientId: input.clientId,
-            redirectUri: input.redirectUri,
-            codeChallenge: input.codeChallenge,
-            expiresAt: Date.now() + 10 * 60 * 1000,
-        });
-        return code;
-    }
-    consumeAuthCode(code) {
-        const record = this.codes.get(code);
-        if (!record) {
-            return undefined;
-        }
-        this.codes.delete(code);
-        if (record.expiresAt < Date.now()) {
-            return undefined;
-        }
-        return record;
-    }
-    createRefreshToken(userId, clientId) {
-        const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
-        this.refreshTokens.set(token, {
-            token,
-            userId,
-            clientId,
-            expiresAt: Date.now() + this.config.refreshTokenTtlSec * 1000,
-            revoked: false,
-        });
-        this.persist();
-        return token;
-    }
-    consumeRefreshToken(token) {
-        const record = this.refreshTokens.get(token);
-        if (!record || record.revoked || record.expiresAt < Date.now()) {
-            return undefined;
-        }
-        record.revoked = true;
-        // Durably revoke the rotated token so it can't be replayed after a restart.
-        this.persist();
-        return record;
-    }
-    revokeRefreshTokensForUser(userId) {
-        let changed = false;
-        for (const record of this.refreshTokens.values()) {
-            if (record.userId === userId && !record.revoked) {
-                record.revoked = true;
-                changed = true;
-            }
-        }
-        if (changed) {
-            this.persist();
-        }
-    }
-    issueTokens(user, clientId, scope) {
-        this.pruneRefreshTokens();
-        this.pruneAuthCodes();
-        const accessToken = (0, jwt_js_1.signJwt)({
-            sub: user.id,
-            email: user.email,
-            name: user.displayName,
-            ...(user.teamId ? { team_id: user.teamId } : {}),
-            scope,
-        }, this.config.jwtSecret, this.config.accessTokenTtlSec);
-        const refreshToken = this.createRefreshToken(user.id, clientId);
-        return {
-            accessToken,
-            refreshToken,
-            expiresIn: this.config.accessTokenTtlSec,
-        };
-    }
-    buildBootstrap(user) {
-        // No AGENTHIPPO_TEAM_ID ⇒ solo deployment: no team object, and nothing is team-managed —
-        // store/routing still apply as defaults but are not locked against the user changing them.
-        const teamConfigured = this.config.teamConfigured;
-        return {
-            version: 1,
-            user: {
-                id: user.id,
-                email: user.email,
-                displayName: user.displayName,
-            },
-            ...(teamConfigured
-                ? {
-                    team: {
-                        id: this.config.team.id,
-                        name: this.config.team.name,
-                        role: 'member',
-                    },
-                }
-                : {}),
-            store: {
-                repo: this.config.team.storeRepo,
-                indexUrl: this.config.team.storeIndexUrl,
-                githubOrg: this.config.team.githubOrg,
-            },
-            routing: {
-                inferenceGatewayUrl: this.config.team.gatewayUrl,
-            },
-            policy: {
-                teamManagedSettings: teamConfigured ? ['store', 'routing'] : [],
-            },
-        };
-    }
-    buildMe(user) {
-        return {
-            user: {
-                id: user.id,
-                email: user.email,
-                displayName: user.displayName,
-            },
-            ...(this.config.teamConfigured
-                ? {
-                    team: {
-                        id: this.config.team.id,
-                        name: this.config.team.name,
-                        role: 'member',
-                    },
-                }
-                : {}),
-        };
-    }
-}
-exports.AuthBrokerStore = AuthBrokerStore;

package/out/authority/warrant.js

@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- *  Copyright (c) AgentHippo.ai. All rights reserved.
- *--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
-var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
-    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
-      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
-    }
-    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
-}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    o[k2] = m[k];
-}));
-var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
-    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
-}) : function(o, v) {
-    o["default"] = v;
-});
-var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
-    var ownKeys = function(o) {
-        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
-            var ar = [];
-            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
-            return ar;
-        };
-        return ownKeys(o);
-    };
-    return function (mod) {
-        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
-        var result = {};
-        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
-        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
-        return result;
-    };
-})();
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.b64urlEncode = b64urlEncode;
-exports.signCompactJws = signCompactJws;
-exports.verifyCompactJws = verifyCompactJws;
-exports.timingSafeEqualString = timingSafeEqualString;
-exports.generateWarrantKeypair = generateWarrantKeypair;
-exports.mintWarrant = mintWarrant;
-exports.verifyWarrant = verifyWarrant;
-exports.jwks = jwks;
-/**
- * Signed warrants (PLAN/serve-v4-clean.md §6).
- *
- * The P1 breach was not a nonce bug — it was **misplaced minting authority**: serve held a
- * bearer secret that let any holder mint a turn for any user. Edge mode relocated that secret;
- * signing removes it. And the deploy samples still share ONE symmetric HMAC
- * `AGENTHIPPO_AUTH_JWT_SECRET` fleet-wide, so compromising any single federated agent yields
- * token-minting authority for the whole fleet including the IdP.
- *
- *   warrant = sign_ES256{ user, pack_version, sandbox_id, tier, exp ≈ turn }
- *
- * The authority plane holds the private key. Data/inference/egress gateways hold **verification
- * keys only** (JWKS) — no plane can mint on another's behalf, and an edge node that is fully
- * compromised can verify but never issue. There is no revocation registry: `exp` is turn-length
- * and anything longer-lived is revoked by killing the sandbox's route (`SandboxDriver.revoke`).
- *
- * Channel binding: a warrant names the `sandbox_id` it was minted for, and the gateway verifies the
- * peer identity of the channel it arrived on INDEPENDENTLY. A warrant lifted from one sandbox and
- * replayed from another fails even though its signature is perfectly valid.
- */
-const crypto = __importStar(require("node:crypto"));
-/** base64url of a UTF-8 string. */
-function b64urlEncode(s) {
-    return Buffer.from(s, 'utf8').toString('base64url');
-}
-/** Sign `payload` as a compact JWS. The ONLY place a private key is used for a JWS in this tree. */
-function signCompactJws(header, payload, privateKeyPem) {
-    const fullHeader = { alg: 'ES256', typ: header.typ ?? 'JWT', kid: header.kid };
-    const signingInput = `${b64urlEncode(JSON.stringify(fullHeader))}.${b64urlEncode(JSON.stringify(payload))}`;
-    const sig = crypto.sign('sha256', Buffer.from(signingInput), {
-        key: crypto.createPrivateKey(privateKeyPem),
-        dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363', // JWS ES256 is raw R||S, not DER
-    });
-    return `${signingInput}.${sig.toString('base64url')}`;
-}
-/**
- * Verify a compact JWS against public keys only. Claim checking (exp, aud, digest, …) is the
- * caller's job — this answers exactly one question: was this byte sequence signed by a key we
- * already trust, under the algorithm we pinned?
- */
-function verifyCompactJws(token, publicKeysByKid, opts = {}) {
-    const parts = token.split('.');
-    if (parts.length !== 3) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed' };
-    }
-    const [headerB64, payloadB64, sigB64] = parts;
-    let header;
-    let payload;
-    try {
-        header = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(headerB64, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));
-        payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payloadB64, 'base64url').toString('utf8'));
-    }
-    catch {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'unparseable' };
-    }
-    if (header.alg !== 'ES256') {
-        return { ok: false, reason: `unsupported alg ${header.alg}` };
-    }
-    // A signed artifact of one KIND must never verify as another, even under the same key.
-    if (opts.typ !== undefined && header.typ !== undefined && header.typ !== opts.typ) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: `unexpected token type ${header.typ}` };
-    }
-    const publicKeyPem = header.kid ? publicKeysByKid[header.kid] : undefined;
-    if (!publicKeyPem) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'unknown kid' };
-    }
-    let signatureValid = false;
-    try {
-        signatureValid = crypto.verify('sha256', Buffer.from(`${headerB64}.${payloadB64}`), { key: crypto.createPublicKey(publicKeyPem), dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }, Buffer.from(sigB64, 'base64url'));
-    }
-    catch {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'bad signature' };
-    }
-    if (!signatureValid) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'bad signature' };
-    }
-    return { ok: true, header, payload, signingInput: `${headerB64}.${payloadB64}` };
-}
-/**
- * Constant-time string compare for values that gate a security decision (digests, thumbprints).
- *
- * These are public values, so a timing oracle is not a practical break — but a digest comparison
- * that short-circuits on the first differing byte is the kind of detail a reviewer has to
- * re-derive every time. One helper, used everywhere, removes the question.
- */
-function timingSafeEqualString(a, b) {
-    const bufA = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8');
-    const bufB = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8');
-    if (bufA.length !== bufB.length) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    return crypto.timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);
-}
-/** Generate an ES256 (P-256) keypair for the authority plane. */
-function generateWarrantKeypair(kid) {
-    const { privateKey, publicKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('ec', { namedCurve: 'P-256' });
-    const publicKeyPem = publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }).toString();
-    return {
-        privateKeyPem: privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' }).toString(),
-        publicKeyPem,
-        kid: kid ?? crypto.createHash('sha256').update(publicKeyPem).digest('hex').slice(0, 16),
-    };
-}
-/** Longer than a turn is not a warrant, it's a credential. Hard cap rather than a default. */
-const MAX_TTL_SECONDS = 300;
-function mintWarrant(input, key) {
-    const now = input.nowSeconds ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-    const ttl = Math.min(input.ttlSeconds ?? 120, MAX_TTL_SECONDS);
-    const claims = {
-        user: input.user,
-        pack: input.pack,
-        packVersion: input.packVersion,
-        sandboxId: input.sandboxId,
-        tier: input.tier,
-        aud: input.aud,
-        iat: now,
-        exp: now + ttl,
-        jti: crypto.randomUUID(),
-    };
-    return signCompactJws({ typ: 'JWT', kid: key.kid }, claims, key.privateKeyPem);
-}
-/**
- * Verify with a public key only. A gateway that can run this cannot mint — that asymmetry is
- * the entire point, and it is what deletes the shared fleet-wide HMAC secret.
- */
-function verifyWarrant(token, publicKeysByKid, input) {
-    // Algorithm confusion is the classic JWT break: a token claiming `none`, or claiming HS256
-    // so the verifier uses the public key as an HMAC secret, must be refused outright. That, plus
-    // the kid-must-be-known rule, lives in verifyCompactJws — one implementation, no drift.
-    const jws = verifyCompactJws(token, publicKeysByKid);
-    if (!jws.ok) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: jws.reason };
-    }
-    const claims = jws.payload;
-    const now = input.nowSeconds ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
-    if (typeof claims.exp !== 'number' || claims.exp <= now) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'expired' };
-    }
-    if (claims.aud !== input.audience) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: `wrong audience ${claims.aud}` };
-    }
-    // Channel binding — the property §12.4b promises. A stolen warrant presented from a
-    // different sandbox fails here even though its signature verifies.
-    if (input.channelSandboxId !== undefined && claims.sandboxId !== input.channelSandboxId) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'warrant not bound to this channel' };
-    }
-    if (!claims.user) {
-        return { ok: false, reason: 'no principal' };
-    }
-    return { ok: true, claims };
-}
-/** JWKS document for gateways to fetch. Publishes verification material ONLY. */
-function jwks(keys) {
-    return {
-        keys: keys.map((k) => {
-            const jwk = crypto.createPublicKey(k.publicKeyPem).export({ format: 'jwk' });
-            return { ...jwk, kid: k.kid, alg: 'ES256', use: 'sig' };
-        }),
-    };
-}

package/out/base-prompts/mcp-servers/.mcp.json

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "mcpServers": {
-    "langfuse-analytics": {
-      "command": "disable-bundled",
-      "env": {
-        "LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY": "${env:LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY}",
-        "LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY": "${env:LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY}",
-        "LANGFUSE_BASE_URL": "${env:LANGFUSE_BASE_URL}"
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
-

package/out/base-prompts/mcp-servers/langfuse-analytics/README.md

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-# Langfuse Analytics MCP Server
-
-MCP server that provides tools for querying Langfuse analytics data (costs, latencies, errors).
-
-## Tools
-
-| Tool | Description |
-|------|-------------|
-| `langfuse_list_sessions` | List recent sessions with filtering |
-| `langfuse_list_traces` | List traces with filtering |
-| `langfuse_get_trace` | Get detailed trace information |
-| `langfuse_cost_summary` | Aggregate costs by model/session/user |
-| `langfuse_latency_summary` | Latency statistics by model/name/session |
-| `langfuse_error_patterns` | Find error patterns in traces |
-
-## Setup
-
-### 1. Install dependencies
-
-```bash
-cd extensions/agentide/base-prompts/mcp-servers/langfuse-analytics
-npm install
-```
-
-### 2. Build
-
-```bash
-npm run build
-```
-
-### 3. Configure environment
-
-Create a `.env` file in your workspace root:
-
-```bash
-LANGFUSE_BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
-LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY=sk-lf-your-secret-key
-LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY=pk-lf-your-public-key
-```
-
-Or export them directly:
-
-```bash
-export LANGFUSE_BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
-export LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY=sk-lf-your-secret-key
-export LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY=pk-lf-your-public-key
-```
-
-### 4. Enable in Agent Hippo
-
-The bundled `.mcp.json` is automatically synced to `.agent-hippo/agents/default/mcp/.mcp.json` on first run:
-
-```json
-{
-  "mcpServers": {
-    "langfuse-analytics": {
-      "command": "enable-bundled",
-      "env": {
-        "LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY": "${env:LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY}",
-        "LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY": "${env:LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY}",
-        "LANGFUSE_BASE_URL": "${env:LANGFUSE_BASE_URL}"
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-## Testing
-
-### Test Langfuse API connection (without MCP)
-
-```bash
-node scripts/test-client.js
-```
-
-### Test MCP server
-
-```bash
-npm test
-# or
-node scripts/test-server.js
-```
-
-## Development
-
-Watch mode for development:
-
-```bash
-npm run dev
-```
-
-## Usage
-
-The server runs via stdio and follows the MCP protocol. It's designed to be:
-1. Started by Agent Hippo's MCP infrastructure
-2. Configured via `.mcp.json` with `enable-bundled` command
-3. Automatically passed to Claude and Codex SDKs
-
-### Manual testing with MCP Inspector
-
-```bash
-npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector node dist/index.js
-```
-
-## Example Queries
-
-### Get cost breakdown by model
-
-```json
-{
-  "name": "langfuse_cost_summary",
-  "arguments": {
-    "groupBy": "model",
-    "limit": 20
-  }
-}
-```
-
-### Find slow operations
-
-```json
-{
-  "name": "langfuse_latency_summary",
-  "arguments": {
-    "groupBy": "name",
-    "fromDate": "2026-01-01"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-### List recent errors
-
-```json
-{
-  "name": "langfuse_error_patterns",
-  "arguments": {
-    "groupBy": "error",
-    "limit": 50
-  }
-}
-```
-

package/out/base-prompts/mcp-servers/langfuse-analytics/mcp.json

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "name": "langfuse-analytics",
-  "label": "Langfuse Analytics",
-  "description": "Query session costs, latencies, and error patterns from Langfuse",
-  "command": "node",
-  "args": ["${serverDir}/dist/index.js"],
-  "env": {
-    "LANGFUSE_BASE_URL": "${env:LANGFUSE_BASE_URL}",
-    "LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY": "${env:LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY}",
-    "LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY": "${env:LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY}"
-  }
-}
-