@agentconnect.md/cli 1.15.0-rc.15 → 1.15.0-rc.24

package/dist/index.js

@@ -8233,8 +8233,10 @@ const AgentSpec = object({
 		"medium",
 		"high"
 	]).optional(),
+	showFooter: boolean().optional(),
 	fastMode: boolean().optional(),
 	permissionMode: string().nullable().optional(),
+	allowRuntimeChangesInChat: boolean().optional(),
 	pause: boolean().optional(),
 	workspace: AgentWorkspace.optional(),
 	env: record(string(), string()).optional(),
@@ -8243,6 +8245,8 @@ const AgentSpec = object({
 	mcpServers: array(string()).default([]),
 	callPolicy: _enum(["all", "selected"]).optional(),
 	allowedCallerAgentIds: array(string()).default([]),
+	outboundPolicy: _enum(["all", "selected"]).optional(),
+	allowedTargetAgentIds: array(string()).optional(),
 	introduceOnJoin: boolean().optional(),
 	restrictFileAccess: boolean().optional()
 });
@@ -8325,6 +8329,36 @@ const AgentScopeDenied = object({
 	launchId: string().uuid(),
 	capability: string()
 });
+/** Editor approval queue. The daemon owns the live resolver and durable local
+* history; the Control Plane only proxies this bounded, secret-masked summary. */
+const AgentPermissionRequestRecord = object({
+	id: string().uuid(),
+	agentId: string().uuid(),
+	createdAt: string().datetime(),
+	requesterId: string().nullable(),
+	requesterName: string().nullable(),
+	command: string().max(240),
+	status: _enum([
+		"pending",
+		"allowed",
+		"denied",
+		"expired"
+	]),
+	resolvedAt: string().datetime().nullable()
+});
+const AgentPermissionRequestList = object({
+	agentId: string().uuid(),
+	limit: number().int().min(1).max(100).default(50)
+});
+const AgentPermissionRequestPage = object({
+	agentId: string().uuid(),
+	requests: array(AgentPermissionRequestRecord)
+});
+const AgentPermissionDecision = object({
+	agentId: string().uuid(),
+	requestId: string().uuid(),
+	decision: _enum(["allow", "deny"])
+});
 //#endregion
 //#region ../protocol/dist/frames/mcpserver.js
 /**
@@ -8422,6 +8456,10 @@ const CollabAgentPlacement = object({
 	botAppId: string().optional(),
 	callPolicy: _enum(["all", "selected"]).default("all"),
 	allowedCallerAgentIds: array(string()).default([]),
+	/** Caller-side authorization. Effective A→B access requires A's outbound
+	* policy to admit B and B's inbound call policy to admit A. */
+	outboundPolicy: _enum(["all", "selected"]).default("all"),
+	allowedTargetAgentIds: array(string()).default([]),
 	name: string().optional(),
 	displayName: string().optional()
 });
@@ -9432,6 +9470,9 @@ const FRAME_SCHEMAS = {
 	"agent/activate": AgentActivate,
 	"agent/activity": AgentActivity,
 	"agent/scope-denied": AgentScopeDenied,
+	"agent/permission-requests": AgentPermissionRequestList,
+	"agent/permission-requests/page": AgentPermissionRequestPage,
+	"agent/permission-decision": AgentPermissionDecision,
 	"route/assign": RouteAssign,
 	"route/assign/ack": RouteAssignAck,
 	"route/update": RouteUpdate,
@@ -9592,6 +9633,9 @@ discriminatedUnion("type", [
 	frame("agent/activate", FRAME_SCHEMAS["agent/activate"]),
 	frame("agent/activity", FRAME_SCHEMAS["agent/activity"]),
 	frame("agent/scope-denied", FRAME_SCHEMAS["agent/scope-denied"]),
+	frame("agent/permission-requests", FRAME_SCHEMAS["agent/permission-requests"]),
+	frame("agent/permission-requests/page", FRAME_SCHEMAS["agent/permission-requests/page"]),
+	frame("agent/permission-decision", FRAME_SCHEMAS["agent/permission-decision"]),
 	frame("route/assign", FRAME_SCHEMAS["route/assign"]),
 	frame("route/assign/ack", FRAME_SCHEMAS["route/assign/ack"]),
 	frame("route/update", FRAME_SCHEMAS["route/update"]),