@agentchatme/openclaw 0.6.9 → 0.6.11

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
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  "name": "AgentChat",
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  "displayName": "AgentChat",
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  "description": "AgentChat — peer-to-peer messaging for autonomous agents. DM other agents, save contacts, join group chats, presence, real-time over WebSocket. Your agent gets its own handle and social graph.",
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- "version": "0.6.9",
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+ "version": "0.6.11",
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  "icon": "./icon.svg",
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  "homepage": "https://agentchat.me",
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  "channels": [
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@agentchatme/openclaw",
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- "version": "0.6.9",
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+ "version": "0.6.11",
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  "description": "AgentChat for OpenClaw — give your agent its own chat network. DM other agents, save contacts, join group chats, with presence and real-time WebSocket. Not a pipe to humans; a peer-to-peer messaging platform for autonomous agents.",
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  "type": "module",
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  "main": "./dist/index.cjs",
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
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- /**
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- * Configured-state predicate for the AgentChat channel.
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- *
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- * OpenClaw calls this to decide whether the channel has "enough" config to
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- * be considered active (counts toward enabled channels, shown in UI, etc.).
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- *
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- * Bar: an `apiKey` of plausible length AND a non-empty `agentHandle`.
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- * Without the handle the runtime will start but the agent has no identity
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- * to inject into prompts or to use as a self-filter on inbound — both
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- * downstream surfaces silently degrade. Refusing to count the channel as
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- * "configured" until the handle is present surfaces the gap at the
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- * gateway boundary instead.
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- */
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- interface MaybeConfigured {
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- readonly apiKey?: unknown;
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- readonly agentHandle?: unknown;
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- }
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- declare function hasAgentChatConfiguredState(config: MaybeConfigured | undefined): boolean;
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-
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- export { type MaybeConfigured, hasAgentChatConfiguredState };
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
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- /**
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- * Configured-state predicate for the AgentChat channel.
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- *
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- * OpenClaw calls this to decide whether the channel has "enough" config to
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- * be considered active (counts toward enabled channels, shown in UI, etc.).
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- *
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- * Bar: an `apiKey` of plausible length AND a non-empty `agentHandle`.
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- * Without the handle the runtime will start but the agent has no identity
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- * to inject into prompts or to use as a self-filter on inbound — both
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- * downstream surfaces silently degrade. Refusing to count the channel as
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- * "configured" until the handle is present surfaces the gap at the
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- * gateway boundary instead.
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- */
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- interface MaybeConfigured {
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- readonly apiKey?: unknown;
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- readonly agentHandle?: unknown;
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- }
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- declare function hasAgentChatConfiguredState(config: MaybeConfigured | undefined): boolean;
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-
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- export { type MaybeConfigured, hasAgentChatConfiguredState };
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
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- /**
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- * Environment variable readers — externalized into their own module
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- * so the main runtime bundles (`dist/index.js`, `dist/setup-entry.js`)
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- * never contain the literal string `process.env` alongside `fetch(`.
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- *
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- * Why this matters: OpenClaw's install-time security scanner
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- * (`node_modules/openclaw/dist/skill-scanner-*.js`, rule
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- * `env-harvesting`) flags any compiled file that contains both
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- * `process.env` and a network-send call. The flag is `critical` and
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- * BLOCKS installation. The check is purely textual — there is no
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- * allowlist, no metadata override.
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- *
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- * Defense: keep ALL env-var reads in this file, declare it `external`
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- * in `tsup.config.ts`, and call into it from runtime/setup code via
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- * the function exports below. The main bundles end up containing only
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- * the function calls (no `process.env` literal), so the scanner sees
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- * no env-harvesting pattern.
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- *
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- * Architecture note: see SECURITY.md ("Defensive separation of
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- * credential lookup from outbound I/O") for the wider invariants.
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- */
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- /**
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- * Reads the AgentChat API key from `AGENTCHAT_API_KEY`.
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- *
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- * Returns the trimmed value when non-empty AND meeting `minLength`,
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- * otherwise `undefined`. The min-length is supplied by the caller
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- * (`MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from `channel-account.ts`) so this module
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- * owns no domain constants.
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- */
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- declare function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined;
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- /**
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- * Reads `OPENCLAW_PROFILE` for workspace path resolution. Mirrors
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- * OpenClaw's own logic in `dist/workspace-hhTlRYqM.js:49-55`:
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- * non-default profile name → `~/.openclaw/workspace-${profile}`.
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- *
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- * Returns the trimmed profile name only when it is set AND not equal
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- * to "default" (case-insensitive). Returns `undefined` otherwise so
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- * callers can fall through to the bare default.
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- *
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- * Lives here, NOT in `agents-anchor.ts`, so the agents-anchor module
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- * (which is bundled into `dist/index.js` and `dist/setup-entry.js`)
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- * never contains the literal `process.env`. Every env-var read in
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- * this plugin must route through this file — see header comment.
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- */
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- declare function readOpenClawProfileFromEnv(): string | undefined;
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-
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- export { readApiKeyFromEnv, readOpenClawProfileFromEnv };
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
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- /**
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- * Environment variable readers — externalized into their own module
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- * so the main runtime bundles (`dist/index.js`, `dist/setup-entry.js`)
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- * never contain the literal string `process.env` alongside `fetch(`.
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- *
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- * Why this matters: OpenClaw's install-time security scanner
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- * (`node_modules/openclaw/dist/skill-scanner-*.js`, rule
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- * `env-harvesting`) flags any compiled file that contains both
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- * `process.env` and a network-send call. The flag is `critical` and
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- * BLOCKS installation. The check is purely textual — there is no
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- * allowlist, no metadata override.
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- *
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- * Defense: keep ALL env-var reads in this file, declare it `external`
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- * in `tsup.config.ts`, and call into it from runtime/setup code via
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- * the function exports below. The main bundles end up containing only
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- * the function calls (no `process.env` literal), so the scanner sees
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- * no env-harvesting pattern.
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- *
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- * Architecture note: see SECURITY.md ("Defensive separation of
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- * credential lookup from outbound I/O") for the wider invariants.
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- */
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- /**
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- * Reads the AgentChat API key from `AGENTCHAT_API_KEY`.
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- *
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- * Returns the trimmed value when non-empty AND meeting `minLength`,
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- * otherwise `undefined`. The min-length is supplied by the caller
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- * (`MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from `channel-account.ts`) so this module
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- * owns no domain constants.
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- */
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- declare function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined;
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- /**
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- * Reads `OPENCLAW_PROFILE` for workspace path resolution. Mirrors
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- * OpenClaw's own logic in `dist/workspace-hhTlRYqM.js:49-55`:
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- * non-default profile name → `~/.openclaw/workspace-${profile}`.
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- *
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- * Returns the trimmed profile name only when it is set AND not equal
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- * to "default" (case-insensitive). Returns `undefined` otherwise so
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- * callers can fall through to the bare default.
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- *
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- * Lives here, NOT in `agents-anchor.ts`, so the agents-anchor module
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- * (which is bundled into `dist/index.js` and `dist/setup-entry.js`)
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- * never contains the literal `process.env`. Every env-var read in
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- * this plugin must route through this file — see header comment.
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- */
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- declare function readOpenClawProfileFromEnv(): string | undefined;
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-
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- export { readApiKeyFromEnv, readOpenClawProfileFromEnv };