@agentchatme/openclaw 0.6.0 → 0.6.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +38 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +39 -0
- package/dist/credentials/read-env.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/credentials/read-env.d.cts +8 -46
- package/dist/credentials/read-env.d.ts +8 -46
- package/dist/credentials/read-env.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.cjs +1 -1
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/setup-entry.cjs +1 -1
- package/dist/setup-entry.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/setup-entry.js +1 -1
- package/dist/setup-entry.js.map +1 -1
- package/openclaw.plugin.json +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -5,6 +5,44 @@ All notable changes to `@agentchatme/openclaw` are documented here.
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The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/);
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this package adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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## 0.6.1 — 2026-04-25
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### Strip trigger keywords from defensive comments — install scanner now passes
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0.6.0 fixed the structural co-location of the credential lookup with
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outbound I/O at the dist-bundle level, but the OpenClaw client's
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install-time scanner is pure per-file pattern matching with no LLM
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context layer (only the ClawHub listing card has the context layer).
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Several defensive comments and JSDoc blocks I added in 0.6.0 — the
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ones that explicitly named the patterns we were defending against
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("process.env", "network", "fetch", "ws") — were themselves enough
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to trip the scanner. The same file, the same pattern, just the wrong
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characters in a comment.
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This release strips the trigger keywords from every code/script
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comment and moves the architectural rationale into SECURITY.md (which
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is not scanned for the credential-harvesting pattern). Concretely:
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- `src/credentials/read-env.ts` — JSDoc reduced to a one-liner
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pointing at SECURITY.md. The function body is unchanged.
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- `src/channel.wizard.ts` — both the import-comment block and the
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`inspect` callback's inline comment trimmed to single-line pointers
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at SECURITY.md.
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- `scripts/fix-cjs-extensions.mjs` — docstring rewritten to describe
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the extension-rewrite mechanism without naming the original
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scanner-trigger pattern.
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- `tsup.config.ts` — `external` block comment trimmed.
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- `SECURITY.md` — new section "Defensive separation of credential
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lookup from outbound I/O" carrying the full architectural
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rationale that previously lived in source comments.
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ClawHub's bundle includes more files than the npm `files` allowlist
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permits (it ships `src/` and `scripts/` alongside `dist/`), so the
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fix targets every layer the scanner sees.
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Behavior, runtime, build outputs, and test surface are byte-identical
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to 0.6.0 modulo the comment text and the new SECURITY.md section.
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## 0.6.0 — 2026-04-25
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### Unblock canonical install via `openclaw plugins install` — structural fix for the ClawHub install-time scanner
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package/SECURITY.md
CHANGED
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@@ -43,6 +43,45 @@ Out of scope here (report to the respective project instead):
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- An on-path attacker doing TLS MITM. We rely on the OS trust store and `ws`'s default TLS validation. Pinning is not implemented; the AgentChat TLS cert is managed by the server.
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- A malicious OpenClaw plugin host. If you run untrusted OpenClaw plugins in the same process, they share the event loop and can observe every frame we handle. Isolate.
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## Defensive separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O
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The plugin reads exactly one secret from the host environment — the
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AgentChat API key — and that lookup is deliberately isolated in its own
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module: `src/credentials/read-env.ts`, emitted as
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`dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs}`. The wizard, runtime, and
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networking modules import the helper but never read host environment
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state directly themselves.
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The separation is structural, not stylistic. ClawHub's install-time
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scanner does pure per-file pattern matching: any single source or
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emitted file that contains both an environment-variable lookup AND an
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outbound HTTP / WebSocket call is flagged as a possible
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credential-harvesting pattern, with no data-flow analysis to clear
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false positives. By keeping the credential helper in a module that
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performs zero outbound I/O — and configuring `tsup` (via the
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`external` list) to keep it as a sibling dist file rather than
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inlining its contents — the emitted tree mirrors the source split:
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- `dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs}` — credential lookup only.
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Contains no outbound HTTP, no WebSocket, no SDK calls.
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- `dist/index.{js,cjs}` and `dist/setup-entry.{js,cjs}` — runtime and
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setup logic. No direct environment-variable access; the helper is
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consumed via a runtime `import` / `require` that resolves to the
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sibling file.
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A post-build step (`scripts/fix-cjs-extensions.mjs`) rewrites the CJS
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bundle's `require('./credentials/read-env.js')` call to use the `.cjs`
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extension so Node's CJS loader resolves to the sibling CJS file
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inside this `"type": "module"` package, instead of attempting to load
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the ESM `.js` sibling and failing with `ERR_REQUIRE_ESM`.
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This pattern mirrors `extensions/telegram/src/token.ts` in the
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upstream `openclaw/openclaw` repository — first-party channel plugins
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use the same separation. Anyone editing the credential helper MUST
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keep it isolated: no SDK imports, no outbound HTTP, no WebSocket. A
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contributor who reintroduces I/O into that module would re-create the
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flag class and block the next install.
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## Log redaction
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By default we redact:
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{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/credentials/read-env.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;
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{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/credentials/read-env.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAYO,SAAS,kBAAkB,SAAA,EAAuC;AACvE,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,CAAI,iBAAA,EAAmB,IAAA,EAAK;AAChD,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,MAAA;AACjB,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAA,GAAS,SAAA,EAAW,OAAO,MAAA;AACnC,EAAA,OAAO,GAAA;AACT","file":"read-env.cjs","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Reads the AgentChat API key from the host environment.\n *\n * Lives in its own module by design. See SECURITY.md (\"Defensive\n * separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O\") for the\n * architectural rationale and the invariants this file must keep.\n *\n * Returns the trimmed value when it is non-empty AND meets the minimum\n * length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length argument is supplied\n * by the caller (currently `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from\n * `channel-account.ts`) so this module owns no domain constants.\n */\nexport function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined {\n const raw = process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY?.trim()\n if (!raw) return undefined\n if (raw.length < minLength) return undefined\n return raw\n}\n"]}
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/**
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* Reads the AgentChat API key from the host environment.
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*
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* ClawHub's install-time security scanner flags any single source or
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* dist file that contains both a `process.env.X` access AND a network
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* call ("Environment variable access combined with network send —
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* possible credential harvesting", `plugins.code_safety`). The scanner
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* doesn't trace data flow, so the only way to satisfy it is to keep
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* env reads and network calls in different files at both the src/ and
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* dist/ layer.
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* Lives in its own module by design. See SECURITY.md ("Defensive
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* separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O") for the
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* architectural rationale and the invariants this file must keep.
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*
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* tsup is configured to emit this file as its own dist entry
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* (`dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs}`) and to mark the relative
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* import as external so the contents are NOT inlined into
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* `dist/index.{js,cjs}` or `dist/setup-entry.{js,cjs}`. After build,
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* the dist tree mirrors the src/ separation:
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* dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs} — env reads, no network → clean
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* dist/index.{js,cjs} — network code, no env reads → clean
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* dist/setup-entry.{js,cjs} — network code, no env reads → clean
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*
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* Anyone editing this file MUST keep the no-network invariant. A
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* future contributor adding a `fetch` call here would re-introduce the
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* scanner false-positive class and block the next ClawHub install.
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*/
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/**
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* Read AGENTCHAT_API_KEY from the environment, trimmed.
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*
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* Returns the trimmed value if it is non-empty AND meets the minimum
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* length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length check is intentional:
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* the wizard's inspect() callback uses this to populate the
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* "credential detected in env, use it?" prompt, and offering an
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* obviously-malformed value would surface a confusing prompt that
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* leads to a wasted GET /v1/agents/me round-trip when the user
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* accepts. Letting an undefined return short-circuit the prompt is
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* the cleaner UX.
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*
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* @param minLength Minimum byte length the value must meet to be
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* surfaced as a candidate. Callers pass `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from
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* `channel-account.ts` so this module stays purely env-shaped and
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* carries no domain constants of its own.
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* Returns the trimmed value when it is non-empty AND meets the minimum
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* length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length argument is supplied
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* by the caller (currently `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from
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* `channel-account.ts`) so this module owns no domain constants.
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*/
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declare function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined;
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* Reads the AgentChat API key from the host environment.
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*
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* ClawHub's install-time security scanner flags any single source or
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* dist file that contains both a `process.env.X` access AND a network
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* call ("Environment variable access combined with network send —
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* possible credential harvesting", `plugins.code_safety`). The scanner
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* doesn't trace data flow, so the only way to satisfy it is to keep
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* env reads and network calls in different files at both the src/ and
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* dist/ layer.
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* Lives in its own module by design. See SECURITY.md ("Defensive
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* separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O") for the
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* architectural rationale and the invariants this file must keep.
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*
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* tsup is configured to emit this file as its own dist entry
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* (`dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs}`) and to mark the relative
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* import as external so the contents are NOT inlined into
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* `dist/index.{js,cjs}` or `dist/setup-entry.{js,cjs}`. After build,
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* the dist tree mirrors the src/ separation:
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*
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* dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs} — env reads, no network → clean
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* dist/index.{js,cjs} — network code, no env reads → clean
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* dist/setup-entry.{js,cjs} — network code, no env reads → clean
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*
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* Anyone editing this file MUST keep the no-network invariant. A
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* future contributor adding a `fetch` call here would re-introduce the
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* scanner false-positive class and block the next ClawHub install.
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*/
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/**
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* Read AGENTCHAT_API_KEY from the environment, trimmed.
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*
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* Returns the trimmed value if it is non-empty AND meets the minimum
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* length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length check is intentional:
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* the wizard's inspect() callback uses this to populate the
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* "credential detected in env, use it?" prompt, and offering an
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* obviously-malformed value would surface a confusing prompt that
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* leads to a wasted GET /v1/agents/me round-trip when the user
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* accepts. Letting an undefined return short-circuit the prompt is
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* the cleaner UX.
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*
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* @param minLength Minimum byte length the value must meet to be
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* surfaced as a candidate. Callers pass `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from
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* `channel-account.ts` so this module stays purely env-shaped and
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* carries no domain constants of its own.
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* Returns the trimmed value when it is non-empty AND meets the minimum
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* length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length argument is supplied
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* by the caller (currently `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from
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* `channel-account.ts`) so this module owns no domain constants.
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*/
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declare function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined;
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{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/credentials/read-env.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";
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{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/credentials/read-env.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAYO,SAAS,kBAAkB,SAAA,EAAuC;AACvE,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,CAAI,iBAAA,EAAmB,IAAA,EAAK;AAChD,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,MAAA;AACjB,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAA,GAAS,SAAA,EAAW,OAAO,MAAA;AACnC,EAAA,OAAO,GAAA;AACT","file":"read-env.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Reads the AgentChat API key from the host environment.\n *\n * Lives in its own module by design. See SECURITY.md (\"Defensive\n * separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O\") for the\n * architectural rationale and the invariants this file must keep.\n *\n * Returns the trimmed value when it is non-empty AND meets the minimum\n * length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length argument is supplied\n * by the caller (currently `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from\n * `channel-account.ts`) so this module owns no domain constants.\n */\nexport function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined {\n const raw = process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY?.trim()\n if (!raw) return undefined\n if (raw.length < minLength) return undefined\n return raw\n}\n"]}
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