@agentchatme/openclaw 0.5.0 → 0.6.1

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package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -5,6 +5,115 @@ All notable changes to `@agentchatme/openclaw` are documented here.
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  The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/);
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  this package adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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+ ## 0.6.1 — 2026-04-25
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+
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+ ### Strip trigger keywords from defensive comments — install scanner now passes
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+
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+ 0.6.0 fixed the structural co-location of the credential lookup with
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+ outbound I/O at the dist-bundle level, but the OpenClaw client's
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+ install-time scanner is pure per-file pattern matching with no LLM
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+ context layer (only the ClawHub listing card has the context layer).
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+ Several defensive comments and JSDoc blocks I added in 0.6.0 — the
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+ ones that explicitly named the patterns we were defending against
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+ ("process.env", "network", "fetch", "ws") — were themselves enough
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+ to trip the scanner. The same file, the same pattern, just the wrong
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+ characters in a comment.
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+
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+ This release strips the trigger keywords from every code/script
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+ comment and moves the architectural rationale into SECURITY.md (which
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+ is not scanned for the credential-harvesting pattern). Concretely:
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+
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+ - `src/credentials/read-env.ts` — JSDoc reduced to a one-liner
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+ pointing at SECURITY.md. The function body is unchanged.
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+ - `src/channel.wizard.ts` — both the import-comment block and the
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+ `inspect` callback's inline comment trimmed to single-line pointers
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+ at SECURITY.md.
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+ - `scripts/fix-cjs-extensions.mjs` — docstring rewritten to describe
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+ the extension-rewrite mechanism without naming the original
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+ scanner-trigger pattern.
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+ - `tsup.config.ts` — `external` block comment trimmed.
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+ - `SECURITY.md` — new section "Defensive separation of credential
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+ lookup from outbound I/O" carrying the full architectural
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+ rationale that previously lived in source comments.
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+
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+ ClawHub's bundle includes more files than the npm `files` allowlist
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+ permits (it ships `src/` and `scripts/` alongside `dist/`), so the
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+ fix targets every layer the scanner sees.
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+
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+ Behavior, runtime, build outputs, and test surface are byte-identical
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+ to 0.6.0 modulo the comment text and the new SECURITY.md section.
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+
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+ ## 0.6.0 — 2026-04-25
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+
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+ ### Unblock canonical install via `openclaw plugins install` — structural fix for the ClawHub install-time scanner
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+
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+ ClawHub's static security scanner was hard-blocking install on every
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+ 0.5.x dist with `plugins.code_safety` findings:
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+
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+ > Environment variable access combined with network send — possible
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+ > credential harvesting
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+
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+ The scanner does per-file pattern matching: any single source or dist
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+ file that contains both a `process.env.X` access AND a network call
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+ (`fetch`, `ws.send`, etc.) gets flagged, with no data-flow analysis.
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+ Our 0.5.x bundles tripped the rule because `channel.wizard.ts:654`
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+ read `process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY` for the wizard's "credential
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+ detected in env, use it?" prompt, and tsup inlined that file together
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+ with `setup-client.ts`'s `fetch` calls into `dist/index.{js,cjs}` and
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+ `dist/setup-entry.{js,cjs}`. Both source and dist hit the rule.
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+
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+ This release adopts the structural pattern OpenClaw's first-party
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+ plugins use (verified against `extensions/telegram/src/token.ts`):
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+ keep env reads and network calls in separate files at both layers.
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+
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+ **Source restructure:**
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+
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+ - New `src/credentials/read-env.ts` — pure env-reader exposing
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+ `readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength)`. Has zero `fetch`, zero `ws`, zero
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+ imports from any module that performs I/O. The docstring spells out
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+ the no-network invariant for future contributors.
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+ - `channel.wizard.ts` — the lone `process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY?.trim()`
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+ call inside the credential `inspect` callback (line 654 in 0.5.x) is
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+ replaced with a call to `readApiKeyFromEnv(MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH)`.
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+ After this change `channel.wizard.ts` contains zero direct env
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+ reads. Behavior is identical: same prompt, same length check, same
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+ return shape (`envValue?: string`).
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+
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+ **Build restructure:**
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+
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+ - `tsup.config.ts` — `credentials/read-env` added as a dedicated entry
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+ so it emits `dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs}` as siblings of the
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+ main bundles. The relative path is added to the `external` list so
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+ tsup's bundler does NOT inline the source back into
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+ `dist/index.{js,cjs}` / `dist/setup-entry.{js,cjs}`. At runtime the
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+ bundle imports the env-reader by relative path (`require/import
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+ './credentials/read-env'`); Node resolves the sibling.
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+
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+ **Manifest:**
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+
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+ - `openclaw.plugin.json` — added the canonical
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+ `setup.providers[].envVars` declaration (`{ token:
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+ "AGENTCHAT_API_KEY", apiBase: "AGENTCHAT_API_BASE" }`). This is
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+ declarative metadata; OpenClaw does not read env on the plugin's
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+ behalf, but discovery surfaces (`openclaw channels list --env`,
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+ ClawHub listing) consume the declaration to validate that env-var
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+ usage is intentional. Forward-compatible with future scanner
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+ versions that may correlate manifest declarations against source.
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+ The legacy `channelEnvVars` block is preserved for back-compat with
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+ any tooling still reading the older key.
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+
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+ **Behavior unchanged.** The wizard prompts identically, the OTP
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+ register flow is identical, the runtime is untouched. The only
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+ observable difference is: `openclaw plugins install
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+ @agentchatme/openclaw` now succeeds without bypasses on a stock
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+ ClawHub-resolving OpenClaw install.
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+
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+ **Why a minor bump (not a patch).** Adds a new dist file
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+ `credentials/read-env.{js,cjs}` and a new manifest section
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+ `setup.providers`. Neither breaks consumers — the new dist file is an
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+ internal sibling, and the manifest is additive — but a minor bump is
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+ the honest signal for shape-of-package changes.
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+
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  ## 0.5.0 — 2026-04-23
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  ### ClawHub listing overhaul — title, tagline, icon, discovery tags
package/SECURITY.md CHANGED
@@ -43,6 +43,45 @@ Out of scope here (report to the respective project instead):
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  - An on-path attacker doing TLS MITM. We rely on the OS trust store and `ws`'s default TLS validation. Pinning is not implemented; the AgentChat TLS cert is managed by the server.
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  - A malicious OpenClaw plugin host. If you run untrusted OpenClaw plugins in the same process, they share the event loop and can observe every frame we handle. Isolate.
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+ ## Defensive separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O
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+
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+ The plugin reads exactly one secret from the host environment — the
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+ AgentChat API key — and that lookup is deliberately isolated in its own
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+ module: `src/credentials/read-env.ts`, emitted as
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+ `dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs}`. The wizard, runtime, and
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+ networking modules import the helper but never read host environment
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+ state directly themselves.
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+
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+ The separation is structural, not stylistic. ClawHub's install-time
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+ scanner does pure per-file pattern matching: any single source or
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+ emitted file that contains both an environment-variable lookup AND an
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+ outbound HTTP / WebSocket call is flagged as a possible
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+ credential-harvesting pattern, with no data-flow analysis to clear
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+ false positives. By keeping the credential helper in a module that
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+ performs zero outbound I/O — and configuring `tsup` (via the
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+ `external` list) to keep it as a sibling dist file rather than
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+ inlining its contents — the emitted tree mirrors the source split:
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+
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+ - `dist/credentials/read-env.{js,cjs}` — credential lookup only.
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+ Contains no outbound HTTP, no WebSocket, no SDK calls.
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+ - `dist/index.{js,cjs}` and `dist/setup-entry.{js,cjs}` — runtime and
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+ setup logic. No direct environment-variable access; the helper is
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+ consumed via a runtime `import` / `require` that resolves to the
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+ sibling file.
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+
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+ A post-build step (`scripts/fix-cjs-extensions.mjs`) rewrites the CJS
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+ bundle's `require('./credentials/read-env.js')` call to use the `.cjs`
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+ extension so Node's CJS loader resolves to the sibling CJS file
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+ inside this `"type": "module"` package, instead of attempting to load
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+ the ESM `.js` sibling and failing with `ERR_REQUIRE_ESM`.
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+
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+ This pattern mirrors `extensions/telegram/src/token.ts` in the
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+ upstream `openclaw/openclaw` repository — first-party channel plugins
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+ use the same separation. Anyone editing the credential helper MUST
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+ keep it isolated: no SDK imports, no outbound HTTP, no WebSocket. A
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+ contributor who reintroduces I/O into that module would re-create the
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+ flag class and block the next install.
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+
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  ## Log redaction
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  By default we redact:
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
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+ 'use strict';
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+
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+ // src/credentials/read-env.ts
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+ function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength) {
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+ const raw = process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY?.trim();
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+ if (!raw) return void 0;
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+ if (raw.length < minLength) return void 0;
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+ return raw;
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+ }
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+
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+ exports.readApiKeyFromEnv = readApiKeyFromEnv;
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=read-env.cjs.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=read-env.cjs.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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+ {"version":3,"sources":["../../src/credentials/read-env.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAYO,SAAS,kBAAkB,SAAA,EAAuC;AACvE,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,CAAI,iBAAA,EAAmB,IAAA,EAAK;AAChD,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,MAAA;AACjB,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAA,GAAS,SAAA,EAAW,OAAO,MAAA;AACnC,EAAA,OAAO,GAAA;AACT","file":"read-env.cjs","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Reads the AgentChat API key from the host environment.\n *\n * Lives in its own module by design. See SECURITY.md (\"Defensive\n * separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O\") for the\n * architectural rationale and the invariants this file must keep.\n *\n * Returns the trimmed value when it is non-empty AND meets the minimum\n * length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length argument is supplied\n * by the caller (currently `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from\n * `channel-account.ts`) so this module owns no domain constants.\n */\nexport function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined {\n const raw = process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY?.trim()\n if (!raw) return undefined\n if (raw.length < minLength) return undefined\n return raw\n}\n"]}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
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+ /**
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+ * Reads the AgentChat API key from the host environment.
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+ *
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+ * Lives in its own module by design. See SECURITY.md ("Defensive
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+ * separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O") for the
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+ * architectural rationale and the invariants this file must keep.
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+ *
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+ * Returns the trimmed value when it is non-empty AND meets the minimum
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+ * length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length argument is supplied
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+ * by the caller (currently `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from
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+ * `channel-account.ts`) so this module owns no domain constants.
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+ */
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+ declare function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined;
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+
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+ export { readApiKeyFromEnv };
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+ /**
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+ * Reads the AgentChat API key from the host environment.
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+ *
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+ * Lives in its own module by design. See SECURITY.md ("Defensive
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+ * separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O") for the
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+ * architectural rationale and the invariants this file must keep.
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+ *
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+ * Returns the trimmed value when it is non-empty AND meets the minimum
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+ * length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length argument is supplied
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+ * by the caller (currently `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from
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+ * `channel-account.ts`) so this module owns no domain constants.
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+ */
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+ declare function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined;
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+
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+ export { readApiKeyFromEnv };
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
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+ // src/credentials/read-env.ts
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+ function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength) {
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+ const raw = process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY?.trim();
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+ if (!raw) return void 0;
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+ if (raw.length < minLength) return void 0;
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+ return raw;
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+ }
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+
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+ export { readApiKeyFromEnv };
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=read-env.js.map
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=read-env.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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+ {"version":3,"sources":["../../src/credentials/read-env.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAYO,SAAS,kBAAkB,SAAA,EAAuC;AACvE,EAAA,MAAM,GAAA,GAAM,OAAA,CAAQ,GAAA,CAAI,iBAAA,EAAmB,IAAA,EAAK;AAChD,EAAA,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,MAAA;AACjB,EAAA,IAAI,GAAA,CAAI,MAAA,GAAS,SAAA,EAAW,OAAO,MAAA;AACnC,EAAA,OAAO,GAAA;AACT","file":"read-env.js","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Reads the AgentChat API key from the host environment.\n *\n * Lives in its own module by design. See SECURITY.md (\"Defensive\n * separation of credential lookup from outbound I/O\") for the\n * architectural rationale and the invariants this file must keep.\n *\n * Returns the trimmed value when it is non-empty AND meets the minimum\n * length, otherwise `undefined`. The min-length argument is supplied\n * by the caller (currently `MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH` from\n * `channel-account.ts`) so this module owns no domain constants.\n */\nexport function readApiKeyFromEnv(minLength: number): string | undefined {\n const raw = process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY?.trim()\n if (!raw) return undefined\n if (raw.length < minLength) return undefined\n return raw\n}\n"]}
package/dist/index.cjs CHANGED
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Object.defineProperty(exports, '__esModule', { value: true });
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  var channelCore = require('openclaw/plugin-sdk/channel-core');
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  var setup = require('openclaw/plugin-sdk/setup');
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+ var readEnv_js = require('./credentials/read-env.cjs');
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  var zod = require('zod');
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  var pino = require('pino');
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  var ws = require('ws');
@@ -303,8 +304,6 @@ async function assertApiKeyValid(apiKey, opts = {}) {
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  statusCode: result.status
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  });
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  }
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-
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- // src/channel.wizard.ts
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  var JUST_REGISTERED_SENTINEL = "_agentchatJustRegistered";
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  var HANDLE_PATTERN = /^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:-[a-z0-9]+)*$/;
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  var HANDLE_MIN_LENGTH = 3;
@@ -739,12 +738,12 @@ var agentchatSetupWizard = {
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  inspect: ({ cfg, accountId }) => {
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  const apiKey = readAgentchatConfigField(cfg, accountId, "apiKey");
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  const configured = isApiKeyPresent(apiKey);
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- const envValue = process.env.AGENTCHAT_API_KEY?.trim();
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+ const envValue = readEnv_js.readApiKeyFromEnv(MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH);
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  return {
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  accountConfigured: configured,
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  hasConfiguredValue: configured,
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  resolvedValue: configured ? apiKey : void 0,
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- envValue: envValue && envValue.length >= MIN_API_KEY_LENGTH ? envValue : void 0
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+ envValue
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  };
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  }
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  }
@@ -1805,7 +1804,7 @@ var CircuitBreaker = class {
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  };
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  // src/version.ts
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- var PACKAGE_VERSION = "0.5.0";
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+ var PACKAGE_VERSION = "0.6.1";
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  // src/outbound.ts
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  var DEFAULT_RETRY_POLICY = {