@agent-watch-ai/edge 0.3.1 → 0.4.0

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Files changed (67) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +46 -0
  2. package/README.md +7 -3
  3. package/SECURITY.md +7 -4
  4. package/dist/cli/constants/cli.constants.d.ts +2 -0
  5. package/dist/cli/constants/cli.constants.js +3 -1
  6. package/dist/cli/doctor.js +13 -2
  7. package/dist/cli/setup.js +138 -29
  8. package/dist/cli/toggle.js +5 -1
  9. package/dist/cli/types/cli.types.d.ts +6 -0
  10. package/dist/cli/uninstall.js +1 -1
  11. package/dist/cli.js +14 -3
  12. package/dist/config/config-store.d.ts +1 -1
  13. package/dist/config/config-store.js +1 -1
  14. package/dist/config/constants/config.constants.d.ts +4 -1
  15. package/dist/config/constants/config.constants.js +7 -2
  16. package/dist/config/schemas/config.schema.d.ts +110 -0
  17. package/dist/config/schemas/config.schema.js +12 -3
  18. package/dist/credentials/constants/credentials.constants.d.ts +8 -0
  19. package/dist/credentials/constants/credentials.constants.js +9 -1
  20. package/dist/credentials/credential-status.js +8 -4
  21. package/dist/credentials/credentials.d.ts +16 -2
  22. package/dist/credentials/credentials.js +28 -3
  23. package/dist/credentials/device-api.d.ts +10 -1
  24. package/dist/credentials/device-api.js +12 -1
  25. package/dist/credentials/identity.d.ts +12 -1
  26. package/dist/credentials/identity.js +12 -1
  27. package/dist/credentials/migration.d.ts +1 -1
  28. package/dist/credentials/migration.js +1 -1
  29. package/dist/credentials/sign-in.d.ts +14 -1
  30. package/dist/credentials/sign-in.js +24 -5
  31. package/dist/credentials/types/credentials.types.d.ts +12 -1
  32. package/dist/enforcement/decision-client.js +2 -1
  33. package/dist/enforcement/enforcement.js +7 -5
  34. package/dist/enforcement/types/enforcement.types.d.ts +2 -2
  35. package/dist/pipeline/constants/pipeline.constants.d.ts +3 -0
  36. package/dist/pipeline/constants/pipeline.constants.js +3 -0
  37. package/dist/pipeline/hook-pipeline.js +56 -7
  38. package/dist/privacy/product-capture.js +2 -0
  39. package/dist/providers/codex/codex.otel.d.ts +12 -1
  40. package/dist/providers/codex/codex.otel.js +61 -11
  41. package/dist/providers/codex/constants/codex.otel.constants.d.ts +5 -0
  42. package/dist/providers/codex/constants/codex.otel.constants.js +5 -0
  43. package/dist/providers/constants/provider.constants.d.ts +8 -0
  44. package/dist/providers/constants/provider.constants.js +8 -0
  45. package/dist/providers/cursor/constants/cursor.constants.d.ts +2 -0
  46. package/dist/providers/cursor/constants/cursor.constants.js +2 -0
  47. package/dist/providers/cursor/cursor.adapter.js +79 -3
  48. package/dist/providers/gemini/constants/gemini.otel.constants.d.ts +6 -0
  49. package/dist/providers/gemini/constants/gemini.otel.constants.js +6 -0
  50. package/dist/providers/gemini/gemini.otel.d.ts +11 -1
  51. package/dist/providers/gemini/gemini.otel.js +52 -12
  52. package/dist/providers/shared/bearer-rewrite.d.ts +19 -0
  53. package/dist/providers/shared/bearer-rewrite.js +46 -0
  54. package/dist/providers/shared/constants/tooling.constants.d.ts +6 -0
  55. package/dist/providers/shared/constants/tooling.constants.js +6 -0
  56. package/dist/providers/shared/tooling.d.ts +28 -0
  57. package/dist/providers/shared/tooling.js +52 -1
  58. package/dist/providers/types/provider.types.d.ts +24 -0
  59. package/dist/storage/atomic-file.d.ts +14 -0
  60. package/dist/storage/atomic-file.js +19 -0
  61. package/dist/storage/constants/storage.constants.d.ts +2 -0
  62. package/dist/storage/constants/storage.constants.js +2 -0
  63. package/dist/turns/work-checkout.d.ts +5 -3
  64. package/dist/turns/work-checkout.js +46 -12
  65. package/docs/DATA_HANDLING.md +11 -4
  66. package/docs/ENTERPRISE_DEPLOYMENT.md +19 -4
  67. package/package.json +1 -1
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
1
1
  import path from 'node:path';
2
2
  import { asRecord, firstString } from '../../core/object.js';
3
+ import { sanitizeText } from '../../privacy/sanitizer.js';
3
4
  import { sha256Hex } from '../../events/event-id.js';
4
- import { COMMAND_KEYS, FILE_EDIT_TOOLS, FILE_PATH_KEYS, FILE_READ_TOOLS, MCP_TOOL_PREFIX, MCP_TOOL_SEPARATOR, SHELL_TOOLS } from './constants/tooling.constants.js';
5
+ import { COMMAND_KEYS, FILE_EDIT_TOOLS, FILE_PATH_KEYS, FILE_READ_TOOLS, COMMAND_HEAD, MAX_TOOL_KEY_LENGTH, MCP_FOLDED_KEY, MCP_TOOL_PREFIX, MCP_TOOL_SEPARATOR, SHELL_TOOLS } from './constants/tooling.constants.js';
5
6
  /**
6
7
  * What kind of thing a tool call is, whatever the agent calls it.
7
8
  *
@@ -66,6 +67,56 @@ export function parseMcpToolName(toolName) {
66
67
  const parts = toolName.split(MCP_TOOL_SEPARATOR);
67
68
  return { server: parts[1], tool: parts.slice(2).join(MCP_TOOL_SEPARATOR) || undefined };
68
69
  }
70
+ /**
71
+ * The `tools_used` key of an MCP call: `mcp__<server>__<tool>`, no arguments.
72
+ *
73
+ * One builder for every provider so the backend can split the key back apart.
74
+ * Scrubbed and cut at the bridge's bound, because a server can come from a
75
+ * URL host or a command and must never carry a credential into a key.
76
+ *
77
+ * @param server - Server's logical name, host or command base name.
78
+ * @param tool - Tool name on that server.
79
+ * @returns The key.
80
+ */
81
+ export function mcpToolKey(server, tool) {
82
+ return sanitizeText(`${MCP_TOOL_PREFIX}${server}${MCP_TOOL_SEPARATOR}${tool}`).slice(0, MAX_TOOL_KEY_LENGTH);
83
+ }
84
+ /**
85
+ * Fold every `mcp__*` key of a `tools_used` map into `mcp`, keeping the count.
86
+ *
87
+ * @param toolsUsed - Per-tool call counts.
88
+ * @returns The counts with MCP server and tool names withheld.
89
+ */
90
+ export function foldMcpNames(toolsUsed) {
91
+ const folded = {};
92
+ for (const [name, count] of Object.entries(toolsUsed)) {
93
+ const key = name.startsWith(MCP_TOOL_PREFIX) ? MCP_FOLDED_KEY : name;
94
+ folded[key] = (folded[key] ?? 0) + count;
95
+ }
96
+ return folded;
97
+ }
98
+ /**
99
+ * Server name of a Cursor MCP hook that carries no `mcp__` name: the host of a
100
+ * remote endpoint, else the base name of a stdio command (first word, quote-aware).
101
+ *
102
+ * @param url - The remote endpoint, if any.
103
+ * @param command - The stdio command line, if any.
104
+ * @returns The server, or undefined when neither yields one.
105
+ */
106
+ export function mcpServerFromEndpoint(url, command) {
107
+ if (url) {
108
+ try {
109
+ return new URL(url).host || undefined;
110
+ }
111
+ catch {
112
+ return undefined;
113
+ }
114
+ }
115
+ const executable = command ? COMMAND_HEAD.exec(command) : null;
116
+ const head = executable?.[1] ?? executable?.[2] ?? executable?.[3];
117
+ // ponytail: an unquoted path with spaces is ambiguous and splits at the first space; npx/uvx/docker name the launcher, not the server.
118
+ return head ? head.split(/[\\/]/).pop() || undefined : undefined;
119
+ }
69
120
  /**
70
121
  * Length and hash of text, as evidence for content we may not transmit.
71
122
  *
@@ -20,6 +20,23 @@ export interface SetupContext {
20
20
  readonly hookCommand: string;
21
21
  /** What setup has recorded so far; an operation returns the next version. */
22
22
  readonly installState: InstallState;
23
+ /**
24
+ * The bearer an agent's own config may hold (Codex, Gemini): the machine's
25
+ * device access token, which the hook path rewrites as it rotates. Never the
26
+ * install key or the device secret (SPEC R8). Absent writes no header.
27
+ */
28
+ readonly bearer?: string;
29
+ }
30
+ /** What a hook needs to swap the bearer in an agent's config for a newer one. */
31
+ export interface BearerRewriteContext {
32
+ /** The file setup recorded, which a hook's environment may not point at. */
33
+ readonly configPath: string;
34
+ /** Which entries are AgentWatch's to touch. */
35
+ readonly installState: InstallState;
36
+ /** The machine's current access token. */
37
+ readonly bearer: string;
38
+ /** The agent's config file as the caller just read it. */
39
+ readonly raw: string;
23
40
  }
24
41
  export interface SetupOutcome {
25
42
  readonly ok: boolean;
@@ -74,6 +91,13 @@ export interface NativeTelemetryConfigurator {
74
91
  * this and is never reported as held back.
75
92
  */
76
93
  withheldSignals?(config: AgentWatchConfig): readonly OtelSignalName[];
94
+ /**
95
+ * Swap the bearer an earlier `configure` wrote for the current one, touching
96
+ * nothing else, atomically at 0600. For agents that read a literal header
97
+ * once at session start (Codex, Gemini): the hook keeps their file on the
98
+ * live access token so the next session starts with one.
99
+ */
100
+ rewriteBearer?(context: BearerRewriteContext): Promise<boolean>;
77
101
  }
78
102
  export interface AgentProvider {
79
103
  readonly id: string;
@@ -14,6 +14,20 @@
14
14
  * target's.
15
15
  */
16
16
  export declare function writeFileAtomic(filePath: string, contents: string, mode?: number): Promise<void>;
17
+ /**
18
+ * Replace another tool's file only if it still holds what we read.
19
+ *
20
+ * For a write the edge makes while that tool may be running and rewriting the
21
+ * file itself (Codex re-serializes its config.toml): a change since our read is
22
+ * the tool's, and it wins. The window left is the re-read to the rename.
23
+ *
24
+ * @param filePath - The file.
25
+ * @param read - Its contents when the change was computed.
26
+ * @param contents - The new contents.
27
+ * @param mode - Permission bits to force.
28
+ * @returns True when the file was written.
29
+ */
30
+ export declare function writeIfUnchanged(filePath: string, read: string, contents: string, mode: number): Promise<boolean>;
17
31
  /**
18
32
  * Copy a file into the backups directory before we mutate it.
19
33
  *
@@ -38,6 +38,25 @@ export async function writeFileAtomic(filePath, contents, mode) {
38
38
  throw error;
39
39
  }
40
40
  }
41
+ /**
42
+ * Replace another tool's file only if it still holds what we read.
43
+ *
44
+ * For a write the edge makes while that tool may be running and rewriting the
45
+ * file itself (Codex re-serializes its config.toml): a change since our read is
46
+ * the tool's, and it wins. The window left is the re-read to the rename.
47
+ *
48
+ * @param filePath - The file.
49
+ * @param read - Its contents when the change was computed.
50
+ * @param contents - The new contents.
51
+ * @param mode - Permission bits to force.
52
+ * @returns True when the file was written.
53
+ */
54
+ export async function writeIfUnchanged(filePath, read, contents, mode) {
55
+ if ((await fs.readFile(filePath, 'utf8').catch(() => undefined)) !== read)
56
+ return false;
57
+ await writeFileAtomic(filePath, contents, mode);
58
+ return true;
59
+ }
41
60
  /**
42
61
  * Copy a file into the backups directory before we mutate it.
43
62
  *
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ export declare const DATA_DIR_VAR = "AGENTWATCH_DATA_DIR";
13
13
  * wins, so an interactive run is unaffected.
14
14
  */
15
15
  export declare const TOKEN_VAR = "AGENTWATCH_TOKEN";
16
+ /** An admin-issued enrollment code for an unattended setup: never argv, where `ps` reads it (SPEC R4). */
17
+ export declare const ENROLLMENT_CODE_VAR = "AGENTWATCH_ENROLLMENT_CODE";
16
18
  export declare const CONFIG_FILE_NAME = "config.json";
17
19
  export declare const INSTALL_STATE_FILE_NAME = "install-state.json";
18
20
  /** Sub-directories of the data root. */
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ export const DATA_DIR_VAR = 'AGENTWATCH_DATA_DIR';
14
14
  * wins, so an interactive run is unaffected.
15
15
  */
16
16
  export const TOKEN_VAR = 'AGENTWATCH_TOKEN';
17
+ /** An admin-issued enrollment code for an unattended setup: never argv, where `ps` reads it (SPEC R4). */
18
+ export const ENROLLMENT_CODE_VAR = 'AGENTWATCH_ENROLLMENT_CODE';
17
19
  export const CONFIG_FILE_NAME = 'config.json';
18
20
  export const INSTALL_STATE_FILE_NAME = 'install-state.json';
19
21
  /** Sub-directories of the data root. */
@@ -51,9 +51,11 @@ export declare function recordCheckouts(store: TurnStateStore, sessionId: string
51
51
  * Every admitted checkout the turn named is fingerprinted again, all at once,
52
52
  * and compared with its baseline. The turn reports, in this order: the one it
53
53
  * changed most (`changed`); else the session's last changed checkout
54
- * (`carried`); else the one it named most (`referenced`); else the Stop folder's
55
- * own repository, as before this existed (`cwd`). Ties go to the checkout named
56
- * first. Every failure makes a candidate lose, never the summary.
54
+ * (`carried`); else the one it named most (`referenced`); else the Stop
55
+ * folder's own repository, as before this existed (`cwd`). Below `changed`, a
56
+ * checkout is reported only while the turn touched no file or one there. Ties
57
+ * go to the checkout named first. Every failure makes a candidate lose, never
58
+ * the summary.
57
59
  *
58
60
  * @param store - Per-session state store.
59
61
  * @param sessionId - Provider session id.
@@ -87,9 +87,11 @@ export async function recordCheckouts(store, sessionId, event, options) {
87
87
  * Every admitted checkout the turn named is fingerprinted again, all at once,
88
88
  * and compared with its baseline. The turn reports, in this order: the one it
89
89
  * changed most (`changed`); else the session's last changed checkout
90
- * (`carried`); else the one it named most (`referenced`); else the Stop folder's
91
- * own repository, as before this existed (`cwd`). Ties go to the checkout named
92
- * first. Every failure makes a candidate lose, never the summary.
90
+ * (`carried`); else the one it named most (`referenced`); else the Stop
91
+ * folder's own repository, as before this existed (`cwd`). Below `changed`, a
92
+ * checkout is reported only while the turn touched no file or one there. Ties
93
+ * go to the checkout named first. Every failure makes a candidate lose, never
94
+ * the summary.
93
95
  *
94
96
  * @param store - Per-session state store.
95
97
  * @param sessionId - Provider session id.
@@ -137,16 +139,24 @@ export async function resolveWorkCheckout(store, sessionId, records, stopEvent,
137
139
  return reportCheckout({ root: byChange.root, evidence: 'changed', probed: probes.get(byChange.root), changed: changed.get(byChange.root), withhold: false }, tools, options);
138
140
  // Carried only while the folder is still the repository that was
139
141
  // remembered: a directory re-cloned from another remote is not that work.
142
+ // Every rung below `changed` also needs the turn's edits, when it made any,
143
+ // to include one there (AWT-618, AWT-620, AWT-621): a session that changed
144
+ // one checkout and then wrote files elsewhere is not working in it, nor in
145
+ // the one its shell sits in. A turn that edited no file reports as before,
146
+ // whatever it read.
140
147
  const carriedProbe = carried === undefined ? undefined : probes.get(carried);
141
- const stillSame = carriedProbe?.closing !== undefined && repositoryIdentity(carried, carriedProbe.remote).repository === memo?.repository;
148
+ const allows = fileEvidenceAllows(tools);
149
+ const stillSame = carriedProbe?.closing !== undefined
150
+ && repositoryIdentity(carried, carriedProbe.remote).repository === memo?.repository
151
+ && allows(carried);
142
152
  if (stillSame)
143
153
  return reportCheckout({ root: carried, evidence: 'carried', probed: carriedProbe, changed: [], withhold: withheld(carried, carriedProbe.branch) }, tools, options);
144
- const byVotes = best(reportable, (candidate) => candidate.votes + candidate.read.size);
154
+ const byVotes = best(reportable.filter((candidate) => allows(candidate.root)), (candidate) => candidate.votes + candidate.read.size);
145
155
  const votedProbe = byVotes === undefined ? undefined : probes.get(byVotes.root);
146
156
  if (byVotes)
147
157
  return reportCheckout({ root: byVotes.root, evidence: 'referenced', probed: votedProbe, changed: [], withhold: withheld(byVotes.root, votedProbe.branch) }, tools, options);
148
158
  const stopRoot = await checkoutRootOf(options.cwd);
149
- const inherited = stopRoot === undefined ? await inheritedCheckout(store, sessionId, options, tools) : undefined;
159
+ const inherited = stopRoot === undefined ? await inheritedCheckout(store, sessionId, options, tools, allows) : undefined;
150
160
  if (inherited)
151
161
  return inherited;
152
162
  // The Stop folder's own repository is held to the same admission as every
@@ -154,7 +164,7 @@ export async function resolveWorkCheckout(store, sessionId, records, stopEvent,
154
164
  // outside the start folder.
155
165
  // A folder whose checkout cannot be found is not admitted either: git may
156
166
  // still have named a repository there, past what the walk reaches.
157
- if (stopRoot === undefined || !admits(stopRoot))
167
+ if (stopRoot === undefined || !admits(stopRoot) || !allows(stopRoot))
158
168
  return { tools: keepingPathsIn(tools, undefined) };
159
169
  // Enrichment read the folder's branch; a detached review gets its pull
160
170
  // request's (SPEC §3b), withheld by the same rule as any other.
@@ -200,11 +210,12 @@ export async function resolveWorkCheckout(store, sessionId, records, stopEvent,
200
210
  * @param sessionId - Provider session id.
201
211
  * @param options - Tracking options.
202
212
  * @param tools - The turn's tool records.
213
+ * @param allows - The turn's file test (`fileEvidenceAllows`).
203
214
  * @returns The report, or undefined when nothing was inherited or it cannot be read.
204
215
  */
205
- async function inheritedCheckout(store, sessionId, options, tools) {
216
+ async function inheritedCheckout(store, sessionId, options, tools, allows) {
206
217
  const found = await resolveInherited(store, sessionId, admission(options, (await store.readStart(sessionId)) ?? options.cwd, true));
207
- if (!found)
218
+ if (!found || !allows(found.root))
208
219
  return undefined;
209
220
  const probed = await probe(emptyCandidate(found.root, 0));
210
221
  if (!probed.closing)
@@ -331,15 +342,38 @@ function candidatesOf(records, admits) {
331
342
  candidate.votes += 1;
332
343
  continue;
333
344
  }
334
- // Only a completed read or edit is evidence: a failed call names a file it
335
- // may never have touched, and carries no access marker.
336
- if (record.kind !== 'tool' || typeof record.filePath !== 'string' || (record.access !== 'read' && record.access !== 'edit'))
345
+ if (!touchedFile(record))
337
346
  continue;
338
347
  const candidate = at(record.repositoryRoot);
339
348
  candidate?.[record.access === 'read' ? 'read' : 'edited'].add(record.filePath);
340
349
  }
341
350
  return [...byRoot.values()].sort(byFirstSight).slice(0, MAX_TURN_CHECKOUTS);
342
351
  }
352
+ /**
353
+ * Whether a turn's edits let a rung below `changed` report a checkout: the
354
+ * turn edited no file, or one of its edits is in it. Reads decide nothing (a
355
+ * turn running tests in a checkout may read `/tmp/out.txt`), though they still
356
+ * rank the checkouts this admits on the `referenced` rung. A file's root is
357
+ * its innermost checkout, so a worktree nested in that folder does not count.
358
+ *
359
+ * @param tools - The turn's tool records.
360
+ * @returns A test of one canonical checkout root.
361
+ */
362
+ function fileEvidenceAllows(tools) {
363
+ const roots = tools.filter((record) => touchedFile(record) && record.access === 'edit').map((record) => (typeof record.repositoryRoot === 'string' ? canonicalRoot(record.repositoryRoot) : undefined));
364
+ return (root) => roots.length === 0 || roots.includes(root);
365
+ }
366
+ /**
367
+ * Whether a record is a file the turn read or edited. Only a completed read or
368
+ * edit is evidence: a failed call names a file it may never have touched, and
369
+ * carries no access marker.
370
+ *
371
+ * @param record - A turn record.
372
+ * @returns True for a completed read or edit of a file.
373
+ */
374
+ function touchedFile(record) {
375
+ return record.kind === 'tool' && typeof record.filePath === 'string' && (record.access === 'read' || record.access === 'edit');
376
+ }
343
377
  /**
344
378
  * A checkout at the Stop: fingerprint and remote together, then the commit diff
345
379
  * when HEAD moved. A checkout whose directory is gone keeps its baseline's
@@ -162,6 +162,12 @@ prompt evidence hashes the prompt as the agent reported it.
162
162
  transcript tail no longer reaches one, and deleted with the session. Codex and
163
163
  Cursor's SQLite indexes are opened read-only through Node's standard library;
164
164
  Node versions before 22.12 omit those optional title fields.
165
+ - `tools_used`: per-tool call counts. An MCP call is keyed `mcp__<server>__<tool>`
166
+ (the server's name, else a remote endpoint's host:port or a stdio command's base name,
167
+ else `unknown`; never arguments. Cursor keys are cut at 200 characters; every key is
168
+ secret-scrubbed before it is sent). `capture.mcpNames: false`
169
+ folds every MCP key into `mcp`, keeping the count; a repository file can set it
170
+ false, never true. It is metadata, so `toolInput` does not gate it.
165
171
  - `tool_inputs` (only under `toolInput` with consent): per shell or connector (MCP)
166
172
  call, `{tool, command}` or `{tool, server, name, arguments}` with the arguments as
167
173
  JSON text; sensitive argument keys are redacted before that, every string is cut
@@ -419,10 +425,11 @@ Global configuration is stored in `~/.agentwatch/config.json` (0600). The
419
425
  organization install key written by setup (from `--token`, `$AGENTWATCH_TOKEN`
420
426
  or the prompt) is exchanged once through `POST /v1/devices/enroll` for a device
421
427
  credential of this machine's own, and the config records `device: { id, store }`
422
- beside the key. The key stays in the file only because Codex and Gemini still
423
- present it (moving them to short-lived tokens, and the key out of the file, is
424
- AWT-357); the Claude hooks and header helper send the device's access token
425
- and never the key once the device is recorded. The device reference is an id
428
+ beside the key. The key stays in the file to enroll again when the device
429
+ secret expires. The Claude hooks and header helper send the device's access
430
+ token and never the key once the device is recorded; Codex and Gemini get the
431
+ same access token in their own config, rewritten by each hook as it rotates
432
+ (docs/NATIVE_OTLP_TOKENS.md). The device reference is an id
426
433
  derived from the install key's digest and the name of the store that holds the
427
434
  secret. The device secret lives in the macOS Keychain (service
428
435
  `agentwatch-device`), the Secret Service keyring through `secret-tool` (only
@@ -36,11 +36,15 @@ or the Secret Service keyring (Linux with a desktop session). `uninstall` withou
36
36
  `--agent` removes it; a Windows DPAPI blob or the no-keychain fallback file lives
37
37
  in `~/.agentwatch/credentials/` and goes with `--purge` as well.
38
38
 
39
- An MDM rollout that sets `$AGENTWATCH_TOKEN` hands setup the install key as
39
+ The MDM templates in `examples/mdm/` deploy no key: `agentwatch setup
40
+ <enrollment-url> --defer-sign-in` configures the organization, and the machine
41
+ sends nothing until its developer runs `agentwatch setup` and signs in.
42
+
43
+ A legacy MDM rollout that sets `$AGENTWATCH_TOKEN` hands setup the install key as
40
44
  before; the edge exchanges it for a device credential during that setup run, or
41
45
  on the first later run that reaches the backend. The key stays in `config.json`
42
- (0600) beside the device until AWT-357, because Codex and Gemini still present
43
- it; re-running setup with the same key keeps the existing device rather than
46
+ (0600) beside the device, to enroll again when the device secret expires; Codex
47
+ and Gemini get the device's access token, and the key only until the exchange succeeds. Re-running setup with the same key keeps the existing device rather than
44
48
  enrolling a new one. On Windows the exchange happens in setup only. Headless Linux has no keychain: the secret is a 0600 file and
45
49
  `agentwatch doctor` reports the credential check as a warning.
46
50
 
@@ -84,7 +88,18 @@ The npm package itself is never removed by `uninstall`; `npm rm -g
84
88
 
85
89
  ## Release operation
86
90
 
87
- Nothing runs on pushes or PRs. A release starts with a `workflow_dispatch` of
91
+ Nothing runs on PRs or branch pushes. The runtime packages `@agent-watch-ai/otel`
92
+ and `agent-watch-otel` are released together by pushing an `otel-vX.Y.Z` tag on
93
+ `main` (`otel-release.yml`, gated by the `otel-release` environment, trusted
94
+ publishing on npm and PyPI). Before the first tag: on PyPI, change the
95
+ `agent-watch-otel` trusted publisher from `python-release.yml` / `pypi-release`
96
+ to `otel-release.yml` / `otel-release`. npm trusted publishing can only be set
97
+ up on a package that exists, so the first publish uses a short-lived granular
98
+ npm token (read and write on the `@agent-watch-ai` scope, 2FA bypass) stored as
99
+ the `NPM_TOKEN` secret of the `otel-release` environment; then add the npm
100
+ trusted publisher (`otel-release.yml`, `otel-release`), delete the secret
101
+ and revoke the token. The workflow publishes PyPI first, then npm; a rerun skips
102
+ what is already published. The CLI release starts with a `workflow_dispatch` of
88
103
  `release.yml`, which verifies and builds artifacts; locally the same is: run
89
104
  `npm ci`, the test/lint/typecheck/build checks, then `npm run release:artifacts`
90
105
  to create a verified tarball, production dependency SBOM, and `SHA256SUMS`.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@agent-watch-ai/edge",
3
- "version": "0.3.1",
3
+ "version": "0.4.0",
4
4
  "description": "Usage and cost telemetry for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI and Antigravity. No daemon, no proxy.",
5
5
  "license": "MIT",
6
6
  "type": "module",