@agent-score/commerce 1.8.0 → 1.8.1

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts","../src/core.ts","../src/_denial.ts","../src/_response.ts","../src/signer.ts","../src/identity/a2a.ts","../src/identity/ucp.ts","../src/identity/ucp-jwks.ts","../src/identity/policy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export type {\n  AccountVerification,\n  AgentIdentity,\n  AgentMemoryHint,\n  AgentScoreCore,\n  AgentScoreCoreOptions,\n  AssessResult,\n  CreateSessionOnMissing,\n  DenialCode,\n  DenialReason,\n  EvaluateOutcome,\n  OperatorVerification,\n  PolicyCheck,\n  PolicyResult,\n  SignerVerdict,\n  VerifyWalletSignerResult,\n} from './core';\nexport { buildAgentMemoryHint } from './core';\nexport type { PaymentSigner, SignerNetwork } from './signer';\nexport { extractPaymentSigner, readX402PaymentHeader } from './signer';\nexport {\n  FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS,\n  buildContactSupportNextSteps,\n  buildSignerMismatchBody,\n  denialReasonStatus,\n  isFixableDenial,\n  verificationAgentInstructions,\n} from './_denial';\nexport { denialReasonToBody } from './_response';\nexport {\n  buildA2AAgentCard,\n  ucpA2AExtension,\n  UCP_A2A_EXTENSION_URI,\n  type A2AAgentCard,\n  type A2AAgentCardCapabilities,\n  type A2AAgentCardExtension,\n  type A2AAgentCardSignature,\n  type A2AAgentInterface,\n  type A2AAgentProvider,\n  type A2AAgentSkill,\n  type BuildA2AAgentCardInput,\n} from './identity/a2a';\nexport {\n  AGENTSCORE_UCP_CAPABILITY,\n  type AgentScoreGatePolicy,\n  buildUCPProfile,\n  type BuildUCPProfileInput,\n  type MppNetworkEntry,\n  type MppPaymentHandlerInput,\n  mppPaymentHandler,\n  type StripeSptPaymentHandlerInput,\n  stripeSptPaymentHandler,\n  type UCPCapabilityBinding,\n  type UCPPaymentHandlerBinding,\n  type UCPProfile,\n  type UCPProfileBody,\n  type UCPServiceBinding,\n  UCPSigningKey,\n  type X402NetworkEntry,\n  type X402PaymentHandlerInput,\n  x402PaymentHandler,\n} from './identity/ucp';\nexport {\n  buildJWKSResponse,\n  generateUCPSigningKey,\n  type GeneratedUCPKey,\n  type JWKSResponse,\n  type SignUCPProfileOptions,\n  type SignedUCPProfile,\n  signUCPProfile,\n  UCPVerificationError,\n  verifyUCPProfile,\n} from './identity/ucp-jwks';\nexport {\n  type EnforcementMode,\n  type GateResult,\n  type IdentityStatus,\n  type PolicyBlock,\n  buildGateOptionsFromPolicy,\n  runGateWithEnforcement,\n  shippingCountryAllowed,\n  shippingStateAllowed,\n} from './identity/policy';\n","import {\n  AgentScore,\n  InvalidCredentialError,\n  PaymentRequiredError,\n  QuotaExceededError,\n  TimeoutError as SdkTimeoutError,\n  TokenExpiredError,\n} from '@agent-score/sdk';\nimport { isFixableDenial } from './_denial';\nimport { QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS } from './_response';\nimport { normalizeAddress } from './address';\nimport { TTLCache } from './cache';\nimport type { PaymentSigner } from './signer';\n\n// Character-based trim avoids a CodeQL polynomial-redos false positive on\n// `/\\/+$/` patterns that report library-input strings.\nfunction stripTrailingSlashes(s: string): string {\n  let end = s.length;\n  while (end > 0 && s.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47 /* '/' */) end--;\n  return end === s.length ? s : s.slice(0, end);\n}\n\ndeclare const __VERSION__: string;\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Public types (framework-agnostic)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface AgentIdentity {\n  address?: string;\n  operatorToken?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Session metadata returned from `POST /v1/sessions`. Surfaced to the `onBeforeSession`\n * hook so merchants can correlate an AgentScore session with their own resume token\n * (e.g. a pending-order id).\n */\nexport interface SessionMetadata {\n  session_id: string;\n  verify_url: string;\n  poll_secret: string;\n  poll_url: string;\n  expires_at?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for auto-creating a verification session when no identity is present.\n *\n * The static `context` / `productName` options are sent on every session request. For\n * per-request context (e.g. the specific product the agent was trying to buy), pass\n * a `getSessionOptions` callback that returns dynamic values; its return is merged\n * over the static defaults.\n *\n * `onBeforeSession` is a side-effect hook that runs after the session is minted but\n * before the 403 is built. Use it to pre-create a reservation/draft/pending-order\n * row in your DB so agents can resume via a merchant-specific id. Return value is\n * merged into `DenialReason.extra`, so it surfaces in both the default 403 body and\n * in a custom `onDenied` handler.\n */\nexport interface CreateSessionOnMissing<TCtx = unknown> {\n  apiKey: string;\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  context?: string;\n  productName?: string;\n  /** Per-request override of `context` / `productName`. Invoked with the framework context. */\n  getSessionOptions?: (ctx: TCtx) => Promise<{ context?: string; productName?: string }>\n                                  |          { context?: string; productName?: string };\n  /** Side-effect hook that runs after the session is minted. Return value is merged\n   *  into `DenialReason.extra` so custom `onDenied` handlers can include merchant-specific\n   *  fields (e.g. `order_id`) in the 403 response. Hook errors are logged and swallowed —\n   *  a failing side effect should not block the 403 from reaching the agent. */\n  onBeforeSession?: (ctx: TCtx, session: SessionMetadata) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>\n                                                          |          Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentScoreCoreOptions {\n  /** AgentScore API key. Required. */\n  apiKey: string;\n  /** Require KYC verification. */\n  requireKyc?: boolean;\n  /** Require operator to be clear of sanctions. */\n  requireSanctionsClear?: boolean;\n  /** Minimum operator age bracket (18 or 21). */\n  minAge?: number;\n  /** List of blocked jurisdictions (blocklist). */\n  blockedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** List of allowed jurisdictions (allowlist — only these pass). */\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** If true, allow the request through when the API is unreachable. Defaults to false. */\n  failOpen?: boolean;\n  /** How long to cache results, in seconds. Defaults to 300. */\n  cacheSeconds?: number;\n  /** AgentScore API base URL. Defaults to \"https://api.agentscore.sh\". */\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  /** Optional chain to filter scoring to. */\n  chain?: string;\n  /** Prepended to the default User-Agent as `\"{userAgent} (@agent-score/commerce@{version})\"`. Use to attribute API calls to your app. */\n  userAgent?: string;\n  /** When set and no identity is found, create a verification session instead of denying immediately. */\n  createSessionOnMissing?: CreateSessionOnMissing;\n}\n\nexport type DenialCode =\n  | 'wallet_not_trusted'\n  | 'missing_identity'\n  | 'api_error'\n  | 'payment_required'\n  | 'identity_verification_required'\n  // Wallet-signer binding: claimed X-Wallet-Address must resolve to the same operator as\n  // the payment signer; wallet-auth is rejected on rails with no wallet signer.\n  | 'wallet_signer_mismatch'\n  | 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing'\n  // Granular credential-state denials passed through from /v1/assess.\n  // - `token_expired`: revoked + TTL-expired (the API unifies these). The 401 body carries\n  //   an auto-minted session, forwarded into DenialReason for one-shot recovery.\n  // - `invalid_credential`: the token doesn't exist at all (typo, never minted, fabricated).\n  //   No auto-session is minted by the API for this case — agents should switch to a\n  //   different stored token or drop the header to bootstrap a fresh session.\n  | 'token_expired'\n  | 'invalid_credential';\n\n/**\n * Cross-merchant pattern hint emitted on bootstrap denials and session-create responses.\n * LLM-hosted agents should persist this to long-term memory so future AgentScore encounters skip\n * the cold-start session flow. Contents are the pattern, not secrets.\n */\nexport interface AgentMemoryHint {\n  save_for_future_agentscore_gates: true;\n  pattern_summary: string;\n  quickstart: string;\n  identity_check_endpoint: string;\n  list_wallets_endpoint?: string;\n  identity_paths: { wallet: string; operator_token: string };\n  bootstrap: string;\n  do_not_persist_in_memory: string[];\n  persist_in_credential_store: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface DenialReason {\n  code: DenialCode;\n  /** Human-readable explanation. When omitted, `denialReasonToBody` substitutes a per-code default. */\n  message?: string;\n  decision?: string;\n  reasons?: string[];\n  verify_url?: string;\n  session_id?: string;\n  poll_secret?: string;\n  poll_url?: string;\n  agent_instructions?: string;\n  /** Cross-merchant memory hint. Emitted on bootstrap denials only by default. */\n  agent_memory?: AgentMemoryHint;\n  /** Full assess response when the denial came from `/v1/assess`. Lets consumers access fields\n   *  not promoted to first-class DenialReason properties (e.g., `policy_result`). Undefined for\n   *  denials that did not originate from an assess call (missing_identity, api_error,\n   *  payment_required, identity_verification_required). */\n  data?: AssessResult;\n  /** Extra fields returned from the `createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession` hook. Merged\n   *  into the default 403 body; custom `onDenied` handlers can spread these into their own\n   *  response shape (e.g. to include a merchant-minted `order_id`). */\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n  // Wallet-signer-match fields — populated for wallet_signer_mismatch only.\n  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n  /** Operator id resolved from `X-Wallet-Address`. */\n  claimed_operator?: string;\n  /** Operator id the actual payment signer resolves to. `null` when the signer wallet isn't\n   *  linked to any operator (treat as a different identity). */\n  actual_signer_operator?: string | null;\n  /** The wallet the agent claimed via header. Echoed back for self-correction. */\n  expected_signer?: string;\n  /** The wallet that actually signed the payment. */\n  actual_signer?: string;\n  /** Wallets the claimed operator could sign with (if enumerable). Present when non-empty. */\n  linked_wallets?: string[];\n}\n\n/** Operator verification details from the assess response. Mirrors python's\n *  `OperatorVerification` dataclass. */\nexport interface OperatorVerification {\n  level: string;\n  operator_type: string | null;\n  verified_at: string | null;\n}\n\n/** Account-level KYC facts that apply to every operator under the same account.\n *  Populated when the API returns account_verification (post-KYC operator).\n *  Mirrors python's account_verification dict shape. */\nexport interface AccountVerification {\n  kyc_level?: string;\n  sanctions_clear?: boolean;\n  age_bracket?: string;\n  jurisdiction?: string;\n  verified_at?: string | null;\n}\n\n/** A single policy check from the assess response. Mirrors python's `PolicyCheck`. */\nexport interface PolicyCheck {\n  rule: string;\n  passed: boolean;\n  required?: unknown;\n  actual?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Policy evaluation result from the assess response. Mirrors python's `PolicyResult`. */\nexport interface PolicyResult {\n  all_passed: boolean;\n  checks: PolicyCheck[];\n}\n\nexport interface AssessResult {\n  decision: string | null;\n  decision_reasons: string[];\n  identity_method?: string;\n  operator_verification?: OperatorVerification;\n  account_verification?: AccountVerification;\n  resolved_operator?: string | null;\n  /** Wallets linked to the same operator as the resolved identity. Capped at 100 entries\n   *  by the API. Useful for advertising in 402 challenges so wallet-auth agents know which\n   *  alt-signers will satisfy `wallet_signer_mismatch`. */\n  linked_wallets?: string[];\n  verify_url?: string;\n  policy_result?: PolicyResult | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reason a failOpen allow short-circuited an evaluate call due to AgentScore-side\n * infrastructure issues. Surfaced on `EvaluateOutcome` so merchants can log/alert when\n * their gate is running in degraded mode (compliance not actually enforced this request).\n *\n * - `quota_exceeded` — AgentScore returned 429\n * - `api_error` — AgentScore returned 5xx or non-2xx that isn't 429\n * - `network_timeout` — request to /v1/assess timed out or failed at the network layer\n */\nexport type FailOpenInfraReason = 'quota_exceeded' | 'api_error' | 'network_timeout';\n\n/** Per-account assess quota observability, captured from `X-Quota-*` response headers\n *  on the success path. Mirrors the SDK's `QuotaInfo` shape — re-exported from gate state\n *  so merchants can monitor approach-to-cap proactively (warn at 80%, alert at 95%). */\nexport interface GateQuotaInfo {\n  limit: number | null;\n  used: number | null;\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp, or the literal string `\"never\"` for unlimited tiers. */\n  reset: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Outcome from `AgentScoreCore.evaluate()`. Adapters map this to framework-specific responses.\n *\n * - `{ kind: 'allow', data }` — the request passed the policy. `data` is present on a normal\n *   allow; `undefined` when fail-open short-circuited (identity missing, API unreachable,\n *   timeout, or 402 paid-tier required).\n * - When `failOpen: true` and the allow was the result of an AgentScore-side infrastructure\n *   failure (429/5xx/timeout), the result also carries `degraded: true` + `infraReason` so\n *   merchants can alert/log without parsing console output.\n * - `quota` propagates the SDK's per-request quota observability when the API emits the\n *   `X-Quota-*` headers. Optional; absent on Enterprise / unlimited tiers.\n * - `{ kind: 'deny', reason }` — the request was denied. Adapters should render a 403 with the\n *   reason, or invoke the caller's custom denial handler.\n */\nexport type EvaluateOutcome =\n  | { kind: 'allow'; data?: AssessResult; degraded?: boolean; infraReason?: FailOpenInfraReason; quota?: GateQuotaInfo }\n  | { kind: 'deny'; reason: DenialReason };\n\nexport interface CaptureWalletOptions {\n  /** Operator credential (`opc_...`) that the agent authenticated with. */\n  operatorToken: string;\n  /** Signer wallet recovered from the payment payload. */\n  walletAddress: string;\n  /** Key-derivation family — `\"evm\"` for any EVM chain, `\"solana\"` for Solana. */\n  network: 'evm' | 'solana';\n  /** Optional stable key for the logical payment (e.g., payment intent id, tx hash). When the\n   *  same key is seen again for the same (credential, wallet, network), the server no-ops —\n   *  prevents agent retries from inflating transaction_count. */\n  idempotencyKey?: string;\n}\n\n/** Combined wallet-signer verdict surfaced by `getSignerVerdict(c)` — both verdicts come\n *  through the gate's primary `/v1/assess` call (single round trip). `signer_match` describes\n *  the wallet-binding (claimed wallet's operator ≡ signer wallet's operator); `signer_sanctions`\n *  describes the OFAC SDN wallet-address check.\n *\n *  `signer_match` is projected to the gate's camelCase `VerifyWalletSignerResult` shape so\n *  existing `buildSignerMismatchBody(...)` helpers consume it unchanged. `signer_sanctions`\n *  passes through in the API's wire shape (already short and stable). Returned `undefined`\n *  from `getSignerVerdict` when the gate didn't run with a signer (operator-token-only\n *  paths, discovery legs with no payment header). */\nexport interface SignerVerdict {\n  signer_match: VerifyWalletSignerResult | null;\n  signer_sanctions:\n    | { status: 'clear' }\n    | { sanctioned: true; ofac_label: string; sdn_uid: string; listed_at: string | null }\n    | { status: 'unavailable' }\n    | null;\n}\n\nexport type VerifyWalletSignerResult =\n  | { kind: 'pass'; claimedOperator: string | null; signerOperator: string | null }\n  | {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch';\n      claimedOperator: string | null;\n      actualSignerOperator: string | null;\n      expectedSigner: string;\n      actualSigner: string;\n      linkedWallets: string[];\n      /** JSON-encoded action copy (action + steps + user_message). Spread into the 403 body\n       *  verbatim so agents get a concrete recovery path inside the denial response itself. */\n      agentInstructions: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing';\n      claimedWallet: string;\n      agentInstructions: string;\n    };\n\nexport interface AgentScoreCore {\n  /**\n   * Evaluate the request's identity against the configured policy.\n   * @param identity - extracted identity (wallet address and/or operator token)\n   * @param ctx - optional framework-specific context (Hono c, Express req, etc.) passed\n   *   through to `createSessionOnMissing` hooks. Opaque to core.\n   */\n  evaluate(\n    identity: AgentIdentity | undefined,\n    ctx?: unknown,\n    /** Pre-extracted payment signer from the inbound request (the adapter middleware\n     *  extracts it via `extractPaymentSigner`). When provided, the assess call carries\n     *  it and the response includes `signer_match` + `signer_sanctions` verdicts in one\n     *  round trip. */\n    signer?: PaymentSigner | null,\n  ): Promise<EvaluateOutcome>;\n  /** Synchronous read of the cached signer verdicts (signer_match + signer_sanctions)\n   *  populated when the gate's evaluate call was made with a pre-extracted signer. Returns\n   *  `undefined` when the gate didn't run, the request was operator-token-authenticated,\n   *  or no signer was extractable (discovery legs). */\n  getSignerVerdict(claimedAddress: string): SignerVerdict | undefined;\n  /** Report a wallet seen paying under an operator credential. Fire-and-forget; silently\n   *  swallows non-fatal errors because capture is informational, not on the critical path. */\n  captureWallet(options: CaptureWalletOptions): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Internal cache entry for the gate's per-`(identity, policy)` assess result memo.\n *  Distinct from the public `AssessResult` interface (the typed `/v1/assess` response\n *  shape returned to merchants); this carries the cached decision plus the per-signer\n *  wallet-match sub-cache. */\ninterface CachedAssessResult {\n  allow: boolean;\n  decision?: string;\n  reasons?: string[];\n  raw?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the cross-merchant memory hint emitted on bootstrap denials. Base URLs are\n * derived from the gate's AgentScore API base so self-hosted / staging deployments get\n * correct pointers. Contents describe the AgentScore identity substrate in transferable\n * terms; merchant-specific context lives in other `agent_instructions` fields.\n */\n// Canonical production AgentScore API — used as the authoritative source for endpoint pointers\n// emitted to agent memory regardless of how a given merchant configured their gate's baseUrl.\nconst CANONICAL_AGENTSCORE_API = 'https://api.agentscore.sh';\n\n// JSON-encoded action copy emitted on wallet-signer-match denials. Spread into 403 bodies\n// by merchants so agents get a concrete recovery path inside the denial response itself —\n// no discovery-doc round trip required.\nconst WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'resign_or_switch_to_operator_token',\n  steps: [\n    'Preferred: re-submit the payment signed by expected_signer (or any entry in linked_wallets — same-operator wallets are fungible) and retry with the same X-Wallet-Address.',\n    'Alternative: drop X-Wallet-Address and retry with X-Operator-Token. Use a stored opc_... if you have one; otherwise retry this request with NO identity header — the merchant will mint a verification session in the 403 body (verify_url + poll_secret). Share verify_url with the user, poll, receive a fresh opc_...',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'The payment signer resolves to a different operator than X-Wallet-Address. Re-sign from expected_signer or any linked_wallets entry, or switch to X-Operator-Token.',\n});\n\nconst WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'switch_to_operator_token',\n  steps: [\n    'This payment rail (Stripe SPT, card) carries no wallet signature — X-Wallet-Address cannot be verified against the payment.',\n    'Drop X-Wallet-Address and retry with X-Operator-Token. If you do not have a stored opc_..., retry with no identity header to receive a verification session.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Wallet-address identity is only supported on wallet-signing rails (Tempo MPP, x402). On Stripe or card, use X-Operator-Token instead.',\n});\n\n// `invalid_credential` is permanent — the token doesn't exist (typo, never minted, fabricated).\n// Distinct from `token_expired` (which carries an auto-session for one-shot recovery): the\n// API doesn't auto-mint a session here because the client may simply have a different valid\n// token to try. Agents should switch tokens or drop the header to bootstrap a session.\nconst INVALID_CREDENTIAL_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'switch_token_or_restart_session',\n  steps: [\n    'The X-Operator-Token you sent does not match any credential. This is a permanent state — retrying with the same token will keep failing.',\n    'If you have other stored opc_... credentials, retry with one of them.',\n    'Otherwise drop X-Operator-Token and retry with no identity header — the merchant will mint a fresh verification session in the 403 body (verify_url + poll_secret) so the user can re-verify and you can poll for a new operator_token.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'The operator_token is not recognized. Use a different stored token, or restart the verification session flow to mint a new one.',\n});\n\nexport function buildAgentMemoryHint(): AgentMemoryHint {\n  // Memory pointers always point at the canonical production API — merchants must not be\n  // able to redirect the cross-merchant memory surface, since that would be a phishing\n  // vector for the verify URL.\n  const api = CANONICAL_AGENTSCORE_API;\n  return {\n    save_for_future_agentscore_gates: true,\n    pattern_summary:\n      'AgentScore is a cross-merchant identity substrate for agent commerce. Any endpoint that ' +\n      'returns 403 missing_identity / identity_verification_required or 402 challenges referencing AgentScore uses ' +\n      'the same identity system. One KYC works across all AgentScore merchants — no re-verification ' +\n      'per site. Save this pattern (and the endpoints below) to persistent memory so future ' +\n      'AgentScore encounters skip the cold-start session flow.',\n    quickstart: 'https://docs.agentscore.sh/guides/agent-identity',\n    identity_check_endpoint: `${api}/v1/credentials`,\n    identity_paths: {\n      wallet:\n        'If paying from a crypto wallet you have used before on any AgentScore merchant, send ' +\n        '`X-Wallet-Address: 0x...`. Shortest path; no token lifecycle to manage.',\n      operator_token:\n        'For any rail (Stripe SPT, card, or a wallet you have not linked yet), send ' +\n        '`X-Operator-Token: opc_...`. Reusable across merchants until the token expires.',\n    },\n    bootstrap:\n      'If you have neither a linked wallet nor a valid operator_token, follow the session/verify ' +\n      'flow in the per-request `agent_instructions` block. This happens at most once per agent ' +\n      'identity — after first verification, the operator_token and any subsequently used wallet ' +\n      'are reusable everywhere.',\n    do_not_persist_in_memory: ['operator_token', 'poll_secret'],\n    persist_in_credential_store: ['operator_token'],\n  };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Core factory\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport function createAgentScoreCore(options: AgentScoreCoreOptions): AgentScoreCore {\n  if (!options.apiKey) {\n    throw new Error('AgentScore API key is required. Get one at https://agentscore.sh/sign-up');\n  }\n\n  const {\n    apiKey,\n    requireKyc,\n    requireSanctionsClear,\n    minAge,\n    blockedJurisdictions,\n    allowedJurisdictions,\n    failOpen = false,\n    cacheSeconds = 300,\n    baseUrl: rawBaseUrl = 'https://api.agentscore.sh',\n    chain: gateChain,\n    userAgent,\n    createSessionOnMissing,\n  } = options;\n\n  const baseUrl = stripTrailingSlashes(rawBaseUrl);\n  const agentMemoryHint = buildAgentMemoryHint();\n\n  const defaultUa = `@agent-score/commerce@${__VERSION__}`;\n  const userAgentHeader = userAgent ? `${userAgent} (${defaultUa})` : defaultUa;\n\n  // Single shared SDK instance for every API call this gate makes (assess, sessions,\n  // credentials/wallets, telemetry). Connection pooling + typed-error classification +\n  // X-Quota-* header capture all flow through here. The SDK owns the transport layer\n  // (timeouts, retry-on-429); the gate adds policy semantics on top. Pass the\n  // merchant-prefixed UA — SDK appends its own default to produce a chain like\n  // `<merchant-app> (@agent-score/commerce@<v>) (@agent-score/sdk@<v>)`.\n  const sdk = new AgentScore({ apiKey, baseUrl, userAgent: userAgentHeader });\n\n  // createSessionOnMissing can carry its own apiKey + baseUrl (merchants sometimes wire\n  // a session-only key for this hook). Lazily build a separate SDK instance keyed on\n  // (apiKey, baseUrl) so we don't construct a new client per request.\n  const sessionSdkCache = new Map<string, AgentScore>();\n  function getSessionSdk(sessionApiKey: string, sessionBaseUrl?: string): AgentScore {\n    const key = `${sessionApiKey}|${sessionBaseUrl ?? ''}`;\n    let s = sessionSdkCache.get(key);\n    if (!s) {\n      s = new AgentScore({\n        apiKey: sessionApiKey,\n        baseUrl: sessionBaseUrl ?? baseUrl,\n        userAgent: userAgentHeader,\n      });\n      sessionSdkCache.set(key, s);\n    }\n    return s;\n  }\n\n  const cache = new TTLCache<CachedAssessResult>(cacheSeconds * 1000);\n\n  // Mint a verification session via /v1/sessions and return the resulting\n  // identity_verification_required DenialReason — or undefined if the mint failed (network\n  // error, non-2xx, missing fields). Used for both the missing-identity path and the\n  // fixable-wallet bootstrap path: in both cases the UX is identical (agent polls the\n  // returned poll_url until it gets a fresh opc_... and retries).\n  async function tryMintSessionDenial(ctx: unknown): Promise<DenialReason | undefined> {\n    if (!createSessionOnMissing) return undefined;\n    try {\n      const sessionBody: { context?: string; product_name?: string } = {};\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.context != null) sessionBody.context = createSessionOnMissing.context;\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.productName != null) sessionBody.product_name = createSessionOnMissing.productName;\n\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions && ctx !== undefined) {\n        try {\n          const dynamic = await createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions(ctx);\n          if (dynamic?.context != null) sessionBody.context = dynamic.context;\n          if (dynamic?.productName != null) sessionBody.product_name = dynamic.productName;\n        } catch (err) {\n          console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions hook failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // createSessionOnMissing.apiKey may differ from the gate's apiKey (e.g. merchant\n      // wires a session-only key for this hook). Build a per-config SDK lazily.\n      const sessionSdk = getSessionSdk(createSessionOnMissing.apiKey, createSessionOnMissing.baseUrl);\n      const data = (await sessionSdk.createSession({\n        ...(sessionBody.context !== undefined ? { context: sessionBody.context } : {}),\n        ...(sessionBody.product_name !== undefined ? { product_name: sessionBody.product_name } : {}),\n      })) as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n      // Validate required fields before trusting the response. A misbehaving (or mocked-wrong)\n      // API could 200 without session_id/poll_secret/verify_url, which would propagate\n      // `undefined` into the 403 body and leave the agent stuck — treat as session-create\n      // failure and fall back to the caller's bare denial.\n      if (\n        typeof data.session_id !== 'string' ||\n        typeof data.poll_secret !== 'string' ||\n        typeof data.verify_url !== 'string'\n      ) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/sessions returned 200 without required fields — falling back to bare denial');\n        return undefined;\n      }\n\n      // Run onBeforeSession side-effect hook. Errors are swallowed — a failing DB write\n      // (e.g. can't insert pending order) should not block the 403.\n      let extra: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession && ctx !== undefined) {\n        try {\n          const sessionMeta = {\n            session_id: data.session_id as string,\n            verify_url: data.verify_url as string,\n            poll_secret: data.poll_secret as string,\n            poll_url: data.poll_url as string,\n            expires_at: data.expires_at as string | undefined,\n          };\n          const result = await createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession(ctx, sessionMeta);\n          if (result && typeof result === 'object') extra = result;\n        } catch (err) {\n          console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession hook failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // The API emits `next_steps` (structured object) on /v1/sessions success. Stringify it\n      // into the gate's `agent_instructions` contract so merchants get the same JSON-encoded\n      // {action, steps, user_message} envelope as every other gate-emitted denial.\n      const apiNextSteps = data.next_steps as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      return {\n        code: 'identity_verification_required',\n        verify_url: data.verify_url as string,\n        session_id: data.session_id as string,\n        poll_secret: data.poll_secret as string,\n        poll_url: data.poll_url as string | undefined,\n        agent_instructions: apiNextSteps ? JSON.stringify(apiNextSteps) : undefined,\n        agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n        ...(extra && { extra }),\n      };\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Session-mint failed (network, /v1/sessions returned non-2xx, body parse error,\n      // onBeforeSession threw inside the inner try). Caller falls back to a bare denial —\n      // agents still get a 403 with a probe-strategy hint. Log loudly so a persistent\n      // /v1/sessions outage isn't masked.\n      console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing path failed — falling back to bare denial:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function evaluate(\n    identity: AgentIdentity | undefined,\n    ctx?: unknown,\n    signer?: PaymentSigner | null,\n  ): Promise<EvaluateOutcome> {\n    // Treat \"returned identity object with no usable fields\" the same as \"no identity at all\" —\n    // otherwise a misbehaving custom extractIdentity would send an empty body to /v1/assess.\n    if (!identity || (!identity.address && !identity.operatorToken)) {\n      // failOpen short-circuits BEFORE the session mint. This branch isn't an infra failure\n      // (no AgentScore call has been made yet) so we don't mark the gate state as degraded —\n      // missing identity + failOpen is the explicit opt-in pass-through behavior, not a\n      // graceful-degradation event. Merchants who need identity-or-deny on a failOpen gate\n      // should add a guard at the handler that checks for X-Wallet-Address / X-Operator-Token\n      // before reading the gate state.\n      if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow' };\n\n      const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n      if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n\n      // Bare missing-identity denial (no session was auto-created). Describe the probe\n      // strategy so agents without memory can recover: try wallet first on signing rails,\n      // fall back to stored opc_..., fall back to session flow (noting that only\n      // auto-session merchants return verify_url + poll data on the retry).\n      const missingIdentityInstructions = JSON.stringify({\n        action: 'probe_identity_then_session',\n        steps: [\n          'If you have a wallet AND this merchant accepts a wallet-signing rail (Tempo MPP or x402 — see openapi.json x-payment-info): send X-Wallet-Address and retry. If the wallet is already linked to an AgentScore operator (via prior SIWE claim or prior captureWallet), this passes in one round trip. If the wallet is unlinked or the account has no KYC, the 403 will include a verify_url — share it with the user to claim the wallet + complete KYC, then retry.',\n          'If step 1 is denied or you already have a stored operator_token (valid + not expired): send X-Operator-Token: opc_... and retry.',\n          'If neither applies: retry with NO identity header. Merchants that auto-create verification sessions (most AgentScore merchants do) return verify_url + session_id + poll_secret in the 403 body — share verify_url with the user, then poll poll_url every 5s with the X-Poll-Secret header until status=verified (the poll returns a one-time operator_token). If the retry returns the same bare 403, this merchant does not support self-service session bootstrapping — direct the user to https://agentscore.sh/sign-up to create an AgentScore identity and mint an operator_token from their dashboard (https://agentscore.sh/dashboard/verify). The user hands the opc_... to you, and you retry with X-Operator-Token.',\n        ],\n        user_message:\n          'Try X-Wallet-Address first if you have a wallet and the merchant accepts Tempo/x402; fall back to a stored X-Operator-Token, then to the session/verify flow described in agent_memory.bootstrap.',\n      });\n      return {\n        kind: 'deny',\n        reason: {\n          code: 'missing_identity',\n          agent_instructions: missingIdentityInstructions,\n          agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    // operator_token is opaque + ASCII-only — lowercasing is safe. Wallet addresses go\n    // through normalizeAddress because Solana base58 is case-sensitive and lowercasing\n    // would corrupt the cache key (a Solana cache miss every time, plus collision risk\n    // with mixed-case variants of the same operator).\n    const cacheKey = identity.operatorToken?.toLowerCase() ?? (identity.address ? normalizeAddress(identity.address) : '');\n\n    const cached = cache.get(cacheKey);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (cached.allow) {\n        const cachedRaw = cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n        const cachedQuota = cachedRaw?.quota as GateQuotaInfo | undefined;\n        return {\n          kind: 'allow',\n          data: cachedRaw as unknown as AssessResult,\n          ...(cachedQuota !== undefined && { quota: cachedQuota }),\n        };\n      }\n      // Fixable compliance denials (kyc_required, kyc_pending, kyc_failed) get the\n      // same UX as missing_identity: mint a fresh verification session, agent polls\n      // until status=verified, gets a fresh opc_..., retries. Unfixable reasons\n      // (sanctions_flagged, age_insufficient, jurisdiction_restricted) keep the bare\n      // wallet_not_trusted denial. `jurisdiction_restricted` is unfixable: the API\n      // only emits it after KYC is verified (the user's KYC'd country is in the\n      // blocked list — re-doing KYC won't change the country).\n      if (isFixableDenial(cached.reasons)) {\n        const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n        if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n      }\n      return {\n        kind: 'deny',\n        reason: {\n          code: 'wallet_not_trusted',\n          decision: cached.decision,\n          reasons: cached.reasons,\n          verify_url: (cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.verify_url as string | undefined,\n          data: cached.raw as AssessResult | undefined,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    const policy: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    if (requireKyc != null) policy.require_kyc = requireKyc;\n    if (requireSanctionsClear != null) policy.require_sanctions_clear = requireSanctionsClear;\n    if (minAge != null) policy.min_age = minAge;\n    if (blockedJurisdictions != null) policy.blocked_jurisdictions = blockedJurisdictions;\n    if (allowedJurisdictions != null) policy.allowed_jurisdictions = allowedJurisdictions;\n\n    let data: Record<string, unknown>;\n    try {\n      // Single SDK call: typed-error subclasses (PaymentRequiredError / TokenExpiredError /\n      // InvalidCredentialError / QuotaExceededError / TimeoutError) flow through the\n      // catch below; success path captures `quota` from X-Quota-* headers automatically.\n      const opts = {\n        chain: gateChain,\n        ...(Object.keys(policy).length > 0 ? { policy: policy as never } : {}),\n        // Pre-extracted payment signer (by the adapter middleware). When present, the API\n        // composes BOTH signer_match (wallet-binding) and signer_sanctions (OFAC SDN wallet\n        // check) verdicts on the response in one round trip. Under\n        // policy.require_sanctions_clear, a signer_sanctions hit flips decision -> deny inline.\n        ...(signer && { signer: { address: signer.address, network: signer.network } }),\n      };\n      // SDK has two overloads — narrow by which identity is set so TS picks the right one.\n      const result = identity.address\n        ? await sdk.assess(identity.address, { ...opts, operatorToken: identity.operatorToken })\n        : await sdk.assess(null, { ...opts, operatorToken: identity.operatorToken! });\n      data = result as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof PaymentRequiredError) {\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'payment_required' } };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof TokenExpiredError) {\n        // SDK extracts the auto-minted session fields onto the error instance — no body\n        // re-parsing needed here.\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: {\n            code: 'token_expired',\n            data: err.details as unknown as AssessResult,\n            ...(err.verifyUrl ? { verify_url: err.verifyUrl } : {}),\n            ...(err.sessionId ? { session_id: err.sessionId } : {}),\n            ...(err.pollSecret ? { poll_secret: err.pollSecret } : {}),\n            ...(err.pollUrl ? { poll_url: err.pollUrl } : {}),\n            ...(err.nextSteps ? { agent_instructions: JSON.stringify(err.nextSteps) } : {}),\n            ...(err.agentMemory ? { agent_memory: err.agentMemory as AgentMemoryHint } : {}),\n          },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof InvalidCredentialError) {\n        // Permanent — no auto-session, agent should switch tokens or restart.\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: {\n            code: 'invalid_credential',\n            agent_instructions: INVALID_CREDENTIAL_INSTRUCTIONS,\n            agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n          },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof QuotaExceededError) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess returned 429 quota_exceeded');\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'quota_exceeded' };\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: { code: 'api_error', agent_instructions: QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof SdkTimeoutError) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess timed out:', err.message);\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'network_timeout' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n      }\n      // Status-based fallbacks for AgentScoreError instances the SDK couldn't classify\n      // into a typed subclass (e.g. 429 with body that lacked error.code, or a fetch\n      // rejection whose .name doesn't match AbortError but whose status code is set).\n      // The real API always emits error.code on 429, so this is purely defensive.\n      const status = (err as { status?: number } | null)?.status;\n      const errName = err instanceof Error ? err.name : '';\n      if (status === 429) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess returned 429 (untyped — defensive)');\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'quota_exceeded' };\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: { code: 'api_error', agent_instructions: QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS },\n        };\n      }\n      if (errName === 'TimeoutError' || errName === 'AbortError') {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess timed out (by Error.name):', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'network_timeout' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n      }\n      // Generic AgentScoreError (rate_limited, 5xx, network_error, body parse, unknown 4xx)\n      // or any non-AgentScoreError unexpected throw — surface as api_error.\n      // Include the SDK-classified error code (when available) so ops/dev see\n      // schema-drift cases like a new 401 error.code rather than a silent 503.\n      const errCode = (err as { code?: string } | null)?.code;\n      const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n      const detail = errCode ? `${errCode}: ${msg}` : msg;\n      console.warn(`[gate] /v1/assess call failed — surfacing as api_error: ${detail}`);\n      if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'api_error' };\n      return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n    }\n\n    const decision = data.decision as string | null | undefined;\n    const decisionReasons = (data.decision_reasons as string[]) ?? [];\n    const allow = decision === 'allow' || decision == null;\n\n    cache.set(cacheKey, { allow, decision: decision ?? undefined, reasons: decisionReasons, raw: data });\n\n    if (allow) {\n      // SDK populates `quota` on the assess response from X-Quota-* headers when the\n      // API emits them. Surface up to the adapter so merchants can monitor approach-to-cap.\n      const quota = data.quota as GateQuotaInfo | undefined;\n      return {\n        kind: 'allow',\n        data: data as unknown as AssessResult,\n        ...(quota !== undefined && { quota }),\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Fixable compliance denials (kyc_required, kyc_pending, kyc_failed) get the\n    // same UX as missing_identity: mint a fresh verification session, agent polls\n    // until status=verified, gets a fresh opc_..., retries. Unfixable reasons\n    // (sanctions_flagged, age_insufficient, jurisdiction_restricted) keep the bare\n    // wallet_not_trusted denial. `jurisdiction_restricted` is unfixable: the API\n    // only emits it after KYC is verified (the user's KYC'd country is in the\n    // blocked list — re-doing KYC won't change the country).\n    if (isFixableDenial(decisionReasons)) {\n      const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n      if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n    }\n\n    return {\n      kind: 'deny',\n      reason: {\n        code: 'wallet_not_trusted',\n        decision: decision ?? undefined,\n        reasons: decisionReasons,\n        verify_url: data.verify_url as string | undefined,\n        data: data as unknown as AssessResult,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  async function captureWallet(options: CaptureWalletOptions): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      await sdk.associateWallet({\n        operatorToken: options.operatorToken,\n        walletAddress: options.walletAddress,\n        network: options.network,\n        ...(options.idempotencyKey ? { idempotencyKey: options.idempotencyKey } : {}),\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Fire-and-forget: don't throw. Log so a persistent capture outage is visible\n      // to merchant ops — otherwise wallet↔operator linkage silently stops.\n      console.warn('[agentscore-commerce] captureWallet failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Project the API's signer_match block onto the gate's VerifyWalletSignerResult shape.\n  // The API authors agent_instructions, claimed/signer operators, and the linked-wallet\n  // set (deny-guarded server-side); the gate just shapes those fields into camelCase.\n  function projectSignerMatch(\n    sm: Record<string, unknown>,\n    claimedNorm: string,\n    signerNorm: string,\n  ): VerifyWalletSignerResult {\n    const kind = sm.kind as string;\n    if (kind === 'pass') {\n      return {\n        kind: 'pass',\n        claimedOperator: (sm.claimed_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        signerOperator: (sm.signer_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      };\n    }\n    if (kind === 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing') {\n      return {\n        kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n        claimedWallet: (sm.claimed_wallet as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm,\n        agentInstructions:\n          (sm.agent_instructions as string | undefined) ?? WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS,\n      };\n    }\n    // Default: wallet_signer_mismatch\n    const linked = sm.linked_wallets;\n    return {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n      claimedOperator: (sm.claimed_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      actualSignerOperator: (sm.signer_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      expectedSigner: (sm.expected_signer as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm,\n      actualSigner: (sm.actual_signer as string | undefined) ?? signerNorm,\n      linkedWallets: Array.isArray(linked)\n        ? (linked as unknown[]).filter((w): w is string => typeof w === 'string')\n        : [],\n      agentInstructions:\n        (sm.agent_instructions as string | undefined) ?? WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Synchronous read of the cached signer verdicts. Adapter middleware extracts the\n   * signer pre-evaluate and the gate's primary /v1/assess call composes both verdicts\n   * (signer_match + signer_sanctions) in one round trip — this getter just reads the\n   * cached response. Returns `undefined` for operator-token-only paths, discovery legs\n   * with no payment credential, or when the gate didn't run.\n   */\n  function getSignerVerdict(claimedAddress: string): SignerVerdict | undefined {\n    const claimedNorm = normalizeAddress(claimedAddress);\n    const cached = cache.get(claimedNorm);\n    if (!cached) return undefined;\n    const raw = cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    if (!raw) return undefined;\n    const rawMatch = raw.signer_match as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    const rawSanctions = raw.signer_sanctions as SignerVerdict['signer_sanctions'] | undefined;\n    if (!rawMatch && !rawSanctions) return undefined;\n    // The API's signer_match has the actual signer wallet baked in (actual_signer); we\n    // didn't track it separately in the cache key (only claimed-side). Pass the API's own\n    // actual_signer as signerNorm so the projected shape is consistent.\n    const signerNorm = (rawMatch?.actual_signer as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm;\n    return {\n      signer_match: rawMatch ? projectSignerMatch(rawMatch, claimedNorm, signerNorm) : null,\n      signer_sanctions: rawSanctions ?? null,\n    };\n  }\n\n  return { evaluate, captureWallet, getSignerVerdict };\n}\n","/**\n * Universal denial helpers shared across every adapter.\n *\n * What lives here:\n *   - `FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS` / `isFixableDenial` — classifier for compliance reasons that can\n *     be resolved by re-completing KYC (vs sanctions / age failures which are permanent).\n *   - `denialReasonStatus` — picks the right HTTP status code per denial code (401 for credential\n *     problems, 503 for transient API errors, 403 for everything else).\n *   - `buildSignerMismatchBody` — produces the standard 403 body for a non-pass signer_match\n *     verdict (read via `getSignerVerdict`).\n *   - `buildContactSupportNextSteps` — standard `next_steps.action: \"contact_support\"` shape for\n *     unfixable compliance denials.\n *   - `verificationAgentInstructions` — the canned `agent_instructions` block for\n *     identity-verification 403s. Vendors can override individual fields.\n *\n * Adapters use `denialReasonStatus` inside their default `onDenied` so vendors get the right\n * status code for free. The body builders are exported from each adapter so vendors who write\n * a custom `onDenied` can compose them without copy-paste.\n */\n\nimport type { DenialReason, VerifyWalletSignerResult } from './core';\n\n/**\n * Compliance denial reasons that can be resolved by re-completing KYC. The API emits these\n * when KYC is missing/pending/failed; the user can re-verify and retry.\n *\n * `jurisdiction_restricted` is NOT in this set — the API only emits it AFTER KYC is verified,\n * meaning the user's KYC'd country is in the merchant's blocked list (or absent from the\n * allowed list). Re-doing KYC won't change the country, so it's permanent. Same shape as\n * `sanctions_flagged` and `age_insufficient` — surface contact_support, don't waste a\n * /v1/sessions mint.\n */\nexport const FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'kyc_required',\n  'kyc_pending',\n  'kyc_failed',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Returns true when a `wallet_not_trusted` denial's reasons are all fixable via KYC\n * re-verification. False when any reason is permanent (sanctions, age, jurisdiction_restricted).\n *\n * Empty reasons returns false — without a known reason we can't promise a fix, so default to\n * the bare denial path (vendors can override via custom onDenied if they want different\n * behavior on empty reasons).\n */\nexport function isFixableDenial(reasons: readonly string[] | undefined): boolean {\n  if (!reasons || reasons.length === 0) return false;\n  return reasons.every((r) => FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS.has(r));\n}\n\n/**\n * The right HTTP status code for a denial. `defaultOnDenied` in every adapter uses this so\n * vendors get correct status codes without writing per-code branches.\n *\n *   - 401 for credential problems the agent can recover from (`token_expired`, `invalid_credential`)\n *   - 503 for transient `api_error`\n *   - 403 for everything else (identity required, compliance fail, signer mismatch, etc.)\n */\nexport function denialReasonStatus(reason: DenialReason): 401 | 403 | 503 {\n  if (reason.code === 'token_expired' || reason.code === 'invalid_credential') return 401;\n  if (reason.code === 'api_error') return 503;\n  return 403;\n}\n\nexport interface SignerMismatchBodyInput {\n  /** Projected signer_match verdict (from `getSignerVerdict(ctx).signer_match`). Only non-pass\n   *  kinds produce a body. */\n  result: VerifyWalletSignerResult;\n  /** Optional override for the human-facing `next_steps.user_message`. */\n  userMessage?: string;\n  /** Optional override for `next_steps.learn_more_url`. Default: AgentScore agent-identity guide. */\n  learnMoreUrl?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Standard 403 body for a non-pass signer-match verdict. Returns null for `pass` so vendors\n * can call it unconditionally:\n *\n *   const verdict = getSignerVerdict(c);\n *   if (verdict?.signer_match) {\n *     const mismatchBody = buildSignerMismatchBody({ result: verdict.signer_match });\n *     if (mismatchBody) return c.json(mismatchBody, 403);\n *   }\n *\n * Body shape mirrors the gate's denial bodies: top-level error.code, all signer-match fields\n * (`claimed_operator`, `actual_signer_operator`, `expected_signer`, `actual_signer`,\n * `linked_wallets`), plus a `next_steps` action describing the recovery path.\n */\nexport function buildSignerMismatchBody(input: SignerMismatchBodyInput): Record<string, unknown> | null {\n  const { result } = input;\n  if (result.kind === 'pass') return null;\n\n  const learnMoreUrl = input.learnMoreUrl ?? 'https://docs.agentscore.sh/guides/agent-identity';\n\n  if (result.kind === 'wallet_signer_mismatch') {\n    const linkedWallets = result.linkedWallets ?? [];\n    const userMessage = input.userMessage ?? (linkedWallets.length > 0\n      ? `Sign the payment with one of the wallets linked to this operator: ${linkedWallets.join(', ')}. Then retry.`\n      : 'Sign the payment with the same wallet you claimed via X-Wallet-Address, or switch to X-Operator-Token for rail-independent identity.');\n    return {\n      error: {\n        code: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n        message:\n          'Payment signer does not match the wallet claimed via X-Wallet-Address. The signer and the claimed wallet must both resolve to the same AgentScore operator.',\n      },\n      claimed_operator: result.claimedOperator,\n      actual_signer_operator: result.actualSignerOperator ?? null,\n      expected_signer: result.expectedSigner,\n      actual_signer: result.actualSigner,\n      linked_wallets: linkedWallets,\n      next_steps: {\n        action: 'regenerate_payment_from_linked_wallet',\n        user_message: userMessage,\n        learn_more_url: learnMoreUrl,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing\n  return {\n    error: {\n      code: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n      message:\n        'Wallet-auth requires a payment rail that carries a wallet signature (Tempo MPP, x402). Stripe SPT and card rails have no wallet signer; switch to X-Operator-Token to use those.',\n    },\n    next_steps: {\n      action: 'switch_to_operator_token',\n      user_message:\n        input.userMessage ??\n        'Drop the X-Wallet-Address header and retry with X-Operator-Token (works on every payment rail).',\n      learn_more_url: learnMoreUrl,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Standard `next_steps` block for unfixable compliance denials (sanctions, age, etc.). Vendors\n * spread this into a 403 body alongside the usual `error`/`reasons` fields.\n *\n *   return c.json({\n *     error: { code: 'compliance_denied', message: '...' },\n *     reasons,\n *     next_steps: buildContactSupportNextSteps('support@example.com'),\n *   }, 403);\n */\nexport function buildContactSupportNextSteps(\n  supportEmail: string,\n  message?: string,\n): { action: 'contact_support'; support_email: string; user_message: string } {\n  return {\n    action: 'contact_support',\n    support_email: supportEmail,\n    user_message:\n      message ??\n      `If you believe this denial is in error, contact support at ${supportEmail} with your order details.`,\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface VerificationAgentInstructionsInput {\n  /** Override the user-facing message. */\n  userAction?: string;\n  /** Replace the generic \"Retry the original merchant request...\" step with a merchant-specific\n   *  one (e.g. \"Retry POST /purchase with X-Operator-Token AND include order_id...\"). When set,\n   *  this REPLACES baseSteps[4] rather than appending — use it instead of `extraSteps[0]` when\n   *  your retry instruction is a refinement of the canonical retry, not an additional step. */\n  retryStep?: string;\n  /** Append additional steps after the retry step. Use this for genuinely additional steps\n   *  (e.g. \"After payment the same call returns 200 with the order\"), not for re-stating the\n   *  retry — use `retryStep` for that. */\n  extraSteps?: string[];\n  /** Override the poll cadence. Default 5 seconds. */\n  pollIntervalSeconds?: number;\n  /** Override how long the agent should keep polling. Default 3600 seconds (1 hour). */\n  timeoutSeconds?: number;\n  /** Optional `order_ttl` note describing how long pending orders survive. */\n  orderTtl?: string;\n  /** Arbitrary additional fields merged into the instructions object. */\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * The canonical `agent_instructions` block for identity-verification 403s. Tells the agent how to\n * present the verify_url, poll for the operator_token, and retry the original request. Universal\n * across every AgentScore-gated merchant — overrides let vendors add merchant-specific steps\n * (e.g. \"include order_id when retrying\").\n */\nexport function verificationAgentInstructions(input: VerificationAgentInstructionsInput = {}): {\n  action: 'poll_for_credential';\n  user_action: string;\n  steps: string[];\n  poll_interval_seconds: number;\n  poll_secret_header: 'X-Poll-Secret';\n  retry_token_header: 'X-Operator-Token';\n  timeout_seconds: number;\n  order_ttl?: string;\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n} {\n  const baseSteps = [\n    'Present the verify_url directly to the user — it is a complete, ready-to-open URL with the session token already embedded (e.g. https://agentscore.sh/verify?session=sess_...). Do NOT modify or construct the URL yourself.',\n    `Immediately begin polling poll_url every ${input.pollIntervalSeconds ?? 5} seconds with header X-Poll-Secret set to poll_secret. The user will complete verification in their browser while you poll in the background.`,\n    'The user visits the URL, signs in, completes identity verification (photo ID + selfie via Stripe Identity), and closes the tab. They do NOT need to copy or paste anything back to you.',\n    'When your poll returns status \"verified\", extract operator_token from the response. This is a one-time value — save it immediately. Subsequent polls return status \"consumed\" without the token.',\n    input.retryStep ?? 'Retry the original merchant request with header X-Operator-Token set to the operator_token value.',\n  ];\n\n  return {\n    action: 'poll_for_credential',\n    user_action:\n      input.userAction ??\n      'The user must visit verify_url to complete identity verification before this request can proceed',\n    steps: input.extraSteps ? [...baseSteps, ...input.extraSteps] : baseSteps,\n    poll_interval_seconds: input.pollIntervalSeconds ?? 5,\n    poll_secret_header: 'X-Poll-Secret',\n    retry_token_header: 'X-Operator-Token',\n    timeout_seconds: input.timeoutSeconds ?? 3600,\n    ...(input.orderTtl ? { order_ttl: input.orderTtl } : {}),\n    ...(input.extra ?? {}),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Shared DenialReason → response body serialization for all adapters.\n *\n * Keeps Hono / Express / Fastify / Web / Next.js defaults aligned — a field added\n * here shows up in every adapter's 403 body automatically, and there's one place\n * to test the marshaling.\n *\n * Body shape: `{ error: { code, message }, ... }` — matches the canonical AgentScore\n * core API response shape (`core/api/src/lib/auth.ts`, `lib/rate-limit.ts`, etc.) and\n * martin-estate's pre-commerce shape, so downstream agents see one consistent\n * `error.code` + `error.message` pair regardless of which layer produced the denial.\n */\n\nimport type { DenialCode, DenialReason } from './core.js';\n\n/**\n * JSON-encoded canonical agent_instructions per denial code. Auto-injected by\n * `denialReasonToBody` when the gate produces a DenialReason without explicit\n * `agent_instructions` so every denial carries a machine-readable next step.\n *\n * Codes covered:\n *  - `wallet_not_trusted` — gate never stamps instructions today (the original gap)\n *  - `payment_required` — gate never stamps; merchant tier misconfig, contact-merchant action\n *  - `identity_verification_required` — fallback when API didn't return next_steps\n *  - `token_expired` — fallback when API didn't return next_steps\n *  - `api_error` — `retry_with_backoff` envelope; sole retry channel (no separate\n *    next_steps block emitted)\n *\n * Codes already stamped explicitly upstream in core.ts (`missing_identity`,\n * `invalid_credential`) and codes that don't go through DenialReason\n * (`wallet_signer_mismatch`, `wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing` — handled by\n * `getSignerVerdict` + `buildSignerMismatchBody`) are not in this map.\n */\nconst WALLET_NOT_TRUSTED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_support',\n  steps: [\n    'The wallet\\'s operator failed an UNFIXABLE compliance check (sanctions, age, or jurisdiction). `reasons` lists which: `sanctions_flagged` / `age_insufficient` / `jurisdiction_restricted`. KYC re-verification won\\'t change the outcome — the policy denial is structural.',\n    'Surface the denial to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact. Do not retry the same merchant request; do not hand the user a verify_url (verification won\\'t fix this code path).',\n    'Fixable compliance reasons (`kyc_required`, `kyc_pending`, `kyc_failed`) do NOT land on this code — the gate auto-mints a verification session for those and returns `identity_verification_required` with poll endpoints, same shape as `missing_identity`. `jurisdiction_restricted` IS in the unfixable bucket because the API only emits it after KYC is verified (the user\\'s KYC\\'d country is in the blocked list — re-doing KYC won\\'t change the country).',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This purchase is denied by the merchant\\'s compliance policy and cannot be resolved by re-verifying. Contact the merchant\\'s support if you believe this is in error.',\n});\n\nconst PAYMENT_REQUIRED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_merchant',\n  steps: [\n    'The merchant\\'s AgentScore account does not have the assess endpoint enabled, so agent identity cannot be evaluated. This is a merchant-side configuration gap — there is no agent-side recovery.',\n    'Contact the merchant (their support channel — typically listed in /llms.txt or the OpenAPI servers metadata) so they can resolve the configuration on their side.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This merchant\\'s identity gate is misconfigured. Contact the merchant — there\\'s nothing to fix on the agent side.',\n});\n\nconst IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'deliver_verify_url_and_poll',\n  steps: [\n    'Share verify_url with the user — they complete identity verification on AgentScore.',\n    'If session_id + poll_secret are present in the body, poll poll_url every 5 seconds with header `X-Poll-Secret: <poll_secret>` until status=verified. The poll returns a one-time operator_token.',\n    'Retry the original request with header `X-Operator-Token: <opc_...>`.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Identity verification is required. Visit verify_url, then poll poll_url for the operator token and retry.',\n});\n\nconst API_ERROR_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'retry_with_backoff',\n  steps: [\n    'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry the request after 5–30 seconds with exponential backoff.',\n    'This is NOT a compliance denial — the user does not need to re-verify their identity. Send the same identity headers (X-Wallet-Address or X-Operator-Token) on retry.',\n    'If the request continues to fail after 3+ retries (~60 seconds total), surface the error to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a moment — this is a transient issue, not a problem with your account.',\n});\n\nexport const QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_merchant',\n  steps: [\n    'AgentScore identity verification is unavailable for this merchant. This is a merchant-side issue and is NOT recoverable via retry.',\n    'Do not retry: the same 503 will be returned until the merchant resolves the issue on their side.',\n    'Surface to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact. The merchant (not the agent) needs to act.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This merchant\\'s identity verification is temporarily unavailable. Try again later, or contact the merchant directly.',\n});\n\nconst TOKEN_EXPIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'deliver_verify_url_and_poll',\n  steps: [\n    'The operator token is expired or revoked. AgentScore auto-mints a fresh verification session — complete it to receive a new opc_...',\n    'Share verify_url with the user, then poll poll_url every 5 seconds with header `X-Poll-Secret: <poll_secret>` until status=verified. The poll returns a fresh one-time operator_token.',\n    'Retry the original request with header `X-Operator-Token: <new_opc_...>`.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Operator token is expired or revoked. A new verification session has been minted — visit verify_url to refresh.',\n});\n\nconst DEFAULT_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS: Partial<Record<DenialCode, string>> = {\n  api_error: API_ERROR_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  wallet_not_trusted: WALLET_NOT_TRUSTED_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  payment_required: PAYMENT_REQUIRED_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  identity_verification_required: IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  token_expired: TOKEN_EXPIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS,\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_MESSAGES: Record<DenialCode, string> = {\n  missing_identity:\n    'No identity provided. Send X-Wallet-Address (wallet) or X-Operator-Token (credential).',\n  identity_verification_required:\n    'Identity verification is required to access this resource. Visit verify_url to complete KYC.',\n  wallet_not_trusted:\n    'The wallet does not meet the merchant compliance policy.',\n  api_error:\n    'AgentScore is unreachable. This is transient — retry in a few seconds.',\n  payment_required:\n    'Assess endpoint not enabled for this merchant. Contact support.',\n  wallet_signer_mismatch:\n    'Payment signer does not match the wallet claimed via X-Wallet-Address. The signer and the claimed wallet must both resolve to the same AgentScore operator.',\n  wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing:\n    'X-Wallet-Address was sent with a rail that has no wallet signature (Stripe SPT / card). Switch to X-Operator-Token, or use a wallet-signing rail (Tempo MPP, x402).',\n  token_expired:\n    'The operator token is expired or revoked. A fresh verification session has been minted — visit verify_url to mint a new token.',\n  invalid_credential:\n    'The operator token is not recognized. Switch to a different stored token, or drop the header to bootstrap a fresh session.',\n};\n\n// Field names the gate claims authority over. Merchant-provided `extra` (from the\n// onBeforeSession hook) MUST NOT override these — a buggy or malicious hook could\n// otherwise replace `verify_url` with a phishing URL or drop agent_instructions.\nconst RESERVED_FIELDS = new Set([\n  'error',\n  'decision',\n  'reasons',\n  'verify_url',\n  'session_id',\n  'poll_secret',\n  'poll_url',\n  'agent_instructions',\n  'agent_memory',\n  'claimed_operator',\n  'actual_signer_operator',\n  'expected_signer',\n  'actual_signer',\n  'linked_wallets',\n]);\n\nexport function denialReasonToBody(reason: DenialReason): Record<string, unknown> {\n  const message = reason.message ?? DEFAULT_MESSAGES[reason.code];\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = { error: { code: reason.code, message } };\n  if (reason.decision) body.decision = reason.decision;\n  if (reason.reasons) body.reasons = reason.reasons;\n  if (reason.verify_url) body.verify_url = reason.verify_url;\n  if (reason.session_id) body.session_id = reason.session_id;\n  if (reason.poll_secret) body.poll_secret = reason.poll_secret;\n  if (reason.poll_url) body.poll_url = reason.poll_url;\n  const instructions = reason.agent_instructions ?? DEFAULT_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS[reason.code];\n  if (instructions) body.agent_instructions = instructions;\n  if (reason.agent_memory) body.agent_memory = reason.agent_memory;\n  if (reason.claimed_operator) body.claimed_operator = reason.claimed_operator;\n  if (reason.code === 'wallet_signer_mismatch') body.actual_signer_operator = reason.actual_signer_operator ?? null;\n  if (reason.expected_signer) body.expected_signer = reason.expected_signer;\n  if (reason.actual_signer) body.actual_signer = reason.actual_signer;\n  if (reason.linked_wallets && reason.linked_wallets.length > 0) body.linked_wallets = reason.linked_wallets;\n  if (reason.extra) {\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(reason.extra)) {\n      if (RESERVED_FIELDS.has(key)) {\n        console.warn(`[gate] onBeforeSession returned reserved field \"${key}\" — ignoring to preserve gate authority`);\n        continue;\n      }\n      body[key] = value;\n    }\n  }\n  return body;\n}\n","/**\n * Payment-signer extraction.\n *\n * Shared between merchants and the gate. Three paths recover a wallet signer:\n *\n *   - **Tempo MPP** — `Authorization: Payment <base64>`; credential `source` is a DID of the\n *     form `did:pkh:eip155:<chain>:<address>`.\n *   - **Solana MPP `solana/charge`** — `Authorization: Payment <base64>`; recovery via either\n *     a `did:pkh:solana:<genesis>:<address>` source (when set by the client) or by decoding\n *     the credential's signed-tx payload and reading the SPL `TransferChecked` authority\n *     (pull mode only — `payload.type === 'transaction'`).\n *   - **x402 EIP-3009 (EVM, e.g. Base/Sepolia)** — `payment-signature` / `x-payment`;\n *     decoded payload carries `payload.authorization.from`.\n *\n * Optional peer deps: `mppx` for MPP credentials, `@solana/kit` for the Solana tx-decode\n * fallback. Both dynamic-imported; merchants who don't accept that rail don't need them.\n */\n\nexport type SignerNetwork = 'evm' | 'solana';\n\nconst TOKEN_PROGRAM = 'TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA';\nconst TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM = 'TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb';\nconst TRANSFER_CHECKED_DISCRIMINATOR = 12;\n\ninterface SolanaKitMinimal {\n  getBase64Codec: () => { encode: (s: string) => Uint8Array };\n  getTransactionDecoder: () => { decode: (b: Uint8Array) => { messageBytes: Uint8Array } };\n  getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder: () => {\n    decode: (b: Uint8Array) => {\n      staticAccounts: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n      instructions: ReadonlyArray<{\n        programAddressIndex: number;\n        accountIndices?: number[];\n        data?: Uint8Array;\n      }>;\n    };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a Solana MPP `solana/charge` credential's `payload.transaction` (base64-encoded\n * signed Solana tx) and return the SPL `TransferChecked` authority — the source-ATA owner,\n * which is the buyer's wallet. Pull mode only (`payload.type === 'transaction'`); push mode\n * (`payload.type === 'signature'`) returns null because recovery would require an RPC fetch.\n */\nasync function extractSolanaSignerFromCredential(credential: unknown): Promise<string | null> {\n  const payload = (credential as { payload?: { transaction?: string; type?: string } }).payload;\n  if (!payload?.transaction || payload.type !== 'transaction') return null;\n\n  const moduleName = '@solana/kit';\n  const kit = (await import(moduleName).catch(() => null)) as SolanaKitMinimal | null;\n  if (!kit?.getBase64Codec || !kit.getTransactionDecoder || !kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const txBytes = kit.getBase64Codec().encode(payload.transaction);\n    const decoded = kit.getTransactionDecoder().decode(txBytes);\n    const message = kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder().decode(decoded.messageBytes);\n\n    // SPL TransferChecked accounts: [source ATA, mint, destination ATA, authority, ...signers].\n    // Returns the FIRST matched authority. For multi-recipient `splits` txs, the buyer\n    // signs ONE tx with N TransferChecked instructions all sharing the same authority,\n    // so first-match is correct; if a tx ever surfaces with mismatched authorities the\n    // first one wins (acceptable since both belong to whoever signed the tx).\n    for (const ix of message.instructions) {\n      const programId = message.staticAccounts[ix.programAddressIndex];\n      if (programId !== TOKEN_PROGRAM && programId !== TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM) continue;\n      const data = ix.data;\n      if (!data || data.length === 0 || data[0] !== TRANSFER_CHECKED_DISCRIMINATOR) continue;\n      const accountIndices = ix.accountIndices ?? [];\n      const authorityIndex = accountIndices[3];\n      if (authorityIndex === undefined) continue;\n      // v0 transactions can carry account indices that resolve via address lookup tables;\n      // staticAccounts only holds the static set. If the index is out of range, the\n      // authority sits in a lookup table we'd need RPC to resolve. Skip cleanly with a\n      // warning rather than returning the wrong address.\n      if (authorityIndex >= message.staticAccounts.length) {\n        console.warn(\n          '[gate] Solana TransferChecked authority resolves through an address lookup table; ' +\n            'signer-match recovery requires the static-account form. Skipping.',\n        );\n        continue;\n      }\n      const authority = message.staticAccounts[authorityIndex];\n      if (authority) return authority;\n    }\n    return null;\n  } catch (err) {\n    console.warn('[gate] Solana credential decode failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface PaymentSigner {\n  /** Recovered wallet address (EVM lowercased; Solana base58 preserved verbatim). */\n  address: string;\n  /** Network family — used by `captureWallet` and downstream cross-chain attribution. */\n  network: SignerNetwork;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recover the signer wallet from the incoming payment credential, including the network\n * family. Returns `null` when no wallet signature is present (e.g. Stripe SPT, card-only\n * payments, or no credential yet).\n *\n * @param request - the inbound `Request`\n * @param x402PaymentHeader - the value of `payment-signature` or `x-payment` header, if any.\n *   Extracted separately because some frameworks (Express) don't expose a web `Request` object.\n */\nexport async function extractPaymentSigner(\n  request: Request,\n  x402PaymentHeader?: string,\n): Promise<PaymentSigner | null> {\n  // MPP — Authorization: Payment <base64>\n  const authHeader = request.headers.get('authorization');\n  if (authHeader) {\n    try {\n      const moduleName = 'mppx';\n      const mppx = (await import(moduleName).catch(() => null)) as {\n        Credential?: {\n          extractPaymentScheme: (h: string) => unknown;\n          fromRequest: (r: Request) => unknown;\n        };\n      } | null;\n      if (mppx?.Credential?.extractPaymentScheme(authHeader)) {\n        const credential = mppx.Credential.fromRequest(request);\n        const source = (credential as { source?: string }).source;\n        const evmMatch = source?.match(/^did:pkh:eip155:\\d+:(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})$/);\n        if (evmMatch) return { address: evmMatch[1]!.toLowerCase(), network: 'evm' };\n        // Solana CAIP-10: did:pkh:solana:<genesis-base58>:<address-base58>\n        const solMatch = source?.match(/^did:pkh:solana:[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44}:([1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44})$/);\n        if (solMatch) return { address: solMatch[1]!, network: 'solana' };\n        // Fallback: source not set by upstream client. Decode the credential's signed-tx\n        // payload to find the SPL TransferChecked authority (= source-ATA owner = buyer\n        // wallet). Pull mode only.\n        const solanaFromTx = await extractSolanaSignerFromCredential(credential);\n        if (solanaFromTx) return { address: solanaFromTx, network: 'solana' };\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] MPP signer extraction failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // x402 — base64 JSON, EIP-3009 only. EVM `payload.authorization.from` is the signer.\n  if (x402PaymentHeader) {\n    try {\n      const decoded = atob(x402PaymentHeader);\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(decoded) as {\n        payload?: { authorization?: { from?: string } };\n      };\n      const from = parsed?.payload?.authorization?.from;\n      if (typeof from === 'string' && /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(from)) {\n        return { address: from.toLowerCase(), network: 'evm' };\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] x402 signer extraction failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Headers-only variant for adapters that don't natively expose a Web Fetch `Request`\n * (Express, Fastify, ASGI-bridged frameworks). Constructs a synthetic Request carrying\n * only the `authorization` header and delegates to {@link extractPaymentSigner}. Works\n * because the MPP and x402 paths only read `request.headers.get('authorization')` and\n * the explicit `x402PaymentHeader` arg — no body, query, or method semantics needed.\n */\nexport async function extractPaymentSignerFromAuth(\n  authHeader: string | null | undefined,\n  x402PaymentHeader?: string,\n): Promise<PaymentSigner | null> {\n  const request = new Request('http://internal.gate/', {\n    headers: authHeader ? { authorization: authHeader } : {},\n  });\n  return extractPaymentSigner(request, x402PaymentHeader);\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the x402 payment header from a `Request`, matching the alternate names merchants might\n * use. Falls back to reading either header directly.\n */\nexport function readX402PaymentHeader(request: Request): string | undefined {\n  return (\n    request.headers.get('payment-signature') ??\n    request.headers.get('x-payment') ??\n    undefined\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * Google A2A (Agent-to-Agent) v1.0 Agent Card builder.\n *\n * Compose the JSON payload for an A2A v1.0 Agent Card per the canonical proto at\n * https://github.com/a2aproject/A2A/blob/main/specification/a2a.proto. Returned object\n * is the unsigned card body — wrap with an A2A `AgentCardSignature` (RFC 7515 JWS)\n * to sign vendor-side before publishing at /.well-known/agent-card.json.\n *\n * Why publish: A2A is a Linux Foundation standard. Signed Agent Cards let any\n * A2A-compatible reader discover an agent's capabilities + protocol bindings without\n * per-platform integration. Per UCP §A2A binding, agents serving UCP via the A2A\n * transport MUST declare the canonical UCP extension URI in `capabilities.extensions[]`\n * so platforms detect UCP support without re-fetching the profile.\n *\n * Spec reference: https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/\n */\n\nconst PROTOCOL_VERSION = '1.0';\nconst DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_BINDING = 'HTTP+JSON';\nconst DEFAULT_INPUT_MODE = 'application/json';\nconst DEFAULT_OUTPUT_MODE = 'application/json';\n\n/** Canonical UCP A2A extension URI — verifiers look for this exact URI in\n *  `capabilities.extensions[]` to detect UCP support on the agent card. Pinned\n *  to the 2026-04-08 spec snapshot. */\nexport const UCP_A2A_EXTENSION_URI = 'https://ucp.dev/2026-04-08/specification/reference';\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.6. Each entry advertises one protocol binding the agent supports.\n *  `supported_interfaces[0]` is the preferred binding (ordered list). */\nexport interface A2AAgentInterface {\n  /** Interface URL (https in production). */\n  url: string;\n  /** Open string — core values are `JSONRPC`, `GRPC`, `HTTP+JSON`. */\n  protocol_binding: string;\n  /** A2A protocol version, e.g. `\"1.0\"`. Distinct from the agent's own version. */\n  protocol_version: string;\n  tenant?: string;\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.2. The org/service that provides the agent. */\nexport interface A2AAgentProvider {\n  url: string;\n  organization: string;\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.5. A distinct capability or function the agent performs.\n *  Lives at the TOP LEVEL of AgentCard (not inside `capabilities`). */\nexport interface A2AAgentSkill {\n  id: string;\n  name: string;\n  description: string;\n  tags: string[];\n  examples?: string[];\n  input_modes?: string[];\n  output_modes?: string[];\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.4. A protocol extension the agent supports.\n *  Lives in `capabilities.extensions[]`. `description` and `required` are\n *  spec-mandated fields, not optional. */\nexport interface A2AAgentCardExtension {\n  uri: string;\n  description: string;\n  required: boolean;\n  params?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/** Build the canonical UCP entry for an A2A agent card's `capabilities.extensions[]`\n *  array.\n *\n *  Per UCP §A2A binding: \"Businesses supporting UCP must advertise the extension and\n *  any optional capabilities in their A2A Agent Card to allow platforms to activate\n *  the extension.\" Pass the `capabilities` map keyed by reverse-DNS service/capability\n *  name (e.g. `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout`), each value a list of `{ version }` records.\n *  Pass `{}` (or omit) when you serve UCP at the discovery layer but have no formal\n *  capability bindings yet.\n *\n *  `required: true` declares the platform must understand UCP to interoperate with\n *  this agent. Default `false`: UCP is offered but not mandatory.\n */\nexport function ucpA2AExtension(\n  capabilities: Record<string, Array<{ version: string }>> = {},\n  options: { required?: boolean } = {},\n): A2AAgentCardExtension {\n  return {\n    uri: UCP_A2A_EXTENSION_URI,\n    description: 'UCP support: this agent serves Universal Commerce Protocol bindings via the A2A transport.',\n    required: options.required ?? false,\n    params: { capabilities },\n  };\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.3. Optional capabilities the agent supports.\n *\n *  Per the canonical proto, `capabilities` declares: streaming, push_notifications,\n *  extensions (the protocol extensions the agent supports), and extended_agent_card.\n *  REST-style endpoint metadata does NOT belong here — A2A uses `supported_interfaces`\n *  on the AgentCard for protocol bindings, and `skills` (top-level) for capability\n *  descriptions. */\nexport interface A2AAgentCardCapabilities {\n  streaming?: boolean;\n  push_notifications?: boolean;\n  extensions?: A2AAgentCardExtension[];\n  extended_agent_card?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.7. JWS signature embedded in an Agent Card.\n *\n *  Multiple signatures MAY be attached to a single card. Verifiers reconstruct the\n *  card body without `signatures` to verify each entry. Format follows RFC 7515 JSON\n *  Web Signature (JWS). */\nexport interface A2AAgentCardSignature {\n  /** Base64url-encoded JSON of the protected JWS header. REQUIRED. */\n  protected: string;\n  /** Base64url-encoded computed signature. REQUIRED. */\n  signature: string;\n  /** Optional unprotected JWS header values. */\n  header?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.1. A2A v1.0 Agent Card body.\n *\n *  Per spec §4.4.7, JWS signatures may be embedded directly in the card via the\n *  `signatures` field; verifiers reconstruct the card body without `signatures` and\n *  verify each entry. Per-vendor identity attestation can also be expressed via a\n *  vendor extension entry inside `capabilities.extensions[]`. */\nexport interface A2AAgentCard {\n  name: string;\n  description: string;\n  /** Ordered; first entry is preferred. */\n  supported_interfaces: A2AAgentInterface[];\n  /** Agent's own version, e.g. `\"1.0.0\"`. Distinct from the A2A protocol version,\n   *  which lives on each `A2AAgentInterface.protocol_version`. */\n  version: string;\n  capabilities: A2AAgentCardCapabilities;\n  default_input_modes: string[];\n  default_output_modes: string[];\n  /** Per spec §4.4.1 (proto field 12, REQUIRED): the agent must declare ≥1 skill.\n   *  The convenience builder `buildA2AAgentCard` enforces non-empty. */\n  skills: A2AAgentSkill[];\n  provider?: A2AAgentProvider;\n  documentation_url?: string;\n  /** Per spec §4.4.1 (proto field 14, optional): URL to an icon for the agent. */\n  icon_url?: string;\n  /** Per spec §4.4.1 (proto field 13, optional) + §4.4.7: JWS signatures embedded\n   *  in the card. Compute over the canonical card body MINUS this field, then attach. */\n  signatures?: A2AAgentCardSignature[];\n  security_schemes?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  security_requirements?: unknown[];\n  /** Vendor-specific extras merged at top level. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface BuildA2AAgentCardInput {\n  /** Agent display name. REQUIRED. */\n  name: string;\n  /** Agent purpose/description. REQUIRED per spec. */\n  description: string;\n  /** The primary interface URL — becomes `supported_interfaces[0].url` (with\n   *  `protocol_binding=HTTP+JSON`, `protocol_version=1.0` by default). For\n   *  multi-binding agents, construct `A2AAgentCard` directly. */\n  url: string;\n  /** Top-level skill declarations — what the agent can do. REQUIRED per spec\n   *  (proto field 12 [field_behavior=REQUIRED]); must have ≥1 entry. */\n  skills: A2AAgentSkill[];\n  /** Agent's own version, e.g. `\"1.0.0\"`. Distinct from the A2A protocol version. */\n  version?: string;\n  /** A2A v1.0 capability extensions. Build the UCP entry with `ucpA2AExtension()`. */\n  extensions?: A2AAgentCardExtension[];\n  /** Capability flag: agent supports streaming responses. */\n  streaming?: boolean;\n  /** Capability flag: agent supports push notifications for async task updates. */\n  push_notifications?: boolean;\n  /** Capability flag: agent serves an extended (more detailed) card when authenticated. */\n  extended_agent_card?: boolean;\n  /** Provider org for the agent. */\n  provider?: A2AAgentProvider;\n  /** URL to additional human-readable documentation. */\n  documentation_url?: string;\n  /** URL to an icon for the agent. */\n  icon_url?: string;\n  /** JWS signatures embedded in the card (per spec §4.4.7). */\n  signatures?: A2AAgentCardSignature[];\n  /** Default input media types (defaults to `[\"application/json\"]`). */\n  default_input_modes?: string[];\n  /** Default output media types (defaults to `[\"application/json\"]`). */\n  default_output_modes?: string[];\n  /** Override the protocol binding for the auto-built primary interface (default `\"HTTP+JSON\"`). */\n  protocol_binding?: string;\n  /** Override the A2A protocol version for the auto-built primary interface (default `\"1.0\"`). */\n  a2a_protocol_version?: string;\n  /** Per-scheme security details (key = scheme name). */\n  security_schemes?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Required security requirements for invoking the agent. */\n  security_requirements?: unknown[];\n  /** Vendor-specific extras merged at the card top level. */\n  extras?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compose an A2A v1.0 Agent Card body per the canonical proto.\n *\n * Returns the UNSIGNED card. To attach identity claims, sign the serialized body\n * as an RFC 7515 JWS (`AgentCardSignature`). Vendors can also add an identity-flavored\n * extension to `capabilities.extensions[]`.\n *\n * The single `url` argument becomes the primary `supported_interfaces[0].url`\n * (with `protocol_binding=HTTP+JSON`, `protocol_version=1.0` by default).\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * import { buildA2AAgentCard, ucpA2AExtension } from '@agent-score/commerce';\n *\n * const card = buildA2AAgentCard({\n *   name: 'Example Merchant Concierge',\n *   description: 'Buy regulated goods via agent payments.',\n *   url: 'https://agents.example.com',\n *   version: '1.0.0',\n *   skills: [\n *     { id: 'purchase', name: 'Purchase', description: 'Buy products via agent payments.', tags: ['commerce', 'payment'] },\n *   ],\n *   extensions: [ucpA2AExtension()],\n * });\n * const signed = await yourJWSSign(card);\n * ```\n */\nexport function buildA2AAgentCard(input: BuildA2AAgentCardInput): A2AAgentCard {\n  if (!input.skills || input.skills.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'buildA2AAgentCard: `skills` MUST be a non-empty list. Per spec §4.4.1 (proto field 12 [field_behavior=REQUIRED]), every Agent Card must declare at least one AgentSkill. Construct A2AAgentCard directly to bypass.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const capabilities: A2AAgentCardCapabilities = {};\n  if (input.streaming !== undefined) capabilities.streaming = input.streaming;\n  if (input.push_notifications !== undefined) capabilities.push_notifications = input.push_notifications;\n  if (input.extensions && input.extensions.length > 0) capabilities.extensions = input.extensions;\n  if (input.extended_agent_card !== undefined) capabilities.extended_agent_card = input.extended_agent_card;\n\n  const primaryInterface: A2AAgentInterface = {\n    url: input.url,\n    protocol_binding: input.protocol_binding ?? DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_BINDING,\n    protocol_version: input.a2a_protocol_version ?? PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n  };\n\n  const card: A2AAgentCard = {\n    name: input.name,\n    description: input.description,\n    supported_interfaces: [primaryInterface],\n    version: input.version ?? '1.0.0',\n    capabilities,\n    default_input_modes: input.default_input_modes ?? [DEFAULT_INPUT_MODE],\n    default_output_modes: input.default_output_modes ?? [DEFAULT_OUTPUT_MODE],\n    skills: input.skills,\n  };\n  if (input.provider !== undefined) card.provider = input.provider;\n  if (input.documentation_url !== undefined) card.documentation_url = input.documentation_url;\n  if (input.icon_url !== undefined) card.icon_url = input.icon_url;\n  if (input.signatures !== undefined && input.signatures.length > 0) card.signatures = input.signatures;\n  if (input.security_schemes !== undefined) card.security_schemes = input.security_schemes;\n  if (input.security_requirements !== undefined) card.security_requirements = input.security_requirements;\n  if (input.extras) {\n    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(input.extras)) {\n      card[k] = v;\n    }\n  }\n  return card;\n}\n","/**\n * UCP (Universal Commerce Protocol) profile builder.\n *\n * Compose the JSON payload published at `/.well-known/ucp` per the UCP spec.\n * Output shape matches the spec example: top-level `{ ucp: {...}, signing_keys: [...] }`\n * envelope, with `services` / `capabilities` / `payment_handlers` as MAPs keyed by\n * reverse-DNS service / capability / handler name.\n *\n * AgentScore identity claims layer over UCP via the `sh.agentscore.identity` capability\n * (vendor-namespaced; UCP doesn't define KYC/sanctions/age/jurisdiction natively). The\n * capability extends `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout` AND `dev.ucp.shopping.cart` (multi-parent,\n * the standard pattern UCP allows for capabilities that compose multiple parents).\n *\n * The unsigned profile body returned here is what merchants publish; pass it through\n * `signUCPProfile` to attach the `agentscore-profile+jws` signature for trust-mode\n * verifiers (vendor extension; UCP itself doesn't mandate profile-body signing).\n *\n * Spec reference: https://ucp.dev/\n */\n\n\n/**\n * UCP per-element shape note: each binding interface (`UCPServiceBinding`,\n * `UCPCapabilityBinding`, `UCPPaymentHandlerBinding`) carries the canonical UCP fields\n * plus arbitrary vendor extras flat on the same object via `[k: string]: unknown`. The\n * python sibling models these as dataclasses with an explicit `extras: dict` field. Both\n * designs offer equivalent guarantees through different mechanisms.\n */\nexport interface UCPSigningKey {\n  /** JWK kid (key id). */\n  kid: string;\n  /** JWK kty (key type) — `EC`, `RSA`, or `OKP`. */\n  kty: string;\n  /** JWK alg (signing algorithm) — `ES256`, `RS256`, or `EdDSA`. */\n  alg?: string;\n  /** JWK use, typically `sig`. */\n  use?: string;\n  /** JWK crv (curve) for EC / OKP keys. */\n  crv?: string;\n  /** JWK x / y / n / e / etc. The full key material; passed through verbatim. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a UCPSigningKey from a public JWK dict (e.g. the `publicJWK` returned by\n * `generateUCPSigningKey()`). Validates required fields and rejects symmetric keys that\n * can't publicly verify a JWS in trust-mode UCP. Mirrors python's\n * `UCPSigningKey.from_jwk(public_jwk)` classmethod via the `UCPSigningKey.fromJWK`\n * static-method-style namespace export below.\n */\nfunction ucpSigningKeyFromJWKImpl(jwk: Record<string, unknown>): UCPSigningKey {\n  if (!jwk || typeof jwk !== 'object') {\n    throw new Error(`UCPSigningKey.fromJWK expected a non-null object; got ${typeof jwk}.`);\n  }\n  if (typeof jwk.kid !== 'string' || !jwk.kid) {\n    throw new Error('UCPSigningKey.fromJWK: JWK missing required field `kid` (or non-string).');\n  }\n  if (typeof jwk.kty !== 'string' || !jwk.kty) {\n    throw new Error('UCPSigningKey.fromJWK: JWK missing required field `kty` (or non-string).');\n  }\n  if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' && jwk.kty !== 'EC' && jwk.kty !== 'RSA') {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UCPSigningKey.fromJWK: kty=${JSON.stringify(jwk.kty)} is not a supported asymmetric key type (expected OKP, EC, or RSA). Symmetric \\`oct\\` keys are rejected because they cannot publicly verify a JWS in the trust-mode UCP flow.`,\n    );\n  }\n  if ((jwk.kty === 'EC' || jwk.kty === 'OKP') && (typeof jwk.crv !== 'string' || !jwk.crv)) {\n    throw new Error(`UCPSigningKey.fromJWK: kty=${jwk.kty} requires a non-empty \\`crv\\` field (e.g., \"P-256\" for EC, \"Ed25519\" for OKP).`);\n  }\n  return jwk as unknown as UCPSigningKey;\n}\n\n/** Static-method-style namespace on the `UCPSigningKey` interface — mirrors python's\n *  `UCPSigningKey.from_jwk(jwk)` classmethod. Use as `UCPSigningKey.fromJWK(jwk)`. */\nexport const UCPSigningKey = {\n  fromJWK: ucpSigningKeyFromJWKImpl,\n};\n\n/** Transport binding — keyed under a service name (e.g., `dev.ucp.shopping`). */\nexport interface UCPServiceBinding {\n  /** Spec version, YYYY-MM-DD per UCP convention. REQUIRED. */\n  version: string;\n  /** URL to human-readable specification. REQUIRED. */\n  spec: string;\n  /** Transport — `rest` / `mcp` / `a2a` / `embedded`. REQUIRED. */\n  transport: 'rest' | 'mcp' | 'a2a' | 'embedded';\n  /** Endpoint URL — required for rest/mcp; A2A points at the agent-card.json URL. */\n  endpoint?: string;\n  /** URL to JSON Schema — required for rest/mcp/embedded per spec. */\n  schema?: string;\n  /** Optional id for entity-instance disambiguation. */\n  id?: string;\n  /** Entity-specific config. */\n  config?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Capability binding — keyed under a capability name (e.g., `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout`). */\nexport interface UCPCapabilityBinding {\n  /** Capability version, YYYY-MM-DD. REQUIRED. */\n  version: string;\n  /** URL to human-readable specification. REQUIRED. */\n  spec: string;\n  /** URL to JSON Schema. REQUIRED. */\n  schema: string;\n  /** Optional id for entity-instance disambiguation. */\n  id?: string;\n  /** Entity-specific config (feature flags, callback URLs, etc). */\n  config?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Parent capability(ies) extended — single string or array for multi-parent. */\n  extends?: string | string[];\n  /** Optional version requirements per UCP §6.5. */\n  requires?: {\n    protocol?: { min: string; max?: string };\n    capabilities?: Record<string, { min: string; max?: string }>;\n  };\n  /** Vendor-specific extras allowed per UCP convention (e.g., the AgentScore identity\n   *  capability adds a vendor-namespaced policy declaration here). */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Payment handler binding — keyed under a handler reverse-DNS name (e.g., `com.google.pay`). */\nexport interface UCPPaymentHandlerBinding {\n  /** Handler instance id (short, human-readable, e.g., `gpay`, `tempo`, `x402`). REQUIRED. */\n  id: string;\n  /** Handler spec version, YYYY-MM-DD. REQUIRED. */\n  version: string;\n  /** URL to handler spec. REQUIRED. */\n  spec: string;\n  /** URL to handler config schema. REQUIRED. */\n  schema: string;\n  /** Available instruments — type + per-type constraints (cards, wallets, etc.). */\n  available_instruments?: Array<{ type: string; constraints?: Record<string, unknown>; [k: string]: unknown }>;\n  /** Handler config — gateway IDs, merchant IDs, public keys, etc. */\n  config?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/** UCP body — nested under the `ucp` key of the published profile. */\nexport interface UCPProfileBody {\n  /** UCP spec version (YYYY-MM-DD). */\n  version: string;\n  /** Display name for the merchant / agent surface. */\n  name?: string;\n  /** Services — keyed by service name (e.g., `dev.ucp.shopping`). Each value is an\n   *  array of transport bindings (one merchant typically advertises multiple transports\n   *  under one service name). */\n  services: Record<string, UCPServiceBinding[]>;\n  /** Capabilities — keyed by capability name (e.g., `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout`). */\n  capabilities: Record<string, UCPCapabilityBinding[]>;\n  /** Payment handlers — keyed by handler reverse-DNS name (e.g., `com.google.pay`). */\n  payment_handlers: Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]>;\n  /** Optional `supported_versions` map linking historical version-specific profile URLs.\n   *  Pattern: `{ \"2026-01-23\": \"https://merchant/.well-known/ucp/2026-01-23\", ... }`. */\n  supported_versions?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras inside the `ucp` envelope. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Full UCP profile body as published at `/.well-known/ucp`. Top-level shape:\n *  `{ ucp: {...}, signing_keys: [...], signature?: \"...\" }`. */\nexport interface UCPProfile {\n  /** UCP body. ALL UCP-spec fields nest here per spec. */\n  ucp: UCPProfileBody;\n  /** JWKS — public keys at the OUTER level per UCP spec. Verifiers fetch this profile,\n   *  match the kid from a JWS / RFC 9421 signature header against this list, and validate. */\n  signing_keys: UCPSigningKey[];\n  /** Set when JWS-signed via `signUCPProfile` — JWS Compact Serialization with detached\n   *  payload (header..signature; payload is the canonicalized body minus this field). */\n  signature?: string;\n  /** Top-level vendor-specific extras (outside the `ucp` envelope). */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface BuildUCPProfileInput {\n  /** UCP spec version. Default `'2026-04-08'` (the latest published UCP spec date). MUST match a published UCP spec version, not a free-form date. */\n  version?: string;\n  /** Display name for the merchant / agent surface. */\n  name?: string;\n  /** Services map, keyed by service name. UCP-shopping merchants typically advertise\n   *  bindings under `'dev.ucp.shopping'`. */\n  services?: Record<string, UCPServiceBinding[]>;\n  /** Capabilities map, keyed by capability name. The `sh.agentscore.identity` capability\n   *  is auto-added when `agentscore_gate` is provided. */\n  capabilities?: Record<string, UCPCapabilityBinding[]>;\n  /** Payment handlers map, keyed by handler reverse-DNS name. */\n  payment_handlers?: Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]>;\n  /** JWKS — public keys the merchant signs with. REQUIRED by spec. */\n  signing_keys: UCPSigningKey[];\n  /** Merchant gate policy declaration. When provided, the SDK auto-injects an\n   *  `sh.agentscore.identity` capability binding into `capabilities`, with the\n   *  policy as the binding's `config`. Static merchant declaration only — no\n   *  per-operator data ever ends up on the public profile. Per-operator identity\n   *  attestation lives on the AP2 risk-signal endpoint, not here. */\n  agentscore_gate?: AgentScoreGatePolicy;\n  /** Optional override for the AgentScore capability schema URL. Field is snake_cased\n   *  for cross-language parity with the Python sibling. */\n  agentscore_schema_url?: string;\n  /** Optional override for the AgentScore capability spec URL. */\n  agentscore_spec_url?: string;\n  /** `supported_versions` map at the profile root for backwards-compat across\n   *  spec dates. Pattern: `{ \"<date>\": \"<base>/.well-known/ucp/<date>\" }`. */\n  supported_versions?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras at the OUTER level (alongside `ucp` + `signing_keys`). */\n  extras?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras INSIDE the `ucp` envelope (alongside `version`, `services`, etc.). */\n  ucp_extras?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_VERSION = '2026-04-08';\n// Reverse-DNS namespacing per UCP convention (`^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:\\.[a-z][a-z0-9_]*)+$`).\n// The bare `agentscore-identity` form fails the spec regex; vendor-namespacing under\n// `sh.agentscore` is honest about the capability being our extension, not UCP-canonical.\nconst AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_NAME = 'sh.agentscore.identity';\n// Date-format version per UCP convention (matches every other binding's version field).\nconst AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_VERSION = '2026-04-08';\n\n/** Merchant gate policy declared on the UCP profile via `sh.agentscore.identity` capability config.\n *  All fields optional; merchant declares which AgentScore checks the gate enforces. Snake-case\n *  field names match the AgentScore API's `/v1/assess` policy contract verbatim — no conversion\n *  layer between this declaration and what the gate actually enforces at runtime. */\nexport interface AgentScoreGatePolicy {\n  /** Gate denies if the operator/account behind the agent is not Stripe-Identity-verified. */\n  require_kyc?: boolean;\n  /** Gate denies if the operator/account is flagged by OpenSanctions screening. */\n  require_sanctions_clear?: boolean;\n  /** Gate denies if the verified age (from KYC) is below this threshold. Common values: 18, 21. */\n  min_age?: number;\n  /** ISO-3166-1 alpha-2 country codes the gate accepts. Empty/absent allows any. Mutually exclusive\n   *  with `blocked_jurisdictions` (set one or the other, not both). */\n  allowed_jurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** ISO-3166-1 alpha-2 country codes the gate denies. Empty/absent denies none. Mutually exclusive\n   *  with `allowed_jurisdictions`. */\n  blocked_jurisdictions?: string[];\n}\nconst AGENTSCORE_DEFAULT_SPEC_URL = 'https://agentscore.sh/specification/identity';\nconst AGENTSCORE_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_URL = 'https://agentscore.sh/schemas/ucp/sh-agentscore-identity-v1.json';\n// Multi-parent extension — `sh.agentscore.identity` declares merchant policy relevant at\n// both checkout-build (compliance gate) and cart-build (price-gate eligibility, jurisdiction-\n// restricted items in cart) time, so an agent reading either parent capability picks up the\n// policy contract. Mirrors the multi-parent convention in the live ecosystem\n// (Shopify's `dev.shopify.catalog.storefront` extends both `catalog.search` and\n// `catalog.lookup`; UCP-canonical `dev.ucp.shopping.discount` extends both checkout and cart).\nconst AGENTSCORE_EXTENDS = ['dev.ucp.shopping.checkout', 'dev.ucp.shopping.cart'];\n\nconst RESERVED_TOP_LEVEL = new Set([\n  'ucp',\n  'signing_keys',\n  'signature',\n  '__proto__',\n  'constructor',\n  'prototype',\n]);\nconst RESERVED_UCP_FIELDS = new Set([\n  'version',\n  'name',\n  'services',\n  'capabilities',\n  'payment_handlers',\n  'supported_versions',\n  '__proto__',\n  'constructor',\n  'prototype',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Compose a UCP profile body for `/.well-known/ucp` publication. Returns the spec-\n * compliant shape: `{ ucp: { version, services, capabilities, payment_handlers, ... },\n * signing_keys: [...] }`. Pass through `signUCPProfile` to attach a JWS signature for\n * trust-mode verifiers.\n *\n * Auto-injects `sh.agentscore.identity` as a vendor capability extending both\n * `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout` and `dev.ucp.shopping.cart` when `agentscore_gate`\n * is provided. The capability's `config` carries the merchant's static gate\n * policy declaration (require_kyc / require_sanctions_clear / min_age /\n * allowed_jurisdictions / blocked_jurisdictions). NO per-operator data is ever\n * placed on the public profile — per-operator identity attestation flows through\n * the AP2 risk-signal endpoint, not here.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * import { buildUCPProfile } from '@agent-score/commerce';\n *\n * const profile = buildUCPProfile({\n *   name: 'Example Merchant',\n *   services: {\n *     'dev.ucp.shopping': [\n *       { version: '2026-04-08', spec: 'https://ucp.dev/2026-04-08/specification/overview',\n *         transport: 'mcp', endpoint: 'https://merchant.example/api/ucp/mcp',\n *         schema: 'https://ucp.dev/services/shopping/mcp.openrpc.json' },\n *     ],\n *   },\n *   payment_handlers: {\n *     ...mppPaymentHandler({ networks: [{ network: 'tempo-mainnet', chain_id: 4217, recipient: TEMPO_ADDR }] }),\n *   },\n *   signing_keys: [signingKey],\n *   agentscore_gate: { require_kyc: true, min_age: 21, allowed_jurisdictions: ['US'] },\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function buildUCPProfile(input: BuildUCPProfileInput): UCPProfile {\n  // Per UCP spec service.json: rest/mcp/a2a transports REQUIRE endpoint;\n  // embedded does not. Validate caller-supplied services so a misconfigured\n  // profile fails locally instead of being rejected by spec-strict platforms.\n  for (const [name, bindings] of Object.entries(input.services ?? {})) {\n    for (const binding of bindings) {\n      if (\n        (binding.transport === 'rest' || binding.transport === 'mcp' || binding.transport === 'a2a')\n        && (binding.endpoint === undefined || binding.endpoint === null || binding.endpoint === '')\n      ) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `buildUCPProfile: service \"${name}\" transport=${binding.transport} requires \\`endpoint\\`. Per UCP spec service.json business_schema, rest/mcp/a2a bindings MUST carry an endpoint URL.`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Per UCP spec payment_handler.json: available_instruments has minItems:1.\n  // Deep-copy each binding and drop available_instruments when empty so a caller\n  // passing `[]` doesn't ship an invalid profile.\n  const paymentHandlers: Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]> = {};\n  for (const [name, bindings] of Object.entries(input.payment_handlers ?? {})) {\n    paymentHandlers[name] = bindings.map((binding) => {\n      if (Array.isArray(binding.available_instruments) && binding.available_instruments.length === 0) {\n        const { available_instruments: _drop, ...rest } = binding;\n        return rest as UCPPaymentHandlerBinding;\n      }\n      return binding;\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Deep-clone the capabilities map so we can safely mutate (auto-add the AgentScore\n  // identity capability) without altering the caller's input.\n  const capabilities: Record<string, UCPCapabilityBinding[]> = {};\n  for (const [name, bindings] of Object.entries(input.capabilities ?? {})) {\n    capabilities[name] = [...bindings];\n  }\n\n  // Auto-inject `sh.agentscore.identity` capability when the merchant declares a gate\n  // policy. Static merchant-policy declaration only — no per-operator data on the public\n  // profile. Per-operator identity attestation flows through the AP2 risk-signal endpoint\n  // or per-request 4xx response bodies, not here.\n  if (input.agentscore_gate) {\n    const gateConfig = { ...input.agentscore_gate };\n    const agentscoreBinding: UCPCapabilityBinding = {\n      version: AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_VERSION,\n      spec: input.agentscore_spec_url ?? AGENTSCORE_DEFAULT_SPEC_URL,\n      schema: input.agentscore_schema_url ?? AGENTSCORE_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_URL,\n      extends: AGENTSCORE_EXTENDS,\n    };\n    // Omit `config` when empty so node + python emit byte-identical canonical output\n    // (python's UCPCapabilityBinding.to_dict already drops empty config).\n    if (Object.keys(gateConfig).length > 0) agentscoreBinding.config = gateConfig;\n    const existing = capabilities[AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_NAME];\n    if (existing) existing.push(agentscoreBinding);\n    else capabilities[AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_NAME] = [agentscoreBinding];\n  }\n\n  const ucp: UCPProfileBody = {\n    version: input.version ?? DEFAULT_VERSION,\n    services: input.services ?? {},\n    capabilities,\n    payment_handlers: paymentHandlers,\n  };\n  if (input.name !== undefined) ucp.name = input.name;\n  if (input.supported_versions !== undefined) ucp.supported_versions = input.supported_versions;\n  if (input.ucp_extras) {\n    for (const k of Object.keys(input.ucp_extras)) {\n      if (RESERVED_UCP_FIELDS.has(k)) {\n        throw new Error(`buildUCPProfile: ucp_extras key \"${k}\" collides with a reserved \\`ucp\\` field; rejected.`);\n      }\n    }\n    Object.assign(ucp, input.ucp_extras);\n  }\n\n  const profile: UCPProfile = {\n    ucp,\n    signing_keys: input.signing_keys,\n  };\n  if (input.extras) {\n    // `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype` reserved so vendor extras can't slip\n    // prototype-pollution payloads into the canonical body.\n    for (const k of Object.keys(input.extras)) {\n      if (RESERVED_TOP_LEVEL.has(k)) {\n        throw new Error(`buildUCPProfile: extras key \"${k}\" collides with a reserved profile field; rejected.`);\n      }\n    }\n    Object.assign(profile, input.extras);\n  }\n\n  return profile;\n}\n\nexport const AGENTSCORE_UCP_CAPABILITY = AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_NAME;\n\n// ─── Payment handler builders ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Vendors compose UCP `payment_handlers` blocks by spreading these helpers.\n// The helpers fill in id/version/spec/schema/config wrapper so vendors only\n// supply merchant-specific data (networks + recipients + profile_id).\n//\n//   payment_handlers: {\n//     ...mppPaymentHandler({ networks: [...] }),\n//     ...x402PaymentHandler({ networks: [...] }),\n//     ...stripeSptPaymentHandler({ profile_id: '...' }),\n//   }\n//\n// Each helper returns `{ [reverse-DNS-key]: [binding] }` so spreading into\n// the parent map composes cleanly. The reverse-DNS keys + spec/schema URLs\n// + handler `version` are owned by these constants; bumping a handler spec\n// version is a one-line change here, not 20 lines across consumers.\n\nconst HANDLER_VERSION = '2026-04-08';\nconst SPEC_BASE = 'https://agentscore.sh/specification/payment-handlers';\nconst SCHEMA_BASE = 'https://agentscore.sh/schemas/payment-handlers';\n\ntype MppNetwork =\n  | 'tempo-mainnet'\n  | 'tempo-testnet'\n  | 'mpp-solana-mainnet'\n  | 'mpp-solana-devnet'\n  | (string & {}); // open for forward-compat (mpp-stellar-pubnet, mpp-lightning-mainnet, …)\n\nexport interface MppNetworkEntry {\n  network: MppNetwork;\n  /** EVM-style chain id (e.g. 4217 for Tempo mainnet). Omit for non-EVM networks. */\n  chain_id?: number;\n  /** Static settlement address. Omit for per-order recipients (e.g. Stripe-derived deposits). */\n  recipient?: string;\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface MppPaymentHandlerInput {\n  networks: MppNetworkEntry[];\n}\n\ntype X402Network =\n  | `base-${number}`\n  | 'solana-mainnet-beta'\n  | 'solana-devnet'\n  | 'stellar-pubnet'\n  | 'stellar-testnet'\n  | (string & {});\n\nexport interface X402NetworkEntry {\n  network: X402Network;\n  /** Static settlement address. Omit for per-order recipients. */\n  recipient?: string;\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface X402PaymentHandlerInput {\n  networks: X402NetworkEntry[];\n}\n\nexport interface StripeSptPaymentHandlerInput {\n  /** Stripe profile id (the merchant-side network identifier the agent's SPT is scoped to). */\n  profile_id: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `sh.agentscore.payment.mpp` payment handler block for a UCP profile.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * buildUCPProfile({\n *   ...,\n *   payment_handlers: {\n *     ...mppPaymentHandler({ networks: [{ network: 'tempo-mainnet', chain_id: 4217 }] }),\n *   },\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function mppPaymentHandler(input: MppPaymentHandlerInput): Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]> {\n  return {\n    'sh.agentscore.payment.mpp': [{\n      id: 'mpp',\n      version: HANDLER_VERSION,\n      spec: `${SPEC_BASE}/mpp`,\n      schema: `${SCHEMA_BASE}/mpp.json`,\n      config: { networks: input.networks },\n    }],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `sh.agentscore.payment.x402` payment handler block for a UCP profile.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * buildUCPProfile({\n *   ...,\n *   payment_handlers: {\n *     ...x402PaymentHandler({ networks: [{ network: 'base-8453', recipient: '0xabc...' }] }),\n *   },\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function x402PaymentHandler(input: X402PaymentHandlerInput): Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]> {\n  return {\n    'sh.agentscore.payment.x402': [{\n      id: 'x402',\n      version: HANDLER_VERSION,\n      spec: `${SPEC_BASE}/x402`,\n      schema: `${SCHEMA_BASE}/x402.json`,\n      config: { networks: input.networks },\n    }],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `sh.agentscore.payment.stripe_spt` payment handler block for a UCP profile.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * buildUCPProfile({\n *   ...,\n *   payment_handlers: {\n *     ...stripeSptPaymentHandler({ profile_id: 'profile_5xKvNqM9BaH' }),\n *   },\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function stripeSptPaymentHandler(input: StripeSptPaymentHandlerInput): Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]> {\n  return {\n    'sh.agentscore.payment.stripe_spt': [{\n      id: 'stripe-spt',\n      version: HANDLER_VERSION,\n      spec: `${SPEC_BASE}/stripe_spt`,\n      schema: `${SCHEMA_BASE}/stripe_spt.json`,\n      config: { rail: 'stripe-spt', profile_id: input.profile_id },\n    }],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * UCP profile signing helpers (JWKS + JWS).\n *\n * UCP §6 (https://ucp.dev/latest/specification/signatures/) requires that profiles\n * published at `/.well-known/ucp` carry a JWKS-backed signature for trust-mode clients\n * (Google AI Mode, Gemini commerce, future ChatGPT app shells). Without a signature,\n * trust-mode clients reject the profile.\n *\n * This module provides:\n *   - `generateUCPSigningKey()` — generate an Ed25519 keypair for signing\n *   - `signUCPProfile()` — sign a UCP profile body, returning a JWS-attached envelope\n *   - `verifyUCPProfile()` — verify a signed profile against a JWKS\n *   - `buildJWKSResponse()` — assemble a JWKS document for `/.well-known/jwks.json`\n *\n * Implementation rides on `jose` (peer-dep, optional). Merchants who don't sign their\n * profile (development) skip this module entirely; the unsigned `buildUCPProfile()`\n * path still works.\n *\n * Why Ed25519: smaller signatures (64 bytes vs 256+ for RSA), faster verification, no\n * curve-parameter ceremony. UCP also accepts ES256 (P-256 ECDSA) — pass `alg: 'ES256'`\n * to `signUCPProfile()` if your existing payment signing key is P-256.\n */\n\nimport type { UCPProfile, UCPSigningKey } from './ucp';\n\n/** Output of `generateUCPSigningKey()`. The private key is what you sign with; the\n *  public JWK is what you publish at `/.well-known/jwks.json` and reference in the\n *  UCP profile's `signing_keys[]`.\n */\nexport interface GeneratedUCPKey {\n  /** Private key (KeyLike, opaque) — pass to `signUCPProfile()`. Never publish. */\n  privateKey: unknown;\n  /** Public key as JWK — publish at `/.well-known/jwks.json` and inline in UCP `signing_keys[]`. */\n  publicJWK: UCPSigningKey;\n}\n\n/** A JWKS document — `{ keys: [...] }` per RFC 7517. Serve at `/.well-known/jwks.json`. */\nexport interface JWKSResponse {\n  keys: UCPSigningKey[];\n}\n\n/** Options for `signUCPProfile()`. */\nexport interface SignUCPProfileOptions {\n  /** Private signing key — opaque KeyLike from `generateUCPSigningKey()` or `importJWK()`. */\n  signingKey: unknown;\n  /** Key ID (must match a `kid` in the profile's `signing_keys[]`). */\n  kid: string;\n  /** Signing algorithm — `EdDSA` (default) or `ES256`. */\n  alg?: 'EdDSA' | 'ES256';\n}\n\n/** A signed UCP profile envelope. Same shape as `UCPProfile` plus the `signature` field\n *  carrying the JWS Compact Serialization over the canonicalized profile body. */\nexport interface SignedUCPProfile extends UCPProfile {\n  /** JWS Compact Serialization (`<header>.<payload>.<signature>`) over the profile body\n   *  with `signature` removed and keys sorted. Verifiers reconstruct the canonical body\n   *  and validate against the JWK identified by `kid` in the JWS protected header. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\nconst JOSE_INSTALL_HINT = 'Install the optional peer dependency: `npm install jose@^6` (or `bun add jose`). Tested against jose v6.x.';\n\n/** UCP §6 + RFC 8725 §3.1 — restrict accepted JWS algorithms. Anything outside this\n *  list (HS, RS, none, etc.) is rejected to prevent alg-confusion attacks where a\n *  hostile JWK published in the profile's signing_keys[] is used with an unintended\n *  algorithm. */\nconst ALLOWED_ALGS = ['EdDSA', 'ES256'] as const;\ntype AllowedAlg = (typeof ALLOWED_ALGS)[number];\n\n/** JWS protected header `typ` value. Vendor-namespaced because UCP §6 does not define\n *  a profile-as-JWS typ; the value advertises that this signed envelope follows the\n *  AgentScore extension semantics rather than a UCP-canonical signing convention.\n *  Verifiers SHOULD enforce this to prevent cross-protocol token reuse (RFC 8725 §3.11). */\nconst PROFILE_TYP = 'agentscore-profile+jws';\n\n/** Discriminated error class so consumers can branch on failure mode without\n *  parsing message strings or importing jose internals. */\nexport class UCPVerificationError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    public readonly code:\n      | 'no_signature'\n      | 'missing_kid'\n      | 'kid_not_found'\n      | 'duplicate_kid'\n      | 'unsupported_alg'\n      | 'wrong_typ'\n      | 'signature_invalid'\n      | 'body_mismatch'\n      | 'malformed_jws'\n      | 'malformed_jwks'\n      | 'unrecognized_critical_header'\n      | 'unusable_key',\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'UCPVerificationError';\n  }\n}\n\nasync function loadJose(): Promise<typeof import('jose')> {\n  try {\n    return await import('jose');\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UCP signing requires the \\`jose\\` library, which is an optional peer dependency. ${JOSE_INSTALL_HINT}\\nOriginal error: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize a UCP profile for signing. Removes the `signature` field (if present),\n * sorts keys deterministically, and returns the JSON string. Both signer and verifier\n * compute the same bytes.\n *\n * Implementation note: UCP §6.2 specifies \"the JSON-serialized profile body, with\n * `signature` removed and keys ordered lexicographically at every nesting level.\" This\n * is JCS-style canonicalization without the full RFC 8785 numeric handling — UCP\n * profiles don't contain floats so the simpler key-sort is sufficient.\n */\nfunction canonicalizeProfile(profile: UCPProfile): string {\n  const stripped = { ...profile } as Record<string, unknown>;\n  delete stripped.signature;\n  return stableStringify(stripped);\n}\n\n/** Deterministic JSON.stringify with lexicographic key ordering at every level.\n *  Rejects ANY non-finite Number (NaN, Infinity, -Infinity) and any Number\n *  whose value has a fractional part OR whose JSON representation may diverge\n *  cross-language. Cross-language float canonicalization (RFC 8785 §3.2.2.3)\n *  is not stable between Node's JSON.stringify and Python's json.dumps\n *  (e.g. `1.0` → `1` vs `1.0`, `1e-7` → `1e-7` vs `1e-07`). UCP profiles\n *  must use decimal strings for monetary or fractional fields to preserve\n *  byte parity with the Python sibling. */\nfunction stableStringify(value: unknown): string {\n  if (value === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'stableStringify: undefined values are not allowed in canonicalized JSON. ' +\n        'Object fields with no value must be omitted.',\n    );\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'function' || typeof value === 'symbol') {\n    throw new Error(`stableStringify: ${typeof value} values are not allowed in canonicalized JSON.`);\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'bigint') {\n    throw new Error('stableStringify: BigInt values are not allowed; use a decimal string.');\n  }\n  if (value instanceof Date) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'stableStringify: Date instances are not allowed; serialize to an ISO string before passing.',\n    );\n  }\n  if (value instanceof Map || value instanceof Set || value instanceof WeakMap || value instanceof WeakSet) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `stableStringify: ${value.constructor.name} values are not allowed; convert to a plain object/array first.`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(value)) {\n    throw new Error('stableStringify: typed arrays are not allowed; convert to a plain array first.');\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'number') {\n    if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `UCP profile canonicalization rejects non-finite Number ${value}. Use a decimal string for any value that may be NaN/Infinity.`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (!Number.isInteger(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `UCP profile canonicalization rejects non-integer Number ${value}. Use a decimal string (e.g. \"9.99\") for monetary or fractional fields to preserve cross-language byte-parity.`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `stableStringify: integer ${value} exceeds Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER. ` +\n          'For values >2^53, use a decimal string to preserve cross-language byte parity.',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'string') {\n    // Cross-language byte parity: pre-ES2019 V8 (and any environment whose\n    // JSON.stringify still escapes U+2028 / U+2029) emits \\u2028 / \\u2029\n    // for these codepoints, while Python's json.dumps with ensure_ascii=False\n    // emits them raw. A string carrying either would canonicalize to different\n    // bytes across the Node and Python siblings and break signature\n    // verification at the language boundary. Mirror the rejection in\n    // core/api/src/lib/canonicalize.ts so the contract stays symmetric.\n    if (value.includes('\\u2028') || value.includes('\\u2029')) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'stableStringify: strings containing U+2028 (LINE SEPARATOR) or U+2029 (PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR) are not allowed; cross-language byte parity requires neither be present (Node JSON.stringify on older V8 escapes them; Python json.dumps with ensure_ascii=False does not).',\n      );\n    }\n    return JSON.stringify(value);\n  }\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return JSON.stringify(value);\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(stableStringify).join(',')}]`;\n  const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const keys = Object.keys(obj).sort((a, b) => {\n    const aPoints = [...a].map((c) => c.codePointAt(0)!);\n    const bPoints = [...b].map((c) => c.codePointAt(0)!);\n    const len = Math.min(aPoints.length, bPoints.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < len; i += 1) {\n      if (aPoints[i] !== bPoints[i]) return aPoints[i] - bPoints[i];\n    }\n    return aPoints.length - bPoints.length;\n  });\n  // Cross-language byte parity: same rejection rationale as the string-value\n  // branch above. Object keys flow through JSON.stringify(k) at the pairs line\n  // below, so without this check a key carrying U+2028 / U+2029 would pass on\n  // modern V8 but Python's _reject_unsafe_numbers (which recurses into dict\n  // keys) would throw at verify time.\n  for (const k of keys) {\n    if (k.includes('
') || k.includes('
')) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'stableStringify: object keys containing U+2028 (LINE SEPARATOR) or U+2029 (PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR) are not allowed; cross-language byte parity (Node JSON.stringify on older V8 escapes them; Python json.dumps with ensure_ascii=False does not).',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  const pairs = keys.map((k) => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${stableStringify(obj[k])}`);\n  return `{${pairs.join(',')}}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Generate a fresh Ed25519 (default) or ES256 keypair for signing UCP profiles.\n *\n * The `privateKey` is an opaque KeyLike — store it server-side and pass to\n * `signUCPProfile()`. Never log or transmit the private key.\n *\n * The `publicJWK` is what you publish at `/.well-known/jwks.json` and inline in the\n * UCP profile's `signing_keys[]` array.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * import { generateUCPSigningKey } from '@agent-score/commerce';\n *\n * const { privateKey, publicJWK } = await generateUCPSigningKey({ kid: 'merchant-2026-05' });\n * // Persist privateKey securely (env var, KMS, secret manager).\n * // Publish publicJWK at /.well-known/jwks.json and reference it in your UCP profile.\n * ```\n */\nexport async function generateUCPSigningKey(opts: {\n  /** Key ID (kid). Must be unique per key; you'll reference this in the UCP profile's `signing_keys[]`. */\n  kid: string;\n  /** Signing algorithm. Default `EdDSA`. */\n  alg?: 'EdDSA' | 'ES256';\n}): Promise<GeneratedUCPKey> {\n  const jose = await loadJose();\n  const alg = opts.alg ?? 'EdDSA';\n  const { privateKey, publicKey } = await jose.generateKeyPair(alg, { extractable: true });\n  const exportedJwk = await jose.exportJWK(publicKey);\n\n  const publicJWK: UCPSigningKey = {\n    kid: opts.kid,\n    alg,\n    use: 'sig',\n    ...exportedJwk,\n  } as UCPSigningKey;\n\n  return { privateKey, publicJWK };\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a UCP profile, returning a new envelope with the JWS attached as `signature`.\n *\n * The signature covers the canonicalized profile body (everything except `signature`\n * itself, with keys sorted at every level). Trust-mode UCP verifiers reconstruct the\n * canonical body, look up the key referenced by the JWS header's `kid`, and validate.\n *\n * The profile's `signing_keys[]` MUST already include a JWK with the matching `kid`\n * — otherwise verifiers can't find the public key. Add the `publicJWK` from\n * `generateUCPSigningKey()` to your `signing_keys[]` before calling this.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * const profile = buildUCPProfile({ ..., signing_keys: [publicJWK] });\n * const signed = await signUCPProfile(profile, { signingKey: privateKey, kid: 'merchant-2026-05' });\n * c.json(signed);\n * ```\n */\nexport async function signUCPProfile(\n  profile: UCPProfile,\n  opts: SignUCPProfileOptions,\n): Promise<SignedUCPProfile> {\n  const jose = await loadJose();\n  const alg = opts.alg ?? 'EdDSA';\n\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.includes(alg as AllowedAlg)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `signUCPProfile: alg ${JSON.stringify(opts.alg)} is not in the supported set [${ALLOWED_ALGS.join(', ')}].`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Sign-time kid sanity check: the profile's `signing_keys[]` MUST contain a\n  // JWK with the matching kid; otherwise verifiers can't resolve the public\n  // key and the profile is dead-on-arrival. Catch this at sign-time rather\n  // than at verifier-time in production.\n  if (typeof opts.kid !== 'string' || !opts.kid) {\n    throw new Error('signUCPProfile: opts.kid must be a non-empty string.');\n  }\n  const kids = (profile.signing_keys ?? []).map((k) => (k as Record<string, unknown>).kid);\n  if (!kids.includes(opts.kid)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `signUCPProfile: kid ${JSON.stringify(opts.kid)} is not present in profile.signing_keys[] (declared kids: ${JSON.stringify(kids)}). Verifiers will not find the key.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const canonicalBody = canonicalizeProfile(profile);\n  const payloadBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(canonicalBody);\n\n  const signature = await new jose.CompactSign(payloadBytes)\n    .setProtectedHeader({ alg, kid: opts.kid, typ: PROFILE_TYP })\n    .sign(opts.signingKey as Parameters<typeof jose.CompactSign.prototype.sign>[0]);\n\n  return { ...profile, signature };\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a signed UCP profile against a JWKS. Returns `true` when the JWS validates\n * against a matching key in `jwks`; throws on signature mismatch, missing key, or\n * canonicalization drift.\n *\n * Round-trip helper for tests and for cross-merchant verification flows. Trust-mode\n * UCP clients use the same algorithm.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * const ok = await verifyUCPProfile(signedProfile, { keys: [publicJWK] });\n * ```\n */\nexport async function verifyUCPProfile(\n  profile: SignedUCPProfile,\n  jwks: JWKSResponse,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (profile === null || typeof profile !== 'object' || Array.isArray(profile)) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'no_signature',\n      `UCP profile must be a JSON object; got ${profile === null ? 'null' : Array.isArray(profile) ? 'array' : typeof profile}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const jose = await loadJose();\n\n  // JWKS shape guard so a malformed argument emits a typed UCPVerificationError\n  // rather than a raw TypeError on `.filter is not a function`.\n  if (!jwks || typeof jwks !== 'object' || !Array.isArray((jwks as { keys?: unknown }).keys)) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'malformed_jwks',\n      `UCP verifier expected JWKS shape { keys: [...] }; got ${jwks === null ? 'null' : typeof jwks === 'object' ? 'object without keys[] array' : typeof jwks}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const stripped = { ...profile } as Partial<SignedUCPProfile>;\n  const sig = stripped.signature;\n  delete stripped.signature;\n  if (typeof sig !== 'string' || !sig) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'no_signature',\n      `UCP profile signature must be a non-empty string; got ${sig === undefined ? 'undefined' : typeof sig}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Pre-decode the protected header so typ → alg → kid → crit checks run BEFORE\n  // jose's compactVerify. jose enforces `crit` internally ahead of the key-resolver\n  // callback, which would surface `unrecognized_critical_header` on a JWS that\n  // also has a wrong typ; the python-commerce sibling's `_peek_jws_header` decodes\n  // the header manually and checks typ first. Mirroring that ordering here means\n  // a JWS with multiple header faults emits the same `code` in both SDKs.\n  let header: { alg?: unknown; kid?: unknown; typ?: unknown; crit?: unknown };\n  try {\n    const protectedB64 = sig.split('.')[0];\n    if (!protectedB64) throw new Error('JWS protected header segment is empty.');\n    const headerJson = new TextDecoder().decode(jose.base64url.decode(protectedB64));\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(headerJson);\n    if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n      throw new Error('JWS protected header is not a JSON object.');\n    }\n    header = parsed as { alg?: unknown; kid?: unknown; typ?: unknown; crit?: unknown };\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'malformed_jws',\n      `JWS protected header is not valid base64url-encoded JSON: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Header check order is typ → alg → kid → crit to match the Python sibling's\n  // _peek_jws_header. RFC 8725 §3.11: enforce expected typ to prevent\n  // cross-protocol token reuse.\n  if (header.typ !== PROFILE_TYP) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError('wrong_typ', `UCP signature typ must be \"${PROFILE_TYP}\"; got ${String(header.typ)}.`);\n  }\n  // RFC 8725 §3.1: restrict to allow-listed algorithms before key resolution\n  // so a hostile JWK can never be used with HS256/none/RS256/etc.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.includes(header.alg as AllowedAlg)) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError('unsupported_alg', `UCP signing alg must be one of ${ALLOWED_ALGS.join(', ')}; got ${String(header.alg)}.`);\n  }\n  // Strict string check: a non-string kid (number/bool/null) could accidentally\n  // match a JWK with an equal-typed kid and mask attacks.\n  if (typeof header.kid !== 'string' || !header.kid) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'missing_kid',\n      `UCP signature header kid must be a non-empty string; got ${header.kid === undefined ? 'undefined' : typeof header.kid}.`,\n    );\n  }\n  // RFC 7515 §4.1.11: `crit` MUST be a non-empty array of strings if present.\n  // Shape-check first (matches python-commerce's malformed_jws split) so that\n  // explicit `crit: null` / `crit: []` / `crit: \"foo\"` / `crit: [42]` aren't\n  // silently accepted; only well-formed crit arrays fall through to the\n  // unrecognized-extension check (RFC 8725 §3.10 — UCP defines no crit headers).\n  if ('crit' in header) {\n    const crit = (header as { crit?: unknown }).crit;\n    if (!Array.isArray(crit) || crit.length === 0 || !crit.every((c) => typeof c === 'string')) {\n      throw new UCPVerificationError(\n        'malformed_jws',\n        `JWS protected header crit must be a non-empty array of strings; got ${JSON.stringify(crit)}.`,\n      );\n    }\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'unrecognized_critical_header',\n      `JWS protected header advertises unrecognized crit headers: ${JSON.stringify(crit)}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  let signedPayload: Uint8Array;\n  try {\n    const verified = await jose.compactVerify(\n      sig,\n      async (h) => {\n        // typ/alg/kid/crit were validated up-front against the pre-decoded header;\n        // this resolver only handles JWK lookup. 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State list is only enforced for US shipments.\n *\n * This module ships three primitives:\n *\n * 1. {@link PolicyBlock} — the typed shape.\n * 2. {@link buildGateOptionsFromPolicy} — translate a block into the options object the\n *    per-framework `agentscoreGate(...)` accepts. Returns `null` when the policy\n *    has no enforcement (treat as \"no gate; anonymous OK\").\n * 3. {@link runGateWithEnforcement} — wrap a per-framework middleware in the\n *    hard/soft enforcement runner. The middleware is given an `onDenied` shim\n *    that captures the denial body and status; the runner returns a structured\n *    {@link GateResult} so the vendor decides how to surface it.\n *\n * All three are additive — vendors using `agentscoreGate(...)` directly are\n * unaffected.\n */\n\nimport type { AgentScoreCoreOptions, DenialReason } from '../core.js';\n\n/** Hard = 403 propagates; soft = swallowed + identity_status=\"unverified\". */\nexport type EnforcementMode = 'hard' | 'soft';\n\n/** Per-order trust level captured at settle time. */\nexport type IdentityStatus = 'verified' | 'unverified' | 'anonymous' | 'denied';\n\n/** Compliance fields a merchant attaches per product / per tier. All optional. */\nexport interface PolicyBlock {\n  enforcement?: EnforcementMode;\n  requireKyc?: boolean;\n  requireSanctionsClear?: boolean;\n  minAge?: number;\n  allowedJurisdictions?: readonly string[];\n  allowedShippingCountries?: readonly string[];\n  allowedShippingStates?: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Outcome of running a gate under an enforcement mode.\n *\n * - `verified`: gate accepted; identity is fully verified for the policy.\n * - `unverified`: soft mode swallowed a gate denial; the agent had *some*\n *   identity but didn't meet the policy. Stamp this on the order so\n *   ops/analytics can tell apart soft passes from hard passes.\n * - `anonymous`: no gate ran (policy was null / no enforcement).\n * - `denied`: hard mode rejected; the caller must propagate the 403. The\n *   `denialBody` and `denialStatus` carry the original gate response so the\n *   caller can return it as-is.\n */\nexport interface GateResult {\n  status: IdentityStatus;\n  denialStatus?: number;\n  denialBody?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  denialReason?: DenialReason;\n}\n\n/**\n * Translate a {@link PolicyBlock} into the options the per-framework\n * `agentscoreGate(...)` expects. Returns `null` when the block has no\n * `enforcement` set — the caller should treat that as \"no gate; anonymous OK\".\n *\n * Use a fresh gate per request rather than constructing once at module scope\n * when the policy varies per resource (e.g. per product). Each adapter's gate\n * is cheap to instantiate.\n */\nexport function buildGateOptionsFromPolicy(\n  policy: PolicyBlock | null | undefined,\n  base: { apiKey: string; baseUrl?: string },\n): AgentScoreCoreOptions | null {\n  if (!policy || !policy.enforcement) return null;\n  return {\n    apiKey: base.apiKey,\n    ...(base.baseUrl !== undefined && { baseUrl: base.baseUrl }),\n    ...(policy.requireKyc !== undefined && { requireKyc: policy.requireKyc }),\n    ...(policy.requireSanctionsClear !== undefined && {\n      requireSanctionsClear: policy.requireSanctionsClear,\n    }),\n    ...(policy.minAge !== undefined && { minAge: policy.minAge }),\n    ...(policy.allowedJurisdictions !== undefined && {\n      allowedJurisdictions: [...policy.allowedJurisdictions],\n    }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Run a per-framework gate middleware respecting the enforcement mode.\n *\n * The vendor passes:\n * - `gate`: their framework's middleware (Hono `MiddlewareHandler`, Express\n *   `(req, res, next) => void`, etc.) — anything that resolves on accept and\n *   throws or returns a `Response` on deny.\n * - `runGate`: a thin adapter that calls the middleware with the framework\n *   context and returns either `{ ok: true }` (gate accepted) or\n *   `{ ok: false, status, body, reason? }` (gate denied with details).\n *\n * `runGateWithEnforcement` wraps that in the hard/soft split:\n *\n * - `gate=null` or `enforcement=null`: no gate fires; status=\"anonymous\".\n * - `enforcement=\"hard\"` + denied: status=\"denied\"; caller propagates denialStatus + denialBody.\n * - `enforcement=\"soft\"` + denied: swallow; status=\"unverified\".\n * - accepted: status=\"verified\".\n */\nexport async function runGateWithEnforcement(\n  enforcement: EnforcementMode | undefined,\n  runGate: (() => Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; status: number; body: Record<string, unknown>; reason?: DenialReason }>) | null,\n): Promise<GateResult> {\n  if (!runGate || !enforcement) return { status: 'anonymous' };\n\n  const outcome = await runGate();\n  if (outcome.ok) return { status: 'verified' };\n\n  if (enforcement === 'hard') {\n    return {\n      status: 'denied',\n      denialStatus: outcome.status,\n      denialBody: outcome.body,\n      ...(outcome.reason !== undefined && { denialReason: outcome.reason }),\n    };\n  }\n  return {\n    status: 'unverified',\n    denialStatus: outcome.status,\n    denialBody: outcome.body,\n    ...(outcome.reason !== undefined && { denialReason: outcome.reason }),\n  };\n}\n\n/** NULL policy / NULL allowlist → ship anywhere. Otherwise country must be in the list. */\nexport function shippingCountryAllowed(country: string, policy: PolicyBlock | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (!policy?.allowedShippingCountries || policy.allowedShippingCountries.length === 0) return true;\n  const allowed = new Set(policy.allowedShippingCountries.map((c) => c.toUpperCase()));\n  return allowed.has(country.toUpperCase());\n}\n\n/**\n * US-state allowlist (e.g. wine).\n *\n * Only enforced for US shipments — non-US shipments are governed by\n * {@link shippingCountryAllowed} independently.\n */\nexport function shippingStateAllowed(\n  state: string,\n  country: string,\n  policy: PolicyBlock | null | undefined,\n): boolean {\n  if (!policy?.allowedShippingStates || policy.allowedShippingStates.length === 0) return true;\n  if (country.toUpperCase() !== 'US') return true;\n  const allowed = new Set(policy.allowedShippingStates.map((s) => s.toUpperCase()));\n  return 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts","../src/core.ts","../src/_denial.ts","../src/_response.ts","../src/signer.ts","../src/identity/a2a.ts","../src/identity/ucp.ts","../src/identity/ucp-jwks.ts","../src/identity/policy.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export type {\n  AccountVerification,\n  AgentIdentity,\n  AgentMemoryHint,\n  AgentScoreCore,\n  AgentScoreCoreOptions,\n  AssessResult,\n  CreateSessionOnMissing,\n  DenialCode,\n  DenialReason,\n  EvaluateOutcome,\n  OperatorVerification,\n  PolicyCheck,\n  PolicyResult,\n  SignerVerdict,\n  VerifyWalletSignerResult,\n} from './core';\nexport { buildAgentMemoryHint } from './core';\nexport type { PaymentSigner, SignerNetwork } from './signer';\nexport { extractPaymentSigner, readX402PaymentHeader } from './signer';\nexport {\n  FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS,\n  buildContactSupportNextSteps,\n  buildSignerMismatchBody,\n  denialReasonStatus,\n  isFixableDenial,\n  verificationAgentInstructions,\n} from './_denial';\nexport { denialReasonToBody } from './_response';\nexport {\n  buildA2AAgentCard,\n  ucpA2AExtension,\n  UCP_A2A_EXTENSION_URI,\n  type A2AAgentCard,\n  type A2AAgentCardCapabilities,\n  type A2AAgentCardExtension,\n  type A2AAgentCardSignature,\n  type A2AAgentInterface,\n  type A2AAgentProvider,\n  type A2AAgentSkill,\n  type BuildA2AAgentCardInput,\n} from './identity/a2a';\nexport {\n  AGENTSCORE_UCP_CAPABILITY,\n  type AgentScoreGatePolicy,\n  buildUCPProfile,\n  type BuildUCPProfileInput,\n  type MppNetworkEntry,\n  type MppPaymentHandlerInput,\n  mppPaymentHandler,\n  type StripeSptPaymentHandlerInput,\n  stripeSptPaymentHandler,\n  type UCPCapabilityBinding,\n  type UCPPaymentHandlerBinding,\n  type UCPProfile,\n  type UCPProfileBody,\n  type UCPServiceBinding,\n  UCPSigningKey,\n  type X402NetworkEntry,\n  type X402PaymentHandlerInput,\n  x402PaymentHandler,\n} from './identity/ucp';\nexport {\n  buildJWKSResponse,\n  generateUCPSigningKey,\n  type GeneratedUCPKey,\n  type JWKSResponse,\n  type SignUCPProfileOptions,\n  type SignedUCPProfile,\n  signUCPProfile,\n  UCPVerificationError,\n  verifyUCPProfile,\n} from './identity/ucp-jwks';\nexport {\n  type EnforcementMode,\n  type GateResult,\n  type IdentityStatus,\n  type PolicyBlock,\n  buildGateOptionsFromPolicy,\n  runGateWithEnforcement,\n  shippingCountryAllowed,\n  shippingStateAllowed,\n} from './identity/policy';\n","import {\n  AgentScore,\n  InvalidCredentialError,\n  PaymentRequiredError,\n  QuotaExceededError,\n  TimeoutError as SdkTimeoutError,\n  TokenExpiredError,\n} from '@agent-score/sdk';\nimport { isFixableDenial } from './_denial';\nimport { QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS } from './_response';\nimport { normalizeAddress } from './address';\nimport { TTLCache } from './cache';\nimport type { PaymentSigner } from './signer';\n\n// Character-based trim avoids a CodeQL polynomial-redos false positive on\n// `/\\/+$/` patterns that report library-input strings.\nfunction stripTrailingSlashes(s: string): string {\n  let end = s.length;\n  while (end > 0 && s.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47 /* '/' */) end--;\n  return end === s.length ? s : s.slice(0, end);\n}\n\ndeclare const __VERSION__: string;\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Public types (framework-agnostic)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface AgentIdentity {\n  address?: string;\n  operatorToken?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Session metadata returned from `POST /v1/sessions`. Surfaced to the `onBeforeSession`\n * hook so merchants can correlate an AgentScore session with their own resume token\n * (e.g. a pending-order id).\n */\nexport interface SessionMetadata {\n  session_id: string;\n  verify_url: string;\n  poll_secret: string;\n  poll_url: string;\n  expires_at?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for auto-creating a verification session when no identity is present.\n *\n * The static `context` / `productName` options are sent on every session request. For\n * per-request context (e.g. the specific product the agent was trying to buy), pass\n * a `getSessionOptions` callback that returns dynamic values; its return is merged\n * over the static defaults.\n *\n * `onBeforeSession` is a side-effect hook that runs after the session is minted but\n * before the 403 is built. Use it to pre-create a reservation/draft/pending-order\n * row in your DB so agents can resume via a merchant-specific id. Return value is\n * merged into `DenialReason.extra`, so it surfaces in both the default 403 body and\n * in a custom `onDenied` handler.\n */\nexport interface CreateSessionOnMissing<TCtx = unknown> {\n  apiKey: string;\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  context?: string;\n  productName?: string;\n  /** Per-request override of `context` / `productName`. Invoked with the framework context. */\n  getSessionOptions?: (ctx: TCtx) => Promise<{ context?: string; productName?: string }>\n                                  |          { context?: string; productName?: string };\n  /** Side-effect hook that runs after the session is minted. Return value is merged\n   *  into `DenialReason.extra` so custom `onDenied` handlers can include merchant-specific\n   *  fields (e.g. `order_id`) in the 403 response. Hook errors are logged and swallowed —\n   *  a failing side effect should not block the 403 from reaching the agent. */\n  onBeforeSession?: (ctx: TCtx, session: SessionMetadata) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>\n                                                          |          Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentScoreCoreOptions {\n  /** AgentScore API key. Required. */\n  apiKey: string;\n  /** Require KYC verification. */\n  requireKyc?: boolean;\n  /** Require operator to be clear of sanctions. */\n  requireSanctionsClear?: boolean;\n  /** Minimum operator age bracket (18 or 21). */\n  minAge?: number;\n  /** List of blocked jurisdictions (blocklist). */\n  blockedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** List of allowed jurisdictions (allowlist — only these pass). */\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** If true, allow the request through when the API is unreachable. Defaults to false. */\n  failOpen?: boolean;\n  /** How long to cache results, in seconds. Defaults to 300. */\n  cacheSeconds?: number;\n  /** AgentScore API base URL. Defaults to \"https://api.agentscore.sh\". */\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  /** Optional chain to filter scoring to. */\n  chain?: string;\n  /** Prepended to the default User-Agent as `\"{userAgent} (@agent-score/commerce@{version})\"`. Use to attribute API calls to your app. */\n  userAgent?: string;\n  /** When set and no identity is found, create a verification session instead of denying immediately. */\n  createSessionOnMissing?: CreateSessionOnMissing;\n}\n\nexport type DenialCode =\n  | 'wallet_not_trusted'\n  | 'missing_identity'\n  | 'api_error'\n  | 'payment_required'\n  | 'identity_verification_required'\n  // Wallet-signer binding: claimed X-Wallet-Address must resolve to the same operator as\n  // the payment signer; wallet-auth is rejected on rails with no wallet signer.\n  | 'wallet_signer_mismatch'\n  | 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing'\n  // Granular credential-state denials passed through from /v1/assess.\n  // - `token_expired`: revoked + TTL-expired (the API unifies these). The 401 body carries\n  //   an auto-minted session, forwarded into DenialReason for one-shot recovery.\n  // - `invalid_credential`: the token doesn't exist at all (typo, never minted, fabricated).\n  //   No auto-session is minted by the API for this case — agents should switch to a\n  //   different stored token or drop the header to bootstrap a fresh session.\n  | 'token_expired'\n  | 'invalid_credential';\n\n/**\n * Cross-merchant pattern hint emitted on bootstrap denials and session-create responses.\n * LLM-hosted agents should persist this to long-term memory so future AgentScore encounters skip\n * the cold-start session flow. Contents are the pattern, not secrets.\n */\nexport interface AgentMemoryHint {\n  save_for_future_agentscore_gates: true;\n  pattern_summary: string;\n  quickstart: string;\n  identity_check_endpoint: string;\n  list_wallets_endpoint?: string;\n  identity_paths: { wallet: string; operator_token: string };\n  bootstrap: string;\n  do_not_persist_in_memory: string[];\n  persist_in_credential_store: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface DenialReason {\n  code: DenialCode;\n  /** Human-readable explanation. When omitted, `denialReasonToBody` substitutes a per-code default. */\n  message?: string;\n  decision?: string;\n  reasons?: string[];\n  verify_url?: string;\n  session_id?: string;\n  poll_secret?: string;\n  poll_url?: string;\n  agent_instructions?: string;\n  /** Cross-merchant memory hint. Emitted on bootstrap denials only by default. */\n  agent_memory?: AgentMemoryHint;\n  /** Full assess response when the denial came from `/v1/assess`. Lets consumers access fields\n   *  not promoted to first-class DenialReason properties (e.g., `policy_result`). Undefined for\n   *  denials that did not originate from an assess call (missing_identity, api_error,\n   *  payment_required, identity_verification_required). */\n  data?: AssessResult;\n  /** Extra fields returned from the `createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession` hook. Merged\n   *  into the default 403 body; custom `onDenied` handlers can spread these into their own\n   *  response shape (e.g. to include a merchant-minted `order_id`). */\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n  // Wallet-signer-match fields — populated for wallet_signer_mismatch only.\n  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n  /** Operator id resolved from `X-Wallet-Address`. */\n  claimed_operator?: string;\n  /** Operator id the actual payment signer resolves to. `null` when the signer wallet isn't\n   *  linked to any operator (treat as a different identity). */\n  actual_signer_operator?: string | null;\n  /** The wallet the agent claimed via header. Echoed back for self-correction. */\n  expected_signer?: string;\n  /** The wallet that actually signed the payment. */\n  actual_signer?: string;\n  /** Wallets the claimed operator could sign with (if enumerable). Present when non-empty. */\n  linked_wallets?: string[];\n}\n\n/** Operator verification details from the assess response. Mirrors python's\n *  `OperatorVerification` dataclass. */\nexport interface OperatorVerification {\n  level: string;\n  operator_type: string | null;\n  verified_at: string | null;\n}\n\n/** Account-level KYC facts that apply to every operator under the same account.\n *  Populated when the API returns account_verification (post-KYC operator).\n *  Mirrors python's account_verification dict shape. */\nexport interface AccountVerification {\n  kyc_level?: string;\n  sanctions_clear?: boolean;\n  age_bracket?: string;\n  jurisdiction?: string;\n  verified_at?: string | null;\n}\n\n/** A single policy check from the assess response. Mirrors python's `PolicyCheck`. */\nexport interface PolicyCheck {\n  rule: string;\n  passed: boolean;\n  required?: unknown;\n  actual?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Policy evaluation result from the assess response. Mirrors python's `PolicyResult`. */\nexport interface PolicyResult {\n  all_passed: boolean;\n  checks: PolicyCheck[];\n}\n\nexport interface AssessResult {\n  decision: string | null;\n  decision_reasons: string[];\n  identity_method?: string;\n  operator_verification?: OperatorVerification;\n  account_verification?: AccountVerification;\n  resolved_operator?: string | null;\n  /** Wallets linked to the same operator as the resolved identity. Capped at 100 entries\n   *  by the API. Useful for advertising in 402 challenges so wallet-auth agents know which\n   *  alt-signers will satisfy `wallet_signer_mismatch`. */\n  linked_wallets?: string[];\n  verify_url?: string;\n  policy_result?: PolicyResult | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reason a failOpen allow short-circuited an evaluate call due to AgentScore-side\n * infrastructure issues. Surfaced on `EvaluateOutcome` so merchants can log/alert when\n * their gate is running in degraded mode (compliance not actually enforced this request).\n *\n * - `quota_exceeded` — AgentScore returned 429\n * - `api_error` — AgentScore returned 5xx or non-2xx that isn't 429\n * - `network_timeout` — request to /v1/assess timed out or failed at the network layer\n */\nexport type FailOpenInfraReason = 'quota_exceeded' | 'api_error' | 'network_timeout';\n\n/** Per-account assess quota observability, captured from `X-Quota-*` response headers\n *  on the success path. Mirrors the SDK's `QuotaInfo` shape — re-exported from gate state\n *  so merchants can monitor approach-to-cap proactively (warn at 80%, alert at 95%). */\nexport interface GateQuotaInfo {\n  limit: number | null;\n  used: number | null;\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp, or the literal string `\"never\"` for unlimited tiers. */\n  reset: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Outcome from `AgentScoreCore.evaluate()`. Adapters map this to framework-specific responses.\n *\n * - `{ kind: 'allow', data }` — the request passed the policy. `data` is present on a normal\n *   allow; `undefined` when fail-open short-circuited (identity missing, API unreachable,\n *   timeout, or 402 paid-tier required).\n * - When `failOpen: true` and the allow was the result of an AgentScore-side infrastructure\n *   failure (429/5xx/timeout), the result also carries `degraded: true` + `infraReason` so\n *   merchants can alert/log without parsing console output.\n * - `quota` propagates the SDK's per-request quota observability when the API emits the\n *   `X-Quota-*` headers. Optional; absent on Enterprise / unlimited tiers.\n * - `{ kind: 'deny', reason }` — the request was denied. Adapters should render a 403 with the\n *   reason, or invoke the caller's custom denial handler.\n */\nexport type EvaluateOutcome =\n  | { kind: 'allow'; data?: AssessResult; degraded?: boolean; infraReason?: FailOpenInfraReason; quota?: GateQuotaInfo }\n  | { kind: 'deny'; reason: DenialReason };\n\nexport interface CaptureWalletOptions {\n  /** Operator credential (`opc_...`) that the agent authenticated with. */\n  operatorToken: string;\n  /** Signer wallet recovered from the payment payload. */\n  walletAddress: string;\n  /** Key-derivation family — `\"evm\"` for any EVM chain, `\"solana\"` for Solana. */\n  network: 'evm' | 'solana';\n  /** Optional stable key for the logical payment (e.g., payment intent id, tx hash). When the\n   *  same key is seen again for the same (credential, wallet, network), the server no-ops —\n   *  prevents agent retries from inflating transaction_count. */\n  idempotencyKey?: string;\n}\n\n/** Combined wallet-signer verdict surfaced by `getSignerVerdict(c)` — both verdicts come\n *  through the gate's primary `/v1/assess` call (single round trip). `signer_match` describes\n *  the wallet-binding (claimed wallet's operator ≡ signer wallet's operator); `signer_sanctions`\n *  describes the OFAC SDN wallet-address check.\n *\n *  `signer_match` is projected to the gate's camelCase `VerifyWalletSignerResult` shape so\n *  existing `buildSignerMismatchBody(...)` helpers consume it unchanged. `signer_sanctions`\n *  passes through in the API's wire shape (already short and stable). Returned `undefined`\n *  from `getSignerVerdict` when the gate didn't run with a signer (operator-token-only\n *  paths, discovery legs with no payment header). */\nexport interface SignerVerdict {\n  signer_match: VerifyWalletSignerResult | null;\n  signer_sanctions:\n    | { status: 'clear' }\n    | { sanctioned: true; ofac_label: string; sdn_uid: string; listed_at: string | null }\n    | { status: 'unavailable' }\n    | null;\n}\n\nexport type VerifyWalletSignerResult =\n  | { kind: 'pass'; claimedOperator: string | null; signerOperator: string | null }\n  | {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch';\n      claimedOperator: string | null;\n      actualSignerOperator: string | null;\n      expectedSigner: string;\n      actualSigner: string;\n      linkedWallets: string[];\n      /** JSON-encoded action copy (action + steps + user_message). Spread into the 403 body\n       *  verbatim so agents get a concrete recovery path inside the denial response itself. */\n      agentInstructions: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing';\n      claimedWallet: string;\n      agentInstructions: string;\n    };\n\nexport interface AgentScoreCore {\n  /**\n   * Evaluate the request's identity against the configured policy.\n   * @param identity - extracted identity (wallet address and/or operator token)\n   * @param ctx - optional framework-specific context (Hono c, Express req, etc.) passed\n   *   through to `createSessionOnMissing` hooks. Opaque to core.\n   */\n  evaluate(\n    identity: AgentIdentity | undefined,\n    ctx?: unknown,\n    /** Pre-extracted payment signer from the inbound request (the adapter middleware\n     *  extracts it via `extractPaymentSigner`). When provided, the assess call carries\n     *  it and the response includes `signer_match` + `signer_sanctions` verdicts in one\n     *  round trip. */\n    signer?: PaymentSigner | null,\n  ): Promise<EvaluateOutcome>;\n  /** Synchronous read of the cached signer verdicts (signer_match + signer_sanctions)\n   *  populated when the gate's evaluate call was made with a pre-extracted signer. Returns\n   *  `undefined` when the gate didn't run, the request was operator-token-authenticated,\n   *  or no signer was extractable (discovery legs). */\n  getSignerVerdict(claimedAddress: string): SignerVerdict | undefined;\n  /** Report a wallet seen paying under an operator credential. Fire-and-forget; silently\n   *  swallows non-fatal errors because capture is informational, not on the critical path. */\n  captureWallet(options: CaptureWalletOptions): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Internal cache entry for the gate's per-`(identity, policy)` assess result memo.\n *  Distinct from the public `AssessResult` interface (the typed `/v1/assess` response\n *  shape returned to merchants); this carries the cached decision plus the per-signer\n *  wallet-match sub-cache. */\ninterface CachedAssessResult {\n  allow: boolean;\n  decision?: string;\n  reasons?: string[];\n  raw?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the cross-merchant memory hint emitted on bootstrap denials. Base URLs are\n * derived from the gate's AgentScore API base so self-hosted / staging deployments get\n * correct pointers. Contents describe the AgentScore identity substrate in transferable\n * terms; merchant-specific context lives in other `agent_instructions` fields.\n */\n// Canonical production AgentScore API — used as the authoritative source for endpoint pointers\n// emitted to agent memory regardless of how a given merchant configured their gate's baseUrl.\nconst CANONICAL_AGENTSCORE_API = 'https://api.agentscore.sh';\n\n// JSON-encoded action copy emitted on wallet-signer-match denials. Spread into 403 bodies\n// by merchants so agents get a concrete recovery path inside the denial response itself —\n// no discovery-doc round trip required.\nconst WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'resign_or_switch_to_operator_token',\n  steps: [\n    'Preferred: re-submit the payment signed by expected_signer (or any entry in linked_wallets — same-operator wallets are fungible) and retry with the same X-Wallet-Address.',\n    'Alternative: drop X-Wallet-Address and retry with X-Operator-Token. Use a stored opc_... if you have one; otherwise retry this request with NO identity header — the merchant will mint a verification session in the 403 body (verify_url + poll_secret). Share verify_url with the user, poll, receive a fresh opc_...',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'The payment signer resolves to a different operator than X-Wallet-Address. Re-sign from expected_signer or any linked_wallets entry, or switch to X-Operator-Token.',\n});\n\nconst WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'switch_to_operator_token',\n  steps: [\n    'This payment rail (Stripe SPT, card) carries no wallet signature — X-Wallet-Address cannot be verified against the payment.',\n    'Drop X-Wallet-Address and retry with X-Operator-Token. If you do not have a stored opc_..., retry with no identity header to receive a verification session.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Wallet-address identity is only supported on wallet-signing rails (Tempo MPP, x402). On Stripe or card, use X-Operator-Token instead.',\n});\n\n// `invalid_credential` is permanent — the token doesn't exist (typo, never minted, fabricated).\n// Distinct from `token_expired` (which carries an auto-session for one-shot recovery): the\n// API doesn't auto-mint a session here because the client may simply have a different valid\n// token to try. Agents should switch tokens or drop the header to bootstrap a session.\nconst INVALID_CREDENTIAL_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'switch_token_or_restart_session',\n  steps: [\n    'The X-Operator-Token you sent does not match any credential. This is a permanent state — retrying with the same token will keep failing.',\n    'If you have other stored opc_... credentials, retry with one of them.',\n    'Otherwise drop X-Operator-Token and retry with no identity header — the merchant will mint a fresh verification session in the 403 body (verify_url + poll_secret) so the user can re-verify and you can poll for a new operator_token.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'The operator_token is not recognized. Use a different stored token, or restart the verification session flow to mint a new one.',\n});\n\nexport function buildAgentMemoryHint(): AgentMemoryHint {\n  // Memory pointers always point at the canonical production API — merchants must not be\n  // able to redirect the cross-merchant memory surface, since that would be a phishing\n  // vector for the verify URL.\n  const api = CANONICAL_AGENTSCORE_API;\n  return {\n    save_for_future_agentscore_gates: true,\n    pattern_summary:\n      'AgentScore is a cross-merchant identity substrate for agent commerce. Any endpoint that ' +\n      'returns 403 missing_identity / identity_verification_required or 402 challenges referencing AgentScore uses ' +\n      'the same identity system. One KYC works across all AgentScore merchants — no re-verification ' +\n      'per site. Save this pattern (and the endpoints below) to persistent memory so future ' +\n      'AgentScore encounters skip the cold-start session flow.',\n    quickstart: 'https://docs.agentscore.sh/guides/agent-identity',\n    identity_check_endpoint: `${api}/v1/credentials`,\n    identity_paths: {\n      wallet:\n        'If paying from a crypto wallet you have used before on any AgentScore merchant, send ' +\n        '`X-Wallet-Address: 0x...`. Shortest path; no token lifecycle to manage.',\n      operator_token:\n        'For any rail (Stripe SPT, card, or a wallet you have not linked yet), send ' +\n        '`X-Operator-Token: opc_...`. Reusable across merchants until the token expires.',\n    },\n    bootstrap:\n      'If you have neither a linked wallet nor a valid operator_token, follow the session/verify ' +\n      'flow in the per-request `agent_instructions` block. This happens at most once per agent ' +\n      'identity — after first verification, the operator_token and any subsequently used wallet ' +\n      'are reusable everywhere.',\n    do_not_persist_in_memory: ['operator_token', 'poll_secret'],\n    persist_in_credential_store: ['operator_token'],\n  };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Core factory\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport function createAgentScoreCore(options: AgentScoreCoreOptions): AgentScoreCore {\n  if (!options.apiKey) {\n    throw new Error('AgentScore API key is required. Get one at https://agentscore.sh/sign-up');\n  }\n\n  const {\n    apiKey,\n    requireKyc,\n    requireSanctionsClear,\n    minAge,\n    blockedJurisdictions,\n    allowedJurisdictions,\n    failOpen = false,\n    cacheSeconds = 300,\n    baseUrl: rawBaseUrl = 'https://api.agentscore.sh',\n    chain: gateChain,\n    userAgent,\n    createSessionOnMissing,\n  } = options;\n\n  const baseUrl = stripTrailingSlashes(rawBaseUrl);\n  const agentMemoryHint = buildAgentMemoryHint();\n\n  const defaultUa = `@agent-score/commerce@${__VERSION__}`;\n  const userAgentHeader = userAgent ? `${userAgent} (${defaultUa})` : defaultUa;\n\n  // Single shared SDK instance for every API call this gate makes (assess, sessions,\n  // credentials/wallets, telemetry). Connection pooling + typed-error classification +\n  // X-Quota-* header capture all flow through here. The SDK owns the transport layer\n  // (timeouts, retry-on-429); the gate adds policy semantics on top. Pass the\n  // merchant-prefixed UA — SDK appends its own default to produce a chain like\n  // `<merchant-app> (@agent-score/commerce@<v>) (@agent-score/sdk@<v>)`.\n  const sdk = new AgentScore({ apiKey, baseUrl, userAgent: userAgentHeader });\n\n  // createSessionOnMissing can carry its own apiKey + baseUrl (merchants sometimes wire\n  // a session-only key for this hook). Lazily build a separate SDK instance keyed on\n  // (apiKey, baseUrl) so we don't construct a new client per request.\n  const sessionSdkCache = new Map<string, AgentScore>();\n  function getSessionSdk(sessionApiKey: string, sessionBaseUrl?: string): AgentScore {\n    const key = `${sessionApiKey}|${sessionBaseUrl ?? ''}`;\n    let s = sessionSdkCache.get(key);\n    if (!s) {\n      s = new AgentScore({\n        apiKey: sessionApiKey,\n        baseUrl: sessionBaseUrl ?? baseUrl,\n        userAgent: userAgentHeader,\n      });\n      sessionSdkCache.set(key, s);\n    }\n    return s;\n  }\n\n  const cache = new TTLCache<CachedAssessResult>(cacheSeconds * 1000);\n\n  // Mint a verification session via /v1/sessions and return the resulting\n  // identity_verification_required DenialReason — or undefined if the mint failed (network\n  // error, non-2xx, missing fields). Used for both the missing-identity path and the\n  // fixable-wallet bootstrap path: in both cases the UX is identical (agent polls the\n  // returned poll_url until it gets a fresh opc_... and retries).\n  async function tryMintSessionDenial(ctx: unknown): Promise<DenialReason | undefined> {\n    if (!createSessionOnMissing) return undefined;\n    try {\n      const sessionBody: { context?: string; product_name?: string } = {};\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.context != null) sessionBody.context = createSessionOnMissing.context;\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.productName != null) sessionBody.product_name = createSessionOnMissing.productName;\n\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions && ctx !== undefined) {\n        try {\n          const dynamic = await createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions(ctx);\n          if (dynamic?.context != null) sessionBody.context = dynamic.context;\n          if (dynamic?.productName != null) sessionBody.product_name = dynamic.productName;\n        } catch (err) {\n          console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions hook failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // createSessionOnMissing.apiKey may differ from the gate's apiKey (e.g. merchant\n      // wires a session-only key for this hook). Build a per-config SDK lazily.\n      const sessionSdk = getSessionSdk(createSessionOnMissing.apiKey, createSessionOnMissing.baseUrl);\n      const data = (await sessionSdk.createSession({\n        ...(sessionBody.context !== undefined ? { context: sessionBody.context } : {}),\n        ...(sessionBody.product_name !== undefined ? { product_name: sessionBody.product_name } : {}),\n      })) as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n      // Validate required fields before trusting the response. A misbehaving (or mocked-wrong)\n      // API could 200 without session_id/poll_secret/verify_url, which would propagate\n      // `undefined` into the 403 body and leave the agent stuck — treat as session-create\n      // failure and fall back to the caller's bare denial.\n      if (\n        typeof data.session_id !== 'string' ||\n        typeof data.poll_secret !== 'string' ||\n        typeof data.verify_url !== 'string'\n      ) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/sessions returned 200 without required fields — falling back to bare denial');\n        return undefined;\n      }\n\n      // Run onBeforeSession side-effect hook. Errors are swallowed — a failing DB write\n      // (e.g. can't insert pending order) should not block the 403.\n      let extra: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession && ctx !== undefined) {\n        try {\n          const sessionMeta = {\n            session_id: data.session_id as string,\n            verify_url: data.verify_url as string,\n            poll_secret: data.poll_secret as string,\n            poll_url: data.poll_url as string,\n            expires_at: data.expires_at as string | undefined,\n          };\n          const result = await createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession(ctx, sessionMeta);\n          if (result && typeof result === 'object') extra = result;\n        } catch (err) {\n          console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession hook failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // The API emits `next_steps` (structured object) on /v1/sessions success. Stringify it\n      // into the gate's `agent_instructions` contract so merchants get the same JSON-encoded\n      // {action, steps, user_message} envelope as every other gate-emitted denial.\n      const apiNextSteps = data.next_steps as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      return {\n        code: 'identity_verification_required',\n        verify_url: data.verify_url as string,\n        session_id: data.session_id as string,\n        poll_secret: data.poll_secret as string,\n        poll_url: data.poll_url as string | undefined,\n        agent_instructions: apiNextSteps ? JSON.stringify(apiNextSteps) : undefined,\n        agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n        ...(extra && { extra }),\n      };\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Session-mint failed (network, /v1/sessions returned non-2xx, body parse error,\n      // onBeforeSession threw inside the inner try). Caller falls back to a bare denial —\n      // agents still get a 403 with a probe-strategy hint. Log loudly so a persistent\n      // /v1/sessions outage isn't masked.\n      console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing path failed — falling back to bare denial:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function evaluate(\n    identity: AgentIdentity | undefined,\n    ctx?: unknown,\n    signer?: PaymentSigner | null,\n  ): Promise<EvaluateOutcome> {\n    // Treat \"returned identity object with no usable fields\" the same as \"no identity at all\" —\n    // otherwise a misbehaving custom extractIdentity would send an empty body to /v1/assess.\n    if (!identity || (!identity.address && !identity.operatorToken)) {\n      // failOpen short-circuits BEFORE the session mint. This branch isn't an infra failure\n      // (no AgentScore call has been made yet) so we don't mark the gate state as degraded —\n      // missing identity + failOpen is the explicit opt-in pass-through behavior, not a\n      // graceful-degradation event. Merchants who need identity-or-deny on a failOpen gate\n      // should add a guard at the handler that checks for X-Wallet-Address / X-Operator-Token\n      // before reading the gate state.\n      if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow' };\n\n      const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n      if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n\n      // Bare missing-identity denial (no session was auto-created). Describe the probe\n      // strategy so agents without memory can recover: try wallet first on signing rails,\n      // fall back to stored opc_..., fall back to session flow (noting that only\n      // auto-session merchants return verify_url + poll data on the retry).\n      const missingIdentityInstructions = JSON.stringify({\n        action: 'probe_identity_then_session',\n        steps: [\n          'If you have a wallet AND this merchant accepts a wallet-signing rail (Tempo MPP or x402 — see openapi.json x-payment-info): send X-Wallet-Address and retry. If the wallet is already linked to an AgentScore operator (via prior SIWE claim or prior captureWallet), this passes in one round trip. If the wallet is unlinked or the account has no KYC, the 403 will include a verify_url — share it with the user to claim the wallet + complete KYC, then retry.',\n          'If step 1 is denied or you already have a stored operator_token (valid + not expired): send X-Operator-Token: opc_... and retry.',\n          'If neither applies: retry with NO identity header. Merchants that auto-create verification sessions (most AgentScore merchants do) return verify_url + session_id + poll_secret in the 403 body — share verify_url with the user, then poll poll_url every 5s with the X-Poll-Secret header until status=verified (the poll returns a one-time operator_token). If the retry returns the same bare 403, this merchant does not support self-service session bootstrapping — direct the user to https://agentscore.sh/sign-up to create an AgentScore identity and mint an operator_token from their dashboard (https://agentscore.sh/dashboard/verify). The user hands the opc_... to you, and you retry with X-Operator-Token.',\n        ],\n        user_message:\n          'Try X-Wallet-Address first if you have a wallet and the merchant accepts Tempo/x402; fall back to a stored X-Operator-Token, then to the session/verify flow described in agent_memory.bootstrap.',\n      });\n      return {\n        kind: 'deny',\n        reason: {\n          code: 'missing_identity',\n          agent_instructions: missingIdentityInstructions,\n          agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    // operator_token is opaque + ASCII-only — lowercasing is safe. Wallet addresses go\n    // through normalizeAddress because Solana base58 is case-sensitive and lowercasing\n    // would corrupt the cache key (a Solana cache miss every time, plus collision risk\n    // with mixed-case variants of the same operator).\n    const cacheKey = identity.operatorToken?.toLowerCase() ?? (identity.address ? normalizeAddress(identity.address) : '');\n\n    const cached = cache.get(cacheKey);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (cached.allow) {\n        const cachedRaw = cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n        const cachedQuota = cachedRaw?.quota as GateQuotaInfo | undefined;\n        return {\n          kind: 'allow',\n          data: cachedRaw as unknown as AssessResult,\n          ...(cachedQuota !== undefined && { quota: cachedQuota }),\n        };\n      }\n      // Fixable compliance denials (kyc_required, kyc_pending, kyc_failed) get the\n      // same UX as missing_identity: mint a fresh verification session, agent polls\n      // until status=verified, gets a fresh opc_..., retries. Unfixable reasons\n      // (sanctions_flagged, age_insufficient, jurisdiction_restricted) keep the bare\n      // wallet_not_trusted denial. `jurisdiction_restricted` is unfixable: the API\n      // only emits it after KYC is verified (the user's KYC'd country is in the\n      // blocked list — re-doing KYC won't change the country).\n      if (isFixableDenial(cached.reasons)) {\n        const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n        if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n      }\n      return {\n        kind: 'deny',\n        reason: {\n          code: 'wallet_not_trusted',\n          decision: cached.decision,\n          reasons: cached.reasons,\n          verify_url: (cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.verify_url as string | undefined,\n          data: cached.raw as AssessResult | undefined,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    const policy: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    if (requireKyc != null) policy.require_kyc = requireKyc;\n    if (requireSanctionsClear != null) policy.require_sanctions_clear = requireSanctionsClear;\n    if (minAge != null) policy.min_age = minAge;\n    if (blockedJurisdictions != null) policy.blocked_jurisdictions = blockedJurisdictions;\n    if (allowedJurisdictions != null) policy.allowed_jurisdictions = allowedJurisdictions;\n\n    let data: Record<string, unknown>;\n    try {\n      // Single SDK call: typed-error subclasses (PaymentRequiredError / TokenExpiredError /\n      // InvalidCredentialError / QuotaExceededError / TimeoutError) flow through the\n      // catch below; success path captures `quota` from X-Quota-* headers automatically.\n      const opts = {\n        chain: gateChain,\n        ...(Object.keys(policy).length > 0 ? { policy: policy as never } : {}),\n        // Pre-extracted payment signer (by the adapter middleware). When present, the API\n        // composes BOTH signer_match (wallet-binding) and signer_sanctions (OFAC SDN wallet\n        // check) verdicts on the response in one round trip. Under\n        // policy.require_sanctions_clear, a signer_sanctions hit flips decision -> deny inline.\n        ...(signer && { signer: { address: signer.address, network: signer.network } }),\n      };\n      // SDK has two overloads — narrow by which identity is set so TS picks the right one.\n      const result = identity.address\n        ? await sdk.assess(identity.address, { ...opts, operatorToken: identity.operatorToken })\n        : await sdk.assess(null, { ...opts, operatorToken: identity.operatorToken! });\n      data = result as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof PaymentRequiredError) {\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'payment_required' } };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof TokenExpiredError) {\n        // SDK extracts the auto-minted session fields onto the error instance — no body\n        // re-parsing needed here.\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: {\n            code: 'token_expired',\n            data: err.details as unknown as AssessResult,\n            ...(err.verifyUrl ? { verify_url: err.verifyUrl } : {}),\n            ...(err.sessionId ? { session_id: err.sessionId } : {}),\n            ...(err.pollSecret ? { poll_secret: err.pollSecret } : {}),\n            ...(err.pollUrl ? { poll_url: err.pollUrl } : {}),\n            ...(err.nextSteps ? { agent_instructions: JSON.stringify(err.nextSteps) } : {}),\n            ...(err.agentMemory ? { agent_memory: err.agentMemory as AgentMemoryHint } : {}),\n          },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof InvalidCredentialError) {\n        // Permanent — no auto-session, agent should switch tokens or restart.\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: {\n            code: 'invalid_credential',\n            agent_instructions: INVALID_CREDENTIAL_INSTRUCTIONS,\n            agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n          },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof QuotaExceededError) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess returned 429 quota_exceeded');\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'quota_exceeded' };\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: { code: 'api_error', agent_instructions: QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof SdkTimeoutError) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess timed out:', err.message);\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'network_timeout' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n      }\n      // Status-based fallbacks for AgentScoreError instances the SDK couldn't classify\n      // into a typed subclass (e.g. 429 with body that lacked error.code, or a fetch\n      // rejection whose .name doesn't match AbortError but whose status code is set).\n      // The real API always emits error.code on 429, so this is purely defensive.\n      const status = (err as { status?: number } | null)?.status;\n      const errName = err instanceof Error ? err.name : '';\n      if (status === 429) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess returned 429 (untyped — defensive)');\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'quota_exceeded' };\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: { code: 'api_error', agent_instructions: QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS },\n        };\n      }\n      if (errName === 'TimeoutError' || errName === 'AbortError') {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess timed out (by Error.name):', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'network_timeout' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n      }\n      // Generic AgentScoreError (rate_limited, 5xx, network_error, body parse, unknown 4xx)\n      // or any non-AgentScoreError unexpected throw — surface as api_error.\n      // Include the SDK-classified error code (when available) so ops/dev see\n      // schema-drift cases like a new 401 error.code rather than a silent 503.\n      const errCode = (err as { code?: string } | null)?.code;\n      const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n      const detail = errCode ? `${errCode}: ${msg}` : msg;\n      console.warn(`[gate] /v1/assess call failed — surfacing as api_error: ${detail}`);\n      if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'api_error' };\n      return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n    }\n\n    const decision = data.decision as string | null | undefined;\n    const decisionReasons = (data.decision_reasons as string[]) ?? [];\n    const allow = decision === 'allow' || decision == null;\n\n    cache.set(cacheKey, { allow, decision: decision ?? undefined, reasons: decisionReasons, raw: data });\n\n    if (allow) {\n      // SDK populates `quota` on the assess response from X-Quota-* headers when the\n      // API emits them. Surface up to the adapter so merchants can monitor approach-to-cap.\n      const quota = data.quota as GateQuotaInfo | undefined;\n      return {\n        kind: 'allow',\n        data: data as unknown as AssessResult,\n        ...(quota !== undefined && { quota }),\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Fixable compliance denials (kyc_required, kyc_pending, kyc_failed) get the\n    // same UX as missing_identity: mint a fresh verification session, agent polls\n    // until status=verified, gets a fresh opc_..., retries. Unfixable reasons\n    // (sanctions_flagged, age_insufficient, jurisdiction_restricted) keep the bare\n    // wallet_not_trusted denial. `jurisdiction_restricted` is unfixable: the API\n    // only emits it after KYC is verified (the user's KYC'd country is in the\n    // blocked list — re-doing KYC won't change the country).\n    if (isFixableDenial(decisionReasons)) {\n      const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n      if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n    }\n\n    return {\n      kind: 'deny',\n      reason: {\n        code: 'wallet_not_trusted',\n        decision: decision ?? undefined,\n        reasons: decisionReasons,\n        verify_url: data.verify_url as string | undefined,\n        data: data as unknown as AssessResult,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  async function captureWallet(options: CaptureWalletOptions): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      await sdk.associateWallet({\n        operatorToken: options.operatorToken,\n        walletAddress: options.walletAddress,\n        network: options.network,\n        ...(options.idempotencyKey ? { idempotencyKey: options.idempotencyKey } : {}),\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Fire-and-forget: don't throw. Log so a persistent capture outage is visible\n      // to merchant ops — otherwise wallet↔operator linkage silently stops.\n      console.warn('[agentscore-commerce] captureWallet failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Project the API's signer_match block onto the gate's VerifyWalletSignerResult shape.\n  // The API authors agent_instructions, claimed/signer operators, and the linked-wallet\n  // set (deny-guarded server-side); the gate just shapes those fields into camelCase.\n  function projectSignerMatch(\n    sm: Record<string, unknown>,\n    claimedNorm: string,\n    signerNorm: string,\n  ): VerifyWalletSignerResult {\n    const kind = sm.kind as string;\n    if (kind === 'pass') {\n      return {\n        kind: 'pass',\n        claimedOperator: (sm.claimed_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        signerOperator: (sm.signer_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      };\n    }\n    if (kind === 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing') {\n      return {\n        kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n        claimedWallet: (sm.claimed_wallet as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm,\n        agentInstructions:\n          (sm.agent_instructions as string | undefined) ?? WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS,\n      };\n    }\n    // Default: wallet_signer_mismatch\n    const linked = sm.linked_wallets;\n    return {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n      claimedOperator: (sm.claimed_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      actualSignerOperator: (sm.signer_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      expectedSigner: (sm.expected_signer as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm,\n      actualSigner: (sm.actual_signer as string | undefined) ?? signerNorm,\n      linkedWallets: Array.isArray(linked)\n        ? (linked as unknown[]).filter((w): w is string => typeof w === 'string')\n        : [],\n      agentInstructions:\n        (sm.agent_instructions as string | undefined) ?? WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Synchronous read of the cached signer verdicts. Adapter middleware extracts the\n   * signer pre-evaluate and the gate's primary /v1/assess call composes both verdicts\n   * (signer_match + signer_sanctions) in one round trip — this getter just reads the\n   * cached response. Returns `undefined` for operator-token-only paths, discovery legs\n   * with no payment credential, or when the gate didn't run.\n   */\n  function getSignerVerdict(claimedAddress: string): SignerVerdict | undefined {\n    const claimedNorm = normalizeAddress(claimedAddress);\n    const cached = cache.get(claimedNorm);\n    if (!cached) return undefined;\n    const raw = cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    if (!raw) return undefined;\n    const rawMatch = raw.signer_match as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    const rawSanctions = raw.signer_sanctions as SignerVerdict['signer_sanctions'] | undefined;\n    if (!rawMatch && !rawSanctions) return undefined;\n    // The API's signer_match has the actual signer wallet baked in (actual_signer); we\n    // didn't track it separately in the cache key (only claimed-side). Pass the API's own\n    // actual_signer as signerNorm so the projected shape is consistent.\n    const signerNorm = (rawMatch?.actual_signer as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm;\n    return {\n      signer_match: rawMatch ? projectSignerMatch(rawMatch, claimedNorm, signerNorm) : null,\n      signer_sanctions: rawSanctions ?? null,\n    };\n  }\n\n  return { evaluate, captureWallet, getSignerVerdict };\n}\n","/**\n * Universal denial helpers shared across every adapter.\n *\n * What lives here:\n *   - `FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS` / `isFixableDenial` — classifier for compliance reasons that can\n *     be resolved by re-completing KYC (vs sanctions / age failures which are permanent).\n *   - `denialReasonStatus` — picks the right HTTP status code per denial code (401 for credential\n *     problems, 503 for transient API errors, 403 for everything else).\n *   - `buildSignerMismatchBody` — produces the standard 403 body for a non-pass signer_match\n *     verdict (read via `getSignerVerdict`).\n *   - `buildContactSupportNextSteps` — standard `next_steps.action: \"contact_support\"` shape for\n *     unfixable compliance denials.\n *   - `verificationAgentInstructions` — the canned `agent_instructions` block for\n *     identity-verification 403s. Vendors can override individual fields.\n *\n * Adapters use `denialReasonStatus` inside their default `onDenied` so vendors get the right\n * status code for free. The body builders are exported from each adapter so vendors who write\n * a custom `onDenied` can compose them without copy-paste.\n */\n\nimport type { DenialReason, VerifyWalletSignerResult } from './core';\n\n/**\n * Compliance denial reasons that can be resolved by re-completing KYC. The API emits these\n * when KYC is missing/pending/failed; the user can re-verify and retry.\n *\n * `jurisdiction_restricted` is NOT in this set — the API only emits it AFTER KYC is verified,\n * meaning the user's KYC'd country is in the merchant's blocked list (or absent from the\n * allowed list). Re-doing KYC won't change the country, so it's permanent. Same shape as\n * `sanctions_flagged` and `age_insufficient` — surface contact_support, don't waste a\n * /v1/sessions mint.\n */\nexport const FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'kyc_required',\n  'kyc_pending',\n  'kyc_failed',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Returns true when a `wallet_not_trusted` denial's reasons are all fixable via KYC\n * re-verification. False when any reason is permanent (sanctions, age, jurisdiction_restricted).\n *\n * Empty reasons returns false — without a known reason we can't promise a fix, so default to\n * the bare denial path (vendors can override via custom onDenied if they want different\n * behavior on empty reasons).\n */\nexport function isFixableDenial(reasons: readonly string[] | undefined): boolean {\n  if (!reasons || reasons.length === 0) return false;\n  return reasons.every((r) => FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS.has(r));\n}\n\n/**\n * The right HTTP status code for a denial. `defaultOnDenied` in every adapter uses this so\n * vendors get correct status codes without writing per-code branches.\n *\n *   - 401 for credential problems the agent can recover from (`token_expired`, `invalid_credential`)\n *   - 503 for transient `api_error`\n *   - 403 for everything else (identity required, compliance fail, signer mismatch, etc.)\n */\nexport function denialReasonStatus(reason: DenialReason): 401 | 403 | 503 {\n  if (reason.code === 'token_expired' || reason.code === 'invalid_credential') return 401;\n  if (reason.code === 'api_error') return 503;\n  return 403;\n}\n\nexport interface SignerMismatchBodyInput {\n  /** Projected signer_match verdict (from `getSignerVerdict(ctx).signer_match`). Only non-pass\n   *  kinds produce a body. */\n  result: VerifyWalletSignerResult;\n  /** Optional override for the human-facing `next_steps.user_message`. */\n  userMessage?: string;\n  /** Optional override for `next_steps.learn_more_url`. Default: AgentScore agent-identity guide. */\n  learnMoreUrl?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Standard 403 body for a non-pass signer-match verdict. Returns null for `pass` so vendors\n * can call it unconditionally:\n *\n *   const verdict = getSignerVerdict(c);\n *   if (verdict?.signer_match) {\n *     const mismatchBody = buildSignerMismatchBody({ result: verdict.signer_match });\n *     if (mismatchBody) return c.json(mismatchBody, 403);\n *   }\n *\n * Body shape mirrors the gate's denial bodies: top-level error.code, all signer-match fields\n * (`claimed_operator`, `actual_signer_operator`, `expected_signer`, `actual_signer`,\n * `linked_wallets`), plus a `next_steps` action describing the recovery path.\n */\nexport function buildSignerMismatchBody(input: SignerMismatchBodyInput): Record<string, unknown> | null {\n  const { result } = input;\n  if (result.kind === 'pass') return null;\n\n  const learnMoreUrl = input.learnMoreUrl ?? 'https://docs.agentscore.sh/guides/agent-identity';\n\n  if (result.kind === 'wallet_signer_mismatch') {\n    const linkedWallets = result.linkedWallets ?? [];\n    const userMessage = input.userMessage ?? (linkedWallets.length > 0\n      ? `Sign the payment with one of the wallets linked to this operator: ${linkedWallets.join(', ')}. Then retry.`\n      : 'Sign the payment with the same wallet you claimed via X-Wallet-Address, or switch to X-Operator-Token for rail-independent identity.');\n    return {\n      error: {\n        code: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n        message:\n          'Payment signer does not match the wallet claimed via X-Wallet-Address. The signer and the claimed wallet must both resolve to the same AgentScore operator.',\n      },\n      claimed_operator: result.claimedOperator,\n      actual_signer_operator: result.actualSignerOperator ?? null,\n      expected_signer: result.expectedSigner,\n      actual_signer: result.actualSigner,\n      linked_wallets: linkedWallets,\n      next_steps: {\n        action: 'regenerate_payment_from_linked_wallet',\n        user_message: userMessage,\n        learn_more_url: learnMoreUrl,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing\n  return {\n    error: {\n      code: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n      message:\n        'Wallet-auth requires a payment rail that carries a wallet signature (Tempo MPP, x402). Stripe SPT and card rails have no wallet signer; switch to X-Operator-Token to use those.',\n    },\n    next_steps: {\n      action: 'switch_to_operator_token',\n      user_message:\n        input.userMessage ??\n        'Drop the X-Wallet-Address header and retry with X-Operator-Token (works on every payment rail).',\n      learn_more_url: learnMoreUrl,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Standard `next_steps` block for unfixable compliance denials (sanctions, age, etc.). Vendors\n * spread this into a 403 body alongside the usual `error`/`reasons` fields.\n *\n *   return c.json({\n *     error: { code: 'compliance_denied', message: '...' },\n *     reasons,\n *     next_steps: buildContactSupportNextSteps('support@example.com'),\n *   }, 403);\n */\nexport function buildContactSupportNextSteps(\n  supportEmail: string,\n  message?: string,\n): { action: 'contact_support'; support_email: string; user_message: string } {\n  return {\n    action: 'contact_support',\n    support_email: supportEmail,\n    user_message:\n      message ??\n      `If you believe this denial is in error, contact support at ${supportEmail} with your order details.`,\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface VerificationAgentInstructionsInput {\n  /** Override the user-facing message. */\n  userAction?: string;\n  /** Replace the generic \"Retry the original merchant request...\" step with a merchant-specific\n   *  one (e.g. \"Retry POST /purchase with X-Operator-Token AND include order_id...\"). When set,\n   *  this REPLACES baseSteps[4] rather than appending — use it instead of `extraSteps[0]` when\n   *  your retry instruction is a refinement of the canonical retry, not an additional step. */\n  retryStep?: string;\n  /** Append additional steps after the retry step. Use this for genuinely additional steps\n   *  (e.g. \"After payment the same call returns 200 with the order\"), not for re-stating the\n   *  retry — use `retryStep` for that. */\n  extraSteps?: string[];\n  /** Override the poll cadence. Default 5 seconds. */\n  pollIntervalSeconds?: number;\n  /** Override how long the agent should keep polling. Default 3600 seconds (1 hour). */\n  timeoutSeconds?: number;\n  /** Optional `order_ttl` note describing how long pending orders survive. */\n  orderTtl?: string;\n  /** Arbitrary additional fields merged into the instructions object. */\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * The canonical `agent_instructions` block for identity-verification 403s. Tells the agent how to\n * present the verify_url, poll for the operator_token, and retry the original request. Universal\n * across every AgentScore-gated merchant — overrides let vendors add merchant-specific steps\n * (e.g. \"include order_id when retrying\").\n */\nexport function verificationAgentInstructions(input: VerificationAgentInstructionsInput = {}): {\n  action: 'poll_for_credential';\n  user_action: string;\n  steps: string[];\n  poll_interval_seconds: number;\n  poll_secret_header: 'X-Poll-Secret';\n  retry_token_header: 'X-Operator-Token';\n  timeout_seconds: number;\n  order_ttl?: string;\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n} {\n  const baseSteps = [\n    'Present the verify_url directly to the user — it is a complete, ready-to-open URL with the session token already embedded (e.g. https://agentscore.sh/verify?session=sess_...). Do NOT modify or construct the URL yourself.',\n    `Immediately begin polling poll_url every ${input.pollIntervalSeconds ?? 5} seconds with header X-Poll-Secret set to poll_secret. The user will complete verification in their browser while you poll in the background.`,\n    'The user visits the URL, signs in, completes identity verification (photo ID + selfie via Stripe Identity), and closes the tab. They do NOT need to copy or paste anything back to you.',\n    'When your poll returns status \"verified\", extract operator_token from the response. This is a one-time value — save it immediately. Subsequent polls return status \"consumed\" without the token.',\n    input.retryStep ?? 'Retry the original merchant request with header X-Operator-Token set to the operator_token value.',\n  ];\n\n  return {\n    action: 'poll_for_credential',\n    user_action:\n      input.userAction ??\n      'The user must visit verify_url to complete identity verification before this request can proceed',\n    steps: input.extraSteps ? [...baseSteps, ...input.extraSteps] : baseSteps,\n    poll_interval_seconds: input.pollIntervalSeconds ?? 5,\n    poll_secret_header: 'X-Poll-Secret',\n    retry_token_header: 'X-Operator-Token',\n    timeout_seconds: input.timeoutSeconds ?? 3600,\n    ...(input.orderTtl ? { order_ttl: input.orderTtl } : {}),\n    ...(input.extra ?? {}),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Shared DenialReason → response body serialization for all adapters.\n *\n * Keeps Hono / Express / Fastify / Web / Next.js defaults aligned — a field added\n * here shows up in every adapter's 403 body automatically, and there's one place\n * to test the marshaling.\n *\n * Body shape: `{ error: { code, message }, ... }` — matches the canonical AgentScore\n * error envelope so downstream agents see one consistent `error.code` +\n * `error.message` pair regardless of which layer produced the denial.\n */\n\nimport type { DenialCode, DenialReason } from './core.js';\n\n/**\n * JSON-encoded canonical agent_instructions per denial code. Auto-injected by\n * `denialReasonToBody` when the gate produces a DenialReason without explicit\n * `agent_instructions` so every denial carries a machine-readable next step.\n *\n * Codes covered:\n *  - `wallet_not_trusted` — gate never stamps instructions today (the original gap)\n *  - `payment_required` — gate never stamps; merchant tier misconfig, contact-merchant action\n *  - `identity_verification_required` — fallback when API didn't return next_steps\n *  - `token_expired` — fallback when API didn't return next_steps\n *  - `api_error` — `retry_with_backoff` envelope; sole retry channel (no separate\n *    next_steps block emitted)\n *\n * Codes already stamped explicitly upstream in core.ts (`missing_identity`,\n * `invalid_credential`) and codes that don't go through DenialReason\n * (`wallet_signer_mismatch`, `wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing` — handled by\n * `getSignerVerdict` + `buildSignerMismatchBody`) are not in this map.\n */\nconst WALLET_NOT_TRUSTED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_support',\n  steps: [\n    'The wallet\\'s operator failed an UNFIXABLE compliance check (sanctions, age, or jurisdiction). `reasons` lists which: `sanctions_flagged` / `age_insufficient` / `jurisdiction_restricted`. KYC re-verification won\\'t change the outcome — the policy denial is structural.',\n    'Surface the denial to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact. Do not retry the same merchant request; do not hand the user a verify_url (verification won\\'t fix this code path).',\n    'Fixable compliance reasons (`kyc_required`, `kyc_pending`, `kyc_failed`) do NOT land on this code — the gate auto-mints a verification session for those and returns `identity_verification_required` with poll endpoints, same shape as `missing_identity`. `jurisdiction_restricted` IS in the unfixable bucket because the API only emits it after KYC is verified (the user\\'s KYC\\'d country is in the blocked list — re-doing KYC won\\'t change the country).',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This purchase is denied by the merchant\\'s compliance policy and cannot be resolved by re-verifying. Contact the merchant\\'s support if you believe this is in error.',\n});\n\nconst PAYMENT_REQUIRED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_merchant',\n  steps: [\n    'The merchant\\'s AgentScore account does not have the assess endpoint enabled, so agent identity cannot be evaluated. This is a merchant-side configuration gap — there is no agent-side recovery.',\n    'Contact the merchant (their support channel — typically listed in /llms.txt or the OpenAPI servers metadata) so they can resolve the configuration on their side.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This merchant\\'s identity gate is misconfigured. Contact the merchant — there\\'s nothing to fix on the agent side.',\n});\n\nconst IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'deliver_verify_url_and_poll',\n  steps: [\n    'Share verify_url with the user — they complete identity verification on AgentScore.',\n    'If session_id + poll_secret are present in the body, poll poll_url every 5 seconds with header `X-Poll-Secret: <poll_secret>` until status=verified. The poll returns a one-time operator_token.',\n    'Retry the original request with header `X-Operator-Token: <opc_...>`.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Identity verification is required. Visit verify_url, then poll poll_url for the operator token and retry.',\n});\n\nconst API_ERROR_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'retry_with_backoff',\n  steps: [\n    'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry the request after 5–30 seconds with exponential backoff.',\n    'This is NOT a compliance denial — the user does not need to re-verify their identity. Send the same identity headers (X-Wallet-Address or X-Operator-Token) on retry.',\n    'If the request continues to fail after 3+ retries (~60 seconds total), surface the error to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a moment — this is a transient issue, not a problem with your account.',\n});\n\nexport const QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_merchant',\n  steps: [\n    'AgentScore identity verification is unavailable for this merchant. This is a merchant-side issue and is NOT recoverable via retry.',\n    'Do not retry: the same 503 will be returned until the merchant resolves the issue on their side.',\n    'Surface to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact. The merchant (not the agent) needs to act.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This merchant\\'s identity verification is temporarily unavailable. Try again later, or contact the merchant directly.',\n});\n\nconst TOKEN_EXPIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'deliver_verify_url_and_poll',\n  steps: [\n    'The operator token is expired or revoked. AgentScore auto-mints a fresh verification session — complete it to receive a new opc_...',\n    'Share verify_url with the user, then poll poll_url every 5 seconds with header `X-Poll-Secret: <poll_secret>` until status=verified. The poll returns a fresh one-time operator_token.',\n    'Retry the original request with header `X-Operator-Token: <new_opc_...>`.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Operator token is expired or revoked. A new verification session has been minted — visit verify_url to refresh.',\n});\n\nconst DEFAULT_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS: Partial<Record<DenialCode, string>> = {\n  api_error: API_ERROR_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  wallet_not_trusted: WALLET_NOT_TRUSTED_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  payment_required: PAYMENT_REQUIRED_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  identity_verification_required: IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  token_expired: TOKEN_EXPIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS,\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_MESSAGES: Record<DenialCode, string> = {\n  missing_identity:\n    'No identity provided. Send X-Wallet-Address (wallet) or X-Operator-Token (credential).',\n  identity_verification_required:\n    'Identity verification is required to access this resource. Visit verify_url to complete KYC.',\n  wallet_not_trusted:\n    'The wallet does not meet the merchant compliance policy.',\n  api_error:\n    'AgentScore is unreachable. This is transient — retry in a few seconds.',\n  payment_required:\n    'Assess endpoint not enabled for this merchant. Contact support.',\n  wallet_signer_mismatch:\n    'Payment signer does not match the wallet claimed via X-Wallet-Address. The signer and the claimed wallet must both resolve to the same AgentScore operator.',\n  wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing:\n    'X-Wallet-Address was sent with a rail that has no wallet signature (Stripe SPT / card). Switch to X-Operator-Token, or use a wallet-signing rail (Tempo MPP, x402).',\n  token_expired:\n    'The operator token is expired or revoked. A fresh verification session has been minted — visit verify_url to mint a new token.',\n  invalid_credential:\n    'The operator token is not recognized. Switch to a different stored token, or drop the header to bootstrap a fresh session.',\n};\n\n// Field names the gate claims authority over. Merchant-provided `extra` (from the\n// onBeforeSession hook) MUST NOT override these — a buggy or malicious hook could\n// otherwise replace `verify_url` with a phishing URL or drop agent_instructions.\nconst RESERVED_FIELDS = new Set([\n  'error',\n  'decision',\n  'reasons',\n  'verify_url',\n  'session_id',\n  'poll_secret',\n  'poll_url',\n  'agent_instructions',\n  'agent_memory',\n  'claimed_operator',\n  'actual_signer_operator',\n  'expected_signer',\n  'actual_signer',\n  'linked_wallets',\n]);\n\nexport function denialReasonToBody(reason: DenialReason): Record<string, unknown> {\n  const message = reason.message ?? DEFAULT_MESSAGES[reason.code];\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = { error: { code: reason.code, message } };\n  if (reason.decision) body.decision = reason.decision;\n  if (reason.reasons) body.reasons = reason.reasons;\n  if (reason.verify_url) body.verify_url = reason.verify_url;\n  if (reason.session_id) body.session_id = reason.session_id;\n  if (reason.poll_secret) body.poll_secret = reason.poll_secret;\n  if (reason.poll_url) body.poll_url = reason.poll_url;\n  const instructions = reason.agent_instructions ?? DEFAULT_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS[reason.code];\n  if (instructions) body.agent_instructions = instructions;\n  if (reason.agent_memory) body.agent_memory = reason.agent_memory;\n  if (reason.claimed_operator) body.claimed_operator = reason.claimed_operator;\n  if (reason.code === 'wallet_signer_mismatch') body.actual_signer_operator = reason.actual_signer_operator ?? null;\n  if (reason.expected_signer) body.expected_signer = reason.expected_signer;\n  if (reason.actual_signer) body.actual_signer = reason.actual_signer;\n  if (reason.linked_wallets && reason.linked_wallets.length > 0) body.linked_wallets = reason.linked_wallets;\n  if (reason.extra) {\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(reason.extra)) {\n      if (RESERVED_FIELDS.has(key)) {\n        console.warn(`[gate] onBeforeSession returned reserved field \"${key}\" — ignoring to preserve gate authority`);\n        continue;\n      }\n      body[key] = value;\n    }\n  }\n  return body;\n}\n","/**\n * Payment-signer extraction.\n *\n * Shared between merchants and the gate. Three paths recover a wallet signer:\n *\n *   - **Tempo MPP** — `Authorization: Payment <base64>`; credential `source` is a DID of the\n *     form `did:pkh:eip155:<chain>:<address>`.\n *   - **Solana MPP `solana/charge`** — `Authorization: Payment <base64>`; recovery via either\n *     a `did:pkh:solana:<genesis>:<address>` source (when set by the client) or by decoding\n *     the credential's signed-tx payload and reading the SPL `TransferChecked` authority\n *     (pull mode only — `payload.type === 'transaction'`).\n *   - **x402 EIP-3009 (EVM, e.g. Base/Sepolia)** — `payment-signature` / `x-payment`;\n *     decoded payload carries `payload.authorization.from`.\n *\n * Optional peer deps: `mppx` for MPP credentials, `@solana/kit` for the Solana tx-decode\n * fallback. Both dynamic-imported; merchants who don't accept that rail don't need them.\n */\n\nexport type SignerNetwork = 'evm' | 'solana';\n\nconst TOKEN_PROGRAM = 'TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA';\nconst TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM = 'TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb';\nconst TRANSFER_CHECKED_DISCRIMINATOR = 12;\n\ninterface SolanaKitMinimal {\n  getBase64Codec: () => { encode: (s: string) => Uint8Array };\n  getTransactionDecoder: () => { decode: (b: Uint8Array) => { messageBytes: Uint8Array } };\n  getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder: () => {\n    decode: (b: Uint8Array) => {\n      staticAccounts: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n      instructions: ReadonlyArray<{\n        programAddressIndex: number;\n        accountIndices?: number[];\n        data?: Uint8Array;\n      }>;\n    };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a Solana MPP `solana/charge` credential's `payload.transaction` (base64-encoded\n * signed Solana tx) and return the SPL `TransferChecked` authority — the source-ATA owner,\n * which is the buyer's wallet. Pull mode only (`payload.type === 'transaction'`); push mode\n * (`payload.type === 'signature'`) returns null because recovery would require an RPC fetch.\n */\nasync function extractSolanaSignerFromCredential(credential: unknown): Promise<string | null> {\n  const payload = (credential as { payload?: { transaction?: string; type?: string } }).payload;\n  if (!payload?.transaction || payload.type !== 'transaction') return null;\n\n  const moduleName = '@solana/kit';\n  const kit = (await import(moduleName).catch(() => null)) as SolanaKitMinimal | null;\n  if (!kit?.getBase64Codec || !kit.getTransactionDecoder || !kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const txBytes = kit.getBase64Codec().encode(payload.transaction);\n    const decoded = kit.getTransactionDecoder().decode(txBytes);\n    const message = kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder().decode(decoded.messageBytes);\n\n    // SPL TransferChecked accounts: [source ATA, mint, destination ATA, authority, ...signers].\n    // Returns the FIRST matched authority. For multi-recipient `splits` txs, the buyer\n    // signs ONE tx with N TransferChecked instructions all sharing the same authority,\n    // so first-match is correct; if a tx ever surfaces with mismatched authorities the\n    // first one wins (acceptable since both belong to whoever signed the tx).\n    for (const ix of message.instructions) {\n      const programId = message.staticAccounts[ix.programAddressIndex];\n      if (programId !== TOKEN_PROGRAM && programId !== TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM) continue;\n      const data = ix.data;\n      if (!data || data.length === 0 || data[0] !== TRANSFER_CHECKED_DISCRIMINATOR) continue;\n      const accountIndices = ix.accountIndices ?? [];\n      const authorityIndex = accountIndices[3];\n      if (authorityIndex === undefined) continue;\n      // v0 transactions can carry account indices that resolve via address lookup tables;\n      // staticAccounts only holds the static set. If the index is out of range, the\n      // authority sits in a lookup table we'd need RPC to resolve. Skip cleanly with a\n      // warning rather than returning the wrong address.\n      if (authorityIndex >= message.staticAccounts.length) {\n        console.warn(\n          '[gate] Solana TransferChecked authority resolves through an address lookup table; ' +\n            'signer-match recovery requires the static-account form. Skipping.',\n        );\n        continue;\n      }\n      const authority = message.staticAccounts[authorityIndex];\n      if (authority) return authority;\n    }\n    return null;\n  } catch (err) {\n    console.warn('[gate] Solana credential decode failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface PaymentSigner {\n  /** Recovered wallet address (EVM lowercased; Solana base58 preserved verbatim). */\n  address: string;\n  /** Network family — used by `captureWallet` and downstream cross-chain attribution. */\n  network: SignerNetwork;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recover the signer wallet from the incoming payment credential, including the network\n * family. Returns `null` when no wallet signature is present (e.g. Stripe SPT, card-only\n * payments, or no credential yet).\n *\n * @param request - the inbound `Request`\n * @param x402PaymentHeader - the value of `payment-signature` or `x-payment` header, if any.\n *   Extracted separately because some frameworks (Express) don't expose a web `Request` object.\n */\nexport async function extractPaymentSigner(\n  request: Request,\n  x402PaymentHeader?: string,\n): Promise<PaymentSigner | null> {\n  // MPP — Authorization: Payment <base64>\n  const authHeader = request.headers.get('authorization');\n  if (authHeader) {\n    try {\n      const moduleName = 'mppx';\n      const mppx = (await import(moduleName).catch(() => null)) as {\n        Credential?: {\n          extractPaymentScheme: (h: string) => unknown;\n          fromRequest: (r: Request) => unknown;\n        };\n      } | null;\n      if (mppx?.Credential?.extractPaymentScheme(authHeader)) {\n        const credential = mppx.Credential.fromRequest(request);\n        const source = (credential as { source?: string }).source;\n        const evmMatch = source?.match(/^did:pkh:eip155:\\d+:(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})$/);\n        if (evmMatch) return { address: evmMatch[1]!.toLowerCase(), network: 'evm' };\n        // Solana CAIP-10: did:pkh:solana:<genesis-base58>:<address-base58>\n        const solMatch = source?.match(/^did:pkh:solana:[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44}:([1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44})$/);\n        if (solMatch) return { address: solMatch[1]!, network: 'solana' };\n        // Fallback: source not set by upstream client. Decode the credential's signed-tx\n        // payload to find the SPL TransferChecked authority (= source-ATA owner = buyer\n        // wallet). Pull mode only.\n        const solanaFromTx = await extractSolanaSignerFromCredential(credential);\n        if (solanaFromTx) return { address: solanaFromTx, network: 'solana' };\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] MPP signer extraction failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // x402 — base64 JSON, EIP-3009 only. EVM `payload.authorization.from` is the signer.\n  if (x402PaymentHeader) {\n    try {\n      const decoded = atob(x402PaymentHeader);\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(decoded) as {\n        payload?: { authorization?: { from?: string } };\n      };\n      const from = parsed?.payload?.authorization?.from;\n      if (typeof from === 'string' && /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(from)) {\n        return { address: from.toLowerCase(), network: 'evm' };\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] x402 signer extraction failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Headers-only variant for adapters that don't natively expose a Web Fetch `Request`\n * (Express, Fastify, ASGI-bridged frameworks). Constructs a synthetic Request carrying\n * only the `authorization` header and delegates to {@link extractPaymentSigner}. Works\n * because the MPP and x402 paths only read `request.headers.get('authorization')` and\n * the explicit `x402PaymentHeader` arg — no body, query, or method semantics needed.\n */\nexport async function extractPaymentSignerFromAuth(\n  authHeader: string | null | undefined,\n  x402PaymentHeader?: string,\n): Promise<PaymentSigner | null> {\n  const request = new Request('http://internal.gate/', {\n    headers: authHeader ? { authorization: authHeader } : {},\n  });\n  return extractPaymentSigner(request, x402PaymentHeader);\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the x402 payment header from a `Request`, matching the alternate names merchants might\n * use. Falls back to reading either header directly.\n */\nexport function readX402PaymentHeader(request: Request): string | undefined {\n  return (\n    request.headers.get('payment-signature') ??\n    request.headers.get('x-payment') ??\n    undefined\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * Google A2A (Agent-to-Agent) v1.0 Agent Card builder.\n *\n * Compose the JSON payload for an A2A v1.0 Agent Card per the canonical proto at\n * https://github.com/a2aproject/A2A/blob/main/specification/a2a.proto. Returned object\n * is the unsigned card body — wrap with an A2A `AgentCardSignature` (RFC 7515 JWS)\n * to sign vendor-side before publishing at /.well-known/agent-card.json.\n *\n * Why publish: A2A is a Linux Foundation standard. Signed Agent Cards let any\n * A2A-compatible reader discover an agent's capabilities + protocol bindings without\n * per-platform integration. Per UCP §A2A binding, agents serving UCP via the A2A\n * transport MUST declare the canonical UCP extension URI in `capabilities.extensions[]`\n * so platforms detect UCP support without re-fetching the profile.\n *\n * Spec reference: https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/\n */\n\nconst PROTOCOL_VERSION = '1.0';\nconst DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_BINDING = 'HTTP+JSON';\nconst DEFAULT_INPUT_MODE = 'application/json';\nconst DEFAULT_OUTPUT_MODE = 'application/json';\n\n/** Canonical UCP A2A extension URI — verifiers look for this exact URI in\n *  `capabilities.extensions[]` to detect UCP support on the agent card. Pinned\n *  to the 2026-04-08 spec snapshot. */\nexport const UCP_A2A_EXTENSION_URI = 'https://ucp.dev/2026-04-08/specification/reference';\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.6. Each entry advertises one protocol binding the agent supports.\n *  `supported_interfaces[0]` is the preferred binding (ordered list). */\nexport interface A2AAgentInterface {\n  /** Interface URL (https in production). */\n  url: string;\n  /** Open string — core values are `JSONRPC`, `GRPC`, `HTTP+JSON`. */\n  protocol_binding: string;\n  /** A2A protocol version, e.g. `\"1.0\"`. Distinct from the agent's own version. */\n  protocol_version: string;\n  tenant?: string;\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.2. The org/service that provides the agent. */\nexport interface A2AAgentProvider {\n  url: string;\n  organization: string;\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.5. A distinct capability or function the agent performs.\n *  Lives at the TOP LEVEL of AgentCard (not inside `capabilities`). */\nexport interface A2AAgentSkill {\n  id: string;\n  name: string;\n  description: string;\n  tags: string[];\n  examples?: string[];\n  input_modes?: string[];\n  output_modes?: string[];\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.4. A protocol extension the agent supports.\n *  Lives in `capabilities.extensions[]`. `description` and `required` are\n *  spec-mandated fields, not optional. */\nexport interface A2AAgentCardExtension {\n  uri: string;\n  description: string;\n  required: boolean;\n  params?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/** Build the canonical UCP entry for an A2A agent card's `capabilities.extensions[]`\n *  array.\n *\n *  Per UCP §A2A binding: \"Businesses supporting UCP must advertise the extension and\n *  any optional capabilities in their A2A Agent Card to allow platforms to activate\n *  the extension.\" Pass the `capabilities` map keyed by reverse-DNS service/capability\n *  name (e.g. `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout`), each value a list of `{ version }` records.\n *  Pass `{}` (or omit) when you serve UCP at the discovery layer but have no formal\n *  capability bindings yet.\n *\n *  `required: true` declares the platform must understand UCP to interoperate with\n *  this agent. Default `false`: UCP is offered but not mandatory.\n */\nexport function ucpA2AExtension(\n  capabilities: Record<string, Array<{ version: string }>> = {},\n  options: { required?: boolean } = {},\n): A2AAgentCardExtension {\n  return {\n    uri: UCP_A2A_EXTENSION_URI,\n    description: 'UCP support: this agent serves Universal Commerce Protocol bindings via the A2A transport.',\n    required: options.required ?? false,\n    params: { capabilities },\n  };\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.3. Optional capabilities the agent supports.\n *\n *  Per the canonical proto, `capabilities` declares: streaming, push_notifications,\n *  extensions (the protocol extensions the agent supports), and extended_agent_card.\n *  REST-style endpoint metadata does NOT belong here — A2A uses `supported_interfaces`\n *  on the AgentCard for protocol bindings, and `skills` (top-level) for capability\n *  descriptions. */\nexport interface A2AAgentCardCapabilities {\n  streaming?: boolean;\n  push_notifications?: boolean;\n  extensions?: A2AAgentCardExtension[];\n  extended_agent_card?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.7. JWS signature embedded in an Agent Card.\n *\n *  Multiple signatures MAY be attached to a single card. Verifiers reconstruct the\n *  card body without `signatures` to verify each entry. Format follows RFC 7515 JSON\n *  Web Signature (JWS). */\nexport interface A2AAgentCardSignature {\n  /** Base64url-encoded JSON of the protected JWS header. REQUIRED. */\n  protected: string;\n  /** Base64url-encoded computed signature. REQUIRED. */\n  signature: string;\n  /** Optional unprotected JWS header values. */\n  header?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/** Per spec §4.4.1. A2A v1.0 Agent Card body.\n *\n *  Per spec §4.4.7, JWS signatures may be embedded directly in the card via the\n *  `signatures` field; verifiers reconstruct the card body without `signatures` and\n *  verify each entry. Per-vendor identity attestation can also be expressed via a\n *  vendor extension entry inside `capabilities.extensions[]`. */\nexport interface A2AAgentCard {\n  name: string;\n  description: string;\n  /** Ordered; first entry is preferred. */\n  supported_interfaces: A2AAgentInterface[];\n  /** Agent's own version, e.g. `\"1.0.0\"`. Distinct from the A2A protocol version,\n   *  which lives on each `A2AAgentInterface.protocol_version`. */\n  version: string;\n  capabilities: A2AAgentCardCapabilities;\n  default_input_modes: string[];\n  default_output_modes: string[];\n  /** Per spec §4.4.1 (proto field 12, REQUIRED): the agent must declare ≥1 skill.\n   *  The convenience builder `buildA2AAgentCard` enforces non-empty. */\n  skills: A2AAgentSkill[];\n  provider?: A2AAgentProvider;\n  documentation_url?: string;\n  /** Per spec §4.4.1 (proto field 14, optional): URL to an icon for the agent. */\n  icon_url?: string;\n  /** Per spec §4.4.1 (proto field 13, optional) + §4.4.7: JWS signatures embedded\n   *  in the card. Compute over the canonical card body MINUS this field, then attach. */\n  signatures?: A2AAgentCardSignature[];\n  security_schemes?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  security_requirements?: unknown[];\n  /** Vendor-specific extras merged at top level. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface BuildA2AAgentCardInput {\n  /** Agent display name. REQUIRED. */\n  name: string;\n  /** Agent purpose/description. REQUIRED per spec. */\n  description: string;\n  /** The primary interface URL — becomes `supported_interfaces[0].url` (with\n   *  `protocol_binding=HTTP+JSON`, `protocol_version=1.0` by default). For\n   *  multi-binding agents, construct `A2AAgentCard` directly. */\n  url: string;\n  /** Top-level skill declarations — what the agent can do. REQUIRED per spec\n   *  (proto field 12 [field_behavior=REQUIRED]); must have ≥1 entry. */\n  skills: A2AAgentSkill[];\n  /** Agent's own version, e.g. `\"1.0.0\"`. Distinct from the A2A protocol version. */\n  version?: string;\n  /** A2A v1.0 capability extensions. Build the UCP entry with `ucpA2AExtension()`. */\n  extensions?: A2AAgentCardExtension[];\n  /** Capability flag: agent supports streaming responses. */\n  streaming?: boolean;\n  /** Capability flag: agent supports push notifications for async task updates. */\n  push_notifications?: boolean;\n  /** Capability flag: agent serves an extended (more detailed) card when authenticated. */\n  extended_agent_card?: boolean;\n  /** Provider org for the agent. */\n  provider?: A2AAgentProvider;\n  /** URL to additional human-readable documentation. */\n  documentation_url?: string;\n  /** URL to an icon for the agent. */\n  icon_url?: string;\n  /** JWS signatures embedded in the card (per spec §4.4.7). */\n  signatures?: A2AAgentCardSignature[];\n  /** Default input media types (defaults to `[\"application/json\"]`). */\n  default_input_modes?: string[];\n  /** Default output media types (defaults to `[\"application/json\"]`). */\n  default_output_modes?: string[];\n  /** Override the protocol binding for the auto-built primary interface (default `\"HTTP+JSON\"`). */\n  protocol_binding?: string;\n  /** Override the A2A protocol version for the auto-built primary interface (default `\"1.0\"`). */\n  a2a_protocol_version?: string;\n  /** Per-scheme security details (key = scheme name). */\n  security_schemes?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Required security requirements for invoking the agent. */\n  security_requirements?: unknown[];\n  /** Vendor-specific extras merged at the card top level. */\n  extras?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compose an A2A v1.0 Agent Card body per the canonical proto.\n *\n * Returns the UNSIGNED card. To attach identity claims, sign the serialized body\n * as an RFC 7515 JWS (`AgentCardSignature`). Vendors can also add an identity-flavored\n * extension to `capabilities.extensions[]`.\n *\n * The single `url` argument becomes the primary `supported_interfaces[0].url`\n * (with `protocol_binding=HTTP+JSON`, `protocol_version=1.0` by default).\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * import { buildA2AAgentCard, ucpA2AExtension } from '@agent-score/commerce';\n *\n * const card = buildA2AAgentCard({\n *   name: 'Example Merchant Concierge',\n *   description: 'Buy regulated goods via agent payments.',\n *   url: 'https://agents.example.com',\n *   version: '1.0.0',\n *   skills: [\n *     { id: 'purchase', name: 'Purchase', description: 'Buy products via agent payments.', tags: ['commerce', 'payment'] },\n *   ],\n *   extensions: [ucpA2AExtension()],\n * });\n * const signed = await yourJWSSign(card);\n * ```\n */\nexport function buildA2AAgentCard(input: BuildA2AAgentCardInput): A2AAgentCard {\n  if (!input.skills || input.skills.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'buildA2AAgentCard: `skills` MUST be a non-empty list. Per spec §4.4.1 (proto field 12 [field_behavior=REQUIRED]), every Agent Card must declare at least one AgentSkill. Construct A2AAgentCard directly to bypass.',\n    );\n  }\n\n  const capabilities: A2AAgentCardCapabilities = {};\n  if (input.streaming !== undefined) capabilities.streaming = input.streaming;\n  if (input.push_notifications !== undefined) capabilities.push_notifications = input.push_notifications;\n  if (input.extensions && input.extensions.length > 0) capabilities.extensions = input.extensions;\n  if (input.extended_agent_card !== undefined) capabilities.extended_agent_card = input.extended_agent_card;\n\n  const primaryInterface: A2AAgentInterface = {\n    url: input.url,\n    protocol_binding: input.protocol_binding ?? DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_BINDING,\n    protocol_version: input.a2a_protocol_version ?? PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n  };\n\n  const card: A2AAgentCard = {\n    name: input.name,\n    description: input.description,\n    supported_interfaces: [primaryInterface],\n    version: input.version ?? '1.0.0',\n    capabilities,\n    default_input_modes: input.default_input_modes ?? [DEFAULT_INPUT_MODE],\n    default_output_modes: input.default_output_modes ?? [DEFAULT_OUTPUT_MODE],\n    skills: input.skills,\n  };\n  if (input.provider !== undefined) card.provider = input.provider;\n  if (input.documentation_url !== undefined) card.documentation_url = input.documentation_url;\n  if (input.icon_url !== undefined) card.icon_url = input.icon_url;\n  if (input.signatures !== undefined && input.signatures.length > 0) card.signatures = input.signatures;\n  if (input.security_schemes !== undefined) card.security_schemes = input.security_schemes;\n  if (input.security_requirements !== undefined) card.security_requirements = input.security_requirements;\n  if (input.extras) {\n    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(input.extras)) {\n      card[k] = v;\n    }\n  }\n  return card;\n}\n","/**\n * UCP (Universal Commerce Protocol) profile builder.\n *\n * Compose the JSON payload published at `/.well-known/ucp` per the UCP spec.\n * Output shape matches the spec example: top-level `{ ucp: {...}, signing_keys: [...] }`\n * envelope, with `services` / `capabilities` / `payment_handlers` as MAPs keyed by\n * reverse-DNS service / capability / handler name.\n *\n * AgentScore identity claims layer over UCP via the `sh.agentscore.identity` capability\n * (vendor-namespaced; UCP doesn't define KYC/sanctions/age/jurisdiction natively). The\n * capability extends `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout` AND `dev.ucp.shopping.cart` (multi-parent,\n * the standard pattern UCP allows for capabilities that compose multiple parents).\n *\n * The unsigned profile body returned here is what merchants publish; pass it through\n * `signUCPProfile` to attach the `agentscore-profile+jws` signature for trust-mode\n * verifiers (vendor extension; UCP itself doesn't mandate profile-body signing).\n *\n * Spec reference: https://ucp.dev/\n */\n\n\n/**\n * UCP per-element shape note: each binding interface (`UCPServiceBinding`,\n * `UCPCapabilityBinding`, `UCPPaymentHandlerBinding`) carries the canonical UCP fields\n * plus arbitrary vendor extras flat on the same object via `[k: string]: unknown`. The\n * python sibling models these as dataclasses with an explicit `extras: dict` field. Both\n * designs offer equivalent guarantees through different mechanisms.\n */\nexport interface UCPSigningKey {\n  /** JWK kid (key id). */\n  kid: string;\n  /** JWK kty (key type) — `EC`, `RSA`, or `OKP`. */\n  kty: string;\n  /** JWK alg (signing algorithm) — `ES256`, `RS256`, or `EdDSA`. */\n  alg?: string;\n  /** JWK use, typically `sig`. */\n  use?: string;\n  /** JWK crv (curve) for EC / OKP keys. */\n  crv?: string;\n  /** JWK x / y / n / e / etc. The full key material; passed through verbatim. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a UCPSigningKey from a public JWK dict (e.g. the `publicJWK` returned by\n * `generateUCPSigningKey()`). Validates required fields and rejects symmetric keys that\n * can't publicly verify a JWS in trust-mode UCP. Mirrors python's\n * `UCPSigningKey.from_jwk(public_jwk)` classmethod via the `UCPSigningKey.fromJWK`\n * static-method-style namespace export below.\n */\nfunction ucpSigningKeyFromJWKImpl(jwk: Record<string, unknown>): UCPSigningKey {\n  if (!jwk || typeof jwk !== 'object') {\n    throw new Error(`UCPSigningKey.fromJWK expected a non-null object; got ${typeof jwk}.`);\n  }\n  if (typeof jwk.kid !== 'string' || !jwk.kid) {\n    throw new Error('UCPSigningKey.fromJWK: JWK missing required field `kid` (or non-string).');\n  }\n  if (typeof jwk.kty !== 'string' || !jwk.kty) {\n    throw new Error('UCPSigningKey.fromJWK: JWK missing required field `kty` (or non-string).');\n  }\n  if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' && jwk.kty !== 'EC' && jwk.kty !== 'RSA') {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UCPSigningKey.fromJWK: kty=${JSON.stringify(jwk.kty)} is not a supported asymmetric key type (expected OKP, EC, or RSA). Symmetric \\`oct\\` keys are rejected because they cannot publicly verify a JWS in the trust-mode UCP flow.`,\n    );\n  }\n  if ((jwk.kty === 'EC' || jwk.kty === 'OKP') && (typeof jwk.crv !== 'string' || !jwk.crv)) {\n    throw new Error(`UCPSigningKey.fromJWK: kty=${jwk.kty} requires a non-empty \\`crv\\` field (e.g., \"P-256\" for EC, \"Ed25519\" for OKP).`);\n  }\n  return jwk as unknown as UCPSigningKey;\n}\n\n/** Static-method-style namespace on the `UCPSigningKey` interface — mirrors python's\n *  `UCPSigningKey.from_jwk(jwk)` classmethod. Use as `UCPSigningKey.fromJWK(jwk)`. */\nexport const UCPSigningKey = {\n  fromJWK: ucpSigningKeyFromJWKImpl,\n};\n\n/** Transport binding — keyed under a service name (e.g., `dev.ucp.shopping`). */\nexport interface UCPServiceBinding {\n  /** Spec version, YYYY-MM-DD per UCP convention. REQUIRED. */\n  version: string;\n  /** URL to human-readable specification. REQUIRED. */\n  spec: string;\n  /** Transport — `rest` / `mcp` / `a2a` / `embedded`. REQUIRED. */\n  transport: 'rest' | 'mcp' | 'a2a' | 'embedded';\n  /** Endpoint URL — required for rest/mcp; A2A points at the agent-card.json URL. */\n  endpoint?: string;\n  /** URL to JSON Schema — required for rest/mcp/embedded per spec. */\n  schema?: string;\n  /** Optional id for entity-instance disambiguation. */\n  id?: string;\n  /** Entity-specific config. */\n  config?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Capability binding — keyed under a capability name (e.g., `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout`). */\nexport interface UCPCapabilityBinding {\n  /** Capability version, YYYY-MM-DD. REQUIRED. */\n  version: string;\n  /** URL to human-readable specification. REQUIRED. */\n  spec: string;\n  /** URL to JSON Schema. REQUIRED. */\n  schema: string;\n  /** Optional id for entity-instance disambiguation. */\n  id?: string;\n  /** Entity-specific config (feature flags, callback URLs, etc). */\n  config?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Parent capability(ies) extended — single string or array for multi-parent. */\n  extends?: string | string[];\n  /** Optional version requirements per UCP §6.5. */\n  requires?: {\n    protocol?: { min: string; max?: string };\n    capabilities?: Record<string, { min: string; max?: string }>;\n  };\n  /** Vendor-specific extras allowed per UCP convention (e.g., the AgentScore identity\n   *  capability adds a vendor-namespaced policy declaration here). */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Payment handler binding — keyed under a handler reverse-DNS name (e.g., `com.google.pay`). */\nexport interface UCPPaymentHandlerBinding {\n  /** Handler instance id (short, human-readable, e.g., `gpay`, `tempo`, `x402`). REQUIRED. */\n  id: string;\n  /** Handler spec version, YYYY-MM-DD. REQUIRED. */\n  version: string;\n  /** URL to handler spec. REQUIRED. */\n  spec: string;\n  /** URL to handler config schema. REQUIRED. */\n  schema: string;\n  /** Available instruments — type + per-type constraints (cards, wallets, etc.). */\n  available_instruments?: Array<{ type: string; constraints?: Record<string, unknown>; [k: string]: unknown }>;\n  /** Handler config — gateway IDs, merchant IDs, public keys, etc. */\n  config?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/** UCP body — nested under the `ucp` key of the published profile. */\nexport interface UCPProfileBody {\n  /** UCP spec version (YYYY-MM-DD). */\n  version: string;\n  /** Display name for the merchant / agent surface. */\n  name?: string;\n  /** Services — keyed by service name (e.g., `dev.ucp.shopping`). Each value is an\n   *  array of transport bindings (one merchant typically advertises multiple transports\n   *  under one service name). */\n  services: Record<string, UCPServiceBinding[]>;\n  /** Capabilities — keyed by capability name (e.g., `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout`). */\n  capabilities: Record<string, UCPCapabilityBinding[]>;\n  /** Payment handlers — keyed by handler reverse-DNS name (e.g., `com.google.pay`). */\n  payment_handlers: Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]>;\n  /** Optional `supported_versions` map linking historical version-specific profile URLs.\n   *  Pattern: `{ \"2026-01-23\": \"https://merchant/.well-known/ucp/2026-01-23\", ... }`. */\n  supported_versions?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras inside the `ucp` envelope. */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Full UCP profile body as published at `/.well-known/ucp`. Top-level shape:\n *  `{ ucp: {...}, signing_keys: [...], signature?: \"...\" }`. */\nexport interface UCPProfile {\n  /** UCP body. ALL UCP-spec fields nest here per spec. */\n  ucp: UCPProfileBody;\n  /** JWKS — public keys at the OUTER level per UCP spec. Verifiers fetch this profile,\n   *  match the kid from a JWS / RFC 9421 signature header against this list, and validate. */\n  signing_keys: UCPSigningKey[];\n  /** Set when JWS-signed via `signUCPProfile` — JWS Compact Serialization with detached\n   *  payload (header..signature; payload is the canonicalized body minus this field). */\n  signature?: string;\n  /** Top-level vendor-specific extras (outside the `ucp` envelope). */\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface BuildUCPProfileInput {\n  /** UCP spec version. Default `'2026-04-08'` (the latest published UCP spec date). MUST match a published UCP spec version, not a free-form date. */\n  version?: string;\n  /** Display name for the merchant / agent surface. */\n  name?: string;\n  /** Services map, keyed by service name. UCP-shopping merchants typically advertise\n   *  bindings under `'dev.ucp.shopping'`. */\n  services?: Record<string, UCPServiceBinding[]>;\n  /** Capabilities map, keyed by capability name. The `sh.agentscore.identity` capability\n   *  is auto-added when `agentscore_gate` is provided. */\n  capabilities?: Record<string, UCPCapabilityBinding[]>;\n  /** Payment handlers map, keyed by handler reverse-DNS name. */\n  payment_handlers?: Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]>;\n  /** JWKS — public keys the merchant signs with. REQUIRED by spec. */\n  signing_keys: UCPSigningKey[];\n  /** Merchant gate policy declaration. When provided, the SDK auto-injects an\n   *  `sh.agentscore.identity` capability binding into `capabilities`, with the\n   *  policy as the binding's `config`. Static merchant declaration only — no\n   *  per-operator data ever ends up on the public profile. Per-operator identity\n   *  attestation lives on the AP2 risk-signal endpoint, not here. */\n  agentscore_gate?: AgentScoreGatePolicy;\n  /** Optional override for the AgentScore capability schema URL. Field is snake_cased\n   *  for cross-language parity with the Python sibling. */\n  agentscore_schema_url?: string;\n  /** Optional override for the AgentScore capability spec URL. */\n  agentscore_spec_url?: string;\n  /** `supported_versions` map at the profile root for backwards-compat across\n   *  spec dates. Pattern: `{ \"<date>\": \"<base>/.well-known/ucp/<date>\" }`. */\n  supported_versions?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras at the OUTER level (alongside `ucp` + `signing_keys`). */\n  extras?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Vendor-specific extras INSIDE the `ucp` envelope (alongside `version`, `services`, etc.). */\n  ucp_extras?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_VERSION = '2026-04-08';\n// Reverse-DNS namespacing per UCP convention (`^[a-z][a-z0-9]*(?:\\.[a-z][a-z0-9_]*)+$`).\n// The bare `agentscore-identity` form fails the spec regex; vendor-namespacing under\n// `sh.agentscore` is honest about the capability being our extension, not UCP-canonical.\nconst AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_NAME = 'sh.agentscore.identity';\n// Date-format version per UCP convention (matches every other binding's version field).\nconst AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_VERSION = '2026-04-08';\n\n/** Merchant gate policy declared on the UCP profile via `sh.agentscore.identity` capability config.\n *  All fields optional; merchant declares which AgentScore checks the gate enforces. Snake-case\n *  field names match the AgentScore API's `/v1/assess` policy contract verbatim — no conversion\n *  layer between this declaration and what the gate actually enforces at runtime. */\nexport interface AgentScoreGatePolicy {\n  /** Gate denies if the operator/account behind the agent is not Stripe-Identity-verified. */\n  require_kyc?: boolean;\n  /** Gate denies if the operator/account is flagged by OpenSanctions screening. */\n  require_sanctions_clear?: boolean;\n  /** Gate denies if the verified age (from KYC) is below this threshold. Common values: 18, 21. */\n  min_age?: number;\n  /** ISO-3166-1 alpha-2 country codes the gate accepts. Empty/absent allows any. Mutually exclusive\n   *  with `blocked_jurisdictions` (set one or the other, not both). */\n  allowed_jurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** ISO-3166-1 alpha-2 country codes the gate denies. Empty/absent denies none. Mutually exclusive\n   *  with `allowed_jurisdictions`. */\n  blocked_jurisdictions?: string[];\n}\nconst AGENTSCORE_DEFAULT_SPEC_URL = 'https://agentscore.sh/specification/identity';\nconst AGENTSCORE_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_URL = 'https://agentscore.sh/schemas/ucp/sh-agentscore-identity-v1.json';\n// Multi-parent extension — `sh.agentscore.identity` declares merchant policy relevant at\n// both checkout-build (compliance gate) and cart-build (price-gate eligibility, jurisdiction-\n// restricted items in cart) time, so an agent reading either parent capability picks up the\n// policy contract. Mirrors the multi-parent convention in the live ecosystem\n// (Shopify's `dev.shopify.catalog.storefront` extends both `catalog.search` and\n// `catalog.lookup`; UCP-canonical `dev.ucp.shopping.discount` extends both checkout and cart).\nconst AGENTSCORE_EXTENDS = ['dev.ucp.shopping.checkout', 'dev.ucp.shopping.cart'];\n\nconst RESERVED_TOP_LEVEL = new Set([\n  'ucp',\n  'signing_keys',\n  'signature',\n  '__proto__',\n  'constructor',\n  'prototype',\n]);\nconst RESERVED_UCP_FIELDS = new Set([\n  'version',\n  'name',\n  'services',\n  'capabilities',\n  'payment_handlers',\n  'supported_versions',\n  '__proto__',\n  'constructor',\n  'prototype',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Compose a UCP profile body for `/.well-known/ucp` publication. Returns the spec-\n * compliant shape: `{ ucp: { version, services, capabilities, payment_handlers, ... },\n * signing_keys: [...] }`. Pass through `signUCPProfile` to attach a JWS signature for\n * trust-mode verifiers.\n *\n * Auto-injects `sh.agentscore.identity` as a vendor capability extending both\n * `dev.ucp.shopping.checkout` and `dev.ucp.shopping.cart` when `agentscore_gate`\n * is provided. The capability's `config` carries the merchant's static gate\n * policy declaration (require_kyc / require_sanctions_clear / min_age /\n * allowed_jurisdictions / blocked_jurisdictions). NO per-operator data is ever\n * placed on the public profile — per-operator identity attestation flows through\n * the AP2 risk-signal endpoint, not here.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * import { buildUCPProfile } from '@agent-score/commerce';\n *\n * const profile = buildUCPProfile({\n *   name: 'Example Merchant',\n *   services: {\n *     'dev.ucp.shopping': [\n *       { version: '2026-04-08', spec: 'https://ucp.dev/2026-04-08/specification/overview',\n *         transport: 'mcp', endpoint: 'https://merchant.example/api/ucp/mcp',\n *         schema: 'https://ucp.dev/services/shopping/mcp.openrpc.json' },\n *     ],\n *   },\n *   payment_handlers: {\n *     ...mppPaymentHandler({ networks: [{ network: 'tempo-mainnet', chain_id: 4217, recipient: TEMPO_ADDR }] }),\n *   },\n *   signing_keys: [signingKey],\n *   agentscore_gate: { require_kyc: true, min_age: 21, allowed_jurisdictions: ['US'] },\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function buildUCPProfile(input: BuildUCPProfileInput): UCPProfile {\n  // Per UCP spec service.json: rest/mcp/a2a transports REQUIRE endpoint;\n  // embedded does not. Validate caller-supplied services so a misconfigured\n  // profile fails locally instead of being rejected by spec-strict platforms.\n  for (const [name, bindings] of Object.entries(input.services ?? {})) {\n    for (const binding of bindings) {\n      if (\n        (binding.transport === 'rest' || binding.transport === 'mcp' || binding.transport === 'a2a')\n        && (binding.endpoint === undefined || binding.endpoint === null || binding.endpoint === '')\n      ) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `buildUCPProfile: service \"${name}\" transport=${binding.transport} requires \\`endpoint\\`. Per UCP spec service.json business_schema, rest/mcp/a2a bindings MUST carry an endpoint URL.`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Per UCP spec payment_handler.json: available_instruments has minItems:1.\n  // Deep-copy each binding and drop available_instruments when empty so a caller\n  // passing `[]` doesn't ship an invalid profile.\n  const paymentHandlers: Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]> = {};\n  for (const [name, bindings] of Object.entries(input.payment_handlers ?? {})) {\n    paymentHandlers[name] = bindings.map((binding) => {\n      if (Array.isArray(binding.available_instruments) && binding.available_instruments.length === 0) {\n        const { available_instruments: _drop, ...rest } = binding;\n        return rest as UCPPaymentHandlerBinding;\n      }\n      return binding;\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Deep-clone the capabilities map so we can safely mutate (auto-add the AgentScore\n  // identity capability) without altering the caller's input.\n  const capabilities: Record<string, UCPCapabilityBinding[]> = {};\n  for (const [name, bindings] of Object.entries(input.capabilities ?? {})) {\n    capabilities[name] = [...bindings];\n  }\n\n  // Auto-inject `sh.agentscore.identity` capability when the merchant declares a gate\n  // policy. Static merchant-policy declaration only — no per-operator data on the public\n  // profile. Per-operator identity attestation flows through the AP2 risk-signal endpoint\n  // or per-request 4xx response bodies, not here.\n  if (input.agentscore_gate) {\n    const gateConfig = { ...input.agentscore_gate };\n    const agentscoreBinding: UCPCapabilityBinding = {\n      version: AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_VERSION,\n      spec: input.agentscore_spec_url ?? AGENTSCORE_DEFAULT_SPEC_URL,\n      schema: input.agentscore_schema_url ?? AGENTSCORE_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_URL,\n      extends: AGENTSCORE_EXTENDS,\n    };\n    // Omit `config` when empty so node + python emit byte-identical canonical output\n    // (python's UCPCapabilityBinding.to_dict already drops empty config).\n    if (Object.keys(gateConfig).length > 0) agentscoreBinding.config = gateConfig;\n    const existing = capabilities[AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_NAME];\n    if (existing) existing.push(agentscoreBinding);\n    else capabilities[AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_NAME] = [agentscoreBinding];\n  }\n\n  const ucp: UCPProfileBody = {\n    version: input.version ?? DEFAULT_VERSION,\n    services: input.services ?? {},\n    capabilities,\n    payment_handlers: paymentHandlers,\n  };\n  if (input.name !== undefined) ucp.name = input.name;\n  if (input.supported_versions !== undefined) ucp.supported_versions = input.supported_versions;\n  if (input.ucp_extras) {\n    for (const k of Object.keys(input.ucp_extras)) {\n      if (RESERVED_UCP_FIELDS.has(k)) {\n        throw new Error(`buildUCPProfile: ucp_extras key \"${k}\" collides with a reserved \\`ucp\\` field; rejected.`);\n      }\n    }\n    Object.assign(ucp, input.ucp_extras);\n  }\n\n  const profile: UCPProfile = {\n    ucp,\n    signing_keys: input.signing_keys,\n  };\n  if (input.extras) {\n    // `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype` reserved so vendor extras can't slip\n    // prototype-pollution payloads into the canonical body.\n    for (const k of Object.keys(input.extras)) {\n      if (RESERVED_TOP_LEVEL.has(k)) {\n        throw new Error(`buildUCPProfile: extras key \"${k}\" collides with a reserved profile field; rejected.`);\n      }\n    }\n    Object.assign(profile, input.extras);\n  }\n\n  return profile;\n}\n\nexport const AGENTSCORE_UCP_CAPABILITY = AGENTSCORE_CAPABILITY_NAME;\n\n// ─── Payment handler builders ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Vendors compose UCP `payment_handlers` blocks by spreading these helpers.\n// The helpers fill in id/version/spec/schema/config wrapper so vendors only\n// supply merchant-specific data (networks + recipients + profile_id).\n//\n//   payment_handlers: {\n//     ...mppPaymentHandler({ networks: [...] }),\n//     ...x402PaymentHandler({ networks: [...] }),\n//     ...stripeSptPaymentHandler({ profile_id: '...' }),\n//   }\n//\n// Each helper returns `{ [reverse-DNS-key]: [binding] }` so spreading into\n// the parent map composes cleanly. The reverse-DNS keys + spec/schema URLs\n// + handler `version` are owned by these constants; bumping a handler spec\n// version is a one-line change here, not 20 lines across consumers.\n\nconst HANDLER_VERSION = '2026-04-08';\nconst SPEC_BASE = 'https://agentscore.sh/specification/payment-handlers';\nconst SCHEMA_BASE = 'https://agentscore.sh/schemas/payment-handlers';\n\ntype MppNetwork =\n  | 'tempo-mainnet'\n  | 'tempo-testnet'\n  | 'mpp-solana-mainnet'\n  | 'mpp-solana-devnet'\n  | (string & {}); // open for forward-compat (mpp-stellar-pubnet, mpp-lightning-mainnet, …)\n\nexport interface MppNetworkEntry {\n  network: MppNetwork;\n  /** EVM-style chain id (e.g. 4217 for Tempo mainnet). Omit for non-EVM networks. */\n  chain_id?: number;\n  /** Static settlement address. Omit for per-order recipients (e.g. Stripe-derived deposits). */\n  recipient?: string;\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface MppPaymentHandlerInput {\n  networks: MppNetworkEntry[];\n}\n\ntype X402Network =\n  | `base-${number}`\n  | 'solana-mainnet-beta'\n  | 'solana-devnet'\n  | 'stellar-pubnet'\n  | 'stellar-testnet'\n  | (string & {});\n\nexport interface X402NetworkEntry {\n  network: X402Network;\n  /** Static settlement address. Omit for per-order recipients. */\n  recipient?: string;\n  [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface X402PaymentHandlerInput {\n  networks: X402NetworkEntry[];\n}\n\nexport interface StripeSptPaymentHandlerInput {\n  /** Stripe profile id (the merchant-side network identifier the agent's SPT is scoped to). */\n  profile_id: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `sh.agentscore.payment.mpp` payment handler block for a UCP profile.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * buildUCPProfile({\n *   ...,\n *   payment_handlers: {\n *     ...mppPaymentHandler({ networks: [{ network: 'tempo-mainnet', chain_id: 4217 }] }),\n *   },\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function mppPaymentHandler(input: MppPaymentHandlerInput): Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]> {\n  return {\n    'sh.agentscore.payment.mpp': [{\n      id: 'mpp',\n      version: HANDLER_VERSION,\n      spec: `${SPEC_BASE}/mpp`,\n      schema: `${SCHEMA_BASE}/mpp.json`,\n      config: { networks: input.networks },\n    }],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `sh.agentscore.payment.x402` payment handler block for a UCP profile.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * buildUCPProfile({\n *   ...,\n *   payment_handlers: {\n *     ...x402PaymentHandler({ networks: [{ network: 'base-8453', recipient: '0xabc...' }] }),\n *   },\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function x402PaymentHandler(input: X402PaymentHandlerInput): Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]> {\n  return {\n    'sh.agentscore.payment.x402': [{\n      id: 'x402',\n      version: HANDLER_VERSION,\n      spec: `${SPEC_BASE}/x402`,\n      schema: `${SCHEMA_BASE}/x402.json`,\n      config: { networks: input.networks },\n    }],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the `sh.agentscore.payment.stripe_spt` payment handler block for a UCP profile.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * buildUCPProfile({\n *   ...,\n *   payment_handlers: {\n *     ...stripeSptPaymentHandler({ profile_id: 'profile_5xKvNqM9BaH' }),\n *   },\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport function stripeSptPaymentHandler(input: StripeSptPaymentHandlerInput): Record<string, UCPPaymentHandlerBinding[]> {\n  return {\n    'sh.agentscore.payment.stripe_spt': [{\n      id: 'stripe-spt',\n      version: HANDLER_VERSION,\n      spec: `${SPEC_BASE}/stripe_spt`,\n      schema: `${SCHEMA_BASE}/stripe_spt.json`,\n      config: { rail: 'stripe-spt', profile_id: input.profile_id },\n    }],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * UCP profile signing helpers (JWKS + JWS).\n *\n * UCP §6 (https://ucp.dev/latest/specification/signatures/) requires that profiles\n * published at `/.well-known/ucp` carry a JWKS-backed signature for trust-mode clients\n * (Google AI Mode, Gemini commerce, future ChatGPT app shells). Without a signature,\n * trust-mode clients reject the profile.\n *\n * This module provides:\n *   - `generateUCPSigningKey()` — generate an Ed25519 keypair for signing\n *   - `signUCPProfile()` — sign a UCP profile body, returning a JWS-attached envelope\n *   - `verifyUCPProfile()` — verify a signed profile against a JWKS\n *   - `buildJWKSResponse()` — assemble a JWKS document for `/.well-known/jwks.json`\n *\n * Implementation rides on `jose` (peer-dep, optional). Merchants who don't sign their\n * profile (development) skip this module entirely; the unsigned `buildUCPProfile()`\n * path still works.\n *\n * Why Ed25519: smaller signatures (64 bytes vs 256+ for RSA), faster verification, no\n * curve-parameter ceremony. UCP also accepts ES256 (P-256 ECDSA) — pass `alg: 'ES256'`\n * to `signUCPProfile()` if your existing payment signing key is P-256.\n */\n\nimport type { UCPProfile, UCPSigningKey } from './ucp';\n\n/** Output of `generateUCPSigningKey()`. The private key is what you sign with; the\n *  public JWK is what you publish at `/.well-known/jwks.json` and reference in the\n *  UCP profile's `signing_keys[]`.\n */\nexport interface GeneratedUCPKey {\n  /** Private key (KeyLike, opaque) — pass to `signUCPProfile()`. Never publish. */\n  privateKey: unknown;\n  /** Public key as JWK — publish at `/.well-known/jwks.json` and inline in UCP `signing_keys[]`. */\n  publicJWK: UCPSigningKey;\n}\n\n/** A JWKS document — `{ keys: [...] }` per RFC 7517. Serve at `/.well-known/jwks.json`. */\nexport interface JWKSResponse {\n  keys: UCPSigningKey[];\n}\n\n/** Options for `signUCPProfile()`. */\nexport interface SignUCPProfileOptions {\n  /** Private signing key — opaque KeyLike from `generateUCPSigningKey()` or `importJWK()`. */\n  signingKey: unknown;\n  /** Key ID (must match a `kid` in the profile's `signing_keys[]`). */\n  kid: string;\n  /** Signing algorithm — `EdDSA` (default) or `ES256`. */\n  alg?: 'EdDSA' | 'ES256';\n}\n\n/** A signed UCP profile envelope. Same shape as `UCPProfile` plus the `signature` field\n *  carrying the JWS Compact Serialization over the canonicalized profile body. */\nexport interface SignedUCPProfile extends UCPProfile {\n  /** JWS Compact Serialization (`<header>.<payload>.<signature>`) over the profile body\n   *  with `signature` removed and keys sorted. Verifiers reconstruct the canonical body\n   *  and validate against the JWK identified by `kid` in the JWS protected header. */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\nconst JOSE_INSTALL_HINT = 'Install the optional peer dependency: `npm install jose@^6` (or `bun add jose`). Tested against jose v6.x.';\n\n/** UCP §6 + RFC 8725 §3.1 — restrict accepted JWS algorithms. Anything outside this\n *  list (HS, RS, none, etc.) is rejected to prevent alg-confusion attacks where a\n *  hostile JWK published in the profile's signing_keys[] is used with an unintended\n *  algorithm. */\nconst ALLOWED_ALGS = ['EdDSA', 'ES256'] as const;\ntype AllowedAlg = (typeof ALLOWED_ALGS)[number];\n\n/** JWS protected header `typ` value. Vendor-namespaced because UCP §6 does not define\n *  a profile-as-JWS typ; the value advertises that this signed envelope follows the\n *  AgentScore extension semantics rather than a UCP-canonical signing convention.\n *  Verifiers SHOULD enforce this to prevent cross-protocol token reuse (RFC 8725 §3.11). */\nconst PROFILE_TYP = 'agentscore-profile+jws';\n\n/** Discriminated error class so consumers can branch on failure mode without\n *  parsing message strings or importing jose internals. */\nexport class UCPVerificationError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    public readonly code:\n      | 'no_signature'\n      | 'missing_kid'\n      | 'kid_not_found'\n      | 'duplicate_kid'\n      | 'unsupported_alg'\n      | 'wrong_typ'\n      | 'signature_invalid'\n      | 'body_mismatch'\n      | 'malformed_jws'\n      | 'malformed_jwks'\n      | 'unrecognized_critical_header'\n      | 'unusable_key',\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'UCPVerificationError';\n  }\n}\n\nasync function loadJose(): Promise<typeof import('jose')> {\n  try {\n    return await import('jose');\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `UCP signing requires the \\`jose\\` library, which is an optional peer dependency. ${JOSE_INSTALL_HINT}\\nOriginal error: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize a UCP profile for signing. Removes the `signature` field (if present),\n * sorts keys deterministically, and returns the JSON string. Both signer and verifier\n * compute the same bytes.\n *\n * Implementation note: UCP §6.2 specifies \"the JSON-serialized profile body, with\n * `signature` removed and keys ordered lexicographically at every nesting level.\" This\n * is JCS-style canonicalization without the full RFC 8785 numeric handling — UCP\n * profiles don't contain floats so the simpler key-sort is sufficient.\n */\nfunction canonicalizeProfile(profile: UCPProfile): string {\n  const stripped = { ...profile } as Record<string, unknown>;\n  delete stripped.signature;\n  return stableStringify(stripped);\n}\n\n/** Deterministic JSON.stringify with lexicographic key ordering at every level.\n *  Rejects ANY non-finite Number (NaN, Infinity, -Infinity) and any Number\n *  whose value has a fractional part OR whose JSON representation may diverge\n *  cross-language. Cross-language float canonicalization (RFC 8785 §3.2.2.3)\n *  is not stable between Node's JSON.stringify and Python's json.dumps\n *  (e.g. `1.0` → `1` vs `1.0`, `1e-7` → `1e-7` vs `1e-07`). UCP profiles\n *  must use decimal strings for monetary or fractional fields to preserve\n *  byte parity with the Python sibling. */\nfunction stableStringify(value: unknown): string {\n  if (value === undefined) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'stableStringify: undefined values are not allowed in canonicalized JSON. ' +\n        'Object fields with no value must be omitted.',\n    );\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'function' || typeof value === 'symbol') {\n    throw new Error(`stableStringify: ${typeof value} values are not allowed in canonicalized JSON.`);\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'bigint') {\n    throw new Error('stableStringify: BigInt values are not allowed; use a decimal string.');\n  }\n  if (value instanceof Date) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'stableStringify: Date instances are not allowed; serialize to an ISO string before passing.',\n    );\n  }\n  if (value instanceof Map || value instanceof Set || value instanceof WeakMap || value instanceof WeakSet) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `stableStringify: ${value.constructor.name} values are not allowed; convert to a plain object/array first.`,\n    );\n  }\n  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(value)) {\n    throw new Error('stableStringify: typed arrays are not allowed; convert to a plain array first.');\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'number') {\n    if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `UCP profile canonicalization rejects non-finite Number ${value}. Use a decimal string for any value that may be NaN/Infinity.`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (!Number.isInteger(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `UCP profile canonicalization rejects non-integer Number ${value}. Use a decimal string (e.g. \"9.99\") for monetary or fractional fields to preserve cross-language byte-parity.`,\n      );\n    }\n    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `stableStringify: integer ${value} exceeds Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER. ` +\n          'For values >2^53, use a decimal string to preserve cross-language byte parity.',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'string') {\n    // Cross-language byte parity: pre-ES2019 V8 (and any environment whose\n    // JSON.stringify still escapes U+2028 / U+2029) emits \\u2028 / \\u2029\n    // for these codepoints, while Python's json.dumps with ensure_ascii=False\n    // emits them raw. A string carrying either would canonicalize to different\n    // bytes across the Node and Python siblings and break signature\n    // verification at the language boundary. Mirror the rejection in\n    // core/api/src/lib/canonicalize.ts so the contract stays symmetric.\n    if (value.includes('\\u2028') || value.includes('\\u2029')) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'stableStringify: strings containing U+2028 (LINE SEPARATOR) or U+2029 (PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR) are not allowed; cross-language byte parity requires neither be present (Node JSON.stringify on older V8 escapes them; Python json.dumps with ensure_ascii=False does not).',\n      );\n    }\n    return JSON.stringify(value);\n  }\n  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return JSON.stringify(value);\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(stableStringify).join(',')}]`;\n  const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const keys = Object.keys(obj).sort((a, b) => {\n    const aPoints = [...a].map((c) => c.codePointAt(0)!);\n    const bPoints = [...b].map((c) => c.codePointAt(0)!);\n    const len = Math.min(aPoints.length, bPoints.length);\n    for (let i = 0; i < len; i += 1) {\n      if (aPoints[i] !== bPoints[i]) return aPoints[i] - bPoints[i];\n    }\n    return aPoints.length - bPoints.length;\n  });\n  // Cross-language byte parity: same rejection rationale as the string-value\n  // branch above. Object keys flow through JSON.stringify(k) at the pairs line\n  // below, so without this check a key carrying U+2028 / U+2029 would pass on\n  // modern V8 but Python's _reject_unsafe_numbers (which recurses into dict\n  // keys) would throw at verify time.\n  for (const k of keys) {\n    if (k.includes('
') || k.includes('
')) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'stableStringify: object keys containing U+2028 (LINE SEPARATOR) or U+2029 (PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR) are not allowed; cross-language byte parity (Node JSON.stringify on older V8 escapes them; Python json.dumps with ensure_ascii=False does not).',\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  const pairs = keys.map((k) => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${stableStringify(obj[k])}`);\n  return `{${pairs.join(',')}}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Generate a fresh Ed25519 (default) or ES256 keypair for signing UCP profiles.\n *\n * The `privateKey` is an opaque KeyLike — store it server-side and pass to\n * `signUCPProfile()`. Never log or transmit the private key.\n *\n * The `publicJWK` is what you publish at `/.well-known/jwks.json` and inline in the\n * UCP profile's `signing_keys[]` array.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * import { generateUCPSigningKey } from '@agent-score/commerce';\n *\n * const { privateKey, publicJWK } = await generateUCPSigningKey({ kid: 'merchant-2026-05' });\n * // Persist privateKey securely (env var, KMS, secret manager).\n * // Publish publicJWK at /.well-known/jwks.json and reference it in your UCP profile.\n * ```\n */\nexport async function generateUCPSigningKey(opts: {\n  /** Key ID (kid). Must be unique per key; you'll reference this in the UCP profile's `signing_keys[]`. */\n  kid: string;\n  /** Signing algorithm. Default `EdDSA`. */\n  alg?: 'EdDSA' | 'ES256';\n}): Promise<GeneratedUCPKey> {\n  const jose = await loadJose();\n  const alg = opts.alg ?? 'EdDSA';\n  const { privateKey, publicKey } = await jose.generateKeyPair(alg, { extractable: true });\n  const exportedJwk = await jose.exportJWK(publicKey);\n\n  const publicJWK: UCPSigningKey = {\n    kid: opts.kid,\n    alg,\n    use: 'sig',\n    ...exportedJwk,\n  } as UCPSigningKey;\n\n  return { privateKey, publicJWK };\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign a UCP profile, returning a new envelope with the JWS attached as `signature`.\n *\n * The signature covers the canonicalized profile body (everything except `signature`\n * itself, with keys sorted at every level). Trust-mode UCP verifiers reconstruct the\n * canonical body, look up the key referenced by the JWS header's `kid`, and validate.\n *\n * The profile's `signing_keys[]` MUST already include a JWK with the matching `kid`\n * — otherwise verifiers can't find the public key. Add the `publicJWK` from\n * `generateUCPSigningKey()` to your `signing_keys[]` before calling this.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * const profile = buildUCPProfile({ ..., signing_keys: [publicJWK] });\n * const signed = await signUCPProfile(profile, { signingKey: privateKey, kid: 'merchant-2026-05' });\n * c.json(signed);\n * ```\n */\nexport async function signUCPProfile(\n  profile: UCPProfile,\n  opts: SignUCPProfileOptions,\n): Promise<SignedUCPProfile> {\n  const jose = await loadJose();\n  const alg = opts.alg ?? 'EdDSA';\n\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.includes(alg as AllowedAlg)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `signUCPProfile: alg ${JSON.stringify(opts.alg)} is not in the supported set [${ALLOWED_ALGS.join(', ')}].`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Sign-time kid sanity check: the profile's `signing_keys[]` MUST contain a\n  // JWK with the matching kid; otherwise verifiers can't resolve the public\n  // key and the profile is dead-on-arrival. Catch this at sign-time rather\n  // than at verifier-time in production.\n  if (typeof opts.kid !== 'string' || !opts.kid) {\n    throw new Error('signUCPProfile: opts.kid must be a non-empty string.');\n  }\n  const kids = (profile.signing_keys ?? []).map((k) => (k as Record<string, unknown>).kid);\n  if (!kids.includes(opts.kid)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `signUCPProfile: kid ${JSON.stringify(opts.kid)} is not present in profile.signing_keys[] (declared kids: ${JSON.stringify(kids)}). Verifiers will not find the key.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const canonicalBody = canonicalizeProfile(profile);\n  const payloadBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(canonicalBody);\n\n  const signature = await new jose.CompactSign(payloadBytes)\n    .setProtectedHeader({ alg, kid: opts.kid, typ: PROFILE_TYP })\n    .sign(opts.signingKey as Parameters<typeof jose.CompactSign.prototype.sign>[0]);\n\n  return { ...profile, signature };\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a signed UCP profile against a JWKS. Returns `true` when the JWS validates\n * against a matching key in `jwks`; throws on signature mismatch, missing key, or\n * canonicalization drift.\n *\n * Round-trip helper for tests and for cross-merchant verification flows. Trust-mode\n * UCP clients use the same algorithm.\n *\n * Example:\n * ```ts\n * const ok = await verifyUCPProfile(signedProfile, { keys: [publicJWK] });\n * ```\n */\nexport async function verifyUCPProfile(\n  profile: SignedUCPProfile,\n  jwks: JWKSResponse,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  if (profile === null || typeof profile !== 'object' || Array.isArray(profile)) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'no_signature',\n      `UCP profile must be a JSON object; got ${profile === null ? 'null' : Array.isArray(profile) ? 'array' : typeof profile}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const jose = await loadJose();\n\n  // JWKS shape guard so a malformed argument emits a typed UCPVerificationError\n  // rather than a raw TypeError on `.filter is not a function`.\n  if (!jwks || typeof jwks !== 'object' || !Array.isArray((jwks as { keys?: unknown }).keys)) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'malformed_jwks',\n      `UCP verifier expected JWKS shape { keys: [...] }; got ${jwks === null ? 'null' : typeof jwks === 'object' ? 'object without keys[] array' : typeof jwks}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  const stripped = { ...profile } as Partial<SignedUCPProfile>;\n  const sig = stripped.signature;\n  delete stripped.signature;\n  if (typeof sig !== 'string' || !sig) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'no_signature',\n      `UCP profile signature must be a non-empty string; got ${sig === undefined ? 'undefined' : typeof sig}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Pre-decode the protected header so typ → alg → kid → crit checks run BEFORE\n  // jose's compactVerify. jose enforces `crit` internally ahead of the key-resolver\n  // callback, which would surface `unrecognized_critical_header` on a JWS that\n  // also has a wrong typ; the python-commerce sibling's `_peek_jws_header` decodes\n  // the header manually and checks typ first. Mirroring that ordering here means\n  // a JWS with multiple header faults emits the same `code` in both SDKs.\n  let header: { alg?: unknown; kid?: unknown; typ?: unknown; crit?: unknown };\n  try {\n    const protectedB64 = sig.split('.')[0];\n    if (!protectedB64) throw new Error('JWS protected header segment is empty.');\n    const headerJson = new TextDecoder().decode(jose.base64url.decode(protectedB64));\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(headerJson);\n    if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null || Array.isArray(parsed)) {\n      throw new Error('JWS protected header is not a JSON object.');\n    }\n    header = parsed as { alg?: unknown; kid?: unknown; typ?: unknown; crit?: unknown };\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'malformed_jws',\n      `JWS protected header is not valid base64url-encoded JSON: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Header check order is typ → alg → kid → crit to match the Python sibling's\n  // _peek_jws_header. RFC 8725 §3.11: enforce expected typ to prevent\n  // cross-protocol token reuse.\n  if (header.typ !== PROFILE_TYP) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError('wrong_typ', `UCP signature typ must be \"${PROFILE_TYP}\"; got ${String(header.typ)}.`);\n  }\n  // RFC 8725 §3.1: restrict to allow-listed algorithms before key resolution\n  // so a hostile JWK can never be used with HS256/none/RS256/etc.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.includes(header.alg as AllowedAlg)) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError('unsupported_alg', `UCP signing alg must be one of ${ALLOWED_ALGS.join(', ')}; got ${String(header.alg)}.`);\n  }\n  // Strict string check: a non-string kid (number/bool/null) could accidentally\n  // match a JWK with an equal-typed kid and mask attacks.\n  if (typeof header.kid !== 'string' || !header.kid) {\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'missing_kid',\n      `UCP signature header kid must be a non-empty string; got ${header.kid === undefined ? 'undefined' : typeof header.kid}.`,\n    );\n  }\n  // RFC 7515 §4.1.11: `crit` MUST be a non-empty array of strings if present.\n  // Shape-check first (matches python-commerce's malformed_jws split) so that\n  // explicit `crit: null` / `crit: []` / `crit: \"foo\"` / `crit: [42]` aren't\n  // silently accepted; only well-formed crit arrays fall through to the\n  // unrecognized-extension check (RFC 8725 §3.10 — UCP defines no crit headers).\n  if ('crit' in header) {\n    const crit = (header as { crit?: unknown }).crit;\n    if (!Array.isArray(crit) || crit.length === 0 || !crit.every((c) => typeof c === 'string')) {\n      throw new UCPVerificationError(\n        'malformed_jws',\n        `JWS protected header crit must be a non-empty array of strings; got ${JSON.stringify(crit)}.`,\n      );\n    }\n    throw new UCPVerificationError(\n      'unrecognized_critical_header',\n      `JWS protected header advertises unrecognized crit headers: ${JSON.stringify(crit)}.`,\n    );\n  }\n\n  let signedPayload: Uint8Array;\n  try {\n    const verified = await jose.compactVerify(\n      sig,\n      async (h) => {\n        // typ/alg/kid/crit were validated up-front against the pre-decoded header;\n        // this resolver only handles JWK lookup. 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State list is only enforced for US shipments.\n *\n * This module ships three primitives:\n *\n * 1. {@link PolicyBlock} — the typed shape.\n * 2. {@link buildGateOptionsFromPolicy} — translate a block into the options object the\n *    per-framework `agentscoreGate(...)` accepts. Returns `null` when the policy\n *    has no enforcement (treat as \"no gate; anonymous OK\").\n * 3. {@link runGateWithEnforcement} — wrap a per-framework middleware in the\n *    hard/soft enforcement runner. The middleware is given an `onDenied` shim\n *    that captures the denial body and status; the runner returns a structured\n *    {@link GateResult} so the vendor decides how to surface it.\n *\n * All three are additive — vendors using `agentscoreGate(...)` directly are\n * unaffected.\n */\n\nimport type { AgentScoreCoreOptions, DenialReason } from '../core.js';\n\n/** Hard = 403 propagates; soft = swallowed + identity_status=\"unverified\". */\nexport type EnforcementMode = 'hard' | 'soft';\n\n/** Per-order trust level captured at settle time. */\nexport type IdentityStatus = 'verified' | 'unverified' | 'anonymous' | 'denied';\n\n/** Compliance fields a merchant attaches per product / per tier. All optional. */\nexport interface PolicyBlock {\n  enforcement?: EnforcementMode;\n  requireKyc?: boolean;\n  requireSanctionsClear?: boolean;\n  minAge?: number;\n  allowedJurisdictions?: readonly string[];\n  allowedShippingCountries?: readonly string[];\n  allowedShippingStates?: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Outcome of running a gate under an enforcement mode.\n *\n * - `verified`: gate accepted; identity is fully verified for the policy.\n * - `unverified`: soft mode swallowed a gate denial; the agent had *some*\n *   identity but didn't meet the policy. Stamp this on the order so\n *   ops/analytics can tell apart soft passes from hard passes.\n * - `anonymous`: no gate ran (policy was null / no enforcement).\n * - `denied`: hard mode rejected; the caller must propagate the 403. The\n *   `denialBody` and `denialStatus` carry the original gate response so the\n *   caller can return it as-is.\n */\nexport interface GateResult {\n  status: IdentityStatus;\n  denialStatus?: number;\n  denialBody?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  denialReason?: DenialReason;\n}\n\n/**\n * Translate a {@link PolicyBlock} into the options the per-framework\n * `agentscoreGate(...)` expects. Returns `null` when the block has no\n * `enforcement` set — the caller should treat that as \"no gate; anonymous OK\".\n *\n * Use a fresh gate per request rather than constructing once at module scope\n * when the policy varies per resource (e.g. per product). Each adapter's gate\n * is cheap to instantiate.\n */\nexport function buildGateOptionsFromPolicy(\n  policy: PolicyBlock | null | undefined,\n  base: { apiKey: string; baseUrl?: string },\n): AgentScoreCoreOptions | null {\n  if (!policy || !policy.enforcement) return null;\n  return {\n    apiKey: base.apiKey,\n    ...(base.baseUrl !== undefined && { baseUrl: base.baseUrl }),\n    ...(policy.requireKyc !== undefined && { requireKyc: policy.requireKyc }),\n    ...(policy.requireSanctionsClear !== undefined && {\n      requireSanctionsClear: policy.requireSanctionsClear,\n    }),\n    ...(policy.minAge !== undefined && { minAge: policy.minAge }),\n    ...(policy.allowedJurisdictions !== undefined && {\n      allowedJurisdictions: [...policy.allowedJurisdictions],\n    }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Run a per-framework gate middleware respecting the enforcement mode.\n *\n * The vendor passes:\n * - `gate`: their framework's middleware (Hono `MiddlewareHandler`, Express\n *   `(req, res, next) => void`, etc.) — anything that resolves on accept and\n *   throws or returns a `Response` on deny.\n * - `runGate`: a thin adapter that calls the middleware with the framework\n *   context and returns either `{ ok: true }` (gate accepted) or\n *   `{ ok: false, status, body, reason? }` (gate denied with details).\n *\n * `runGateWithEnforcement` wraps that in the hard/soft split:\n *\n * - `gate=null` or `enforcement=null`: no gate fires; status=\"anonymous\".\n * - `enforcement=\"hard\"` + denied: status=\"denied\"; caller propagates denialStatus + denialBody.\n * - `enforcement=\"soft\"` + denied: swallow; status=\"unverified\".\n * - accepted: status=\"verified\".\n */\nexport async function runGateWithEnforcement(\n  enforcement: EnforcementMode | undefined,\n  runGate: (() => Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; status: number; body: Record<string, unknown>; reason?: DenialReason }>) | null,\n): Promise<GateResult> {\n  if (!runGate || !enforcement) return { status: 'anonymous' };\n\n  const outcome = await runGate();\n  if (outcome.ok) return { status: 'verified' };\n\n  if (enforcement === 'hard') {\n    return {\n      status: 'denied',\n      denialStatus: outcome.status,\n      denialBody: outcome.body,\n      ...(outcome.reason !== undefined && { denialReason: outcome.reason }),\n    };\n  }\n  return {\n    status: 'unverified',\n    denialStatus: outcome.status,\n    denialBody: outcome.body,\n    ...(outcome.reason !== undefined && { denialReason: outcome.reason }),\n  };\n}\n\n/** NULL policy / NULL allowlist → ship anywhere. Otherwise country must be in the list. */\nexport function shippingCountryAllowed(country: string, policy: PolicyBlock | null | undefined): boolean {\n  if (!policy?.allowedShippingCountries || policy.allowedShippingCountries.length === 0) return true;\n  const allowed = new Set(policy.allowedShippingCountries.map((c) => c.toUpperCase()));\n  return allowed.has(country.toUpperCase());\n}\n\n/**\n * US-state allowlist (e.g. wine).\n *\n * Only enforced for US shipments — non-US shipments are governed by\n * {@link shippingCountryAllowed} independently.\n */\nexport function shippingStateAllowed(\n  state: string,\n  country: string,\n  policy: PolicyBlock | null | undefined,\n): boolean {\n  if (!policy?.allowedShippingStates || policy.allowedShippingStates.length === 0) return true;\n  if (country.toUpperCase() !== 'US') return true;\n  const allowed = new Set(policy.allowedShippingStates.map((s) => s.toUpperCase()));\n  return 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