@agent-score/commerce 1.6.0 → 1.8.0

package/dist/identity/hono.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/identity/hono.ts","../../src/_denial.ts","../../src/_response.ts","../../src/core.ts","../../src/address.ts","../../src/cache.ts","../../src/signer.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import {\n  FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS,\n  buildContactSupportNextSteps,\n  buildSignerMismatchBody,\n  denialReasonStatus,\n  isFixableDenial,\n  verificationAgentInstructions,\n} from '../_denial';\nimport { denialReasonToBody } from '../_response';\nimport { createAgentScoreCore } from '../core';\nimport { extractPaymentSignerAddress, readX402PaymentHeader } from '../signer';\nimport type {\n  AgentIdentity,\n  AgentScoreCore,\n  AgentScoreCoreOptions,\n  AssessResult,\n  CreateSessionOnMissing,\n  DenialReason,\n  FailOpenInfraReason,\n  GateQuotaInfo,\n  VerifyWalletSignerResult,\n} from '../core';\nimport type { Context, MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';\n\nconst CONTEXT_KEY = 'agentscore';\nconst GATE_STATE_KEY = '__agentscoreGate';\n\ninterface GateState {\n  core: AgentScoreCore;\n  operatorToken?: string;\n  walletAddress?: string;\n  /** Set to `true` only when the gate fail-open'd due to AgentScore-side infra failure\n   *  (429/5xx/network timeout). Compliance was NOT enforced for this request — log/alert\n   *  in your handler. See {@link getGateDegradedState}. */\n  degraded?: boolean;\n  /** Why the gate degraded — quota_exceeded / api_error / network_timeout. */\n  infraReason?: FailOpenInfraReason;\n  /** Per-account assess quota observability captured from `X-Quota-*` response headers\n   *  on the success path. Absent on Enterprise / unlimited tiers, or when the gate didn't\n   *  call assess. */\n  quota?: GateQuotaInfo;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentScoreGateOptions extends Omit<AgentScoreCoreOptions, 'createSessionOnMissing'> {\n  /** Custom function to extract agent identity (wallet address and/or operator token). */\n  extractIdentity?: (c: Context) => AgentIdentity | undefined;\n  /** Custom handler invoked when a request is denied. Must return a Hono `Response`. */\n  onDenied?: (c: Context, reason: DenialReason) => Response | Promise<Response>;\n  /** Auto-create a verification session when no identity is present. The `getSessionOptions`\n   *  and `onBeforeSession` hooks receive the Hono `Context` so they can read the request body,\n   *  look up product metadata, and pre-create merchant-specific resume tokens. */\n  createSessionOnMissing?: CreateSessionOnMissing<Context>;\n}\n\nfunction defaultExtractIdentity(c: Context): AgentIdentity | undefined {\n  const token = c.req.header('x-operator-token');\n  const addr = c.req.header('x-wallet-address');\n  const identity: AgentIdentity = {};\n  if (token && token.length > 0) identity.operatorToken = token;\n  if (addr && addr.length > 0) identity.address = addr;\n  if (identity.operatorToken || identity.address) return identity;\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction defaultOnDenied(c: Context, reason: DenialReason): Response {\n  return c.json(denialReasonToBody(reason), denialReasonStatus(reason));\n}\n\n/**\n * Hono middleware that gates requests using AgentScore trust and policy evaluation.\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from 'hono';\n * import { agentscoreGate } from '@agent-score/commerce/identity/hono';\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * app.use('/purchase', agentscoreGate({ apiKey: 'as_live_...', requireKyc: true, minAge: 21 }));\n * ```\n */\nexport function agentscoreGate(options: AgentScoreGateOptions): MiddlewareHandler {\n  const { extractIdentity = defaultExtractIdentity, onDenied = defaultOnDenied, ...coreOptions } = options;\n  const core = createAgentScoreCore(coreOptions as AgentScoreCoreOptions);\n\n  return async (c, next) => {\n    const identity = extractIdentity(c);\n    c.set(GATE_STATE_KEY, {\n      core,\n      operatorToken: identity?.operatorToken,\n      walletAddress: identity?.address,\n    } satisfies GateState);\n\n    const outcome = await core.evaluate(identity, c);\n\n    if (outcome.kind === 'allow') {\n      if (outcome.degraded || outcome.quota) {\n        const prev = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState;\n        c.set(GATE_STATE_KEY, {\n          ...prev,\n          ...(outcome.degraded && { degraded: true, infraReason: outcome.infraReason }),\n          ...(outcome.quota && { quota: outcome.quota }),\n        } satisfies GateState);\n      }\n      if (outcome.data) c.set(CONTEXT_KEY, outcome.data);\n      await next();\n      return;\n    }\n\n    return onDenied(c, outcome.reason);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Retrieve AgentScore assess data from a Hono `Context`. Returns `undefined` if the gate\n * did not run (e.g. in fail-open mode with a missing identity, or on a route without the\n * gate middleware).\n */\nexport function getAgentScoreData(c: Context): AssessResult | undefined {\n  return c.get(CONTEXT_KEY) as AssessResult | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read whether the gate fail-open'd due to AgentScore-side infrastructure failure on\n * this request. Returns `{ degraded: false }` for normal allows; `{ degraded: true,\n * infraReason }` when the gate was bypassed (compliance NOT enforced — log/alert).\n *\n * Only set when `failOpen: true` was configured AND the failure was an infra failure\n * (429 quota_exceeded, 5xx api_error, network_timeout). Real compliance denials never\n * trigger fail-open and so never set this flag.\n */\nexport function getGateDegradedState(c: Context): { degraded: boolean; infraReason?: FailOpenInfraReason } {\n  const state = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState | undefined;\n  return { degraded: state?.degraded ?? false, infraReason: state?.infraReason };\n}\n\n/**\n * Read AgentScore assess quota observability captured from `X-Quota-*` response headers\n * on this request's gate evaluate. Returns `undefined` when the request was a fail-open\n * pass-through (no assess call) or when the API didn't emit quota headers (Enterprise /\n * unlimited tiers). Use to monitor approach-to-cap proactively.\n */\nexport function getGateQuotaInfo(c: Context): GateQuotaInfo | undefined {\n  const state = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState | undefined;\n  return state?.quota;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a wallet that paid under the operator_token the gate extracted on this request.\n * Call this after a successful payment to build AgentScore's cross-merchant credential↔wallet\n * profile. No-ops silently if the gate never ran, the request was wallet-authenticated (no\n * operator_token to associate), or the API call fails — capture is fire-and-forget by design.\n *\n * ```ts\n * app.post('/purchase', async (c) => {\n *   const assess = getAgentScoreData(c);\n *   // ... run payment, recover signer wallet from the payload ...\n *   await captureWallet(c, { walletAddress: signer, network: 'evm' });\n *   return c.json({ ok: true });\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport async function captureWallet(\n  c: Context,\n  options: { walletAddress: string; network: 'evm' | 'solana'; idempotencyKey?: string },\n): Promise<void> {\n  const state = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState | undefined;\n  if (!state?.operatorToken) return;\n  await state.core.captureWallet({\n    operatorToken: state.operatorToken,\n    walletAddress: options.walletAddress,\n    network: options.network,\n    idempotencyKey: options.idempotencyKey,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify the payment signer resolves to the same operator as the claimed `X-Wallet-Address`.\n *\n * Call this AFTER the agent submits a payment credential, BEFORE settling. Returns:\n *\n *   - `pass` — signer matches (byte-equal or same-operator)\n *   - `wallet_signer_mismatch` — signer resolves to a different operator (or is unlinked)\n *   - `wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing` — payment rail has no wallet signer (SPT/card);\n *     agent should switch to `X-Operator-Token`\n *\n * No-ops (returns `pass` with `claimedOperator: null`) when the request was operator-token\n * authenticated — signer-match only applies to wallet-auth.\n *\n * The helper auto-extracts the signer from MPP (`Authorization: Payment`) or x402\n * (`payment-signature` / `x-payment`) headers. Pass `options.signer` explicitly to override.\n *\n * ```ts\n * app.post('/purchase', async (c) => {\n *   const result = await verifyWalletSignerMatch(c);\n *   if (result.kind !== 'pass') return c.json({ error: result.kind, ...result }, 403);\n *   // ... proceed with settlement ...\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport async function verifyWalletSignerMatch(\n  c: Context,\n  options?: { signer?: string | null; network?: 'evm' | 'solana' },\n): Promise<VerifyWalletSignerResult> {\n  const state = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState | undefined;\n  // No check when: not a wallet-auth request, OR both headers were sent (operator-token wins —\n  // the caller opted out of strict wallet-auth). Signer-match only runs on strict wallet-auth.\n  if (!state?.walletAddress || state.operatorToken) {\n    return { kind: 'pass', claimedOperator: null, signerOperator: null };\n  }\n\n  const signer =\n    options?.signer !== undefined\n      ? options.signer\n      : await extractPaymentSignerAddress(c.req.raw, readX402PaymentHeader(c.req.raw));\n\n  return state.core.verifyWalletSignerMatch({\n    claimedWallet: state.walletAddress,\n    signer,\n    network: options?.network,\n  });\n}\n\n// Re-export the denial helpers so vendors can compose custom onDenied handlers\n// without reaching into the internal _denial module.\nexport {\n  FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS,\n  buildContactSupportNextSteps,\n  buildSignerMismatchBody,\n  denialReasonStatus,\n  isFixableDenial,\n  verificationAgentInstructions,\n};\nexport { denialReasonToBody };\nexport { extractPaymentSignerAddress, readX402PaymentHeader };\n","/**\n * Universal denial helpers shared across every adapter.\n *\n * What lives here:\n *   - `FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS` / `isFixableDenial` — classifier for compliance reasons that can\n *     be resolved by re-completing KYC (vs sanctions / age failures which are permanent).\n *   - `denialReasonStatus` — picks the right HTTP status code per denial code (401 for credential\n *     problems, 503 for transient API errors, 403 for everything else).\n *   - `buildSignerMismatchBody` — produces the standard 403 body for a `verifyWalletSignerMatch`\n *     non-pass result.\n *   - `buildContactSupportNextSteps` — standard `next_steps.action: \"contact_support\"` shape for\n *     unfixable compliance denials.\n *   - `verificationAgentInstructions` — the canned `agent_instructions` block for\n *     identity-verification 403s. Vendors can override individual fields.\n *\n * Adapters use `denialReasonStatus` inside their default `onDenied` so vendors get the right\n * status code for free. The body builders are exported from each adapter so vendors who write\n * a custom `onDenied` can compose them without copy-paste.\n */\n\nimport type { DenialReason, VerifyWalletSignerResult } from './core';\n\n/**\n * Compliance denial reasons that can be resolved by re-completing KYC. The API emits these\n * when KYC is missing/pending/failed; the user can re-verify and retry.\n *\n * `jurisdiction_restricted` is NOT in this set — the API only emits it AFTER KYC is verified,\n * meaning the user's KYC'd country is in the merchant's blocked list (or absent from the\n * allowed list). Re-doing KYC won't change the country, so it's permanent. Same shape as\n * `sanctions_flagged` and `age_insufficient` — surface contact_support, don't waste a\n * /v1/sessions mint.\n */\nexport const FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'kyc_required',\n  'kyc_pending',\n  'kyc_failed',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Returns true when a `wallet_not_trusted` denial's reasons are all fixable via KYC\n * re-verification. False when any reason is permanent (sanctions, age, jurisdiction_restricted).\n *\n * Empty reasons returns false — without a known reason we can't promise a fix, so default to\n * the bare denial path (vendors can override via custom onDenied if they want different\n * behavior on empty reasons).\n */\nexport function isFixableDenial(reasons: readonly string[] | undefined): boolean {\n  if (!reasons || reasons.length === 0) return false;\n  return reasons.every((r) => FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS.has(r));\n}\n\n/**\n * The right HTTP status code for a denial. `defaultOnDenied` in every adapter uses this so\n * vendors get correct status codes without writing per-code branches.\n *\n *   - 401 for credential problems the agent can recover from (`token_expired`, `invalid_credential`)\n *   - 503 for transient `api_error`\n *   - 403 for everything else (identity required, compliance fail, signer mismatch, etc.)\n */\nexport function denialReasonStatus(reason: DenialReason): 401 | 403 | 503 {\n  if (reason.code === 'token_expired' || reason.code === 'invalid_credential') return 401;\n  if (reason.code === 'api_error') return 503;\n  return 403;\n}\n\nexport interface SignerMismatchBodyInput {\n  /** Result from `verifyWalletSignerMatch`. The function only emits a body for non-pass results. */\n  result: VerifyWalletSignerResult;\n  /** Optional override for the human-facing `next_steps.user_message`. */\n  userMessage?: string;\n  /** Optional override for `next_steps.learn_more_url`. Default: AgentScore agent-identity guide. */\n  learnMoreUrl?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Standard 403 body for a non-pass `verifyWalletSignerMatch` result. Returns null for `pass` /\n * `api_error` so vendors can call it unconditionally:\n *\n *   const result = await verifyWalletSignerMatch(c);\n *   const mismatchBody = buildSignerMismatchBody({ result });\n *   if (mismatchBody) return c.json(mismatchBody, 403);\n *\n * Body shape mirrors the gate's denial bodies: top-level error.code, all signer-match fields\n * (`claimed_operator`, `actual_signer_operator`, `expected_signer`, `actual_signer`,\n * `linked_wallets`), plus a `next_steps` action describing the recovery path.\n */\nexport function buildSignerMismatchBody(input: SignerMismatchBodyInput): Record<string, unknown> | null {\n  const { result } = input;\n  if (result.kind === 'pass' || result.kind === 'api_error') return null;\n\n  const learnMoreUrl = input.learnMoreUrl ?? 'https://docs.agentscore.sh/guides/agent-identity';\n\n  if (result.kind === 'wallet_signer_mismatch') {\n    const linkedWallets = result.linkedWallets ?? [];\n    const userMessage = input.userMessage ?? (linkedWallets.length > 0\n      ? `Sign the payment with one of the wallets linked to this operator: ${linkedWallets.join(', ')}. Then retry.`\n      : 'Sign the payment with the same wallet you claimed via X-Wallet-Address, or switch to X-Operator-Token for rail-independent identity.');\n    return {\n      error: {\n        code: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n        message:\n          'Payment signer does not match the wallet claimed via X-Wallet-Address. The signer and the claimed wallet must both resolve to the same AgentScore operator.',\n      },\n      claimed_operator: result.claimedOperator,\n      actual_signer_operator: result.actualSignerOperator ?? null,\n      expected_signer: result.expectedSigner,\n      actual_signer: result.actualSigner,\n      linked_wallets: linkedWallets,\n      next_steps: {\n        action: 'regenerate_payment_from_linked_wallet',\n        user_message: userMessage,\n        learn_more_url: learnMoreUrl,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing\n  return {\n    error: {\n      code: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n      message:\n        'Wallet-auth requires a payment rail that carries a wallet signature (Tempo MPP, x402). Stripe SPT and card rails have no wallet signer; switch to X-Operator-Token to use those.',\n    },\n    next_steps: {\n      action: 'switch_to_operator_token',\n      user_message:\n        input.userMessage ??\n        'Drop the X-Wallet-Address header and retry with X-Operator-Token (works on every payment rail).',\n      learn_more_url: learnMoreUrl,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Standard `next_steps` block for unfixable compliance denials (sanctions, age, etc.). Vendors\n * spread this into a 403 body alongside the usual `error`/`reasons` fields.\n *\n *   return c.json({\n *     error: { code: 'compliance_denied', message: '...' },\n *     reasons,\n *     next_steps: buildContactSupportNextSteps('support@example.com'),\n *   }, 403);\n */\nexport function buildContactSupportNextSteps(\n  supportEmail: string,\n  message?: string,\n): { action: 'contact_support'; support_email: string; user_message: string } {\n  return {\n    action: 'contact_support',\n    support_email: supportEmail,\n    user_message:\n      message ??\n      `If you believe this denial is in error, contact support at ${supportEmail} with your order details.`,\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface VerificationAgentInstructionsInput {\n  /** Override the user-facing message. */\n  userAction?: string;\n  /** Replace the generic \"Retry the original merchant request...\" step with a merchant-specific\n   *  one (e.g. \"Retry POST /purchase with X-Operator-Token AND include order_id...\"). When set,\n   *  this REPLACES baseSteps[4] rather than appending — use it instead of `extraSteps[0]` when\n   *  your retry instruction is a refinement of the canonical retry, not an additional step. */\n  retryStep?: string;\n  /** Append additional steps after the retry step. Use this for genuinely additional steps\n   *  (e.g. \"After payment the same call returns 200 with the order\"), not for re-stating the\n   *  retry — use `retryStep` for that. */\n  extraSteps?: string[];\n  /** Override the poll cadence. Default 5 seconds. */\n  pollIntervalSeconds?: number;\n  /** Override how long the agent should keep polling. Default 3600 seconds (1 hour). */\n  timeoutSeconds?: number;\n  /** Optional `order_ttl` note describing how long pending orders survive. */\n  orderTtl?: string;\n  /** Arbitrary additional fields merged into the instructions object. */\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * The canonical `agent_instructions` block for identity-verification 403s. Tells the agent how to\n * present the verify_url, poll for the operator_token, and retry the original request. Universal\n * across every AgentScore-gated merchant — overrides let vendors add merchant-specific steps\n * (e.g. \"include order_id when retrying\").\n */\nexport function verificationAgentInstructions(input: VerificationAgentInstructionsInput = {}): {\n  action: 'poll_for_credential';\n  user_action: string;\n  steps: string[];\n  poll_interval_seconds: number;\n  poll_secret_header: 'X-Poll-Secret';\n  retry_token_header: 'X-Operator-Token';\n  timeout_seconds: number;\n  order_ttl?: string;\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n} {\n  const baseSteps = [\n    'Present the verify_url directly to the user — it is a complete, ready-to-open URL with the session token already embedded (e.g. https://agentscore.sh/verify?session=sess_...). Do NOT modify or construct the URL yourself.',\n    `Immediately begin polling poll_url every ${input.pollIntervalSeconds ?? 5} seconds with header X-Poll-Secret set to poll_secret. The user will complete verification in their browser while you poll in the background.`,\n    'The user visits the URL, signs in, completes identity verification (photo ID + selfie via Stripe Identity), and closes the tab. They do NOT need to copy or paste anything back to you.',\n    'When your poll returns status \"verified\", extract operator_token from the response. This is a one-time value — save it immediately. Subsequent polls return status \"consumed\" without the token.',\n    input.retryStep ?? 'Retry the original merchant request with header X-Operator-Token set to the operator_token value.',\n  ];\n\n  return {\n    action: 'poll_for_credential',\n    user_action:\n      input.userAction ??\n      'The user must visit verify_url to complete identity verification before this request can proceed',\n    steps: input.extraSteps ? [...baseSteps, ...input.extraSteps] : baseSteps,\n    poll_interval_seconds: input.pollIntervalSeconds ?? 5,\n    poll_secret_header: 'X-Poll-Secret',\n    retry_token_header: 'X-Operator-Token',\n    timeout_seconds: input.timeoutSeconds ?? 3600,\n    ...(input.orderTtl ? { order_ttl: input.orderTtl } : {}),\n    ...(input.extra ?? {}),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Shared DenialReason → response body serialization for all adapters.\n *\n * Keeps Hono / Express / Fastify / Web / Next.js defaults aligned — a field added\n * here shows up in every adapter's 403 body automatically, and there's one place\n * to test the marshaling.\n *\n * Body shape: `{ error: { code, message }, ... }` — matches the canonical AgentScore\n * core API response shape (`core/api/src/lib/auth.ts`, `lib/rate-limit.ts`, etc.) and\n * martin-estate's pre-commerce shape, so downstream agents see one consistent\n * `error.code` + `error.message` pair regardless of which layer produced the denial.\n */\n\nimport type { DenialCode, DenialReason } from './core.js';\n\n/**\n * JSON-encoded canonical agent_instructions per denial code. Auto-injected by\n * `denialReasonToBody` when the gate produces a DenialReason without explicit\n * `agent_instructions` so every denial carries a machine-readable next step.\n *\n * Codes covered:\n *  - `wallet_not_trusted` — gate never stamps instructions today (the original gap)\n *  - `payment_required` — gate never stamps; merchant tier misconfig, contact-merchant action\n *  - `identity_verification_required` — fallback when API didn't return next_steps\n *  - `token_expired` — fallback when API didn't return next_steps\n *  - `api_error` — `retry_with_backoff` envelope; sole retry channel (no separate\n *    next_steps block emitted)\n *\n * Codes already stamped explicitly upstream in core.ts (`missing_identity`,\n * `invalid_credential`) and codes that don't go through DenialReason\n * (`wallet_signer_mismatch`, `wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing` — handled by\n * `verifyWalletSignerMatch` result type) are not in this map.\n */\nconst WALLET_NOT_TRUSTED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_support',\n  steps: [\n    'The wallet\\'s operator failed an UNFIXABLE compliance check (sanctions, age, or jurisdiction). `reasons` lists which: `sanctions_flagged` / `age_insufficient` / `jurisdiction_restricted`. KYC re-verification won\\'t change the outcome — the policy denial is structural.',\n    'Surface the denial to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact. Do not retry the same merchant request; do not hand the user a verify_url (verification won\\'t fix this code path).',\n    'Fixable compliance reasons (`kyc_required`, `kyc_pending`, `kyc_failed`) do NOT land on this code — the gate auto-mints a verification session for those and returns `identity_verification_required` with poll endpoints, same shape as `missing_identity`. `jurisdiction_restricted` IS in the unfixable bucket because the API only emits it after KYC is verified (the user\\'s KYC\\'d country is in the blocked list — re-doing KYC won\\'t change the country).',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This purchase is denied by the merchant\\'s compliance policy and cannot be resolved by re-verifying. Contact the merchant\\'s support if you believe this is in error.',\n});\n\nconst PAYMENT_REQUIRED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_merchant',\n  steps: [\n    'The merchant\\'s AgentScore account does not have the assess endpoint enabled, so agent identity cannot be evaluated. This is a merchant-side configuration gap — there is no agent-side recovery.',\n    'Contact the merchant (their support channel — typically listed in /llms.txt or the OpenAPI servers metadata) so they can resolve the configuration on their side.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This merchant\\'s identity gate is misconfigured. Contact the merchant — there\\'s nothing to fix on the agent side.',\n});\n\nconst IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'deliver_verify_url_and_poll',\n  steps: [\n    'Share verify_url with the user — they complete identity verification on AgentScore.',\n    'If session_id + poll_secret are present in the body, poll poll_url every 5 seconds with header `X-Poll-Secret: <poll_secret>` until status=verified. The poll returns a one-time operator_token.',\n    'Retry the original request with header `X-Operator-Token: <opc_...>`.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Identity verification is required. Visit verify_url, then poll poll_url for the operator token and retry.',\n});\n\nconst API_ERROR_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'retry_with_backoff',\n  steps: [\n    'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry the request after 5–30 seconds with exponential backoff.',\n    'This is NOT a compliance denial — the user does not need to re-verify their identity. Send the same identity headers (X-Wallet-Address or X-Operator-Token) on retry.',\n    'If the request continues to fail after 3+ retries (~60 seconds total), surface the error to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a moment — this is a transient issue, not a problem with your account.',\n});\n\nexport const QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_merchant',\n  steps: [\n    'AgentScore identity verification is unavailable for this merchant. This is a merchant-side issue and is NOT recoverable via retry.',\n    'Do not retry: the same 503 will be returned until the merchant resolves the issue on their side.',\n    'Surface to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact. The merchant (not the agent) needs to act.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This merchant\\'s identity verification is temporarily unavailable. Try again later, or contact the merchant directly.',\n});\n\nconst TOKEN_EXPIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'deliver_verify_url_and_poll',\n  steps: [\n    'The operator token is expired or revoked. AgentScore auto-mints a fresh verification session — complete it to receive a new opc_...',\n    'Share verify_url with the user, then poll poll_url every 5 seconds with header `X-Poll-Secret: <poll_secret>` until status=verified. The poll returns a fresh one-time operator_token.',\n    'Retry the original request with header `X-Operator-Token: <new_opc_...>`.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Operator token is expired or revoked. A new verification session has been minted — visit verify_url to refresh.',\n});\n\nconst DEFAULT_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS: Partial<Record<DenialCode, string>> = {\n  api_error: API_ERROR_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  wallet_not_trusted: WALLET_NOT_TRUSTED_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  payment_required: PAYMENT_REQUIRED_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  identity_verification_required: IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  token_expired: TOKEN_EXPIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS,\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_MESSAGES: Record<DenialCode, string> = {\n  missing_identity:\n    'No identity provided. Send X-Wallet-Address (wallet) or X-Operator-Token (credential).',\n  identity_verification_required:\n    'Identity verification is required to access this resource. Visit verify_url to complete KYC.',\n  wallet_not_trusted:\n    'The wallet does not meet the merchant compliance policy.',\n  api_error:\n    'AgentScore is unreachable. This is transient — retry in a few seconds.',\n  payment_required:\n    'Assess endpoint not enabled for this merchant. Contact support.',\n  wallet_signer_mismatch:\n    'Payment signer does not match the wallet claimed via X-Wallet-Address. The signer and the claimed wallet must both resolve to the same AgentScore operator.',\n  wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing:\n    'X-Wallet-Address was sent with a rail that has no wallet signature (Stripe SPT / card). Switch to X-Operator-Token, or use a wallet-signing rail (Tempo MPP, x402).',\n  token_expired:\n    'The operator token is expired or revoked. A fresh verification session has been minted — visit verify_url to mint a new token.',\n  invalid_credential:\n    'The operator token is not recognized. Switch to a different stored token, or drop the header to bootstrap a fresh session.',\n};\n\n// Field names the gate claims authority over. Merchant-provided `extra` (from the\n// onBeforeSession hook) MUST NOT override these — a buggy or malicious hook could\n// otherwise replace `verify_url` with a phishing URL or drop agent_instructions.\nconst RESERVED_FIELDS = new Set([\n  'error',\n  'decision',\n  'reasons',\n  'verify_url',\n  'session_id',\n  'poll_secret',\n  'poll_url',\n  'agent_instructions',\n  'agent_memory',\n  'claimed_operator',\n  'actual_signer_operator',\n  'expected_signer',\n  'actual_signer',\n  'linked_wallets',\n]);\n\nexport function denialReasonToBody(reason: DenialReason): Record<string, unknown> {\n  const message = reason.message ?? DEFAULT_MESSAGES[reason.code];\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = { error: { code: reason.code, message } };\n  if (reason.decision) body.decision = reason.decision;\n  if (reason.reasons) body.reasons = reason.reasons;\n  if (reason.verify_url) body.verify_url = reason.verify_url;\n  if (reason.session_id) body.session_id = reason.session_id;\n  if (reason.poll_secret) body.poll_secret = reason.poll_secret;\n  if (reason.poll_url) body.poll_url = reason.poll_url;\n  const instructions = reason.agent_instructions ?? DEFAULT_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS[reason.code];\n  if (instructions) body.agent_instructions = instructions;\n  if (reason.agent_memory) body.agent_memory = reason.agent_memory;\n  if (reason.claimed_operator) body.claimed_operator = reason.claimed_operator;\n  if (reason.code === 'wallet_signer_mismatch') body.actual_signer_operator = reason.actual_signer_operator ?? null;\n  if (reason.expected_signer) body.expected_signer = reason.expected_signer;\n  if (reason.actual_signer) body.actual_signer = reason.actual_signer;\n  if (reason.linked_wallets && reason.linked_wallets.length > 0) body.linked_wallets = reason.linked_wallets;\n  if (reason.extra) {\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(reason.extra)) {\n      if (RESERVED_FIELDS.has(key)) {\n        console.warn(`[gate] onBeforeSession returned reserved field \"${key}\" — ignoring to preserve gate authority`);\n        continue;\n      }\n      body[key] = value;\n    }\n  }\n  return body;\n}\n","import {\n  AgentScore,\n  InvalidCredentialError,\n  PaymentRequiredError,\n  QuotaExceededError,\n  TimeoutError as SdkTimeoutError,\n  TokenExpiredError,\n} from '@agent-score/sdk';\nimport { isFixableDenial } from './_denial';\nimport { QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS } from './_response';\nimport { normalizeAddress } from './address';\nimport { TTLCache } from './cache';\n\n// Character-based trim avoids a CodeQL polynomial-redos false positive on\n// `/\\/+$/` patterns that report library-input strings.\nfunction stripTrailingSlashes(s: string): string {\n  let end = s.length;\n  while (end > 0 && s.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47 /* '/' */) end--;\n  return end === s.length ? s : s.slice(0, end);\n}\n\ndeclare const __VERSION__: string;\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Public types (framework-agnostic)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface AgentIdentity {\n  address?: string;\n  operatorToken?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Session metadata returned from `POST /v1/sessions`. Surfaced to the `onBeforeSession`\n * hook so merchants can correlate an AgentScore session with their own resume token\n * (e.g. a pending-order id).\n */\nexport interface SessionMetadata {\n  session_id: string;\n  verify_url: string;\n  poll_secret: string;\n  poll_url: string;\n  expires_at?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for auto-creating a verification session when no identity is present.\n *\n * The static `context` / `productName` options are sent on every session request. For\n * per-request context (e.g. the specific product the agent was trying to buy), pass\n * a `getSessionOptions` callback that returns dynamic values; its return is merged\n * over the static defaults.\n *\n * `onBeforeSession` is a side-effect hook that runs after the session is minted but\n * before the 403 is built. Use it to pre-create a reservation/draft/pending-order\n * row in your DB so agents can resume via a merchant-specific id. Return value is\n * merged into `DenialReason.extra`, so it surfaces in both the default 403 body and\n * in a custom `onDenied` handler.\n */\nexport interface CreateSessionOnMissing<TCtx = unknown> {\n  apiKey: string;\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  context?: string;\n  productName?: string;\n  /** Per-request override of `context` / `productName`. Invoked with the framework context. */\n  getSessionOptions?: (ctx: TCtx) => Promise<{ context?: string; productName?: string }>\n                                  |          { context?: string; productName?: string };\n  /** Side-effect hook that runs after the session is minted. Return value is merged\n   *  into `DenialReason.extra` so custom `onDenied` handlers can include merchant-specific\n   *  fields (e.g. `order_id`) in the 403 response. Hook errors are logged and swallowed —\n   *  a failing side effect should not block the 403 from reaching the agent. */\n  onBeforeSession?: (ctx: TCtx, session: SessionMetadata) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>\n                                                          |          Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentScoreCoreOptions {\n  /** AgentScore API key. Required. */\n  apiKey: string;\n  /** Require KYC verification. */\n  requireKyc?: boolean;\n  /** Require operator to be clear of sanctions. */\n  requireSanctionsClear?: boolean;\n  /** Minimum operator age bracket (18 or 21). */\n  minAge?: number;\n  /** List of blocked jurisdictions (blocklist). */\n  blockedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** List of allowed jurisdictions (allowlist — only these pass). */\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** If true, allow the request through when the API is unreachable. Defaults to false. */\n  failOpen?: boolean;\n  /** How long to cache results, in seconds. Defaults to 300. */\n  cacheSeconds?: number;\n  /** AgentScore API base URL. Defaults to \"https://api.agentscore.sh\". */\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  /** Optional chain to filter scoring to. */\n  chain?: string;\n  /** Prepended to the default User-Agent as `\"{userAgent} (@agent-score/commerce@{version})\"`. Use to attribute API calls to your app. */\n  userAgent?: string;\n  /** When set and no identity is found, create a verification session instead of denying immediately. */\n  createSessionOnMissing?: CreateSessionOnMissing;\n}\n\nexport type DenialCode =\n  | 'wallet_not_trusted'\n  | 'missing_identity'\n  | 'api_error'\n  | 'payment_required'\n  | 'identity_verification_required'\n  // Wallet-signer binding: claimed X-Wallet-Address must resolve to the same operator as\n  // the payment signer; wallet-auth is rejected on rails with no wallet signer.\n  | 'wallet_signer_mismatch'\n  | 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing'\n  // Granular credential-state denials passed through from /v1/assess.\n  // - `token_expired`: revoked + TTL-expired (the API unifies these). The 401 body carries\n  //   an auto-minted session, forwarded into DenialReason for one-shot recovery.\n  // - `invalid_credential`: the token doesn't exist at all (typo, never minted, fabricated).\n  //   No auto-session is minted by the API for this case — agents should switch to a\n  //   different stored token or drop the header to bootstrap a fresh session.\n  | 'token_expired'\n  | 'invalid_credential';\n\n/**\n * Cross-merchant pattern hint emitted on bootstrap denials and session-create responses.\n * LLM-hosted agents should persist this to long-term memory so future AgentScore encounters skip\n * the cold-start session flow. Contents are the pattern, not secrets.\n */\nexport interface AgentMemoryHint {\n  save_for_future_agentscore_gates: true;\n  pattern_summary: string;\n  quickstart: string;\n  identity_check_endpoint: string;\n  list_wallets_endpoint?: string;\n  identity_paths: { wallet: string; operator_token: string };\n  bootstrap: string;\n  do_not_persist_in_memory: string[];\n  persist_in_credential_store: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface DenialReason {\n  code: DenialCode;\n  /** Human-readable explanation. When omitted, `denialReasonToBody` substitutes a per-code default. */\n  message?: string;\n  decision?: string;\n  reasons?: string[];\n  verify_url?: string;\n  session_id?: string;\n  poll_secret?: string;\n  poll_url?: string;\n  agent_instructions?: string;\n  /** Cross-merchant memory hint. Emitted on bootstrap denials only by default. */\n  agent_memory?: AgentMemoryHint;\n  /** Full assess response when the denial came from `/v1/assess`. Lets consumers access fields\n   *  not promoted to first-class DenialReason properties (e.g., `policy_result`). Undefined for\n   *  denials that did not originate from an assess call (missing_identity, api_error,\n   *  payment_required, identity_verification_required). */\n  data?: AssessResult;\n  /** Extra fields returned from the `createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession` hook. Merged\n   *  into the default 403 body; custom `onDenied` handlers can spread these into their own\n   *  response shape (e.g. to include a merchant-minted `order_id`). */\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n  // Wallet-signer-match fields — populated for wallet_signer_mismatch only.\n  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n  /** Operator id resolved from `X-Wallet-Address`. */\n  claimed_operator?: string;\n  /** Operator id the actual payment signer resolves to. `null` when the signer wallet isn't\n   *  linked to any operator (treat as a different identity). */\n  actual_signer_operator?: string | null;\n  /** The wallet the agent claimed via header. Echoed back for self-correction. */\n  expected_signer?: string;\n  /** The wallet that actually signed the payment. */\n  actual_signer?: string;\n  /** Wallets the claimed operator could sign with (if enumerable). Present when non-empty. */\n  linked_wallets?: string[];\n}\n\n/** Operator verification details from the assess response. Mirrors python's\n *  `OperatorVerification` dataclass. */\nexport interface OperatorVerification {\n  level: string;\n  operator_type: string | null;\n  verified_at: string | null;\n}\n\n/** Account-level KYC facts that apply to every operator under the same account.\n *  Populated when the API returns account_verification (post-KYC operator).\n *  Mirrors python's account_verification dict shape. */\nexport interface AccountVerification {\n  kyc_level?: string;\n  sanctions_clear?: boolean;\n  age_bracket?: string;\n  jurisdiction?: string;\n  verified_at?: string | null;\n}\n\n/** A single policy check from the assess response. Mirrors python's `PolicyCheck`. */\nexport interface PolicyCheck {\n  rule: string;\n  passed: boolean;\n  required?: unknown;\n  actual?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Policy evaluation result from the assess response. Mirrors python's `PolicyResult`. */\nexport interface PolicyResult {\n  all_passed: boolean;\n  checks: PolicyCheck[];\n}\n\nexport interface AssessResult {\n  decision: string | null;\n  decision_reasons: string[];\n  identity_method?: string;\n  operator_verification?: OperatorVerification;\n  account_verification?: AccountVerification;\n  resolved_operator?: string | null;\n  /** Wallets linked to the same operator as the resolved identity. Capped at 100 entries\n   *  by the API. Useful for advertising in 402 challenges so wallet-auth agents know which\n   *  alt-signers will satisfy `wallet_signer_mismatch`. */\n  linked_wallets?: string[];\n  verify_url?: string;\n  policy_result?: PolicyResult | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reason a failOpen allow short-circuited an evaluate call due to AgentScore-side\n * infrastructure issues. Surfaced on `EvaluateOutcome` so merchants can log/alert when\n * their gate is running in degraded mode (compliance not actually enforced this request).\n *\n * - `quota_exceeded` — AgentScore returned 429\n * - `api_error` — AgentScore returned 5xx or non-2xx that isn't 429\n * - `network_timeout` — request to /v1/assess timed out or failed at the network layer\n */\nexport type FailOpenInfraReason = 'quota_exceeded' | 'api_error' | 'network_timeout';\n\n/** Per-account assess quota observability, captured from `X-Quota-*` response headers\n *  on the success path. Mirrors the SDK's `QuotaInfo` shape — re-exported from gate state\n *  so merchants can monitor approach-to-cap proactively (warn at 80%, alert at 95%). */\nexport interface GateQuotaInfo {\n  limit: number | null;\n  used: number | null;\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp, or the literal string `\"never\"` for unlimited tiers. */\n  reset: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Outcome from `AgentScoreCore.evaluate()`. Adapters map this to framework-specific responses.\n *\n * - `{ kind: 'allow', data }` — the request passed the policy. `data` is present on a normal\n *   allow; `undefined` when fail-open short-circuited (identity missing, API unreachable,\n *   timeout, or 402 paid-tier required).\n * - When `failOpen: true` and the allow was the result of an AgentScore-side infrastructure\n *   failure (429/5xx/timeout), the result also carries `degraded: true` + `infraReason` so\n *   merchants can alert/log without parsing console output.\n * - `quota` propagates the SDK's per-request quota observability when the API emits the\n *   `X-Quota-*` headers. Optional; absent on Enterprise / unlimited tiers.\n * - `{ kind: 'deny', reason }` — the request was denied. Adapters should render a 403 with the\n *   reason, or invoke the caller's custom denial handler.\n */\nexport type EvaluateOutcome =\n  | { kind: 'allow'; data?: AssessResult; degraded?: boolean; infraReason?: FailOpenInfraReason; quota?: GateQuotaInfo }\n  | { kind: 'deny'; reason: DenialReason };\n\nexport interface CaptureWalletOptions {\n  /** Operator credential (`opc_...`) that the agent authenticated with. */\n  operatorToken: string;\n  /** Signer wallet recovered from the payment payload. */\n  walletAddress: string;\n  /** Key-derivation family — `\"evm\"` for any EVM chain, `\"solana\"` for Solana. */\n  network: 'evm' | 'solana';\n  /** Optional stable key for the logical payment (e.g., payment intent id, tx hash). When the\n   *  same key is seen again for the same (credential, wallet, network), the server no-ops —\n   *  prevents agent retries from inflating transaction_count. */\n  idempotencyKey?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyWalletSignerMatchOptions {\n  /** The wallet claimed via `X-Wallet-Address`. */\n  claimedWallet: string;\n  /** The signer wallet recovered from the payment credential. `null` means the rail carries\n   *  no wallet signer (SPT, card) — the helper returns `wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing`. */\n  signer: string | null;\n  /** Network of the signer. EVM covers every EVM chain; `solana` lives in its own namespace. */\n  network?: 'evm' | 'solana';\n}\n\nexport type VerifyWalletSignerResult =\n  | { kind: 'pass'; claimedOperator: string | null; signerOperator: string | null }\n  | {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch';\n      claimedOperator: string | null;\n      actualSignerOperator: string | null;\n      expectedSigner: string;\n      actualSigner: string;\n      linkedWallets: string[];\n      /** JSON-encoded action copy (action + steps + user_message). Spread into the 403 body\n       *  verbatim so agents get a concrete recovery path inside the denial response itself. */\n      agentInstructions: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing';\n      claimedWallet: string;\n      agentInstructions: string;\n    }\n  // Transient — the resolve call to /v1/assess failed or timed out. Caller should\n  // retry or surface as 503. Distinct from wallet_signer_mismatch (which is an actual\n  // security reject) so legitimate users don't get rejected on network flakes.\n  | { kind: 'api_error'; claimedWallet: string };\n\nexport interface AgentScoreCore {\n  /**\n   * Evaluate the request's identity against the configured policy.\n   * @param identity - extracted identity (wallet address and/or operator token)\n   * @param ctx - optional framework-specific context (Hono c, Express req, etc.) passed\n   *   through to `createSessionOnMissing` hooks. Opaque to core.\n   */\n  evaluate(identity: AgentIdentity | undefined, ctx?: unknown): Promise<EvaluateOutcome>;\n  /** Report a wallet seen paying under an operator credential. Fire-and-forget; silently\n   *  swallows non-fatal errors because capture is informational, not on the critical path. */\n  captureWallet(options: CaptureWalletOptions): Promise<void>;\n  /**\n   * Verify the payment signer resolves to the same operator as the claimed `X-Wallet-Address`.\n   *\n   * Returns `pass` when the signer is linked to the same operator as the claimed wallet\n   * (byte-equal wallets pass trivially; other wallets linked to the same operator also pass —\n   * multi-wallet agents work without ergonomic pain). Returns `wallet_signer_mismatch` when\n   * the signer resolves to a different (or no) operator. Returns `wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing`\n   * when the signer is `null` (SPT, card — rails that carry no wallet signature).\n   *\n   * Call this AFTER the gate evaluates (so the claimed wallet's operator is cached) and\n   * AFTER the payment credential is parsed (so the signer is known). Merchants should call\n   * it before settling payment.\n   */\n  verifyWalletSignerMatch(options: VerifyWalletSignerMatchOptions): Promise<VerifyWalletSignerResult>;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Internal cache entry for the gate's per-`(identity, policy)` assess result memo.\n *  Distinct from the public `AssessResult` interface (the typed `/v1/assess` response\n *  shape returned to merchants); this carries the cached decision plus the per-signer\n *  wallet-match sub-cache. */\ninterface CachedAssessResult {\n  allow: boolean;\n  decision?: string;\n  reasons?: string[];\n  raw?: unknown;\n  // Per-signer wallet-match verdicts cached from prior verifyWalletSignerMatch() calls\n  // for this same claimed wallet. Each signer gets its own slot so two payments under\n  // the same claimed identity but from different signer wallets don't serve stale\n  // verdicts to each other. Verdicts come from the API's `signer_match` response field\n  // (populated when the assess request carried `resolve_signer`), so reading a hit\n  // skips the round-trip altogether.\n  signerMatchBySigner?: Map<string, Record<string, unknown>>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the cross-merchant memory hint emitted on bootstrap denials. Base URLs are\n * derived from the gate's AgentScore API base so self-hosted / staging deployments get\n * correct pointers. Contents describe the AgentScore identity substrate in transferable\n * terms; merchant-specific context lives in other `agent_instructions` fields.\n */\n// Canonical production AgentScore API — used as the authoritative source for endpoint pointers\n// emitted to agent memory regardless of how a given merchant configured their gate's baseUrl.\nconst CANONICAL_AGENTSCORE_API = 'https://api.agentscore.sh';\n\n// JSON-encoded action copy emitted on wallet-signer-match denials. Spread into 403 bodies\n// by merchants so agents get a concrete recovery path inside the denial response itself —\n// no discovery-doc round trip required.\nconst WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'resign_or_switch_to_operator_token',\n  steps: [\n    'Preferred: re-submit the payment signed by expected_signer (or any entry in linked_wallets — same-operator wallets are fungible) and retry with the same X-Wallet-Address.',\n    'Alternative: drop X-Wallet-Address and retry with X-Operator-Token. Use a stored opc_... if you have one; otherwise retry this request with NO identity header — the merchant will mint a verification session in the 403 body (verify_url + poll_secret). Share verify_url with the user, poll, receive a fresh opc_...',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'The payment signer resolves to a different operator than X-Wallet-Address. Re-sign from expected_signer or any linked_wallets entry, or switch to X-Operator-Token.',\n});\n\nconst WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'switch_to_operator_token',\n  steps: [\n    'This payment rail (Stripe SPT, card) carries no wallet signature — X-Wallet-Address cannot be verified against the payment.',\n    'Drop X-Wallet-Address and retry with X-Operator-Token. If you do not have a stored opc_..., retry with no identity header to receive a verification session.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Wallet-address identity is only supported on wallet-signing rails (Tempo MPP, x402). On Stripe or card, use X-Operator-Token instead.',\n});\n\n// `invalid_credential` is permanent — the token doesn't exist (typo, never minted, fabricated).\n// Distinct from `token_expired` (which carries an auto-session for one-shot recovery): the\n// API doesn't auto-mint a session here because the client may simply have a different valid\n// token to try. Agents should switch tokens or drop the header to bootstrap a session.\nconst INVALID_CREDENTIAL_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'switch_token_or_restart_session',\n  steps: [\n    'The X-Operator-Token you sent does not match any credential. This is a permanent state — retrying with the same token will keep failing.',\n    'If you have other stored opc_... credentials, retry with one of them.',\n    'Otherwise drop X-Operator-Token and retry with no identity header — the merchant will mint a fresh verification session in the 403 body (verify_url + poll_secret) so the user can re-verify and you can poll for a new operator_token.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'The operator_token is not recognized. Use a different stored token, or restart the verification session flow to mint a new one.',\n});\n\nexport function buildAgentMemoryHint(): AgentMemoryHint {\n  // Memory pointers always point at the canonical production API — merchants must not be\n  // able to redirect the cross-merchant memory surface, since that would be a phishing\n  // vector for the verify URL.\n  const api = CANONICAL_AGENTSCORE_API;\n  return {\n    save_for_future_agentscore_gates: true,\n    pattern_summary:\n      'AgentScore is a cross-merchant identity substrate for agent commerce. Any endpoint that ' +\n      'returns 403 missing_identity / identity_verification_required or 402 challenges referencing AgentScore uses ' +\n      'the same identity system. One KYC works across all AgentScore merchants — no re-verification ' +\n      'per site. Save this pattern (and the endpoints below) to persistent memory so future ' +\n      'AgentScore encounters skip the cold-start session flow.',\n    quickstart: 'https://docs.agentscore.sh/guides/agent-identity',\n    identity_check_endpoint: `${api}/v1/credentials`,\n    identity_paths: {\n      wallet:\n        'If paying from a crypto wallet you have used before on any AgentScore merchant, send ' +\n        '`X-Wallet-Address: 0x...`. Shortest path; no token lifecycle to manage.',\n      operator_token:\n        'For any rail (Stripe SPT, card, or a wallet you have not linked yet), send ' +\n        '`X-Operator-Token: opc_...`. Reusable across merchants until the token expires.',\n    },\n    bootstrap:\n      'If you have neither a linked wallet nor a valid operator_token, follow the session/verify ' +\n      'flow in the per-request `agent_instructions` block. This happens at most once per agent ' +\n      'identity — after first verification, the operator_token and any subsequently used wallet ' +\n      'are reusable everywhere.',\n    do_not_persist_in_memory: ['operator_token', 'poll_secret'],\n    persist_in_credential_store: ['operator_token'],\n  };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Core factory\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport function createAgentScoreCore(options: AgentScoreCoreOptions): AgentScoreCore {\n  if (!options.apiKey) {\n    throw new Error('AgentScore API key is required. Get one at https://agentscore.sh/sign-up');\n  }\n\n  const {\n    apiKey,\n    requireKyc,\n    requireSanctionsClear,\n    minAge,\n    blockedJurisdictions,\n    allowedJurisdictions,\n    failOpen = false,\n    cacheSeconds = 300,\n    baseUrl: rawBaseUrl = 'https://api.agentscore.sh',\n    chain: gateChain,\n    userAgent,\n    createSessionOnMissing,\n  } = options;\n\n  const baseUrl = stripTrailingSlashes(rawBaseUrl);\n  const agentMemoryHint = buildAgentMemoryHint();\n\n  const defaultUa = `@agent-score/commerce@${__VERSION__}`;\n  const userAgentHeader = userAgent ? `${userAgent} (${defaultUa})` : defaultUa;\n\n  // Single shared SDK instance for every API call this gate makes (assess, sessions,\n  // credentials/wallets, telemetry). Connection pooling + typed-error classification +\n  // X-Quota-* header capture all flow through here. The SDK owns the transport layer\n  // (timeouts, retry-on-429); the gate adds policy semantics on top. Pass the\n  // merchant-prefixed UA — SDK appends its own default to produce a chain like\n  // `<merchant-app> (@agent-score/commerce@<v>) (@agent-score/sdk@<v>)`.\n  const sdk = new AgentScore({ apiKey, baseUrl, userAgent: userAgentHeader });\n\n  // createSessionOnMissing can carry its own apiKey + baseUrl (merchants sometimes wire\n  // a session-only key for this hook). Lazily build a separate SDK instance keyed on\n  // (apiKey, baseUrl) so we don't construct a new client per request.\n  const sessionSdkCache = new Map<string, AgentScore>();\n  function getSessionSdk(sessionApiKey: string, sessionBaseUrl?: string): AgentScore {\n    const key = `${sessionApiKey}|${sessionBaseUrl ?? ''}`;\n    let s = sessionSdkCache.get(key);\n    if (!s) {\n      s = new AgentScore({\n        apiKey: sessionApiKey,\n        baseUrl: sessionBaseUrl ?? baseUrl,\n        userAgent: userAgentHeader,\n      });\n      sessionSdkCache.set(key, s);\n    }\n    return s;\n  }\n\n  const cache = new TTLCache<CachedAssessResult>(cacheSeconds * 1000);\n\n  // Mint a verification session via /v1/sessions and return the resulting\n  // identity_verification_required DenialReason — or undefined if the mint failed (network\n  // error, non-2xx, missing fields). Used for both the missing-identity path and the\n  // fixable-wallet bootstrap path: in both cases the UX is identical (agent polls the\n  // returned poll_url until it gets a fresh opc_... and retries).\n  async function tryMintSessionDenial(ctx: unknown): Promise<DenialReason | undefined> {\n    if (!createSessionOnMissing) return undefined;\n    try {\n      const sessionBody: { context?: string; product_name?: string } = {};\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.context != null) sessionBody.context = createSessionOnMissing.context;\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.productName != null) sessionBody.product_name = createSessionOnMissing.productName;\n\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions && ctx !== undefined) {\n        try {\n          const dynamic = await createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions(ctx);\n          if (dynamic?.context != null) sessionBody.context = dynamic.context;\n          if (dynamic?.productName != null) sessionBody.product_name = dynamic.productName;\n        } catch (err) {\n          console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions hook failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // createSessionOnMissing.apiKey may differ from the gate's apiKey (e.g. merchant\n      // wires a session-only key for this hook). Build a per-config SDK lazily.\n      const sessionSdk = getSessionSdk(createSessionOnMissing.apiKey, createSessionOnMissing.baseUrl);\n      const data = (await sessionSdk.createSession({\n        ...(sessionBody.context !== undefined ? { context: sessionBody.context } : {}),\n        ...(sessionBody.product_name !== undefined ? { product_name: sessionBody.product_name } : {}),\n      })) as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n      // Validate required fields before trusting the response. A misbehaving (or mocked-wrong)\n      // API could 200 without session_id/poll_secret/verify_url, which would propagate\n      // `undefined` into the 403 body and leave the agent stuck — treat as session-create\n      // failure and fall back to the caller's bare denial.\n      if (\n        typeof data.session_id !== 'string' ||\n        typeof data.poll_secret !== 'string' ||\n        typeof data.verify_url !== 'string'\n      ) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/sessions returned 200 without required fields — falling back to bare denial');\n        return undefined;\n      }\n\n      // Run onBeforeSession side-effect hook. Errors are swallowed — a failing DB write\n      // (e.g. can't insert pending order) should not block the 403.\n      let extra: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession && ctx !== undefined) {\n        try {\n          const sessionMeta = {\n            session_id: data.session_id as string,\n            verify_url: data.verify_url as string,\n            poll_secret: data.poll_secret as string,\n            poll_url: data.poll_url as string,\n            expires_at: data.expires_at as string | undefined,\n          };\n          const result = await createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession(ctx, sessionMeta);\n          if (result && typeof result === 'object') extra = result;\n        } catch (err) {\n          console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession hook failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // The API emits `next_steps` (structured object) on /v1/sessions success. Stringify it\n      // into the gate's `agent_instructions` contract so merchants get the same JSON-encoded\n      // {action, steps, user_message} envelope as every other gate-emitted denial.\n      const apiNextSteps = data.next_steps as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      return {\n        code: 'identity_verification_required',\n        verify_url: data.verify_url as string,\n        session_id: data.session_id as string,\n        poll_secret: data.poll_secret as string,\n        poll_url: data.poll_url as string | undefined,\n        agent_instructions: apiNextSteps ? JSON.stringify(apiNextSteps) : undefined,\n        agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n        ...(extra && { extra }),\n      };\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Session-mint failed (network, /v1/sessions returned non-2xx, body parse error,\n      // onBeforeSession threw inside the inner try). Caller falls back to a bare denial —\n      // agents still get a 403 with a probe-strategy hint. Log loudly so a persistent\n      // /v1/sessions outage isn't masked.\n      console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing path failed — falling back to bare denial:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function evaluate(identity: AgentIdentity | undefined, ctx?: unknown): Promise<EvaluateOutcome> {\n    // Treat \"returned identity object with no usable fields\" the same as \"no identity at all\" —\n    // otherwise a misbehaving custom extractIdentity would send an empty body to /v1/assess.\n    if (!identity || (!identity.address && !identity.operatorToken)) {\n      // failOpen short-circuits BEFORE the session mint. This branch isn't an infra failure\n      // (no AgentScore call has been made yet) so we don't mark the gate state as degraded —\n      // missing identity + failOpen is the explicit opt-in pass-through behavior, not a\n      // graceful-degradation event. Merchants who need identity-or-deny on a failOpen gate\n      // should add a guard at the handler that checks for X-Wallet-Address / X-Operator-Token\n      // before reading the gate state.\n      if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow' };\n\n      const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n      if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n\n      // Bare missing-identity denial (no session was auto-created). Describe the probe\n      // strategy so agents without memory can recover: try wallet first on signing rails,\n      // fall back to stored opc_..., fall back to session flow (noting that only\n      // auto-session merchants return verify_url + poll data on the retry).\n      const missingIdentityInstructions = JSON.stringify({\n        action: 'probe_identity_then_session',\n        steps: [\n          'If you have a wallet AND this merchant accepts a wallet-signing rail (Tempo MPP or x402 — see openapi.json x-payment-info): send X-Wallet-Address and retry. If the wallet is already linked to an AgentScore operator (via prior SIWE claim or prior captureWallet), this passes in one round trip. If the wallet is unlinked or the account has no KYC, the 403 will include a verify_url — share it with the user to claim the wallet + complete KYC, then retry.',\n          'If step 1 is denied or you already have a stored operator_token (valid + not expired): send X-Operator-Token: opc_... and retry.',\n          'If neither applies: retry with NO identity header. Merchants that auto-create verification sessions (most AgentScore merchants do) return verify_url + session_id + poll_secret in the 403 body — share verify_url with the user, then poll poll_url every 5s with the X-Poll-Secret header until status=verified (the poll returns a one-time operator_token). If the retry returns the same bare 403, this merchant does not support self-service session bootstrapping — direct the user to https://agentscore.sh/sign-up to create an AgentScore identity and mint an operator_token from their dashboard (https://agentscore.sh/dashboard/verify). The user hands the opc_... to you, and you retry with X-Operator-Token.',\n        ],\n        user_message:\n          'Try X-Wallet-Address first if you have a wallet and the merchant accepts Tempo/x402; fall back to a stored X-Operator-Token, then to the session/verify flow described in agent_memory.bootstrap.',\n      });\n      return {\n        kind: 'deny',\n        reason: {\n          code: 'missing_identity',\n          agent_instructions: missingIdentityInstructions,\n          agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    // operator_token is opaque + ASCII-only — lowercasing is safe. Wallet addresses go\n    // through normalizeAddress because Solana base58 is case-sensitive and lowercasing\n    // would corrupt the cache key (a Solana cache miss every time, plus collision risk\n    // with mixed-case variants of the same operator).\n    const cacheKey = identity.operatorToken?.toLowerCase() ?? (identity.address ? normalizeAddress(identity.address) : '');\n\n    const cached = cache.get(cacheKey);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (cached.allow) {\n        const cachedRaw = cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n        const cachedQuota = cachedRaw?.quota as GateQuotaInfo | undefined;\n        return {\n          kind: 'allow',\n          data: cachedRaw as unknown as AssessResult,\n          ...(cachedQuota !== undefined && { quota: cachedQuota }),\n        };\n      }\n      // Fixable compliance denials (kyc_required, kyc_pending, kyc_failed) get the\n      // same UX as missing_identity: mint a fresh verification session, agent polls\n      // until status=verified, gets a fresh opc_..., retries. Unfixable reasons\n      // (sanctions_flagged, age_insufficient, jurisdiction_restricted) keep the bare\n      // wallet_not_trusted denial. `jurisdiction_restricted` is unfixable: the API\n      // only emits it after KYC is verified (the user's KYC'd country is in the\n      // blocked list — re-doing KYC won't change the country).\n      if (isFixableDenial(cached.reasons)) {\n        const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n        if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n      }\n      return {\n        kind: 'deny',\n        reason: {\n          code: 'wallet_not_trusted',\n          decision: cached.decision,\n          reasons: cached.reasons,\n          verify_url: (cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.verify_url as string | undefined,\n          data: cached.raw as AssessResult | undefined,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    const policy: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    if (requireKyc != null) policy.require_kyc = requireKyc;\n    if (requireSanctionsClear != null) policy.require_sanctions_clear = requireSanctionsClear;\n    if (minAge != null) policy.min_age = minAge;\n    if (blockedJurisdictions != null) policy.blocked_jurisdictions = blockedJurisdictions;\n    if (allowedJurisdictions != null) policy.allowed_jurisdictions = allowedJurisdictions;\n\n    let data: Record<string, unknown>;\n    try {\n      // Single SDK call: typed-error subclasses (PaymentRequiredError / TokenExpiredError /\n      // InvalidCredentialError / QuotaExceededError / TimeoutError) flow through the\n      // catch below; success path captures `quota` from X-Quota-* headers automatically.\n      const opts = {\n        chain: gateChain,\n        ...(Object.keys(policy).length > 0 ? { policy: policy as never } : {}),\n      };\n      // SDK has two overloads — narrow by which identity is set so TS picks the right one.\n      const result = identity.address\n        ? await sdk.assess(identity.address, { ...opts, operatorToken: identity.operatorToken })\n        : await sdk.assess(null, { ...opts, operatorToken: identity.operatorToken! });\n      data = result as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof PaymentRequiredError) {\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'payment_required' } };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof TokenExpiredError) {\n        // SDK extracts the auto-minted session fields onto the error instance — no body\n        // re-parsing needed here.\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: {\n            code: 'token_expired',\n            data: err.details as unknown as AssessResult,\n            ...(err.verifyUrl ? { verify_url: err.verifyUrl } : {}),\n            ...(err.sessionId ? { session_id: err.sessionId } : {}),\n            ...(err.pollSecret ? { poll_secret: err.pollSecret } : {}),\n            ...(err.pollUrl ? { poll_url: err.pollUrl } : {}),\n            ...(err.nextSteps ? { agent_instructions: JSON.stringify(err.nextSteps) } : {}),\n            ...(err.agentMemory ? { agent_memory: err.agentMemory as AgentMemoryHint } : {}),\n          },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof InvalidCredentialError) {\n        // Permanent — no auto-session, agent should switch tokens or restart.\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: {\n            code: 'invalid_credential',\n            agent_instructions: INVALID_CREDENTIAL_INSTRUCTIONS,\n            agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n          },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof QuotaExceededError) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess returned 429 quota_exceeded');\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'quota_exceeded' };\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: { code: 'api_error', agent_instructions: QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof SdkTimeoutError) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess timed out:', err.message);\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'network_timeout' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n      }\n      // Status-based fallbacks for AgentScoreError instances the SDK couldn't classify\n      // into a typed subclass (e.g. 429 with body that lacked error.code, or a fetch\n      // rejection whose .name doesn't match AbortError but whose status code is set).\n      // The real API always emits error.code on 429, so this is purely defensive.\n      const status = (err as { status?: number } | null)?.status;\n      const errName = err instanceof Error ? err.name : '';\n      if (status === 429) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess returned 429 (untyped — defensive)');\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'quota_exceeded' };\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: { code: 'api_error', agent_instructions: QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS },\n        };\n      }\n      if (errName === 'TimeoutError' || errName === 'AbortError') {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess timed out (by Error.name):', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'network_timeout' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n      }\n      // Generic AgentScoreError (rate_limited, 5xx, network_error, body parse, unknown 4xx)\n      // or any non-AgentScoreError unexpected throw — surface as api_error.\n      // Include the SDK-classified error code (when available) so ops/dev see\n      // schema-drift cases like a new 401 error.code rather than a silent 503.\n      const errCode = (err as { code?: string } | null)?.code;\n      const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n      const detail = errCode ? `${errCode}: ${msg}` : msg;\n      console.warn(`[gate] /v1/assess call failed — surfacing as api_error: ${detail}`);\n      if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'api_error' };\n      return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n    }\n\n    const decision = data.decision as string | null | undefined;\n    const decisionReasons = (data.decision_reasons as string[]) ?? [];\n    const allow = decision === 'allow' || decision == null;\n\n    cache.set(cacheKey, { allow, decision: decision ?? undefined, reasons: decisionReasons, raw: data });\n\n    if (allow) {\n      // SDK populates `quota` on the assess response from X-Quota-* headers when the\n      // API emits them. Surface up to the adapter so merchants can monitor approach-to-cap.\n      const quota = data.quota as GateQuotaInfo | undefined;\n      return {\n        kind: 'allow',\n        data: data as unknown as AssessResult,\n        ...(quota !== undefined && { quota }),\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Fixable compliance denials (kyc_required, kyc_pending, kyc_failed) get the\n    // same UX as missing_identity: mint a fresh verification session, agent polls\n    // until status=verified, gets a fresh opc_..., retries. Unfixable reasons\n    // (sanctions_flagged, age_insufficient, jurisdiction_restricted) keep the bare\n    // wallet_not_trusted denial. `jurisdiction_restricted` is unfixable: the API\n    // only emits it after KYC is verified (the user's KYC'd country is in the\n    // blocked list — re-doing KYC won't change the country).\n    if (isFixableDenial(decisionReasons)) {\n      const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n      if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n    }\n\n    return {\n      kind: 'deny',\n      reason: {\n        code: 'wallet_not_trusted',\n        decision: decision ?? undefined,\n        reasons: decisionReasons,\n        verify_url: data.verify_url as string | undefined,\n        data: data as unknown as AssessResult,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  async function captureWallet(options: CaptureWalletOptions): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      await sdk.associateWallet({\n        operatorToken: options.operatorToken,\n        walletAddress: options.walletAddress,\n        network: options.network,\n        ...(options.idempotencyKey ? { idempotencyKey: options.idempotencyKey } : {}),\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Fire-and-forget: don't throw. Log so a persistent capture outage is visible\n      // to merchant ops — otherwise wallet↔operator linkage silently stops.\n      console.warn('[agentscore-commerce] captureWallet failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resolve a wallet to its operator id via /v1/assess.\n   *\n   * Returns:\n   *   - `{ ok: true, operator: <id> }` — wallet is linked to that operator\n   *   - `{ ok: true, operator: null }` — wallet is valid but not linked to any operator\n   *   - `{ ok: false }` — the API call failed (network, timeout, non-2xx). Distinguishable so\n   *     callers can emit `api_error` instead of falsely asserting \"no operator linked\".\n   *\n   * Checks the main evaluate() cache before making a fresh call — if the gate already\n   * resolved this wallet during identity evaluation, we have the resolved_operator already.\n   */\n  async function resolveWalletToOperator(\n    walletAddress: string,\n  ): Promise<{ ok: true; operator: string | null; linkedWallets: string[] } | { ok: false }> {\n    // Network-aware: lowercases EVM, preserves Solana base58 case. The DB stores both\n    // formats verbatim in operator_credential_wallets.wallet_address; lowercasing a\n    // Solana address would never match.\n    const wallet = normalizeAddress(walletAddress);\n\n    // Cache lookup — first the plain cache (populated by evaluate() for identity-headered wallets).\n    // Saves a second /v1/assess call when the gate already looked up this wallet.\n    const extractFromCached = (raw: Record<string, unknown>): { operator: string | null; linkedWallets: string[] } => {\n      const op = raw.resolved_operator;\n      const links = raw.linked_wallets;\n      return {\n        operator: typeof op === 'string' ? op : null,\n        linkedWallets: Array.isArray(links) ? (links as unknown[]).filter((w): w is string => typeof w === 'string') : [],\n      };\n    };\n\n    const plainCached = cache.get(wallet);\n    if (plainCached?.raw) {\n      return { ok: true, ...extractFromCached(plainCached.raw as Record<string, unknown>) };\n    }\n    const resolveCached = cache.get(`resolve:${wallet}`);\n    if (resolveCached?.raw) {\n      return { ok: true, ...extractFromCached(resolveCached.raw as Record<string, unknown>) };\n    }\n\n    try {\n      const data = (await sdk.assess(walletAddress)) as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n      cache.set(`resolve:${wallet}`, { allow: true, raw: data });\n      return { ok: true, ...extractFromCached(data) };\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Network/timeout/parse on the wallet→operator resolve path. Caller maps\n      // `{ok:false}` to `wallet_signer_mismatch.kind === 'api_error'`, which already\n      // surfaces as 503 — but log here too so multi-wallet match failures aren't\n      // silently indistinguishable from \"operator simply has no linked wallet\".\n      console.warn('[gate] resolveWalletToOperator failed — returning { ok:false }:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n      return { ok: false };\n    }\n  }\n\n  function reportSignerEvent(kind: 'pass' | 'wallet_signer_mismatch' | 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing' | 'api_error'): void {\n    // Fire-and-forget: surfaces mismatch-catch rate + api_error SLO on the dashboard.\n    // SDK's telemetrySignerMatch already does the catch + warn-log internally; this\n    // call must not affect the gate's decision so we don't await.\n    void sdk.telemetrySignerMatch({ kind });\n  }\n\n  // Project the API's signer_match block onto the gate's VerifyWalletSignerResult shape.\n  // The API authors agent_instructions, claimed/signer operators, and the linked-wallet\n  // set (deny-guarded server-side); the gate just shapes those fields into camelCase.\n  function projectSignerMatch(\n    sm: Record<string, unknown>,\n    claimedNorm: string,\n    signerNorm: string,\n  ): VerifyWalletSignerResult {\n    const kind = sm.kind as string;\n    if (kind === 'pass') {\n      return {\n        kind: 'pass',\n        claimedOperator: (sm.claimed_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        signerOperator: (sm.signer_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      };\n    }\n    if (kind === 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing') {\n      return {\n        kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n        claimedWallet: (sm.claimed_wallet as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm,\n        agentInstructions:\n          (sm.agent_instructions as string | undefined) ?? WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS,\n      };\n    }\n    // Default: wallet_signer_mismatch\n    const linked = sm.linked_wallets;\n    return {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n      claimedOperator: (sm.claimed_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      actualSignerOperator: (sm.signer_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      expectedSigner: (sm.expected_signer as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm,\n      actualSigner: (sm.actual_signer as string | undefined) ?? signerNorm,\n      linkedWallets: Array.isArray(linked)\n        ? (linked as unknown[]).filter((w): w is string => typeof w === 'string')\n        : [],\n      agentInstructions:\n        (sm.agent_instructions as string | undefined) ?? WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS,\n    };\n  }\n\n  async function verifyWalletSignerMatch(\n    options: VerifyWalletSignerMatchOptions,\n  ): Promise<VerifyWalletSignerResult> {\n    const { claimedWallet, signer, network } = options;\n\n    if (!signer) {\n      reportSignerEvent('wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing');\n      return {\n        kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n        claimedWallet,\n        agentInstructions: WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS,\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Network-aware normalization: lowercase EVM, preserve Solana base58. The byte-equal\n    // short-circuit and downstream cache-key derivation MUST match how the DB stores\n    // wallets; lowercasing Solana would corrupt both.\n    const claimedNorm = normalizeAddress(claimedWallet);\n    const signerNorm = normalizeAddress(signer);\n\n    // Byte-equal short-circuit — no API lookup; same wallet ≡ same operator by definition.\n    if (claimedNorm === signerNorm) {\n      reportSignerEvent('pass');\n      return { kind: 'pass', claimedOperator: null, signerOperator: null };\n    }\n\n    // Cache hit — a prior call for this same (claimed, signer) pair already populated\n    // signer_match. Skip the round trip + telemetry post (the API recorded it the first\n    // time). Subsequent same-pair payments cost zero outbound assess calls.\n    const cachedEntry = cache.get(claimedNorm);\n    const cachedMatch = cachedEntry?.signerMatchBySigner?.get(signerNorm);\n    if (cachedMatch) {\n      return projectSignerMatch(cachedMatch, claimedNorm, signerNorm);\n    }\n\n    // Single fresh assess call carrying resolve_signer. Server-side resolves both wallets\n    // against the operator graph and returns a signer_match verdict in the response —\n    // collapses the legacy 2 follow-up calls (one per wallet) into one round trip.\n    const inferredNetwork: 'evm' | 'solana' = network ?? (signerNorm.startsWith('0x') ? 'evm' : 'solana');\n    let assessResponse: { signer_match?: Record<string, unknown> } & Record<string, unknown>;\n    try {\n      assessResponse = (await sdk.assess(claimedNorm, {\n        resolveSigner: { address: signerNorm, network: inferredNetwork },\n      })) as unknown as { signer_match?: Record<string, unknown> } & Record<string, unknown>;\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] verifyWalletSignerMatch assess failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n      reportSignerEvent('api_error');\n      return { kind: 'api_error', claimedWallet: claimedNorm };\n    }\n\n    const signerMatch = assessResponse.signer_match;\n    if (signerMatch && typeof signerMatch === 'object') {\n      // Cache for repeat same-pair lookups. Server-side already recorded telemetry for\n      // this verdict, so skip the SDK-side reportSignerEvent — avoids double-counting.\n      if (cachedEntry) {\n        // Mutate the existing entry in place — TTLCache.get() returns a reference, so the\n        // store's record sees the new sub-map without a `set()` call. This preserves the\n        // gate's original cache TTL window (set() would reset it forward, causing the\n        // gate verdict to be served past its intended freshness horizon).\n        const map = cachedEntry.signerMatchBySigner ?? new Map<string, Record<string, unknown>>();\n        map.set(signerNorm, signerMatch);\n        cachedEntry.signerMatchBySigner = map;\n      } else {\n        // No prior gate cache for this wallet — create a fresh entry with the verdict\n        // attached so a subsequent same-pair call hits cache.\n        const entry: CachedAssessResult = { allow: true, raw: assessResponse };\n        entry.signerMatchBySigner = new Map([[signerNorm, signerMatch]]);\n        cache.set(claimedNorm, entry);\n      }\n      return projectSignerMatch(signerMatch, claimedNorm, signerNorm);\n    }\n\n    // API response had no signer_match (server didn't compute one). Fall back to the\n    // 2-resolve path so the gate still produces a verdict.\n    const [claimedResolve, signerResolve] = await Promise.all([\n      resolveWalletToOperator(claimedNorm),\n      resolveWalletToOperator(signerNorm),\n    ]);\n\n    if (!claimedResolve.ok || !signerResolve.ok) {\n      reportSignerEvent('api_error');\n      return { kind: 'api_error', claimedWallet: claimedNorm };\n    }\n\n    const claimedOperator = claimedResolve.operator;\n    const signerOperator = signerResolve.operator;\n\n    if (claimedOperator && signerOperator && claimedOperator === signerOperator) {\n      reportSignerEvent('pass');\n      return { kind: 'pass', claimedOperator, signerOperator };\n    }\n\n    reportSignerEvent('wallet_signer_mismatch');\n    return {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n      claimedOperator,\n      actualSignerOperator: signerOperator,\n      expectedSigner: claimedNorm,\n      actualSigner: signerNorm,\n      linkedWallets: claimedResolve.linkedWallets,\n      agentInstructions: WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS,\n    };\n  }\n\n  return { evaluate, captureWallet, verifyWalletSignerMatch };\n}\n","// Network-aware address normalization. EVM addresses (0x + 40 hex) are\n// case-insensitive in the protocol — we lowercase them so DB lookups against\n// `address_lower`-style columns work. Solana addresses are base58 and are\n// case-sensitive — we MUST preserve the input verbatim, never lowercase.\n//\n// Must produce identical output to the API normalizer (`core/api/src/lib/address.ts`)\n// so the gate, API, and merchants normalize the same way. If the two ever drift,\n// captured wallets won't resolve and signer-match silently breaks.\n\nconst SOLANA_BASE58_RE = /^[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44}$/;\nconst EVM_RE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;\n\nexport const isValidEvmAddress = (address: string): boolean => EVM_RE.test(address);\n\nexport const isSolanaAddress = (address: string): boolean =>\n  SOLANA_BASE58_RE.test(address) && !address.startsWith('0x');\n\nexport const isValidAddress = (address: string): boolean =>\n  isValidEvmAddress(address) || isSolanaAddress(address);\n\nexport const normalizeAddress = (address: string): string => {\n  if (isSolanaAddress(address)) { return address; }\n  return address.toLowerCase();\n};\n","export class TTLCache<T> {\n  private store = new Map<string, { value: T; expiresAt: number }>();\n  private maxSize: number;\n\n  constructor(private defaultTtlMs: number, maxSize = 10000) {\n    this.maxSize = maxSize;\n  }\n\n  get(key: string): T | undefined {\n    const entry = this.store.get(key);\n    if (!entry) return undefined;\n    if (Date.now() > entry.expiresAt) {\n      this.store.delete(key);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return entry.value;\n  }\n\n  set(key: string, value: T, ttlMs?: number): void {\n    if (this.store.size >= this.maxSize) {\n      this.sweep();\n    }\n    if (this.store.size >= this.maxSize) {\n      this.evictOldest(this.store.size - this.maxSize + 1);\n    }\n    this.store.set(key, {\n      value,\n      expiresAt: Date.now() + (ttlMs ?? this.defaultTtlMs),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** Remove all expired entries. */\n  private sweep(): void {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    for (const [k, v] of this.store) {\n      if (now > v.expiresAt) {\n        this.store.delete(k);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Evict the oldest `count` entries by insertion order. */\n  private evictOldest(count: number): void {\n    let removed = 0;\n    for (const key of this.store.keys()) {\n      if (removed >= count) break;\n      this.store.delete(key);\n      removed++;\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Payment-signer extraction.\n *\n * Shared between merchants and the gate. Three paths recover a wallet signer:\n *\n *   - **Tempo MPP** — `Authorization: Payment <base64>`; credential `source` is a DID of the\n *     form `did:pkh:eip155:<chain>:<address>`.\n *   - **Solana MPP `solana/charge`** — `Authorization: Payment <base64>`; recovery via either\n *     a `did:pkh:solana:<genesis>:<address>` source (when set by the client) or by decoding\n *     the credential's signed-tx payload and reading the SPL `TransferChecked` authority\n *     (pull mode only — `payload.type === 'transaction'`).\n *   - **x402 EIP-3009 (EVM, e.g. Base/Sepolia)** — `payment-signature` / `x-payment`;\n *     decoded payload carries `payload.authorization.from`.\n *\n * Optional peer deps: `mppx` for MPP credentials, `@solana/kit` for the Solana tx-decode\n * fallback. Both dynamic-imported; merchants who don't accept that rail don't need them.\n */\n\nexport type SignerNetwork = 'evm' | 'solana';\n\nconst TOKEN_PROGRAM = 'TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA';\nconst TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM = 'TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb';\nconst TRANSFER_CHECKED_DISCRIMINATOR = 12;\n\ninterface SolanaKitMinimal {\n  getBase64Codec: () => { encode: (s: string) => Uint8Array };\n  getTransactionDecoder: () => { decode: (b: Uint8Array) => { messageBytes: Uint8Array } };\n  getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder: () => {\n    decode: (b: Uint8Array) => {\n      staticAccounts: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n      instructions: ReadonlyArray<{\n        programAddressIndex: number;\n        accountIndices?: number[];\n        data?: Uint8Array;\n      }>;\n    };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a Solana MPP `solana/charge` credential's `payload.transaction` (base64-encoded\n * signed Solana tx) and return the SPL `TransferChecked` authority — the source-ATA owner,\n * which is the buyer's wallet. Pull mode only (`payload.type === 'transaction'`); push mode\n * (`payload.type === 'signature'`) returns null because recovery would require an RPC fetch.\n */\nasync function extractSolanaSignerFromCredential(credential: unknown): Promise<string | null> {\n  const payload = (credential as { payload?: { transaction?: string; type?: string } }).payload;\n  if (!payload?.transaction || payload.type !== 'transaction') return null;\n\n  const moduleName = '@solana/kit';\n  const kit = (await import(moduleName).catch(() => null)) as SolanaKitMinimal | null;\n  if (!kit?.getBase64Codec || !kit.getTransactionDecoder || !kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const txBytes = kit.getBase64Codec().encode(payload.transaction);\n    const decoded = kit.getTransactionDecoder().decode(txBytes);\n    const message = kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder().decode(decoded.messageBytes);\n\n    // SPL TransferChecked accounts: [source ATA, mint, destination ATA, authority, ...signers].\n    // Returns the FIRST matched authority. For multi-recipient `splits` txs, the buyer\n    // signs ONE tx with N TransferChecked instructions all sharing the same authority,\n    // so first-match is correct; if a tx ever surfaces with mismatched authorities the\n    // first one wins (acceptable since both belong to whoever signed the tx).\n    for (const ix of message.instructions) {\n      const programId = message.staticAccounts[ix.programAddressIndex];\n      if (programId !== TOKEN_PROGRAM && programId !== TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM) continue;\n      const data = ix.data;\n      if (!data || data.length === 0 || data[0] !== TRANSFER_CHECKED_DISCRIMINATOR) continue;\n      const accountIndices = ix.accountIndices ?? [];\n      const authorityIndex = accountIndices[3];\n      if (authorityIndex === undefined) continue;\n      // v0 transactions can carry account indices that resolve via address lookup tables;\n      // staticAccounts only holds the static set. If the index is out of range, the\n      // authority sits in a lookup table we'd need RPC to resolve. Skip cleanly with a\n      // warning rather than returning the wrong address.\n      if (authorityIndex >= message.staticAccounts.length) {\n        console.warn(\n          '[gate] Solana TransferChecked authority resolves through an address lookup table; ' +\n            'signer-match recovery requires the static-account form. Skipping.',\n        );\n        continue;\n      }\n      const authority = message.staticAccounts[authorityIndex];\n      if (authority) return authority;\n    }\n    return null;\n  } catch (err) {\n    console.warn('[gate] Solana credential decode failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface PaymentSigner {\n  /** Recovered wallet address (EVM lowercased; Solana base58 preserved verbatim). */\n  address: string;\n  /** Network family — used by `captureWallet` and downstream cross-chain attribution. */\n  network: SignerNetwork;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recover the signer wallet from the incoming payment credential, including the network\n * family. Returns `null` when no wallet signature is present (e.g. Stripe SPT, card-only\n * payments, or no credential yet).\n *\n * @param request - the inbound `Request`\n * @param x402PaymentHeader - the value of `payment-signature` or `x-payment` header, if any.\n *   Extracted separately because some frameworks (Express) don't expose a web `Request` object.\n */\nexport async function extractPaymentSigner(\n  request: Request,\n  x402PaymentHeader?: string,\n): Promise<PaymentSigner | null> {\n  // MPP — Authorization: Payment <base64>\n  const authHeader = request.headers.get('authorization');\n  if (authHeader) {\n    try {\n      const moduleName = 'mppx';\n      const mppx = (await import(moduleName).catch(() => null)) as {\n        Credential?: {\n          extractPaymentScheme: (h: string) => unknown;\n          fromRequest: (r: Request) => unknown;\n        };\n      } | null;\n      if (mppx?.Credential?.extractPaymentScheme(authHeader)) {\n        const credential = mppx.Credential.fromRequest(request);\n        const source = (credential as { source?: string }).source;\n        const evmMatch = source?.match(/^did:pkh:eip155:\\d+:(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})$/);\n        if (evmMatch) return { address: evmMatch[1]!.toLowerCase(), network: 'evm' };\n        // Solana CAIP-10: did:pkh:solana:<genesis-base58>:<address-base58>\n        const solMatch = source?.match(/^did:pkh:solana:[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44}:([1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44})$/);\n        if (solMatch) return { address: solMatch[1]!, network: 'solana' };\n        // Fallback: source not set by upstream client. Decode the credential's signed-tx\n        // payload to find the SPL TransferChecked authority (= source-ATA owner = buyer\n        // wallet). Pull mode only.\n        const solanaFromTx = await extractSolanaSignerFromCredential(credential);\n        if (solanaFromTx) return { address: solanaFromTx, network: 'solana' };\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] MPP signer extraction failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // x402 — base64 JSON, EIP-3009 only. EVM `payload.authorization.from` is the signer.\n  if (x402PaymentHeader) {\n    try {\n      const decoded = atob(x402PaymentHeader);\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(decoded) as {\n        payload?: { authorization?: { from?: string } };\n      };\n      const from = parsed?.payload?.authorization?.from;\n      if (typeof from === 'string' && /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(from)) {\n        return { address: from.toLowerCase(), network: 'evm' };\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] x402 signer extraction failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Address-only convenience over {@link extractPaymentSigner}. Used by the gate adapters\n * (verifyWalletSignerMatch) where only the address matters for operator comparison.\n */\nexport async function extractPaymentSignerAddress(\n  request: Request,\n  x402PaymentHeader?: string,\n): Promise<string | null> {\n  const result = await extractPaymentSigner(request, x402PaymentHeader);\n  return result?.address ?? null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the x402 payment header from a `Request`, matching the alternate names merchants might\n * use. Falls back to reading either header directly.\n */\nexport function readX402PaymentHeader(request: Request): string | undefined {\n  return (\n    request.headers.get('payment-signature') ??\n    request.headers.get('x-payment') ??\n    undefined\n  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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/identity/hono.ts","../../src/_denial.ts","../../src/_response.ts","../../src/core.ts","../../src/address.ts","../../src/cache.ts","../../src/signer.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import {\n  FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS,\n  buildContactSupportNextSteps,\n  buildSignerMismatchBody,\n  denialReasonStatus,\n  isFixableDenial,\n  verificationAgentInstructions,\n} from '../_denial';\nimport { denialReasonToBody } from '../_response';\nimport { createAgentScoreCore } from '../core';\nimport { extractPaymentSigner, readX402PaymentHeader } from '../signer';\nimport type {\n  AgentIdentity,\n  AgentScoreCore,\n  AgentScoreCoreOptions,\n  AssessResult,\n  CreateSessionOnMissing,\n  DenialReason,\n  FailOpenInfraReason,\n  GateQuotaInfo,\n  SignerVerdict,\n} from '../core';\nimport type { Context, MiddlewareHandler } from 'hono';\n\nconst CONTEXT_KEY = 'agentscore';\nconst GATE_STATE_KEY = '__agentscoreGate';\n\ninterface GateState {\n  core: AgentScoreCore;\n  operatorToken?: string;\n  walletAddress?: string;\n  /** Set to `true` only when the gate fail-open'd due to AgentScore-side infra failure\n   *  (429/5xx/network timeout). Compliance was NOT enforced for this request — log/alert\n   *  in your handler. See {@link getGateDegradedState}. */\n  degraded?: boolean;\n  /** Why the gate degraded — quota_exceeded / api_error / network_timeout. */\n  infraReason?: FailOpenInfraReason;\n  /** Per-account assess quota observability captured from `X-Quota-*` response headers\n   *  on the success path. Absent on Enterprise / unlimited tiers, or when the gate didn't\n   *  call assess. */\n  quota?: GateQuotaInfo;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentScoreGateOptions extends Omit<AgentScoreCoreOptions, 'createSessionOnMissing'> {\n  /** Custom function to extract agent identity (wallet address and/or operator token). */\n  extractIdentity?: (c: Context) => AgentIdentity | undefined;\n  /** Custom handler invoked when a request is denied. Must return a Hono `Response`. */\n  onDenied?: (c: Context, reason: DenialReason) => Response | Promise<Response>;\n  /** Auto-create a verification session when no identity is present. The `getSessionOptions`\n   *  and `onBeforeSession` hooks receive the Hono `Context` so they can read the request body,\n   *  look up product metadata, and pre-create merchant-specific resume tokens. */\n  createSessionOnMissing?: CreateSessionOnMissing<Context>;\n}\n\nfunction defaultExtractIdentity(c: Context): AgentIdentity | undefined {\n  const token = c.req.header('x-operator-token');\n  const addr = c.req.header('x-wallet-address');\n  const identity: AgentIdentity = {};\n  if (token && token.length > 0) identity.operatorToken = token;\n  if (addr && addr.length > 0) identity.address = addr;\n  if (identity.operatorToken || identity.address) return identity;\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction defaultOnDenied(c: Context, reason: DenialReason): Response {\n  return c.json(denialReasonToBody(reason), denialReasonStatus(reason));\n}\n\n/**\n * Hono middleware that gates requests using AgentScore trust and policy evaluation.\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { Hono } from 'hono';\n * import { agentscoreGate } from '@agent-score/commerce/identity/hono';\n *\n * const app = new Hono();\n * app.use('/purchase', agentscoreGate({ apiKey: 'as_live_...', requireKyc: true, minAge: 21 }));\n * ```\n */\nexport function agentscoreGate(options: AgentScoreGateOptions): MiddlewareHandler {\n  const { extractIdentity = defaultExtractIdentity, onDenied = defaultOnDenied, ...coreOptions } = options;\n  const core = createAgentScoreCore(coreOptions as AgentScoreCoreOptions);\n\n  return async (c, next) => {\n    const identity = extractIdentity(c);\n    c.set(GATE_STATE_KEY, {\n      core,\n      operatorToken: identity?.operatorToken,\n      walletAddress: identity?.address,\n    } satisfies GateState);\n\n    // Extract the payment signer from MPP / x402 headers before the assess call. When a\n    // signer is recovered, the API composes both signer_match + signer_sanctions on the\n    // primary assess response in one round trip; under policy.require_sanctions_clear a\n    // wallet-sanctions hit flips decision -> deny inline so the gate's onDenied fires\n    // before the handler runs. No-op on discovery legs (no payment header present).\n    const signer = await extractPaymentSigner(c.req.raw, readX402PaymentHeader(c.req.raw));\n    const outcome = await core.evaluate(identity, c, signer);\n\n    if (outcome.kind === 'allow') {\n      if (outcome.degraded || outcome.quota) {\n        const prev = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState;\n        c.set(GATE_STATE_KEY, {\n          ...prev,\n          ...(outcome.degraded && { degraded: true, infraReason: outcome.infraReason }),\n          ...(outcome.quota && { quota: outcome.quota }),\n        } satisfies GateState);\n      }\n      if (outcome.data) c.set(CONTEXT_KEY, outcome.data);\n      await next();\n      return;\n    }\n\n    return onDenied(c, outcome.reason);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Retrieve AgentScore assess data from a Hono `Context`. Returns `undefined` if the gate\n * did not run (e.g. in fail-open mode with a missing identity, or on a route without the\n * gate middleware).\n */\nexport function getAgentScoreData(c: Context): AssessResult | undefined {\n  return c.get(CONTEXT_KEY) as AssessResult | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read whether the gate fail-open'd due to AgentScore-side infrastructure failure on\n * this request. Returns `{ degraded: false }` for normal allows; `{ degraded: true,\n * infraReason }` when the gate was bypassed (compliance NOT enforced — log/alert).\n *\n * Only set when `failOpen: true` was configured AND the failure was an infra failure\n * (429 quota_exceeded, 5xx api_error, network_timeout). Real compliance denials never\n * trigger fail-open and so never set this flag.\n */\nexport function getGateDegradedState(c: Context): { degraded: boolean; infraReason?: FailOpenInfraReason } {\n  const state = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState | undefined;\n  return { degraded: state?.degraded ?? false, infraReason: state?.infraReason };\n}\n\n/**\n * Read AgentScore assess quota observability captured from `X-Quota-*` response headers\n * on this request's gate evaluate. Returns `undefined` when the request was a fail-open\n * pass-through (no assess call) or when the API didn't emit quota headers (Enterprise /\n * unlimited tiers). Use to monitor approach-to-cap proactively.\n */\nexport function getGateQuotaInfo(c: Context): GateQuotaInfo | undefined {\n  const state = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState | undefined;\n  return state?.quota;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a wallet that paid under the operator_token the gate extracted on this request.\n * Call this after a successful payment to build AgentScore's cross-merchant credential↔wallet\n * profile. No-ops silently if the gate never ran, the request was wallet-authenticated (no\n * operator_token to associate), or the API call fails — capture is fire-and-forget by design.\n *\n * ```ts\n * app.post('/purchase', async (c) => {\n *   const assess = getAgentScoreData(c);\n *   // ... run payment, recover signer wallet from the payload ...\n *   await captureWallet(c, { walletAddress: signer, network: 'evm' });\n *   return c.json({ ok: true });\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport async function captureWallet(\n  c: Context,\n  options: { walletAddress: string; network: 'evm' | 'solana'; idempotencyKey?: string },\n): Promise<void> {\n  const state = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState | undefined;\n  if (!state?.operatorToken) return;\n  await state.core.captureWallet({\n    operatorToken: state.operatorToken,\n    walletAddress: options.walletAddress,\n    network: options.network,\n    idempotencyKey: options.idempotencyKey,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous read of the cached signer verdicts (`signer_match` wallet-binding +\n * `signer_sanctions` OFAC SDN wallet-address check). Both verdicts were composed by the\n * gate's primary `/v1/assess` call on this request — single round trip, no extra API call.\n *\n * Returns `undefined` when the gate didn't run, the request was operator-token-only, or\n * no payment credential was attached (discovery legs).\n *\n * Under `policy.require_sanctions_clear`, an OFAC SDN hit (or unavailable lookup) is\n * already enforced by the gate (decision → deny before the handler runs); merchant code\n * typically only needs this getter for the `signer_match` wallet-binding verdict.\n */\nexport function getSignerVerdict(c: Context): SignerVerdict | undefined {\n  const state = c.get(GATE_STATE_KEY) as GateState | undefined;\n  if (!state?.walletAddress) return undefined;\n  return state.core.getSignerVerdict(state.walletAddress);\n}\n\n\n// Re-export the denial helpers so vendors can compose custom onDenied handlers\n// without reaching into the internal _denial module.\nexport {\n  FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS,\n  buildContactSupportNextSteps,\n  buildSignerMismatchBody,\n  denialReasonStatus,\n  isFixableDenial,\n  verificationAgentInstructions,\n};\nexport { denialReasonToBody };\nexport { readX402PaymentHeader };\n","/**\n * Universal denial helpers shared across every adapter.\n *\n * What lives here:\n *   - `FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS` / `isFixableDenial` — classifier for compliance reasons that can\n *     be resolved by re-completing KYC (vs sanctions / age failures which are permanent).\n *   - `denialReasonStatus` — picks the right HTTP status code per denial code (401 for credential\n *     problems, 503 for transient API errors, 403 for everything else).\n *   - `buildSignerMismatchBody` — produces the standard 403 body for a non-pass signer_match\n *     verdict (read via `getSignerVerdict`).\n *   - `buildContactSupportNextSteps` — standard `next_steps.action: \"contact_support\"` shape for\n *     unfixable compliance denials.\n *   - `verificationAgentInstructions` — the canned `agent_instructions` block for\n *     identity-verification 403s. Vendors can override individual fields.\n *\n * Adapters use `denialReasonStatus` inside their default `onDenied` so vendors get the right\n * status code for free. The body builders are exported from each adapter so vendors who write\n * a custom `onDenied` can compose them without copy-paste.\n */\n\nimport type { DenialReason, VerifyWalletSignerResult } from './core';\n\n/**\n * Compliance denial reasons that can be resolved by re-completing KYC. The API emits these\n * when KYC is missing/pending/failed; the user can re-verify and retry.\n *\n * `jurisdiction_restricted` is NOT in this set — the API only emits it AFTER KYC is verified,\n * meaning the user's KYC'd country is in the merchant's blocked list (or absent from the\n * allowed list). Re-doing KYC won't change the country, so it's permanent. Same shape as\n * `sanctions_flagged` and `age_insufficient` — surface contact_support, don't waste a\n * /v1/sessions mint.\n */\nexport const FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'kyc_required',\n  'kyc_pending',\n  'kyc_failed',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Returns true when a `wallet_not_trusted` denial's reasons are all fixable via KYC\n * re-verification. False when any reason is permanent (sanctions, age, jurisdiction_restricted).\n *\n * Empty reasons returns false — without a known reason we can't promise a fix, so default to\n * the bare denial path (vendors can override via custom onDenied if they want different\n * behavior on empty reasons).\n */\nexport function isFixableDenial(reasons: readonly string[] | undefined): boolean {\n  if (!reasons || reasons.length === 0) return false;\n  return reasons.every((r) => FIXABLE_DENIAL_REASONS.has(r));\n}\n\n/**\n * The right HTTP status code for a denial. `defaultOnDenied` in every adapter uses this so\n * vendors get correct status codes without writing per-code branches.\n *\n *   - 401 for credential problems the agent can recover from (`token_expired`, `invalid_credential`)\n *   - 503 for transient `api_error`\n *   - 403 for everything else (identity required, compliance fail, signer mismatch, etc.)\n */\nexport function denialReasonStatus(reason: DenialReason): 401 | 403 | 503 {\n  if (reason.code === 'token_expired' || reason.code === 'invalid_credential') return 401;\n  if (reason.code === 'api_error') return 503;\n  return 403;\n}\n\nexport interface SignerMismatchBodyInput {\n  /** Projected signer_match verdict (from `getSignerVerdict(ctx).signer_match`). Only non-pass\n   *  kinds produce a body. */\n  result: VerifyWalletSignerResult;\n  /** Optional override for the human-facing `next_steps.user_message`. */\n  userMessage?: string;\n  /** Optional override for `next_steps.learn_more_url`. Default: AgentScore agent-identity guide. */\n  learnMoreUrl?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Standard 403 body for a non-pass signer-match verdict. Returns null for `pass` so vendors\n * can call it unconditionally:\n *\n *   const verdict = getSignerVerdict(c);\n *   if (verdict?.signer_match) {\n *     const mismatchBody = buildSignerMismatchBody({ result: verdict.signer_match });\n *     if (mismatchBody) return c.json(mismatchBody, 403);\n *   }\n *\n * Body shape mirrors the gate's denial bodies: top-level error.code, all signer-match fields\n * (`claimed_operator`, `actual_signer_operator`, `expected_signer`, `actual_signer`,\n * `linked_wallets`), plus a `next_steps` action describing the recovery path.\n */\nexport function buildSignerMismatchBody(input: SignerMismatchBodyInput): Record<string, unknown> | null {\n  const { result } = input;\n  if (result.kind === 'pass') return null;\n\n  const learnMoreUrl = input.learnMoreUrl ?? 'https://docs.agentscore.sh/guides/agent-identity';\n\n  if (result.kind === 'wallet_signer_mismatch') {\n    const linkedWallets = result.linkedWallets ?? [];\n    const userMessage = input.userMessage ?? (linkedWallets.length > 0\n      ? `Sign the payment with one of the wallets linked to this operator: ${linkedWallets.join(', ')}. Then retry.`\n      : 'Sign the payment with the same wallet you claimed via X-Wallet-Address, or switch to X-Operator-Token for rail-independent identity.');\n    return {\n      error: {\n        code: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n        message:\n          'Payment signer does not match the wallet claimed via X-Wallet-Address. The signer and the claimed wallet must both resolve to the same AgentScore operator.',\n      },\n      claimed_operator: result.claimedOperator,\n      actual_signer_operator: result.actualSignerOperator ?? null,\n      expected_signer: result.expectedSigner,\n      actual_signer: result.actualSigner,\n      linked_wallets: linkedWallets,\n      next_steps: {\n        action: 'regenerate_payment_from_linked_wallet',\n        user_message: userMessage,\n        learn_more_url: learnMoreUrl,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing\n  return {\n    error: {\n      code: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n      message:\n        'Wallet-auth requires a payment rail that carries a wallet signature (Tempo MPP, x402). Stripe SPT and card rails have no wallet signer; switch to X-Operator-Token to use those.',\n    },\n    next_steps: {\n      action: 'switch_to_operator_token',\n      user_message:\n        input.userMessage ??\n        'Drop the X-Wallet-Address header and retry with X-Operator-Token (works on every payment rail).',\n      learn_more_url: learnMoreUrl,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Standard `next_steps` block for unfixable compliance denials (sanctions, age, etc.). Vendors\n * spread this into a 403 body alongside the usual `error`/`reasons` fields.\n *\n *   return c.json({\n *     error: { code: 'compliance_denied', message: '...' },\n *     reasons,\n *     next_steps: buildContactSupportNextSteps('support@example.com'),\n *   }, 403);\n */\nexport function buildContactSupportNextSteps(\n  supportEmail: string,\n  message?: string,\n): { action: 'contact_support'; support_email: string; user_message: string } {\n  return {\n    action: 'contact_support',\n    support_email: supportEmail,\n    user_message:\n      message ??\n      `If you believe this denial is in error, contact support at ${supportEmail} with your order details.`,\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface VerificationAgentInstructionsInput {\n  /** Override the user-facing message. */\n  userAction?: string;\n  /** Replace the generic \"Retry the original merchant request...\" step with a merchant-specific\n   *  one (e.g. \"Retry POST /purchase with X-Operator-Token AND include order_id...\"). When set,\n   *  this REPLACES baseSteps[4] rather than appending — use it instead of `extraSteps[0]` when\n   *  your retry instruction is a refinement of the canonical retry, not an additional step. */\n  retryStep?: string;\n  /** Append additional steps after the retry step. Use this for genuinely additional steps\n   *  (e.g. \"After payment the same call returns 200 with the order\"), not for re-stating the\n   *  retry — use `retryStep` for that. */\n  extraSteps?: string[];\n  /** Override the poll cadence. Default 5 seconds. */\n  pollIntervalSeconds?: number;\n  /** Override how long the agent should keep polling. Default 3600 seconds (1 hour). */\n  timeoutSeconds?: number;\n  /** Optional `order_ttl` note describing how long pending orders survive. */\n  orderTtl?: string;\n  /** Arbitrary additional fields merged into the instructions object. */\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * The canonical `agent_instructions` block for identity-verification 403s. Tells the agent how to\n * present the verify_url, poll for the operator_token, and retry the original request. Universal\n * across every AgentScore-gated merchant — overrides let vendors add merchant-specific steps\n * (e.g. \"include order_id when retrying\").\n */\nexport function verificationAgentInstructions(input: VerificationAgentInstructionsInput = {}): {\n  action: 'poll_for_credential';\n  user_action: string;\n  steps: string[];\n  poll_interval_seconds: number;\n  poll_secret_header: 'X-Poll-Secret';\n  retry_token_header: 'X-Operator-Token';\n  timeout_seconds: number;\n  order_ttl?: string;\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n} {\n  const baseSteps = [\n    'Present the verify_url directly to the user — it is a complete, ready-to-open URL with the session token already embedded (e.g. https://agentscore.sh/verify?session=sess_...). Do NOT modify or construct the URL yourself.',\n    `Immediately begin polling poll_url every ${input.pollIntervalSeconds ?? 5} seconds with header X-Poll-Secret set to poll_secret. The user will complete verification in their browser while you poll in the background.`,\n    'The user visits the URL, signs in, completes identity verification (photo ID + selfie via Stripe Identity), and closes the tab. They do NOT need to copy or paste anything back to you.',\n    'When your poll returns status \"verified\", extract operator_token from the response. This is a one-time value — save it immediately. Subsequent polls return status \"consumed\" without the token.',\n    input.retryStep ?? 'Retry the original merchant request with header X-Operator-Token set to the operator_token value.',\n  ];\n\n  return {\n    action: 'poll_for_credential',\n    user_action:\n      input.userAction ??\n      'The user must visit verify_url to complete identity verification before this request can proceed',\n    steps: input.extraSteps ? [...baseSteps, ...input.extraSteps] : baseSteps,\n    poll_interval_seconds: input.pollIntervalSeconds ?? 5,\n    poll_secret_header: 'X-Poll-Secret',\n    retry_token_header: 'X-Operator-Token',\n    timeout_seconds: input.timeoutSeconds ?? 3600,\n    ...(input.orderTtl ? { order_ttl: input.orderTtl } : {}),\n    ...(input.extra ?? {}),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Shared DenialReason → response body serialization for all adapters.\n *\n * Keeps Hono / Express / Fastify / Web / Next.js defaults aligned — a field added\n * here shows up in every adapter's 403 body automatically, and there's one place\n * to test the marshaling.\n *\n * Body shape: `{ error: { code, message }, ... }` — matches the canonical AgentScore\n * core API response shape (`core/api/src/lib/auth.ts`, `lib/rate-limit.ts`, etc.) and\n * martin-estate's pre-commerce shape, so downstream agents see one consistent\n * `error.code` + `error.message` pair regardless of which layer produced the denial.\n */\n\nimport type { DenialCode, DenialReason } from './core.js';\n\n/**\n * JSON-encoded canonical agent_instructions per denial code. Auto-injected by\n * `denialReasonToBody` when the gate produces a DenialReason without explicit\n * `agent_instructions` so every denial carries a machine-readable next step.\n *\n * Codes covered:\n *  - `wallet_not_trusted` — gate never stamps instructions today (the original gap)\n *  - `payment_required` — gate never stamps; merchant tier misconfig, contact-merchant action\n *  - `identity_verification_required` — fallback when API didn't return next_steps\n *  - `token_expired` — fallback when API didn't return next_steps\n *  - `api_error` — `retry_with_backoff` envelope; sole retry channel (no separate\n *    next_steps block emitted)\n *\n * Codes already stamped explicitly upstream in core.ts (`missing_identity`,\n * `invalid_credential`) and codes that don't go through DenialReason\n * (`wallet_signer_mismatch`, `wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing` — handled by\n * `getSignerVerdict` + `buildSignerMismatchBody`) are not in this map.\n */\nconst WALLET_NOT_TRUSTED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_support',\n  steps: [\n    'The wallet\\'s operator failed an UNFIXABLE compliance check (sanctions, age, or jurisdiction). `reasons` lists which: `sanctions_flagged` / `age_insufficient` / `jurisdiction_restricted`. KYC re-verification won\\'t change the outcome — the policy denial is structural.',\n    'Surface the denial to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact. Do not retry the same merchant request; do not hand the user a verify_url (verification won\\'t fix this code path).',\n    'Fixable compliance reasons (`kyc_required`, `kyc_pending`, `kyc_failed`) do NOT land on this code — the gate auto-mints a verification session for those and returns `identity_verification_required` with poll endpoints, same shape as `missing_identity`. `jurisdiction_restricted` IS in the unfixable bucket because the API only emits it after KYC is verified (the user\\'s KYC\\'d country is in the blocked list — re-doing KYC won\\'t change the country).',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This purchase is denied by the merchant\\'s compliance policy and cannot be resolved by re-verifying. Contact the merchant\\'s support if you believe this is in error.',\n});\n\nconst PAYMENT_REQUIRED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_merchant',\n  steps: [\n    'The merchant\\'s AgentScore account does not have the assess endpoint enabled, so agent identity cannot be evaluated. This is a merchant-side configuration gap — there is no agent-side recovery.',\n    'Contact the merchant (their support channel — typically listed in /llms.txt or the OpenAPI servers metadata) so they can resolve the configuration on their side.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This merchant\\'s identity gate is misconfigured. Contact the merchant — there\\'s nothing to fix on the agent side.',\n});\n\nconst IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'deliver_verify_url_and_poll',\n  steps: [\n    'Share verify_url with the user — they complete identity verification on AgentScore.',\n    'If session_id + poll_secret are present in the body, poll poll_url every 5 seconds with header `X-Poll-Secret: <poll_secret>` until status=verified. The poll returns a one-time operator_token.',\n    'Retry the original request with header `X-Operator-Token: <opc_...>`.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Identity verification is required. Visit verify_url, then poll poll_url for the operator token and retry.',\n});\n\nconst API_ERROR_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'retry_with_backoff',\n  steps: [\n    'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry the request after 5–30 seconds with exponential backoff.',\n    'This is NOT a compliance denial — the user does not need to re-verify their identity. Send the same identity headers (X-Wallet-Address or X-Operator-Token) on retry.',\n    'If the request continues to fail after 3+ retries (~60 seconds total), surface the error to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Please try again in a moment — this is a transient issue, not a problem with your account.',\n});\n\nexport const QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'contact_merchant',\n  steps: [\n    'AgentScore identity verification is unavailable for this merchant. This is a merchant-side issue and is NOT recoverable via retry.',\n    'Do not retry: the same 503 will be returned until the merchant resolves the issue on their side.',\n    'Surface to the user with the merchant\\'s support contact. The merchant (not the agent) needs to act.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'This merchant\\'s identity verification is temporarily unavailable. Try again later, or contact the merchant directly.',\n});\n\nconst TOKEN_EXPIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'deliver_verify_url_and_poll',\n  steps: [\n    'The operator token is expired or revoked. AgentScore auto-mints a fresh verification session — complete it to receive a new opc_...',\n    'Share verify_url with the user, then poll poll_url every 5 seconds with header `X-Poll-Secret: <poll_secret>` until status=verified. The poll returns a fresh one-time operator_token.',\n    'Retry the original request with header `X-Operator-Token: <new_opc_...>`.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Operator token is expired or revoked. A new verification session has been minted — visit verify_url to refresh.',\n});\n\nconst DEFAULT_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS: Partial<Record<DenialCode, string>> = {\n  api_error: API_ERROR_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  wallet_not_trusted: WALLET_NOT_TRUSTED_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  payment_required: PAYMENT_REQUIRED_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  identity_verification_required: IDENTITY_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS,\n  token_expired: TOKEN_EXPIRED_FALLBACK_INSTRUCTIONS,\n};\n\nconst DEFAULT_MESSAGES: Record<DenialCode, string> = {\n  missing_identity:\n    'No identity provided. Send X-Wallet-Address (wallet) or X-Operator-Token (credential).',\n  identity_verification_required:\n    'Identity verification is required to access this resource. Visit verify_url to complete KYC.',\n  wallet_not_trusted:\n    'The wallet does not meet the merchant compliance policy.',\n  api_error:\n    'AgentScore is unreachable. This is transient — retry in a few seconds.',\n  payment_required:\n    'Assess endpoint not enabled for this merchant. Contact support.',\n  wallet_signer_mismatch:\n    'Payment signer does not match the wallet claimed via X-Wallet-Address. The signer and the claimed wallet must both resolve to the same AgentScore operator.',\n  wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing:\n    'X-Wallet-Address was sent with a rail that has no wallet signature (Stripe SPT / card). Switch to X-Operator-Token, or use a wallet-signing rail (Tempo MPP, x402).',\n  token_expired:\n    'The operator token is expired or revoked. A fresh verification session has been minted — visit verify_url to mint a new token.',\n  invalid_credential:\n    'The operator token is not recognized. Switch to a different stored token, or drop the header to bootstrap a fresh session.',\n};\n\n// Field names the gate claims authority over. Merchant-provided `extra` (from the\n// onBeforeSession hook) MUST NOT override these — a buggy or malicious hook could\n// otherwise replace `verify_url` with a phishing URL or drop agent_instructions.\nconst RESERVED_FIELDS = new Set([\n  'error',\n  'decision',\n  'reasons',\n  'verify_url',\n  'session_id',\n  'poll_secret',\n  'poll_url',\n  'agent_instructions',\n  'agent_memory',\n  'claimed_operator',\n  'actual_signer_operator',\n  'expected_signer',\n  'actual_signer',\n  'linked_wallets',\n]);\n\nexport function denialReasonToBody(reason: DenialReason): Record<string, unknown> {\n  const message = reason.message ?? DEFAULT_MESSAGES[reason.code];\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = { error: { code: reason.code, message } };\n  if (reason.decision) body.decision = reason.decision;\n  if (reason.reasons) body.reasons = reason.reasons;\n  if (reason.verify_url) body.verify_url = reason.verify_url;\n  if (reason.session_id) body.session_id = reason.session_id;\n  if (reason.poll_secret) body.poll_secret = reason.poll_secret;\n  if (reason.poll_url) body.poll_url = reason.poll_url;\n  const instructions = reason.agent_instructions ?? DEFAULT_AGENT_INSTRUCTIONS[reason.code];\n  if (instructions) body.agent_instructions = instructions;\n  if (reason.agent_memory) body.agent_memory = reason.agent_memory;\n  if (reason.claimed_operator) body.claimed_operator = reason.claimed_operator;\n  if (reason.code === 'wallet_signer_mismatch') body.actual_signer_operator = reason.actual_signer_operator ?? null;\n  if (reason.expected_signer) body.expected_signer = reason.expected_signer;\n  if (reason.actual_signer) body.actual_signer = reason.actual_signer;\n  if (reason.linked_wallets && reason.linked_wallets.length > 0) body.linked_wallets = reason.linked_wallets;\n  if (reason.extra) {\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(reason.extra)) {\n      if (RESERVED_FIELDS.has(key)) {\n        console.warn(`[gate] onBeforeSession returned reserved field \"${key}\" — ignoring to preserve gate authority`);\n        continue;\n      }\n      body[key] = value;\n    }\n  }\n  return body;\n}\n","import {\n  AgentScore,\n  InvalidCredentialError,\n  PaymentRequiredError,\n  QuotaExceededError,\n  TimeoutError as SdkTimeoutError,\n  TokenExpiredError,\n} from '@agent-score/sdk';\nimport { isFixableDenial } from './_denial';\nimport { QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS } from './_response';\nimport { normalizeAddress } from './address';\nimport { TTLCache } from './cache';\nimport type { PaymentSigner } from './signer';\n\n// Character-based trim avoids a CodeQL polynomial-redos false positive on\n// `/\\/+$/` patterns that report library-input strings.\nfunction stripTrailingSlashes(s: string): string {\n  let end = s.length;\n  while (end > 0 && s.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 47 /* '/' */) end--;\n  return end === s.length ? s : s.slice(0, end);\n}\n\ndeclare const __VERSION__: string;\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Public types (framework-agnostic)\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface AgentIdentity {\n  address?: string;\n  operatorToken?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Session metadata returned from `POST /v1/sessions`. Surfaced to the `onBeforeSession`\n * hook so merchants can correlate an AgentScore session with their own resume token\n * (e.g. a pending-order id).\n */\nexport interface SessionMetadata {\n  session_id: string;\n  verify_url: string;\n  poll_secret: string;\n  poll_url: string;\n  expires_at?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Configuration for auto-creating a verification session when no identity is present.\n *\n * The static `context` / `productName` options are sent on every session request. For\n * per-request context (e.g. the specific product the agent was trying to buy), pass\n * a `getSessionOptions` callback that returns dynamic values; its return is merged\n * over the static defaults.\n *\n * `onBeforeSession` is a side-effect hook that runs after the session is minted but\n * before the 403 is built. Use it to pre-create a reservation/draft/pending-order\n * row in your DB so agents can resume via a merchant-specific id. Return value is\n * merged into `DenialReason.extra`, so it surfaces in both the default 403 body and\n * in a custom `onDenied` handler.\n */\nexport interface CreateSessionOnMissing<TCtx = unknown> {\n  apiKey: string;\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  context?: string;\n  productName?: string;\n  /** Per-request override of `context` / `productName`. Invoked with the framework context. */\n  getSessionOptions?: (ctx: TCtx) => Promise<{ context?: string; productName?: string }>\n                                  |          { context?: string; productName?: string };\n  /** Side-effect hook that runs after the session is minted. Return value is merged\n   *  into `DenialReason.extra` so custom `onDenied` handlers can include merchant-specific\n   *  fields (e.g. `order_id`) in the 403 response. Hook errors are logged and swallowed —\n   *  a failing side effect should not block the 403 from reaching the agent. */\n  onBeforeSession?: (ctx: TCtx, session: SessionMetadata) => Promise<Record<string, unknown>>\n                                                          |          Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nexport interface AgentScoreCoreOptions {\n  /** AgentScore API key. Required. */\n  apiKey: string;\n  /** Require KYC verification. */\n  requireKyc?: boolean;\n  /** Require operator to be clear of sanctions. */\n  requireSanctionsClear?: boolean;\n  /** Minimum operator age bracket (18 or 21). */\n  minAge?: number;\n  /** List of blocked jurisdictions (blocklist). */\n  blockedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** List of allowed jurisdictions (allowlist — only these pass). */\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  /** If true, allow the request through when the API is unreachable. Defaults to false. */\n  failOpen?: boolean;\n  /** How long to cache results, in seconds. Defaults to 300. */\n  cacheSeconds?: number;\n  /** AgentScore API base URL. Defaults to \"https://api.agentscore.sh\". */\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  /** Optional chain to filter scoring to. */\n  chain?: string;\n  /** Prepended to the default User-Agent as `\"{userAgent} (@agent-score/commerce@{version})\"`. Use to attribute API calls to your app. */\n  userAgent?: string;\n  /** When set and no identity is found, create a verification session instead of denying immediately. */\n  createSessionOnMissing?: CreateSessionOnMissing;\n}\n\nexport type DenialCode =\n  | 'wallet_not_trusted'\n  | 'missing_identity'\n  | 'api_error'\n  | 'payment_required'\n  | 'identity_verification_required'\n  // Wallet-signer binding: claimed X-Wallet-Address must resolve to the same operator as\n  // the payment signer; wallet-auth is rejected on rails with no wallet signer.\n  | 'wallet_signer_mismatch'\n  | 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing'\n  // Granular credential-state denials passed through from /v1/assess.\n  // - `token_expired`: revoked + TTL-expired (the API unifies these). The 401 body carries\n  //   an auto-minted session, forwarded into DenialReason for one-shot recovery.\n  // - `invalid_credential`: the token doesn't exist at all (typo, never minted, fabricated).\n  //   No auto-session is minted by the API for this case — agents should switch to a\n  //   different stored token or drop the header to bootstrap a fresh session.\n  | 'token_expired'\n  | 'invalid_credential';\n\n/**\n * Cross-merchant pattern hint emitted on bootstrap denials and session-create responses.\n * LLM-hosted agents should persist this to long-term memory so future AgentScore encounters skip\n * the cold-start session flow. Contents are the pattern, not secrets.\n */\nexport interface AgentMemoryHint {\n  save_for_future_agentscore_gates: true;\n  pattern_summary: string;\n  quickstart: string;\n  identity_check_endpoint: string;\n  list_wallets_endpoint?: string;\n  identity_paths: { wallet: string; operator_token: string };\n  bootstrap: string;\n  do_not_persist_in_memory: string[];\n  persist_in_credential_store: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface DenialReason {\n  code: DenialCode;\n  /** Human-readable explanation. When omitted, `denialReasonToBody` substitutes a per-code default. */\n  message?: string;\n  decision?: string;\n  reasons?: string[];\n  verify_url?: string;\n  session_id?: string;\n  poll_secret?: string;\n  poll_url?: string;\n  agent_instructions?: string;\n  /** Cross-merchant memory hint. Emitted on bootstrap denials only by default. */\n  agent_memory?: AgentMemoryHint;\n  /** Full assess response when the denial came from `/v1/assess`. Lets consumers access fields\n   *  not promoted to first-class DenialReason properties (e.g., `policy_result`). Undefined for\n   *  denials that did not originate from an assess call (missing_identity, api_error,\n   *  payment_required, identity_verification_required). */\n  data?: AssessResult;\n  /** Extra fields returned from the `createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession` hook. Merged\n   *  into the default 403 body; custom `onDenied` handlers can spread these into their own\n   *  response shape (e.g. to include a merchant-minted `order_id`). */\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n  // Wallet-signer-match fields — populated for wallet_signer_mismatch only.\n  // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n  /** Operator id resolved from `X-Wallet-Address`. */\n  claimed_operator?: string;\n  /** Operator id the actual payment signer resolves to. `null` when the signer wallet isn't\n   *  linked to any operator (treat as a different identity). */\n  actual_signer_operator?: string | null;\n  /** The wallet the agent claimed via header. Echoed back for self-correction. */\n  expected_signer?: string;\n  /** The wallet that actually signed the payment. */\n  actual_signer?: string;\n  /** Wallets the claimed operator could sign with (if enumerable). Present when non-empty. */\n  linked_wallets?: string[];\n}\n\n/** Operator verification details from the assess response. Mirrors python's\n *  `OperatorVerification` dataclass. */\nexport interface OperatorVerification {\n  level: string;\n  operator_type: string | null;\n  verified_at: string | null;\n}\n\n/** Account-level KYC facts that apply to every operator under the same account.\n *  Populated when the API returns account_verification (post-KYC operator).\n *  Mirrors python's account_verification dict shape. */\nexport interface AccountVerification {\n  kyc_level?: string;\n  sanctions_clear?: boolean;\n  age_bracket?: string;\n  jurisdiction?: string;\n  verified_at?: string | null;\n}\n\n/** A single policy check from the assess response. Mirrors python's `PolicyCheck`. */\nexport interface PolicyCheck {\n  rule: string;\n  passed: boolean;\n  required?: unknown;\n  actual?: unknown;\n}\n\n/** Policy evaluation result from the assess response. Mirrors python's `PolicyResult`. */\nexport interface PolicyResult {\n  all_passed: boolean;\n  checks: PolicyCheck[];\n}\n\nexport interface AssessResult {\n  decision: string | null;\n  decision_reasons: string[];\n  identity_method?: string;\n  operator_verification?: OperatorVerification;\n  account_verification?: AccountVerification;\n  resolved_operator?: string | null;\n  /** Wallets linked to the same operator as the resolved identity. Capped at 100 entries\n   *  by the API. Useful for advertising in 402 challenges so wallet-auth agents know which\n   *  alt-signers will satisfy `wallet_signer_mismatch`. */\n  linked_wallets?: string[];\n  verify_url?: string;\n  policy_result?: PolicyResult | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reason a failOpen allow short-circuited an evaluate call due to AgentScore-side\n * infrastructure issues. Surfaced on `EvaluateOutcome` so merchants can log/alert when\n * their gate is running in degraded mode (compliance not actually enforced this request).\n *\n * - `quota_exceeded` — AgentScore returned 429\n * - `api_error` — AgentScore returned 5xx or non-2xx that isn't 429\n * - `network_timeout` — request to /v1/assess timed out or failed at the network layer\n */\nexport type FailOpenInfraReason = 'quota_exceeded' | 'api_error' | 'network_timeout';\n\n/** Per-account assess quota observability, captured from `X-Quota-*` response headers\n *  on the success path. Mirrors the SDK's `QuotaInfo` shape — re-exported from gate state\n *  so merchants can monitor approach-to-cap proactively (warn at 80%, alert at 95%). */\nexport interface GateQuotaInfo {\n  limit: number | null;\n  used: number | null;\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp, or the literal string `\"never\"` for unlimited tiers. */\n  reset: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Outcome from `AgentScoreCore.evaluate()`. Adapters map this to framework-specific responses.\n *\n * - `{ kind: 'allow', data }` — the request passed the policy. `data` is present on a normal\n *   allow; `undefined` when fail-open short-circuited (identity missing, API unreachable,\n *   timeout, or 402 paid-tier required).\n * - When `failOpen: true` and the allow was the result of an AgentScore-side infrastructure\n *   failure (429/5xx/timeout), the result also carries `degraded: true` + `infraReason` so\n *   merchants can alert/log without parsing console output.\n * - `quota` propagates the SDK's per-request quota observability when the API emits the\n *   `X-Quota-*` headers. Optional; absent on Enterprise / unlimited tiers.\n * - `{ kind: 'deny', reason }` — the request was denied. Adapters should render a 403 with the\n *   reason, or invoke the caller's custom denial handler.\n */\nexport type EvaluateOutcome =\n  | { kind: 'allow'; data?: AssessResult; degraded?: boolean; infraReason?: FailOpenInfraReason; quota?: GateQuotaInfo }\n  | { kind: 'deny'; reason: DenialReason };\n\nexport interface CaptureWalletOptions {\n  /** Operator credential (`opc_...`) that the agent authenticated with. */\n  operatorToken: string;\n  /** Signer wallet recovered from the payment payload. */\n  walletAddress: string;\n  /** Key-derivation family — `\"evm\"` for any EVM chain, `\"solana\"` for Solana. */\n  network: 'evm' | 'solana';\n  /** Optional stable key for the logical payment (e.g., payment intent id, tx hash). When the\n   *  same key is seen again for the same (credential, wallet, network), the server no-ops —\n   *  prevents agent retries from inflating transaction_count. */\n  idempotencyKey?: string;\n}\n\n/** Combined wallet-signer verdict surfaced by `getSignerVerdict(c)` — both verdicts come\n *  through the gate's primary `/v1/assess` call (single round trip). `signer_match` describes\n *  the wallet-binding (claimed wallet's operator ≡ signer wallet's operator); `signer_sanctions`\n *  describes the OFAC SDN wallet-address check.\n *\n *  `signer_match` is projected to the gate's camelCase `VerifyWalletSignerResult` shape so\n *  existing `buildSignerMismatchBody(...)` helpers consume it unchanged. `signer_sanctions`\n *  passes through in the API's wire shape (already short and stable). Returned `undefined`\n *  from `getSignerVerdict` when the gate didn't run with a signer (operator-token-only\n *  paths, discovery legs with no payment header). */\nexport interface SignerVerdict {\n  signer_match: VerifyWalletSignerResult | null;\n  signer_sanctions:\n    | { status: 'clear' }\n    | { sanctioned: true; ofac_label: string; sdn_uid: string; listed_at: string | null }\n    | { status: 'unavailable' }\n    | null;\n}\n\nexport type VerifyWalletSignerResult =\n  | { kind: 'pass'; claimedOperator: string | null; signerOperator: string | null }\n  | {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch';\n      claimedOperator: string | null;\n      actualSignerOperator: string | null;\n      expectedSigner: string;\n      actualSigner: string;\n      linkedWallets: string[];\n      /** JSON-encoded action copy (action + steps + user_message). Spread into the 403 body\n       *  verbatim so agents get a concrete recovery path inside the denial response itself. */\n      agentInstructions: string;\n    }\n  | {\n      kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing';\n      claimedWallet: string;\n      agentInstructions: string;\n    };\n\nexport interface AgentScoreCore {\n  /**\n   * Evaluate the request's identity against the configured policy.\n   * @param identity - extracted identity (wallet address and/or operator token)\n   * @param ctx - optional framework-specific context (Hono c, Express req, etc.) passed\n   *   through to `createSessionOnMissing` hooks. Opaque to core.\n   */\n  evaluate(\n    identity: AgentIdentity | undefined,\n    ctx?: unknown,\n    /** Pre-extracted payment signer from the inbound request (the adapter middleware\n     *  extracts it via `extractPaymentSigner`). When provided, the assess call carries\n     *  it and the response includes `signer_match` + `signer_sanctions` verdicts in one\n     *  round trip. */\n    signer?: PaymentSigner | null,\n  ): Promise<EvaluateOutcome>;\n  /** Synchronous read of the cached signer verdicts (signer_match + signer_sanctions)\n   *  populated when the gate's evaluate call was made with a pre-extracted signer. Returns\n   *  `undefined` when the gate didn't run, the request was operator-token-authenticated,\n   *  or no signer was extractable (discovery legs). */\n  getSignerVerdict(claimedAddress: string): SignerVerdict | undefined;\n  /** Report a wallet seen paying under an operator credential. Fire-and-forget; silently\n   *  swallows non-fatal errors because capture is informational, not on the critical path. */\n  captureWallet(options: CaptureWalletOptions): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internal types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/** Internal cache entry for the gate's per-`(identity, policy)` assess result memo.\n *  Distinct from the public `AssessResult` interface (the typed `/v1/assess` response\n *  shape returned to merchants); this carries the cached decision plus the per-signer\n *  wallet-match sub-cache. */\ninterface CachedAssessResult {\n  allow: boolean;\n  decision?: string;\n  reasons?: string[];\n  raw?: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the cross-merchant memory hint emitted on bootstrap denials. Base URLs are\n * derived from the gate's AgentScore API base so self-hosted / staging deployments get\n * correct pointers. Contents describe the AgentScore identity substrate in transferable\n * terms; merchant-specific context lives in other `agent_instructions` fields.\n */\n// Canonical production AgentScore API — used as the authoritative source for endpoint pointers\n// emitted to agent memory regardless of how a given merchant configured their gate's baseUrl.\nconst CANONICAL_AGENTSCORE_API = 'https://api.agentscore.sh';\n\n// JSON-encoded action copy emitted on wallet-signer-match denials. Spread into 403 bodies\n// by merchants so agents get a concrete recovery path inside the denial response itself —\n// no discovery-doc round trip required.\nconst WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'resign_or_switch_to_operator_token',\n  steps: [\n    'Preferred: re-submit the payment signed by expected_signer (or any entry in linked_wallets — same-operator wallets are fungible) and retry with the same X-Wallet-Address.',\n    'Alternative: drop X-Wallet-Address and retry with X-Operator-Token. Use a stored opc_... if you have one; otherwise retry this request with NO identity header — the merchant will mint a verification session in the 403 body (verify_url + poll_secret). Share verify_url with the user, poll, receive a fresh opc_...',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'The payment signer resolves to a different operator than X-Wallet-Address. Re-sign from expected_signer or any linked_wallets entry, or switch to X-Operator-Token.',\n});\n\nconst WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'switch_to_operator_token',\n  steps: [\n    'This payment rail (Stripe SPT, card) carries no wallet signature — X-Wallet-Address cannot be verified against the payment.',\n    'Drop X-Wallet-Address and retry with X-Operator-Token. If you do not have a stored opc_..., retry with no identity header to receive a verification session.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'Wallet-address identity is only supported on wallet-signing rails (Tempo MPP, x402). On Stripe or card, use X-Operator-Token instead.',\n});\n\n// `invalid_credential` is permanent — the token doesn't exist (typo, never minted, fabricated).\n// Distinct from `token_expired` (which carries an auto-session for one-shot recovery): the\n// API doesn't auto-mint a session here because the client may simply have a different valid\n// token to try. Agents should switch tokens or drop the header to bootstrap a session.\nconst INVALID_CREDENTIAL_INSTRUCTIONS = JSON.stringify({\n  action: 'switch_token_or_restart_session',\n  steps: [\n    'The X-Operator-Token you sent does not match any credential. This is a permanent state — retrying with the same token will keep failing.',\n    'If you have other stored opc_... credentials, retry with one of them.',\n    'Otherwise drop X-Operator-Token and retry with no identity header — the merchant will mint a fresh verification session in the 403 body (verify_url + poll_secret) so the user can re-verify and you can poll for a new operator_token.',\n  ],\n  user_message:\n    'The operator_token is not recognized. Use a different stored token, or restart the verification session flow to mint a new one.',\n});\n\nexport function buildAgentMemoryHint(): AgentMemoryHint {\n  // Memory pointers always point at the canonical production API — merchants must not be\n  // able to redirect the cross-merchant memory surface, since that would be a phishing\n  // vector for the verify URL.\n  const api = CANONICAL_AGENTSCORE_API;\n  return {\n    save_for_future_agentscore_gates: true,\n    pattern_summary:\n      'AgentScore is a cross-merchant identity substrate for agent commerce. Any endpoint that ' +\n      'returns 403 missing_identity / identity_verification_required or 402 challenges referencing AgentScore uses ' +\n      'the same identity system. One KYC works across all AgentScore merchants — no re-verification ' +\n      'per site. Save this pattern (and the endpoints below) to persistent memory so future ' +\n      'AgentScore encounters skip the cold-start session flow.',\n    quickstart: 'https://docs.agentscore.sh/guides/agent-identity',\n    identity_check_endpoint: `${api}/v1/credentials`,\n    identity_paths: {\n      wallet:\n        'If paying from a crypto wallet you have used before on any AgentScore merchant, send ' +\n        '`X-Wallet-Address: 0x...`. Shortest path; no token lifecycle to manage.',\n      operator_token:\n        'For any rail (Stripe SPT, card, or a wallet you have not linked yet), send ' +\n        '`X-Operator-Token: opc_...`. Reusable across merchants until the token expires.',\n    },\n    bootstrap:\n      'If you have neither a linked wallet nor a valid operator_token, follow the session/verify ' +\n      'flow in the per-request `agent_instructions` block. This happens at most once per agent ' +\n      'identity — after first verification, the operator_token and any subsequently used wallet ' +\n      'are reusable everywhere.',\n    do_not_persist_in_memory: ['operator_token', 'poll_secret'],\n    persist_in_credential_store: ['operator_token'],\n  };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Core factory\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport function createAgentScoreCore(options: AgentScoreCoreOptions): AgentScoreCore {\n  if (!options.apiKey) {\n    throw new Error('AgentScore API key is required. Get one at https://agentscore.sh/sign-up');\n  }\n\n  const {\n    apiKey,\n    requireKyc,\n    requireSanctionsClear,\n    minAge,\n    blockedJurisdictions,\n    allowedJurisdictions,\n    failOpen = false,\n    cacheSeconds = 300,\n    baseUrl: rawBaseUrl = 'https://api.agentscore.sh',\n    chain: gateChain,\n    userAgent,\n    createSessionOnMissing,\n  } = options;\n\n  const baseUrl = stripTrailingSlashes(rawBaseUrl);\n  const agentMemoryHint = buildAgentMemoryHint();\n\n  const defaultUa = `@agent-score/commerce@${__VERSION__}`;\n  const userAgentHeader = userAgent ? `${userAgent} (${defaultUa})` : defaultUa;\n\n  // Single shared SDK instance for every API call this gate makes (assess, sessions,\n  // credentials/wallets, telemetry). Connection pooling + typed-error classification +\n  // X-Quota-* header capture all flow through here. The SDK owns the transport layer\n  // (timeouts, retry-on-429); the gate adds policy semantics on top. Pass the\n  // merchant-prefixed UA — SDK appends its own default to produce a chain like\n  // `<merchant-app> (@agent-score/commerce@<v>) (@agent-score/sdk@<v>)`.\n  const sdk = new AgentScore({ apiKey, baseUrl, userAgent: userAgentHeader });\n\n  // createSessionOnMissing can carry its own apiKey + baseUrl (merchants sometimes wire\n  // a session-only key for this hook). Lazily build a separate SDK instance keyed on\n  // (apiKey, baseUrl) so we don't construct a new client per request.\n  const sessionSdkCache = new Map<string, AgentScore>();\n  function getSessionSdk(sessionApiKey: string, sessionBaseUrl?: string): AgentScore {\n    const key = `${sessionApiKey}|${sessionBaseUrl ?? ''}`;\n    let s = sessionSdkCache.get(key);\n    if (!s) {\n      s = new AgentScore({\n        apiKey: sessionApiKey,\n        baseUrl: sessionBaseUrl ?? baseUrl,\n        userAgent: userAgentHeader,\n      });\n      sessionSdkCache.set(key, s);\n    }\n    return s;\n  }\n\n  const cache = new TTLCache<CachedAssessResult>(cacheSeconds * 1000);\n\n  // Mint a verification session via /v1/sessions and return the resulting\n  // identity_verification_required DenialReason — or undefined if the mint failed (network\n  // error, non-2xx, missing fields). Used for both the missing-identity path and the\n  // fixable-wallet bootstrap path: in both cases the UX is identical (agent polls the\n  // returned poll_url until it gets a fresh opc_... and retries).\n  async function tryMintSessionDenial(ctx: unknown): Promise<DenialReason | undefined> {\n    if (!createSessionOnMissing) return undefined;\n    try {\n      const sessionBody: { context?: string; product_name?: string } = {};\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.context != null) sessionBody.context = createSessionOnMissing.context;\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.productName != null) sessionBody.product_name = createSessionOnMissing.productName;\n\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions && ctx !== undefined) {\n        try {\n          const dynamic = await createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions(ctx);\n          if (dynamic?.context != null) sessionBody.context = dynamic.context;\n          if (dynamic?.productName != null) sessionBody.product_name = dynamic.productName;\n        } catch (err) {\n          console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing.getSessionOptions hook failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // createSessionOnMissing.apiKey may differ from the gate's apiKey (e.g. merchant\n      // wires a session-only key for this hook). Build a per-config SDK lazily.\n      const sessionSdk = getSessionSdk(createSessionOnMissing.apiKey, createSessionOnMissing.baseUrl);\n      const data = (await sessionSdk.createSession({\n        ...(sessionBody.context !== undefined ? { context: sessionBody.context } : {}),\n        ...(sessionBody.product_name !== undefined ? { product_name: sessionBody.product_name } : {}),\n      })) as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n      // Validate required fields before trusting the response. A misbehaving (or mocked-wrong)\n      // API could 200 without session_id/poll_secret/verify_url, which would propagate\n      // `undefined` into the 403 body and leave the agent stuck — treat as session-create\n      // failure and fall back to the caller's bare denial.\n      if (\n        typeof data.session_id !== 'string' ||\n        typeof data.poll_secret !== 'string' ||\n        typeof data.verify_url !== 'string'\n      ) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/sessions returned 200 without required fields — falling back to bare denial');\n        return undefined;\n      }\n\n      // Run onBeforeSession side-effect hook. Errors are swallowed — a failing DB write\n      // (e.g. can't insert pending order) should not block the 403.\n      let extra: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      if (createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession && ctx !== undefined) {\n        try {\n          const sessionMeta = {\n            session_id: data.session_id as string,\n            verify_url: data.verify_url as string,\n            poll_secret: data.poll_secret as string,\n            poll_url: data.poll_url as string,\n            expires_at: data.expires_at as string | undefined,\n          };\n          const result = await createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession(ctx, sessionMeta);\n          if (result && typeof result === 'object') extra = result;\n        } catch (err) {\n          console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing.onBeforeSession hook failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        }\n      }\n\n      // The API emits `next_steps` (structured object) on /v1/sessions success. Stringify it\n      // into the gate's `agent_instructions` contract so merchants get the same JSON-encoded\n      // {action, steps, user_message} envelope as every other gate-emitted denial.\n      const apiNextSteps = data.next_steps as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n      return {\n        code: 'identity_verification_required',\n        verify_url: data.verify_url as string,\n        session_id: data.session_id as string,\n        poll_secret: data.poll_secret as string,\n        poll_url: data.poll_url as string | undefined,\n        agent_instructions: apiNextSteps ? JSON.stringify(apiNextSteps) : undefined,\n        agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n        ...(extra && { extra }),\n      };\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Session-mint failed (network, /v1/sessions returned non-2xx, body parse error,\n      // onBeforeSession threw inside the inner try). Caller falls back to a bare denial —\n      // agents still get a 403 with a probe-strategy hint. Log loudly so a persistent\n      // /v1/sessions outage isn't masked.\n      console.warn('[gate] createSessionOnMissing path failed — falling back to bare denial:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function evaluate(\n    identity: AgentIdentity | undefined,\n    ctx?: unknown,\n    signer?: PaymentSigner | null,\n  ): Promise<EvaluateOutcome> {\n    // Treat \"returned identity object with no usable fields\" the same as \"no identity at all\" —\n    // otherwise a misbehaving custom extractIdentity would send an empty body to /v1/assess.\n    if (!identity || (!identity.address && !identity.operatorToken)) {\n      // failOpen short-circuits BEFORE the session mint. This branch isn't an infra failure\n      // (no AgentScore call has been made yet) so we don't mark the gate state as degraded —\n      // missing identity + failOpen is the explicit opt-in pass-through behavior, not a\n      // graceful-degradation event. Merchants who need identity-or-deny on a failOpen gate\n      // should add a guard at the handler that checks for X-Wallet-Address / X-Operator-Token\n      // before reading the gate state.\n      if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow' };\n\n      const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n      if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n\n      // Bare missing-identity denial (no session was auto-created). Describe the probe\n      // strategy so agents without memory can recover: try wallet first on signing rails,\n      // fall back to stored opc_..., fall back to session flow (noting that only\n      // auto-session merchants return verify_url + poll data on the retry).\n      const missingIdentityInstructions = JSON.stringify({\n        action: 'probe_identity_then_session',\n        steps: [\n          'If you have a wallet AND this merchant accepts a wallet-signing rail (Tempo MPP or x402 — see openapi.json x-payment-info): send X-Wallet-Address and retry. If the wallet is already linked to an AgentScore operator (via prior SIWE claim or prior captureWallet), this passes in one round trip. If the wallet is unlinked or the account has no KYC, the 403 will include a verify_url — share it with the user to claim the wallet + complete KYC, then retry.',\n          'If step 1 is denied or you already have a stored operator_token (valid + not expired): send X-Operator-Token: opc_... and retry.',\n          'If neither applies: retry with NO identity header. Merchants that auto-create verification sessions (most AgentScore merchants do) return verify_url + session_id + poll_secret in the 403 body — share verify_url with the user, then poll poll_url every 5s with the X-Poll-Secret header until status=verified (the poll returns a one-time operator_token). If the retry returns the same bare 403, this merchant does not support self-service session bootstrapping — direct the user to https://agentscore.sh/sign-up to create an AgentScore identity and mint an operator_token from their dashboard (https://agentscore.sh/dashboard/verify). The user hands the opc_... to you, and you retry with X-Operator-Token.',\n        ],\n        user_message:\n          'Try X-Wallet-Address first if you have a wallet and the merchant accepts Tempo/x402; fall back to a stored X-Operator-Token, then to the session/verify flow described in agent_memory.bootstrap.',\n      });\n      return {\n        kind: 'deny',\n        reason: {\n          code: 'missing_identity',\n          agent_instructions: missingIdentityInstructions,\n          agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    // operator_token is opaque + ASCII-only — lowercasing is safe. Wallet addresses go\n    // through normalizeAddress because Solana base58 is case-sensitive and lowercasing\n    // would corrupt the cache key (a Solana cache miss every time, plus collision risk\n    // with mixed-case variants of the same operator).\n    const cacheKey = identity.operatorToken?.toLowerCase() ?? (identity.address ? normalizeAddress(identity.address) : '');\n\n    const cached = cache.get(cacheKey);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (cached.allow) {\n        const cachedRaw = cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n        const cachedQuota = cachedRaw?.quota as GateQuotaInfo | undefined;\n        return {\n          kind: 'allow',\n          data: cachedRaw as unknown as AssessResult,\n          ...(cachedQuota !== undefined && { quota: cachedQuota }),\n        };\n      }\n      // Fixable compliance denials (kyc_required, kyc_pending, kyc_failed) get the\n      // same UX as missing_identity: mint a fresh verification session, agent polls\n      // until status=verified, gets a fresh opc_..., retries. Unfixable reasons\n      // (sanctions_flagged, age_insufficient, jurisdiction_restricted) keep the bare\n      // wallet_not_trusted denial. `jurisdiction_restricted` is unfixable: the API\n      // only emits it after KYC is verified (the user's KYC'd country is in the\n      // blocked list — re-doing KYC won't change the country).\n      if (isFixableDenial(cached.reasons)) {\n        const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n        if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n      }\n      return {\n        kind: 'deny',\n        reason: {\n          code: 'wallet_not_trusted',\n          decision: cached.decision,\n          reasons: cached.reasons,\n          verify_url: (cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.verify_url as string | undefined,\n          data: cached.raw as AssessResult | undefined,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    const policy: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    if (requireKyc != null) policy.require_kyc = requireKyc;\n    if (requireSanctionsClear != null) policy.require_sanctions_clear = requireSanctionsClear;\n    if (minAge != null) policy.min_age = minAge;\n    if (blockedJurisdictions != null) policy.blocked_jurisdictions = blockedJurisdictions;\n    if (allowedJurisdictions != null) policy.allowed_jurisdictions = allowedJurisdictions;\n\n    let data: Record<string, unknown>;\n    try {\n      // Single SDK call: typed-error subclasses (PaymentRequiredError / TokenExpiredError /\n      // InvalidCredentialError / QuotaExceededError / TimeoutError) flow through the\n      // catch below; success path captures `quota` from X-Quota-* headers automatically.\n      const opts = {\n        chain: gateChain,\n        ...(Object.keys(policy).length > 0 ? { policy: policy as never } : {}),\n        // Pre-extracted payment signer (by the adapter middleware). When present, the API\n        // composes BOTH signer_match (wallet-binding) and signer_sanctions (OFAC SDN wallet\n        // check) verdicts on the response in one round trip. Under\n        // policy.require_sanctions_clear, a signer_sanctions hit flips decision -> deny inline.\n        ...(signer && { signer: { address: signer.address, network: signer.network } }),\n      };\n      // SDK has two overloads — narrow by which identity is set so TS picks the right one.\n      const result = identity.address\n        ? await sdk.assess(identity.address, { ...opts, operatorToken: identity.operatorToken })\n        : await sdk.assess(null, { ...opts, operatorToken: identity.operatorToken! });\n      data = result as unknown as Record<string, unknown>;\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof PaymentRequiredError) {\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'payment_required' } };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof TokenExpiredError) {\n        // SDK extracts the auto-minted session fields onto the error instance — no body\n        // re-parsing needed here.\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: {\n            code: 'token_expired',\n            data: err.details as unknown as AssessResult,\n            ...(err.verifyUrl ? { verify_url: err.verifyUrl } : {}),\n            ...(err.sessionId ? { session_id: err.sessionId } : {}),\n            ...(err.pollSecret ? { poll_secret: err.pollSecret } : {}),\n            ...(err.pollUrl ? { poll_url: err.pollUrl } : {}),\n            ...(err.nextSteps ? { agent_instructions: JSON.stringify(err.nextSteps) } : {}),\n            ...(err.agentMemory ? { agent_memory: err.agentMemory as AgentMemoryHint } : {}),\n          },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof InvalidCredentialError) {\n        // Permanent — no auto-session, agent should switch tokens or restart.\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: {\n            code: 'invalid_credential',\n            agent_instructions: INVALID_CREDENTIAL_INSTRUCTIONS,\n            agent_memory: agentMemoryHint,\n          },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof QuotaExceededError) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess returned 429 quota_exceeded');\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'quota_exceeded' };\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: { code: 'api_error', agent_instructions: QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS },\n        };\n      }\n      if (err instanceof SdkTimeoutError) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess timed out:', err.message);\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'network_timeout' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n      }\n      // Status-based fallbacks for AgentScoreError instances the SDK couldn't classify\n      // into a typed subclass (e.g. 429 with body that lacked error.code, or a fetch\n      // rejection whose .name doesn't match AbortError but whose status code is set).\n      // The real API always emits error.code on 429, so this is purely defensive.\n      const status = (err as { status?: number } | null)?.status;\n      const errName = err instanceof Error ? err.name : '';\n      if (status === 429) {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess returned 429 (untyped — defensive)');\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'quota_exceeded' };\n        return {\n          kind: 'deny',\n          reason: { code: 'api_error', agent_instructions: QUOTA_EXCEEDED_INSTRUCTIONS },\n        };\n      }\n      if (errName === 'TimeoutError' || errName === 'AbortError') {\n        console.warn('[gate] /v1/assess timed out (by Error.name):', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n        if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'network_timeout' };\n        return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n      }\n      // Generic AgentScoreError (rate_limited, 5xx, network_error, body parse, unknown 4xx)\n      // or any non-AgentScoreError unexpected throw — surface as api_error.\n      // Include the SDK-classified error code (when available) so ops/dev see\n      // schema-drift cases like a new 401 error.code rather than a silent 503.\n      const errCode = (err as { code?: string } | null)?.code;\n      const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n      const detail = errCode ? `${errCode}: ${msg}` : msg;\n      console.warn(`[gate] /v1/assess call failed — surfacing as api_error: ${detail}`);\n      if (failOpen) return { kind: 'allow', degraded: true, infraReason: 'api_error' };\n      return { kind: 'deny', reason: { code: 'api_error' } };\n    }\n\n    const decision = data.decision as string | null | undefined;\n    const decisionReasons = (data.decision_reasons as string[]) ?? [];\n    const allow = decision === 'allow' || decision == null;\n\n    cache.set(cacheKey, { allow, decision: decision ?? undefined, reasons: decisionReasons, raw: data });\n\n    if (allow) {\n      // SDK populates `quota` on the assess response from X-Quota-* headers when the\n      // API emits them. Surface up to the adapter so merchants can monitor approach-to-cap.\n      const quota = data.quota as GateQuotaInfo | undefined;\n      return {\n        kind: 'allow',\n        data: data as unknown as AssessResult,\n        ...(quota !== undefined && { quota }),\n      };\n    }\n\n    // Fixable compliance denials (kyc_required, kyc_pending, kyc_failed) get the\n    // same UX as missing_identity: mint a fresh verification session, agent polls\n    // until status=verified, gets a fresh opc_..., retries. Unfixable reasons\n    // (sanctions_flagged, age_insufficient, jurisdiction_restricted) keep the bare\n    // wallet_not_trusted denial. `jurisdiction_restricted` is unfixable: the API\n    // only emits it after KYC is verified (the user's KYC'd country is in the\n    // blocked list — re-doing KYC won't change the country).\n    if (isFixableDenial(decisionReasons)) {\n      const sessionReason = await tryMintSessionDenial(ctx);\n      if (sessionReason) return { kind: 'deny', reason: sessionReason };\n    }\n\n    return {\n      kind: 'deny',\n      reason: {\n        code: 'wallet_not_trusted',\n        decision: decision ?? undefined,\n        reasons: decisionReasons,\n        verify_url: data.verify_url as string | undefined,\n        data: data as unknown as AssessResult,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  async function captureWallet(options: CaptureWalletOptions): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      await sdk.associateWallet({\n        operatorToken: options.operatorToken,\n        walletAddress: options.walletAddress,\n        network: options.network,\n        ...(options.idempotencyKey ? { idempotencyKey: options.idempotencyKey } : {}),\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Fire-and-forget: don't throw. Log so a persistent capture outage is visible\n      // to merchant ops — otherwise wallet↔operator linkage silently stops.\n      console.warn('[agentscore-commerce] captureWallet failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Project the API's signer_match block onto the gate's VerifyWalletSignerResult shape.\n  // The API authors agent_instructions, claimed/signer operators, and the linked-wallet\n  // set (deny-guarded server-side); the gate just shapes those fields into camelCase.\n  function projectSignerMatch(\n    sm: Record<string, unknown>,\n    claimedNorm: string,\n    signerNorm: string,\n  ): VerifyWalletSignerResult {\n    const kind = sm.kind as string;\n    if (kind === 'pass') {\n      return {\n        kind: 'pass',\n        claimedOperator: (sm.claimed_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n        signerOperator: (sm.signer_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      };\n    }\n    if (kind === 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing') {\n      return {\n        kind: 'wallet_auth_requires_wallet_signing',\n        claimedWallet: (sm.claimed_wallet as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm,\n        agentInstructions:\n          (sm.agent_instructions as string | undefined) ?? WALLET_AUTH_REQUIRES_WALLET_SIGNING_INSTRUCTIONS,\n      };\n    }\n    // Default: wallet_signer_mismatch\n    const linked = sm.linked_wallets;\n    return {\n      kind: 'wallet_signer_mismatch',\n      claimedOperator: (sm.claimed_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      actualSignerOperator: (sm.signer_operator as string | null | undefined) ?? null,\n      expectedSigner: (sm.expected_signer as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm,\n      actualSigner: (sm.actual_signer as string | undefined) ?? signerNorm,\n      linkedWallets: Array.isArray(linked)\n        ? (linked as unknown[]).filter((w): w is string => typeof w === 'string')\n        : [],\n      agentInstructions:\n        (sm.agent_instructions as string | undefined) ?? WALLET_SIGNER_MISMATCH_INSTRUCTIONS,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Synchronous read of the cached signer verdicts. Adapter middleware extracts the\n   * signer pre-evaluate and the gate's primary /v1/assess call composes both verdicts\n   * (signer_match + signer_sanctions) in one round trip — this getter just reads the\n   * cached response. Returns `undefined` for operator-token-only paths, discovery legs\n   * with no payment credential, or when the gate didn't run.\n   */\n  function getSignerVerdict(claimedAddress: string): SignerVerdict | undefined {\n    const claimedNorm = normalizeAddress(claimedAddress);\n    const cached = cache.get(claimedNorm);\n    if (!cached) return undefined;\n    const raw = cached.raw as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    if (!raw) return undefined;\n    const rawMatch = raw.signer_match as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    const rawSanctions = raw.signer_sanctions as SignerVerdict['signer_sanctions'] | undefined;\n    if (!rawMatch && !rawSanctions) return undefined;\n    // The API's signer_match has the actual signer wallet baked in (actual_signer); we\n    // didn't track it separately in the cache key (only claimed-side). Pass the API's own\n    // actual_signer as signerNorm so the projected shape is consistent.\n    const signerNorm = (rawMatch?.actual_signer as string | undefined) ?? claimedNorm;\n    return {\n      signer_match: rawMatch ? projectSignerMatch(rawMatch, claimedNorm, signerNorm) : null,\n      signer_sanctions: rawSanctions ?? null,\n    };\n  }\n\n  return { evaluate, captureWallet, getSignerVerdict };\n}\n","// Network-aware address normalization. EVM addresses (0x + 40 hex) are\n// case-insensitive in the protocol — we lowercase them so DB lookups against\n// `address_lower`-style columns work. Solana addresses are base58 and are\n// case-sensitive — we MUST preserve the input verbatim, never lowercase.\n//\n// Must produce identical output to the API normalizer (`core/api/src/lib/address.ts`)\n// so the gate, API, and merchants normalize the same way. If the two ever drift,\n// captured wallets won't resolve and signer-match silently breaks.\n\nconst SOLANA_BASE58_RE = /^[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44}$/;\nconst EVM_RE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;\n\nexport const isValidEvmAddress = (address: string): boolean => EVM_RE.test(address);\n\nexport const isSolanaAddress = (address: string): boolean =>\n  SOLANA_BASE58_RE.test(address) && !address.startsWith('0x');\n\nexport const isValidAddress = (address: string): boolean =>\n  isValidEvmAddress(address) || isSolanaAddress(address);\n\nexport const normalizeAddress = (address: string): string => {\n  if (isSolanaAddress(address)) { return address; }\n  return address.toLowerCase();\n};\n","export class TTLCache<T> {\n  private store = new Map<string, { value: T; expiresAt: number }>();\n  private maxSize: number;\n\n  constructor(private defaultTtlMs: number, maxSize = 10000) {\n    this.maxSize = maxSize;\n  }\n\n  get(key: string): T | undefined {\n    const entry = this.store.get(key);\n    if (!entry) return undefined;\n    if (Date.now() > entry.expiresAt) {\n      this.store.delete(key);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n    return entry.value;\n  }\n\n  set(key: string, value: T, ttlMs?: number): void {\n    if (this.store.size >= this.maxSize) {\n      this.sweep();\n    }\n    if (this.store.size >= this.maxSize) {\n      this.evictOldest(this.store.size - this.maxSize + 1);\n    }\n    this.store.set(key, {\n      value,\n      expiresAt: Date.now() + (ttlMs ?? this.defaultTtlMs),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** Remove all expired entries. */\n  private sweep(): void {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    for (const [k, v] of this.store) {\n      if (now > v.expiresAt) {\n        this.store.delete(k);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Evict the oldest `count` entries by insertion order. */\n  private evictOldest(count: number): void {\n    let removed = 0;\n    for (const key of this.store.keys()) {\n      if (removed >= count) break;\n      this.store.delete(key);\n      removed++;\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Payment-signer extraction.\n *\n * Shared between merchants and the gate. Three paths recover a wallet signer:\n *\n *   - **Tempo MPP** — `Authorization: Payment <base64>`; credential `source` is a DID of the\n *     form `did:pkh:eip155:<chain>:<address>`.\n *   - **Solana MPP `solana/charge`** — `Authorization: Payment <base64>`; recovery via either\n *     a `did:pkh:solana:<genesis>:<address>` source (when set by the client) or by decoding\n *     the credential's signed-tx payload and reading the SPL `TransferChecked` authority\n *     (pull mode only — `payload.type === 'transaction'`).\n *   - **x402 EIP-3009 (EVM, e.g. Base/Sepolia)** — `payment-signature` / `x-payment`;\n *     decoded payload carries `payload.authorization.from`.\n *\n * Optional peer deps: `mppx` for MPP credentials, `@solana/kit` for the Solana tx-decode\n * fallback. Both dynamic-imported; merchants who don't accept that rail don't need them.\n */\n\nexport type SignerNetwork = 'evm' | 'solana';\n\nconst TOKEN_PROGRAM = 'TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA';\nconst TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM = 'TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb';\nconst TRANSFER_CHECKED_DISCRIMINATOR = 12;\n\ninterface SolanaKitMinimal {\n  getBase64Codec: () => { encode: (s: string) => Uint8Array };\n  getTransactionDecoder: () => { decode: (b: Uint8Array) => { messageBytes: Uint8Array } };\n  getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder: () => {\n    decode: (b: Uint8Array) => {\n      staticAccounts: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n      instructions: ReadonlyArray<{\n        programAddressIndex: number;\n        accountIndices?: number[];\n        data?: Uint8Array;\n      }>;\n    };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a Solana MPP `solana/charge` credential's `payload.transaction` (base64-encoded\n * signed Solana tx) and return the SPL `TransferChecked` authority — the source-ATA owner,\n * which is the buyer's wallet. Pull mode only (`payload.type === 'transaction'`); push mode\n * (`payload.type === 'signature'`) returns null because recovery would require an RPC fetch.\n */\nasync function extractSolanaSignerFromCredential(credential: unknown): Promise<string | null> {\n  const payload = (credential as { payload?: { transaction?: string; type?: string } }).payload;\n  if (!payload?.transaction || payload.type !== 'transaction') return null;\n\n  const moduleName = '@solana/kit';\n  const kit = (await import(moduleName).catch(() => null)) as SolanaKitMinimal | null;\n  if (!kit?.getBase64Codec || !kit.getTransactionDecoder || !kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder) {\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const txBytes = kit.getBase64Codec().encode(payload.transaction);\n    const decoded = kit.getTransactionDecoder().decode(txBytes);\n    const message = kit.getCompiledTransactionMessageDecoder().decode(decoded.messageBytes);\n\n    // SPL TransferChecked accounts: [source ATA, mint, destination ATA, authority, ...signers].\n    // Returns the FIRST matched authority. For multi-recipient `splits` txs, the buyer\n    // signs ONE tx with N TransferChecked instructions all sharing the same authority,\n    // so first-match is correct; if a tx ever surfaces with mismatched authorities the\n    // first one wins (acceptable since both belong to whoever signed the tx).\n    for (const ix of message.instructions) {\n      const programId = message.staticAccounts[ix.programAddressIndex];\n      if (programId !== TOKEN_PROGRAM && programId !== TOKEN_2022_PROGRAM) continue;\n      const data = ix.data;\n      if (!data || data.length === 0 || data[0] !== TRANSFER_CHECKED_DISCRIMINATOR) continue;\n      const accountIndices = ix.accountIndices ?? [];\n      const authorityIndex = accountIndices[3];\n      if (authorityIndex === undefined) continue;\n      // v0 transactions can carry account indices that resolve via address lookup tables;\n      // staticAccounts only holds the static set. If the index is out of range, the\n      // authority sits in a lookup table we'd need RPC to resolve. Skip cleanly with a\n      // warning rather than returning the wrong address.\n      if (authorityIndex >= message.staticAccounts.length) {\n        console.warn(\n          '[gate] Solana TransferChecked authority resolves through an address lookup table; ' +\n            'signer-match recovery requires the static-account form. Skipping.',\n        );\n        continue;\n      }\n      const authority = message.staticAccounts[authorityIndex];\n      if (authority) return authority;\n    }\n    return null;\n  } catch (err) {\n    console.warn('[gate] Solana credential decode failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface PaymentSigner {\n  /** Recovered wallet address (EVM lowercased; Solana base58 preserved verbatim). */\n  address: string;\n  /** Network family — used by `captureWallet` and downstream cross-chain attribution. */\n  network: SignerNetwork;\n}\n\n/**\n * Recover the signer wallet from the incoming payment credential, including the network\n * family. Returns `null` when no wallet signature is present (e.g. Stripe SPT, card-only\n * payments, or no credential yet).\n *\n * @param request - the inbound `Request`\n * @param x402PaymentHeader - the value of `payment-signature` or `x-payment` header, if any.\n *   Extracted separately because some frameworks (Express) don't expose a web `Request` object.\n */\nexport async function extractPaymentSigner(\n  request: Request,\n  x402PaymentHeader?: string,\n): Promise<PaymentSigner | null> {\n  // MPP — Authorization: Payment <base64>\n  const authHeader = request.headers.get('authorization');\n  if (authHeader) {\n    try {\n      const moduleName = 'mppx';\n      const mppx = (await import(moduleName).catch(() => null)) as {\n        Credential?: {\n          extractPaymentScheme: (h: string) => unknown;\n          fromRequest: (r: Request) => unknown;\n        };\n      } | null;\n      if (mppx?.Credential?.extractPaymentScheme(authHeader)) {\n        const credential = mppx.Credential.fromRequest(request);\n        const source = (credential as { source?: string }).source;\n        const evmMatch = source?.match(/^did:pkh:eip155:\\d+:(0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40})$/);\n        if (evmMatch) return { address: evmMatch[1]!.toLowerCase(), network: 'evm' };\n        // Solana CAIP-10: did:pkh:solana:<genesis-base58>:<address-base58>\n        const solMatch = source?.match(/^did:pkh:solana:[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44}:([1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44})$/);\n        if (solMatch) return { address: solMatch[1]!, network: 'solana' };\n        // Fallback: source not set by upstream client. Decode the credential's signed-tx\n        // payload to find the SPL TransferChecked authority (= source-ATA owner = buyer\n        // wallet). Pull mode only.\n        const solanaFromTx = await extractSolanaSignerFromCredential(credential);\n        if (solanaFromTx) return { address: solanaFromTx, network: 'solana' };\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] MPP signer extraction failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  // x402 — base64 JSON, EIP-3009 only. EVM `payload.authorization.from` is the signer.\n  if (x402PaymentHeader) {\n    try {\n      const decoded = atob(x402PaymentHeader);\n      const parsed = JSON.parse(decoded) as {\n        payload?: { authorization?: { from?: string } };\n      };\n      const from = parsed?.payload?.authorization?.from;\n      if (typeof from === 'string' && /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(from)) {\n        return { address: from.toLowerCase(), network: 'evm' };\n      }\n    } catch (err) {\n      console.warn('[gate] x402 signer extraction failed:', err instanceof Error ? err.message : err);\n    }\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Headers-only variant for adapters that don't natively expose a Web Fetch `Request`\n * (Express, Fastify, ASGI-bridged frameworks). Constructs a synthetic Request carrying\n * only the `authorization` header and delegates to {@link extractPaymentSigner}. Works\n * because the MPP and x402 paths only read `request.headers.get('authorization')` and\n * the explicit `x402PaymentHeader` arg — no body, query, or method semantics needed.\n */\nexport async function extractPaymentSignerFromAuth(\n  authHeader: string | null | undefined,\n  x402PaymentHeader?: string,\n): Promise<PaymentSigner | null> {\n  const request = new Request('http://internal.gate/', {\n    headers: authHeader ? { authorization: authHeader } : {},\n  });\n  return extractPaymentSigner(request, x402PaymentHeader);\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the x402 payment header from a `Request`, matching the alternate names merchants might\n * use. Falls back to reading either header directly.\n */\nexport function readX402PaymentHeader(request: Request): string | undefined {\n  return (\n    request.headers.get('payment-signature') ??\n    request.headers.get('x-payment') ??\n    undefined\n  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