@agent-native/core 0.35.2 → 0.36.0

package/dist/server/request-context.d.ts

@@ -50,10 +50,9 @@ export interface RequestContext {
     orgId?: string;
     timezone?: string;
     /**
-     * Set when SSR code reads authenticated request context. The SSR cache layer
-     * uses this as a last-resort leak guard: public shell/data should not read
-     * user/org state during render, but older templates still do. Routes that
-     * need CDN caching should move those reads behind client-side actions/API.
+     * Set when code reads authenticated request context. Public SSR shell/data
+     * should not depend on this value; user/org-specific reads belong behind
+     * client-side actions/API after hydration.
      */
     authContextAccessed?: boolean;
     /**

package/dist/server/request-context.d.ts.map

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package/dist/server/request-context.js.map

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On Node.js (Netlify, self-hosted)\n * concurrent requests would overwrite each other's env vars. AsyncLocalStorage\n * gives each async call-chain its own isolated context.\n *\n * Supported on all deployment targets:\n * - Node.js (native)\n * - Cloudflare Workers (via nodejs_compat flag)\n * - Deno Deploy (via node:async_hooks compat)\n *\n * For CLI scripts that run outside a request context, the getters fall back to\n * process.env so existing `AGENT_USER_EMAIL=x pnpm action foo` invocations\n * continue to work.\n */\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\";\n\n/**\n * Per-request agent-run state. Lives on `RequestContext.run` so the\n * agent-chat plugin can populate fields as the run progresses (owner,\n * resolved API key, system prompt, engine, model, threadId) without\n * mutating module-scope `let` bindings — those leak across concurrent\n * requests on a single Node.js process.\n *\n * Mutated in-place by `prepareRun`, `onEngineResolved`, `onRunStart` so\n * tool factory closures (automation, fetch, team, builder-browser) read\n * the live per-request value via `getRequestRunContext()`.\n */\nexport interface RequestRunContext {\n  /** Origin of the current request (used by the builder-browser tool). */\n  requestOrigin?: string;\n  /** Stable browser tab id for tab-scoped app-state reads/writes. */\n  browserTabId?: string;\n  /** Resource scope for the current chat thread, e.g. the active deck. */\n  chatScope?: {\n    type: string;\n    id: string;\n    label?: string;\n  } | null;\n  /** Resolved owner email (set by prepareRun). */\n  owner?: string;\n  /** Owner's active Anthropic API key (set by prepareRun). */\n  userApiKey?: string;\n  /** Thread ID for the current run (set by onRunStart). */\n  threadId?: string;\n  /** System prompt actually sent to the model for this run. */\n  systemPrompt?: string;\n  /** Engine instance for this run (set by onEngineResolved). */\n  engine?: import(\"../agent/engine/types.js\").AgentEngine;\n  /** Model name for this run (set by onEngineResolved). */\n  model?: string;\n  /** Tool calls made so far in the current agent loop. */\n  toolCalls?: Array<{ name: string; input: unknown }>;\n  /** Tool results returned so far in the current agent loop. */\n  toolResults?: Array<{ name: string; content: string; isError: boolean }>;\n}\n\nexport interface RequestContext {\n  userEmail?: string;\n  userName?: string;\n  orgId?: string;\n  timezone?: string;\n  /**\n   * Set when SSR code reads authenticated request context. The SSR cache layer\n   * uses this as a last-resort leak guard: public shell/data should not read\n   * user/org state during render, but older templates still do. Routes that\n   * need CDN caching should move those reads behind client-side actions/API.\n   */\n  authContextAccessed?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Origin of the inbound request (e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:8100`). Set by the\n   * MCP mount from the request headers so actions that build externally\n   * fetchable URLs (e.g. design `export-coding-handoff`'s signed raw-code URL)\n   * resolve the real local-workspace origin instead of a prod/localhost\n   * fallback. Optional — absent on paths that don't populate it.\n   */\n  requestOrigin?: string;\n  /**\n   * True when this request is being processed by an integration-platform\n   * webhook (Slack, Telegram, etc.) where the function timeout is the\n   * binding constraint. Code that calls slow remote APIs can use this to apply\n   * tighter budgets on this path while leaving normal agent-chat callers\n   * (5+ min budget) unaffected.\n   */\n  isIntegrationCaller?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Metadata for the currently-processing integration task. This lets tools\n   * that start long-running remote work persist a continuation that can update\n   * the originating platform thread after the current function budget ends.\n   */\n  integration?: {\n    taskId: string;\n    attempts?: number;\n    incoming: import(\"../integrations/types.js\").IncomingMessage;\n    placeholderRef?: string;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Mutable per-request agent-run state. Populated by the agent-chat plugin\n   * during a run; tool closures dereference it on each invocation.\n   */\n  run?: RequestRunContext;\n}\n\nconst GLOBAL_KEY = \"__agentNativeRequestContextAls\" as const;\nconst OBSERVERS_KEY = \"__agentNativeRequestContextObservers\" as const;\ntype RequestContextObserver = (ctx: RequestContext) => void;\ntype GlobalWithRequestContext = typeof globalThis & {\n  [GLOBAL_KEY]?: AsyncLocalStorage<RequestContext>;\n  [OBSERVERS_KEY]?: RequestContextObserver[];\n};\nconst globalRef = globalThis as GlobalWithRequestContext;\nif (!globalRef[GLOBAL_KEY]) {\n  globalRef[GLOBAL_KEY] = new AsyncLocalStorage<RequestContext>();\n}\nif (!globalRef[OBSERVERS_KEY]) {\n  globalRef[OBSERVERS_KEY] = [];\n}\nconst als = globalRef[GLOBAL_KEY]!;\nconst observers = globalRef[OBSERVERS_KEY]!;\n\n/**\n * Register a callback fired every time `runWithRequestContext` enters a new\n * scope. The hook runs INSIDE the AsyncLocalStorage scope, so observability\n * helpers that read the current isolation scope (e.g. Sentry) attach to the\n * right per-request context.\n *\n * Returned function unregisters the observer. Observers must never throw —\n * any error is swallowed so a misbehaving observer can't break the request\n * path.\n */\nexport function addRequestContextObserver(\n  observer: RequestContextObserver,\n): () => void {\n  observers.push(observer);\n  return () => {\n    const i = observers.indexOf(observer);\n    if (i !== -1) observers.splice(i, 1);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Run a callback within a per-request context. The context is available to all\n * async operations spawned from `fn` via `getRequestUserEmail()` / `getRequestOrgId()`.\n *\n * Any registered `addRequestContextObserver` callbacks fire inside the new\n * scope before `fn` runs, so observability code can pin user/org info onto\n * isolation-scoped backends (Sentry, OpenTelemetry, etc.).\n */\nexport function runWithRequestContext<T>(\n  ctx: RequestContext,\n  fn: () => T | Promise<T>,\n): T | Promise<T> {\n  return als.run(ctx, () => {\n    if (observers.length > 0) {\n      for (const obs of observers) {\n        try {\n          obs(ctx);\n        } catch {\n          // Observers must never break the request path.\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    return fn();\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Return the active request context, if this call chain is running under one.\n *\n * This is intentionally distinct from `getRequestUserEmail()`: callers that\n * have an active context with no authenticated user must not fall through to\n * process-wide CLI fallbacks such as `AGENT_USER_EMAIL` or \"latest session\".\n */\nexport function getRequestContext(): RequestContext | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  markAuthContextAccess(store);\n  return store;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when AsyncLocalStorage has an active context for this call chain.\n * Useful for helpers that support both HTTP requests and standalone CLI runs.\n */\nexport function hasRequestContext(): boolean {\n  return als.getStore() !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the current request's user email.\n *\n * - If a request context exists (HTTP/A2A path), returns its `userEmail` —\n *   even when that value is `undefined`. The env fallback MUST NOT fire here:\n *   a stale process-wide `AGENT_USER_EMAIL` from a CLI run or previous bug\n *   would leak into an unauthenticated A2A/API call (e.g. unsigned or API-key\n *   modes where `runWithRequestContext({ userEmail: undefined })` is used).\n * - Only when there is NO request context (CLI scripts) do we fall back to\n *   `process.env.AGENT_USER_EMAIL`.\n */\nexport function getRequestUserEmail(): string | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (store !== undefined) {\n    if (store.userEmail) markAuthContextAccess(store);\n    return store.userEmail;\n  }\n  return process.env.AGENT_USER_EMAIL;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the current request's display name, when the auth provider supplied one.\n *\n * The same request-context fallback rules as `getRequestUserEmail()` apply:\n * HTTP/A2A calls only read AsyncLocalStorage, while CLI scripts may opt in via\n * `AGENT_USER_NAME`.\n */\nexport function getRequestUserName(): string | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (store !== undefined) {\n    if (store.userName) markAuthContextAccess(store);\n    return store.userName;\n  }\n  return process.env.AGENT_USER_NAME;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the current request's org ID.\n *\n * Same store-aware semantics as `getRequestUserEmail()` — env fallback is\n * CLI-only, so a request that explicitly has no org doesn't inherit a stale\n * `process.env.AGENT_ORG_ID` from a prior request on the same Lambda instance.\n */\nexport function getRequestOrgId(): string | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (store !== undefined) {\n    if (store.orgId) markAuthContextAccess(store);\n    return store.orgId;\n  }\n  return process.env.AGENT_ORG_ID;\n}\n\nfunction markAuthContextAccess(ctx: RequestContext | undefined) {\n  if (!ctx) return;\n  if (ctx.userEmail || ctx.userName || ctx.orgId) {\n    ctx.authContextAccessed = true;\n  }\n}\n\nexport function hasAuthContextAccess(ctx: RequestContext | undefined): boolean {\n  return Boolean(ctx?.authContextAccessed);\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the current request's IANA timezone (e.g. \"America/Los_Angeles\").\n * The UI sends this via the `x-user-timezone` header on every action call, and\n * the agent chat plugin propagates it into the request context so that\n * agent-initiated tool calls also see the user's timezone. Falls back to\n * `process.env.AGENT_USER_TIMEZONE` only for CLI scripts (no request context).\n */\nexport function getRequestTimezone(): string | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (store !== undefined) return store.timezone;\n  return process.env.AGENT_USER_TIMEZONE;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when this request is on an integration-platform path (Slack,\n * Telegram, etc.) — i.e. we're inside the integration plugin's processor\n * function and the platform's deliver-by deadline plus the host's function\n * timeout are the binding budget. Non-integration callers (CLI, normal\n * agent chat) should treat this as `false`.\n */\nexport function isIntegrationCallerRequest(): boolean {\n  return als.getStore()?.isIntegrationCaller === true;\n}\n\nexport function getIntegrationRequestContext():\n  | NonNullable<RequestContext[\"integration\"]>\n  | undefined {\n  return als.getStore()?.integration;\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience: returns `{ userEmail, orgId }` from the active request context,\n * suitable for passing to `resolveCredential(key, ctx)`. Returns `null` when\n * no user is associated with the call (e.g. an unauthenticated public route).\n *\n * For framework actions auto-mounted at `/_agent-native/actions/...` this is\n * always populated because action-routes wraps every invocation in\n * `runWithRequestContext`. For hand-written `/api/*` routes the calling code\n * is responsible for setting up the context (see `runWithRequestContext`).\n */\nexport function getCredentialContext(): {\n  userEmail: string;\n  orgId: string | null;\n} | null {\n  const userEmail = getRequestUserEmail();\n  if (!userEmail) return null;\n  return { userEmail, orgId: getRequestOrgId() ?? null };\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the active request's mutable agent-run state. Returns `undefined` when\n * called outside an agent run (e.g. before `prepareRun` or in a non-agent\n * code path). Callers must tolerate the field absence; use the helper\n * `requireRequestRunContext()` if missing context is a programming error.\n */\nexport function getRequestRunContext(): RequestRunContext | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (!store) return undefined;\n  return store.run;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ensure a `RequestRunContext` exists on the active request store and\n * return it. Used by the agent-chat handler to attach run state once it\n * starts processing a chat request. Returns `undefined` if there is no\n * active request store (caller should not be invoking this outside ALS).\n */\nexport function ensureRequestRunContext(): RequestRunContext | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (!store) return undefined;\n  if (!store.run) store.run = {};\n  return store.run;\n}\n"]}
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On Node.js (Netlify, self-hosted)\n * concurrent requests would overwrite each other's env vars. AsyncLocalStorage\n * gives each async call-chain its own isolated context.\n *\n * Supported on all deployment targets:\n * - Node.js (native)\n * - Cloudflare Workers (via nodejs_compat flag)\n * - Deno Deploy (via node:async_hooks compat)\n *\n * For CLI scripts that run outside a request context, the getters fall back to\n * process.env so existing `AGENT_USER_EMAIL=x pnpm action foo` invocations\n * continue to work.\n */\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\";\n\n/**\n * Per-request agent-run state. Lives on `RequestContext.run` so the\n * agent-chat plugin can populate fields as the run progresses (owner,\n * resolved API key, system prompt, engine, model, threadId) without\n * mutating module-scope `let` bindings — those leak across concurrent\n * requests on a single Node.js process.\n *\n * Mutated in-place by `prepareRun`, `onEngineResolved`, `onRunStart` so\n * tool factory closures (automation, fetch, team, builder-browser) read\n * the live per-request value via `getRequestRunContext()`.\n */\nexport interface RequestRunContext {\n  /** Origin of the current request (used by the builder-browser tool). */\n  requestOrigin?: string;\n  /** Stable browser tab id for tab-scoped app-state reads/writes. */\n  browserTabId?: string;\n  /** Resource scope for the current chat thread, e.g. the active deck. */\n  chatScope?: {\n    type: string;\n    id: string;\n    label?: string;\n  } | null;\n  /** Resolved owner email (set by prepareRun). */\n  owner?: string;\n  /** Owner's active Anthropic API key (set by prepareRun). */\n  userApiKey?: string;\n  /** Thread ID for the current run (set by onRunStart). */\n  threadId?: string;\n  /** System prompt actually sent to the model for this run. */\n  systemPrompt?: string;\n  /** Engine instance for this run (set by onEngineResolved). */\n  engine?: import(\"../agent/engine/types.js\").AgentEngine;\n  /** Model name for this run (set by onEngineResolved). */\n  model?: string;\n  /** Tool calls made so far in the current agent loop. */\n  toolCalls?: Array<{ name: string; input: unknown }>;\n  /** Tool results returned so far in the current agent loop. */\n  toolResults?: Array<{ name: string; content: string; isError: boolean }>;\n}\n\nexport interface RequestContext {\n  userEmail?: string;\n  userName?: string;\n  orgId?: string;\n  timezone?: string;\n  /**\n   * Set when code reads authenticated request context. Public SSR shell/data\n   * should not depend on this value; user/org-specific reads belong behind\n   * client-side actions/API after hydration.\n   */\n  authContextAccessed?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Origin of the inbound request (e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:8100`). Set by the\n   * MCP mount from the request headers so actions that build externally\n   * fetchable URLs (e.g. design `export-coding-handoff`'s signed raw-code URL)\n   * resolve the real local-workspace origin instead of a prod/localhost\n   * fallback. Optional — absent on paths that don't populate it.\n   */\n  requestOrigin?: string;\n  /**\n   * True when this request is being processed by an integration-platform\n   * webhook (Slack, Telegram, etc.) where the function timeout is the\n   * binding constraint. Code that calls slow remote APIs can use this to apply\n   * tighter budgets on this path while leaving normal agent-chat callers\n   * (5+ min budget) unaffected.\n   */\n  isIntegrationCaller?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Metadata for the currently-processing integration task. This lets tools\n   * that start long-running remote work persist a continuation that can update\n   * the originating platform thread after the current function budget ends.\n   */\n  integration?: {\n    taskId: string;\n    attempts?: number;\n    incoming: import(\"../integrations/types.js\").IncomingMessage;\n    placeholderRef?: string;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Mutable per-request agent-run state. Populated by the agent-chat plugin\n   * during a run; tool closures dereference it on each invocation.\n   */\n  run?: RequestRunContext;\n}\n\nconst GLOBAL_KEY = \"__agentNativeRequestContextAls\" as const;\nconst OBSERVERS_KEY = \"__agentNativeRequestContextObservers\" as const;\ntype RequestContextObserver = (ctx: RequestContext) => void;\ntype GlobalWithRequestContext = typeof globalThis & {\n  [GLOBAL_KEY]?: AsyncLocalStorage<RequestContext>;\n  [OBSERVERS_KEY]?: RequestContextObserver[];\n};\nconst globalRef = globalThis as GlobalWithRequestContext;\nif (!globalRef[GLOBAL_KEY]) {\n  globalRef[GLOBAL_KEY] = new AsyncLocalStorage<RequestContext>();\n}\nif (!globalRef[OBSERVERS_KEY]) {\n  globalRef[OBSERVERS_KEY] = [];\n}\nconst als = globalRef[GLOBAL_KEY]!;\nconst observers = globalRef[OBSERVERS_KEY]!;\n\n/**\n * Register a callback fired every time `runWithRequestContext` enters a new\n * scope. The hook runs INSIDE the AsyncLocalStorage scope, so observability\n * helpers that read the current isolation scope (e.g. Sentry) attach to the\n * right per-request context.\n *\n * Returned function unregisters the observer. Observers must never throw —\n * any error is swallowed so a misbehaving observer can't break the request\n * path.\n */\nexport function addRequestContextObserver(\n  observer: RequestContextObserver,\n): () => void {\n  observers.push(observer);\n  return () => {\n    const i = observers.indexOf(observer);\n    if (i !== -1) observers.splice(i, 1);\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Run a callback within a per-request context. The context is available to all\n * async operations spawned from `fn` via `getRequestUserEmail()` / `getRequestOrgId()`.\n *\n * Any registered `addRequestContextObserver` callbacks fire inside the new\n * scope before `fn` runs, so observability code can pin user/org info onto\n * isolation-scoped backends (Sentry, OpenTelemetry, etc.).\n */\nexport function runWithRequestContext<T>(\n  ctx: RequestContext,\n  fn: () => T | Promise<T>,\n): T | Promise<T> {\n  return als.run(ctx, () => {\n    if (observers.length > 0) {\n      for (const obs of observers) {\n        try {\n          obs(ctx);\n        } catch {\n          // Observers must never break the request path.\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    return fn();\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Return the active request context, if this call chain is running under one.\n *\n * This is intentionally distinct from `getRequestUserEmail()`: callers that\n * have an active context with no authenticated user must not fall through to\n * process-wide CLI fallbacks such as `AGENT_USER_EMAIL` or \"latest session\".\n */\nexport function getRequestContext(): RequestContext | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  markAuthContextAccess(store);\n  return store;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when AsyncLocalStorage has an active context for this call chain.\n * Useful for helpers that support both HTTP requests and standalone CLI runs.\n */\nexport function hasRequestContext(): boolean {\n  return als.getStore() !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the current request's user email.\n *\n * - If a request context exists (HTTP/A2A path), returns its `userEmail` —\n *   even when that value is `undefined`. The env fallback MUST NOT fire here:\n *   a stale process-wide `AGENT_USER_EMAIL` from a CLI run or previous bug\n *   would leak into an unauthenticated A2A/API call (e.g. unsigned or API-key\n *   modes where `runWithRequestContext({ userEmail: undefined })` is used).\n * - Only when there is NO request context (CLI scripts) do we fall back to\n *   `process.env.AGENT_USER_EMAIL`.\n */\nexport function getRequestUserEmail(): string | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (store !== undefined) {\n    if (store.userEmail) markAuthContextAccess(store);\n    return store.userEmail;\n  }\n  return process.env.AGENT_USER_EMAIL;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the current request's display name, when the auth provider supplied one.\n *\n * The same request-context fallback rules as `getRequestUserEmail()` apply:\n * HTTP/A2A calls only read AsyncLocalStorage, while CLI scripts may opt in via\n * `AGENT_USER_NAME`.\n */\nexport function getRequestUserName(): string | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (store !== undefined) {\n    if (store.userName) markAuthContextAccess(store);\n    return store.userName;\n  }\n  return process.env.AGENT_USER_NAME;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the current request's org ID.\n *\n * Same store-aware semantics as `getRequestUserEmail()` — env fallback is\n * CLI-only, so a request that explicitly has no org doesn't inherit a stale\n * `process.env.AGENT_ORG_ID` from a prior request on the same Lambda instance.\n */\nexport function getRequestOrgId(): string | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (store !== undefined) {\n    if (store.orgId) markAuthContextAccess(store);\n    return store.orgId;\n  }\n  return process.env.AGENT_ORG_ID;\n}\n\nfunction markAuthContextAccess(ctx: RequestContext | undefined) {\n  if (!ctx) return;\n  if (ctx.userEmail || ctx.userName || ctx.orgId) {\n    ctx.authContextAccessed = true;\n  }\n}\n\nexport function hasAuthContextAccess(ctx: RequestContext | undefined): boolean {\n  return Boolean(ctx?.authContextAccessed);\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the current request's IANA timezone (e.g. \"America/Los_Angeles\").\n * The UI sends this via the `x-user-timezone` header on every action call, and\n * the agent chat plugin propagates it into the request context so that\n * agent-initiated tool calls also see the user's timezone. Falls back to\n * `process.env.AGENT_USER_TIMEZONE` only for CLI scripts (no request context).\n */\nexport function getRequestTimezone(): string | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (store !== undefined) return store.timezone;\n  return process.env.AGENT_USER_TIMEZONE;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when this request is on an integration-platform path (Slack,\n * Telegram, etc.) — i.e. we're inside the integration plugin's processor\n * function and the platform's deliver-by deadline plus the host's function\n * timeout are the binding budget. Non-integration callers (CLI, normal\n * agent chat) should treat this as `false`.\n */\nexport function isIntegrationCallerRequest(): boolean {\n  return als.getStore()?.isIntegrationCaller === true;\n}\n\nexport function getIntegrationRequestContext():\n  | NonNullable<RequestContext[\"integration\"]>\n  | undefined {\n  return als.getStore()?.integration;\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience: returns `{ userEmail, orgId }` from the active request context,\n * suitable for passing to `resolveCredential(key, ctx)`. Returns `null` when\n * no user is associated with the call (e.g. an unauthenticated public route).\n *\n * For framework actions auto-mounted at `/_agent-native/actions/...` this is\n * always populated because action-routes wraps every invocation in\n * `runWithRequestContext`. For hand-written `/api/*` routes the calling code\n * is responsible for setting up the context (see `runWithRequestContext`).\n */\nexport function getCredentialContext(): {\n  userEmail: string;\n  orgId: string | null;\n} | null {\n  const userEmail = getRequestUserEmail();\n  if (!userEmail) return null;\n  return { userEmail, orgId: getRequestOrgId() ?? null };\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the active request's mutable agent-run state. Returns `undefined` when\n * called outside an agent run (e.g. before `prepareRun` or in a non-agent\n * code path). Callers must tolerate the field absence; use the helper\n * `requireRequestRunContext()` if missing context is a programming error.\n */\nexport function getRequestRunContext(): RequestRunContext | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (!store) return undefined;\n  return store.run;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ensure a `RequestRunContext` exists on the active request store and\n * return it. Used by the agent-chat handler to attach run state once it\n * starts processing a chat request. Returns `undefined` if there is no\n * active request store (caller should not be invoking this outside ALS).\n */\nexport function ensureRequestRunContext(): RequestRunContext | undefined {\n  const store = als.getStore();\n  if (!store) return undefined;\n  if (!store.run) store.run = {};\n  return store.run;\n}\n"]}

package/dist/server/security-headers.d.ts

@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@
  *
  * Sets a baseline set of "no-brainer" security headers on every framework HTTP
  * response. These headers are layered defenses: each one mitigates a specific
- * class of attack, and together they harden the surface against clickjacking,
- * MIME-sniffing, referrer leakage, mixed-content downgrades, and cross-origin
- * window/embed access.
+ * class of attack, and together they harden the surface against MIME-sniffing,
+ * referrer leakage, mixed-content downgrades, and cross-origin window/embed
+ * access.
  *
  * The headers we emit:
  *
@@ -16,15 +16,6 @@
  *   - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` — disables browser MIME sniffing so
  *     a tool /render route serving user-authored HTML can't be misinterpreted
  *     as some other content type by a clever Accept header.
- *   - `X-Frame-Options: DENY` — prevents the entire app from being iframed by
- *     other origins (clickjacking the agent chat, booking pages, etc.). The
- *     tool /render endpoint and any other route that legitimately needs to be
- *     embedded in the same-origin app shell can opt out by setting its own
- *     header inside the route handler — h3's `setResponseHeader` overwrites,
- *     so a route emitting `SAMEORIGIN` wins over our middleware default.
- *     We skip this header entirely in dev (NODE_ENV !== "production") so the
- *     desktop app's local dev frame (localhost:3334) can iframe templates
- *     running on other localhost ports (e.g. mail at 8085).
  *   - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` — strips path/query
  *     from outbound Referer headers when the request crosses origin, so a
  *     public-share viewer's outbound link clicks never leak the share token.
@@ -36,25 +27,31 @@
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` — isolates window.opener so
  *     a popup-window opener reference can't read or modify our document.
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp` — emitted only for
- *     validated MCP embed-session page loads. COEP hosts such as Claude's MCP
- *     Apps proxy require framed cross-origin documents to opt in explicitly.
+ *     validated MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe navigations.
+ *     COEP hosts such as Claude's MCP Apps proxy require framed cross-origin
+ *     documents to opt in explicitly.
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site` — prevents other origins from
  *     embedding our endpoints as `<img>` / `<script>` / `<audio>`, blocking
  *     the simplest data-leak chain when combined with auth cookies. Validated
- *     MCP embed-session page loads use `cross-origin` so COEP hosts such as
- *     Claude's MCP Apps proxy can frame the short-lived app document.
+ *     MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe navigations use
+ *     `cross-origin` so COEP hosts can frame app documents.
  *
  * NOTE: `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy` is NOT set by default because it
  * requires every embedded subresource to opt in via CORP/CORS, which would
  * break Builder's iframe editor and template embed use cases. COOP + CORP
  * without COEP gives us most of the protection on normal responses; COEP is
- * only added for validated MCP embed-session page loads (see above).
+ * only added for validated MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe
+ * navigations (see above).
+ *
+ * NOTE: `X-Frame-Options` is intentionally not set globally. Agent-native apps
+ * are expected to run inside iframe hosts such as Builder, Design, and MCP app
+ * shells. Routes that render especially sensitive iframe-only documents should
+ * set their own route-specific CSP / frame policy.
  */
 /**
  * Create the security-headers h3 middleware. Mount this BEFORE other route
  * handlers so the headers are present on every response (including 4xx/5xx
- * error pages). Route handlers that need to relax a specific header (e.g.
- * `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on the tool render route) can call
+ * error pages). Route handlers that need to tighten a specific header can call
  * `setResponseHeader` after this runs — the latest write wins.
  */
 export declare function createSecurityHeadersMiddleware(): import("h3").EventHandlerWithFetch<import("h3").EventHandlerRequest, any>;

package/dist/server/security-headers.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"security-headers.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/server/security-headers.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiDG;AA+CH;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,+BAA+B,8EA4C9C"}

package/dist/server/security-headers.js

@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@
  *
  * Sets a baseline set of "no-brainer" security headers on every framework HTTP
  * response. These headers are layered defenses: each one mitigates a specific
- * class of attack, and together they harden the surface against clickjacking,
- * MIME-sniffing, referrer leakage, mixed-content downgrades, and cross-origin
- * window/embed access.
+ * class of attack, and together they harden the surface against MIME-sniffing,
+ * referrer leakage, mixed-content downgrades, and cross-origin window/embed
+ * access.
  *
  * The headers we emit:
  *
@@ -16,15 +16,6 @@
  *   - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` — disables browser MIME sniffing so
  *     a tool /render route serving user-authored HTML can't be misinterpreted
  *     as some other content type by a clever Accept header.
- *   - `X-Frame-Options: DENY` — prevents the entire app from being iframed by
- *     other origins (clickjacking the agent chat, booking pages, etc.). The
- *     tool /render endpoint and any other route that legitimately needs to be
- *     embedded in the same-origin app shell can opt out by setting its own
- *     header inside the route handler — h3's `setResponseHeader` overwrites,
- *     so a route emitting `SAMEORIGIN` wins over our middleware default.
- *     We skip this header entirely in dev (NODE_ENV !== "production") so the
- *     desktop app's local dev frame (localhost:3334) can iframe templates
- *     running on other localhost ports (e.g. mail at 8085).
  *   - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` — strips path/query
  *     from outbound Referer headers when the request crosses origin, so a
  *     public-share viewer's outbound link clicks never leak the share token.
@@ -36,19 +27,26 @@
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` — isolates window.opener so
  *     a popup-window opener reference can't read or modify our document.
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp` — emitted only for
- *     validated MCP embed-session page loads. COEP hosts such as Claude's MCP
- *     Apps proxy require framed cross-origin documents to opt in explicitly.
+ *     validated MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe navigations.
+ *     COEP hosts such as Claude's MCP Apps proxy require framed cross-origin
+ *     documents to opt in explicitly.
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site` — prevents other origins from
  *     embedding our endpoints as `<img>` / `<script>` / `<audio>`, blocking
  *     the simplest data-leak chain when combined with auth cookies. Validated
- *     MCP embed-session page loads use `cross-origin` so COEP hosts such as
- *     Claude's MCP Apps proxy can frame the short-lived app document.
+ *     MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe navigations use
+ *     `cross-origin` so COEP hosts can frame app documents.
  *
  * NOTE: `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy` is NOT set by default because it
  * requires every embedded subresource to opt in via CORP/CORS, which would
  * break Builder's iframe editor and template embed use cases. COOP + CORP
  * without COEP gives us most of the protection on normal responses; COEP is
- * only added for validated MCP embed-session page loads (see above).
+ * only added for validated MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe
+ * navigations (see above).
+ *
+ * NOTE: `X-Frame-Options` is intentionally not set globally. Agent-native apps
+ * are expected to run inside iframe hosts such as Builder, Design, and MCP app
+ * shells. Routes that render especially sensitive iframe-only documents should
+ * set their own route-specific CSP / frame policy.
  */
 import { defineEventHandler, getHeader, setResponseHeader } from "h3";
 import { requestHasEmbedAuthMarker } from "./embed-session.js";
@@ -82,30 +80,31 @@ function isMcpEndpointRequest(event) {
         String(event?.node?.req?.url ?? event?.path ?? "/").split("?")[0];
     return (pathname === "/_agent-native/mcp" || pathname.endsWith("/_agent-native/mcp"));
 }
+function isIframeNavigationRequest(event) {
+    return getHeader(event, "sec-fetch-dest") === "iframe";
+}
 /**
  * Create the security-headers h3 middleware. Mount this BEFORE other route
  * handlers so the headers are present on every response (including 4xx/5xx
- * error pages). Route handlers that need to relax a specific header (e.g.
- * `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on the tool render route) can call
+ * error pages). Route handlers that need to tighten a specific header can call
  * `setResponseHeader` after this runs — the latest write wins.
  */
 export function createSecurityHeadersMiddleware() {
-    const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === "production";
     return defineEventHandler((event) => {
         const embedFrameRequest = requestHasEmbedAuthMarker(event);
         const mcpEndpointRequest = isMcpEndpointRequest(event);
+        const iframeNavigationRequest = isIframeNavigationRequest(event);
         const requestOrigin = getHeader(event, "origin");
         setResponseHeader(event, "X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
-        if (isProduction && !embedFrameRequest) {
-            setResponseHeader(event, "X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
-        }
         setResponseHeader(event, "Referrer-Policy", embedFrameRequest ? "no-referrer" : "strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
         setResponseHeader(event, "Permissions-Policy", PERMISSIONS_POLICY);
         setResponseHeader(event, "Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy", "same-origin");
-        if (embedFrameRequest) {
+        if (embedFrameRequest || iframeNavigationRequest) {
             setResponseHeader(event, "Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy", "require-corp");
         }
-        setResponseHeader(event, "Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy", embedFrameRequest || mcpEndpointRequest ? "cross-origin" : "same-site");
+        setResponseHeader(event, "Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy", embedFrameRequest || mcpEndpointRequest || iframeNavigationRequest
+            ? "cross-origin"
+            : "same-site");
         if (embedFrameRequest && isMcpEmbedCorsOrigin(requestOrigin)) {
             setResponseHeader(event, "Access-Control-Allow-Origin", requestOrigin);
             setResponseHeader(event, "Vary", "Origin");

package/dist/server/security-headers.js.map

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These headers are layered defenses: each one mitigates a specific\n * class of attack, and together they harden the surface against clickjacking,\n * MIME-sniffing, referrer leakage, mixed-content downgrades, and cross-origin\n * window/embed access.\n *\n * The headers we emit:\n *\n *   - `Strict-Transport-Security` — forces HTTPS for the browser's lifetime\n *     of the cached value, preventing SSL-strip MITM. Only emitted when the\n *     request scheme is `https` (we don't want to break local-dev HTTP, and\n *     emitting HSTS over HTTP is a no-op per the spec but causes confusion).\n *   - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` — disables browser MIME sniffing so\n *     a tool /render route serving user-authored HTML can't be misinterpreted\n *     as some other content type by a clever Accept header.\n *   - `X-Frame-Options: DENY` — prevents the entire app from being iframed by\n *     other origins (clickjacking the agent chat, booking pages, etc.). The\n *     tool /render endpoint and any other route that legitimately needs to be\n *     embedded in the same-origin app shell can opt out by setting its own\n *     header inside the route handler — h3's `setResponseHeader` overwrites,\n *     so a route emitting `SAMEORIGIN` wins over our middleware default.\n *     We skip this header entirely in dev (NODE_ENV !== \"production\") so the\n *     desktop app's local dev frame (localhost:3334) can iframe templates\n *     running on other localhost ports (e.g. mail at 8085).\n *   - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` — strips path/query\n *     from outbound Referer headers when the request crosses origin, so a\n *     public-share viewer's outbound link clicks never leak the share token.\n *   - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(),\n *     screen-wake-lock=()` — allows the app shell to request microphone access\n *     for composer dictation while keeping camera/location/wake-lock blocked\n *     by default. Templates that need broader media capture for recording UI\n *     override this on their own routes.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` — isolates window.opener so\n *     a popup-window opener reference can't read or modify our document.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp` — emitted only for\n *     validated MCP embed-session page loads. COEP hosts such as Claude's MCP\n *     Apps proxy require framed cross-origin documents to opt in explicitly.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site` — prevents other origins from\n *     embedding our endpoints as `<img>` / `<script>` / `<audio>`, blocking\n *     the simplest data-leak chain when combined with auth cookies. Validated\n *     MCP embed-session page loads use `cross-origin` so COEP hosts such as\n *     Claude's MCP Apps proxy can frame the short-lived app document.\n *\n * NOTE: `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy` is NOT set by default because it\n * requires every embedded subresource to opt in via CORP/CORS, which would\n * break Builder's iframe editor and template embed use cases. COOP + CORP\n * without COEP gives us most of the protection on normal responses; COEP is\n * only added for validated MCP embed-session page loads (see above).\n */\n\nimport { defineEventHandler, getHeader, setResponseHeader } from \"h3\";\nimport { requestHasEmbedAuthMarker } from \"./embed-session.js\";\nimport {\n  isMcpEmbedCorsOrigin,\n  MCP_EMBED_CORS_ALLOW_HEADERS,\n} from \"../shared/mcp-embed-headers.js\";\n\nconst HSTS = \"max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\";\nconst PERMISSIONS_POLICY =\n  \"camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(), screen-wake-lock=()\";\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the request was received over HTTPS. We trust both the\n * underlying connection (when the server is terminating TLS itself) and the\n * `x-forwarded-proto` header (set by Netlify, Vercel, Cloudflare, and any\n * other reverse proxy that fronts the framework).\n */\nfunction isHttpsRequest(event: any): boolean {\n  const xfp =\n    event?.node?.req?.headers?.[\"x-forwarded-proto\"] ??\n    event?.headers?.get?.(\"x-forwarded-proto\");\n  if (typeof xfp === \"string\" && xfp.split(\",\")[0].trim() === \"https\")\n    return true;\n  if (Array.isArray(xfp) && xfp[0] === \"https\") return true;\n  // h3 sets `event.url.protocol` to \"http:\" or \"https:\".\n  const proto = event?.url?.protocol;\n  if (proto === \"https:\") return true;\n  // Direct Node `req.connection.encrypted` (older runtimes).\n  if (event?.node?.req?.connection?.encrypted) return true;\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction isMcpEndpointRequest(event: any): boolean {\n  const pathname =\n    event?.url?.pathname ??\n    String(event?.node?.req?.url ?? event?.path ?? \"/\").split(\"?\")[0];\n  return (\n    pathname === \"/_agent-native/mcp\" || pathname.endsWith(\"/_agent-native/mcp\")\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the security-headers h3 middleware. Mount this BEFORE other route\n * handlers so the headers are present on every response (including 4xx/5xx\n * error pages). Route handlers that need to relax a specific header (e.g.\n * `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on the tool render route) can call\n * `setResponseHeader` after this runs — the latest write wins.\n */\nexport function createSecurityHeadersMiddleware() {\n  const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\";\n  return defineEventHandler((event) => {\n    const embedFrameRequest = requestHasEmbedAuthMarker(event);\n    const mcpEndpointRequest = isMcpEndpointRequest(event);\n    const requestOrigin = getHeader(event, \"origin\");\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"X-Content-Type-Options\", \"nosniff\");\n    if (isProduction && !embedFrameRequest) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"X-Frame-Options\", \"DENY\");\n    }\n    setResponseHeader(\n      event,\n      \"Referrer-Policy\",\n      embedFrameRequest ? \"no-referrer\" : \"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\",\n    );\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Permissions-Policy\", PERMISSIONS_POLICY);\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy\", \"same-origin\");\n    if (embedFrameRequest) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy\", \"require-corp\");\n    }\n    setResponseHeader(\n      event,\n      \"Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy\",\n      embedFrameRequest || mcpEndpointRequest ? \"cross-origin\" : \"same-site\",\n    );\n    if (embedFrameRequest && isMcpEmbedCorsOrigin(requestOrigin)) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", requestOrigin);\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Vary\", \"Origin\");\n      setResponseHeader(\n        event,\n        \"Access-Control-Allow-Methods\",\n        \"GET,HEAD,POST,PUT,PATCH,DELETE,OPTIONS\",\n      );\n      setResponseHeader(\n        event,\n        \"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\",\n        MCP_EMBED_CORS_ALLOW_HEADERS,\n      );\n    }\n    if (isHttpsRequest(event)) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Strict-Transport-Security\", HSTS);\n    }\n    // Continue to the next handler — we only set headers, don't return a body.\n    return undefined;\n  });\n}\n"]}
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These headers are layered defenses: each one mitigates a specific\n * class of attack, and together they harden the surface against MIME-sniffing,\n * referrer leakage, mixed-content downgrades, and cross-origin window/embed\n * access.\n *\n * The headers we emit:\n *\n *   - `Strict-Transport-Security` — forces HTTPS for the browser's lifetime\n *     of the cached value, preventing SSL-strip MITM. Only emitted when the\n *     request scheme is `https` (we don't want to break local-dev HTTP, and\n *     emitting HSTS over HTTP is a no-op per the spec but causes confusion).\n *   - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` — disables browser MIME sniffing so\n *     a tool /render route serving user-authored HTML can't be misinterpreted\n *     as some other content type by a clever Accept header.\n *   - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` — strips path/query\n *     from outbound Referer headers when the request crosses origin, so a\n *     public-share viewer's outbound link clicks never leak the share token.\n *   - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(),\n *     screen-wake-lock=()` — allows the app shell to request microphone access\n *     for composer dictation while keeping camera/location/wake-lock blocked\n *     by default. Templates that need broader media capture for recording UI\n *     override this on their own routes.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` — isolates window.opener so\n *     a popup-window opener reference can't read or modify our document.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp` — emitted only for\n *     validated MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe navigations.\n *     COEP hosts such as Claude's MCP Apps proxy require framed cross-origin\n *     documents to opt in explicitly.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site` — prevents other origins from\n *     embedding our endpoints as `<img>` / `<script>` / `<audio>`, blocking\n *     the simplest data-leak chain when combined with auth cookies. Validated\n *     MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe navigations use\n *     `cross-origin` so COEP hosts can frame app documents.\n *\n * NOTE: `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy` is NOT set by default because it\n * requires every embedded subresource to opt in via CORP/CORS, which would\n * break Builder's iframe editor and template embed use cases. COOP + CORP\n * without COEP gives us most of the protection on normal responses; COEP is\n * only added for validated MCP embed-session page loads and browser iframe\n * navigations (see above).\n *\n * NOTE: `X-Frame-Options` is intentionally not set globally. Agent-native apps\n * are expected to run inside iframe hosts such as Builder, Design, and MCP app\n * shells. Routes that render especially sensitive iframe-only documents should\n * set their own route-specific CSP / frame policy.\n */\n\nimport { defineEventHandler, getHeader, setResponseHeader } from \"h3\";\nimport { requestHasEmbedAuthMarker } from \"./embed-session.js\";\nimport {\n  isMcpEmbedCorsOrigin,\n  MCP_EMBED_CORS_ALLOW_HEADERS,\n} from \"../shared/mcp-embed-headers.js\";\n\nconst HSTS = \"max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\";\nconst PERMISSIONS_POLICY =\n  \"camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(), screen-wake-lock=()\";\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the request was received over HTTPS. We trust both the\n * underlying connection (when the server is terminating TLS itself) and the\n * `x-forwarded-proto` header (set by Netlify, Vercel, Cloudflare, and any\n * other reverse proxy that fronts the framework).\n */\nfunction isHttpsRequest(event: any): boolean {\n  const xfp =\n    event?.node?.req?.headers?.[\"x-forwarded-proto\"] ??\n    event?.headers?.get?.(\"x-forwarded-proto\");\n  if (typeof xfp === \"string\" && xfp.split(\",\")[0].trim() === \"https\")\n    return true;\n  if (Array.isArray(xfp) && xfp[0] === \"https\") return true;\n  // h3 sets `event.url.protocol` to \"http:\" or \"https:\".\n  const proto = event?.url?.protocol;\n  if (proto === \"https:\") return true;\n  // Direct Node `req.connection.encrypted` (older runtimes).\n  if (event?.node?.req?.connection?.encrypted) return true;\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction isMcpEndpointRequest(event: any): boolean {\n  const pathname =\n    event?.url?.pathname ??\n    String(event?.node?.req?.url ?? event?.path ?? \"/\").split(\"?\")[0];\n  return (\n    pathname === \"/_agent-native/mcp\" || pathname.endsWith(\"/_agent-native/mcp\")\n  );\n}\n\nfunction isIframeNavigationRequest(event: any): boolean {\n  return getHeader(event, \"sec-fetch-dest\") === \"iframe\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the security-headers h3 middleware. Mount this BEFORE other route\n * handlers so the headers are present on every response (including 4xx/5xx\n * error pages). Route handlers that need to tighten a specific header can call\n * `setResponseHeader` after this runs — the latest write wins.\n */\nexport function createSecurityHeadersMiddleware() {\n  return defineEventHandler((event) => {\n    const embedFrameRequest = requestHasEmbedAuthMarker(event);\n    const mcpEndpointRequest = isMcpEndpointRequest(event);\n    const iframeNavigationRequest = isIframeNavigationRequest(event);\n    const requestOrigin = getHeader(event, \"origin\");\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"X-Content-Type-Options\", \"nosniff\");\n    setResponseHeader(\n      event,\n      \"Referrer-Policy\",\n      embedFrameRequest ? \"no-referrer\" : \"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\",\n    );\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Permissions-Policy\", PERMISSIONS_POLICY);\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy\", \"same-origin\");\n    if (embedFrameRequest || iframeNavigationRequest) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy\", \"require-corp\");\n    }\n    setResponseHeader(\n      event,\n      \"Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy\",\n      embedFrameRequest || mcpEndpointRequest || iframeNavigationRequest\n        ? \"cross-origin\"\n        : \"same-site\",\n    );\n    if (embedFrameRequest && isMcpEmbedCorsOrigin(requestOrigin)) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\", requestOrigin);\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Vary\", \"Origin\");\n      setResponseHeader(\n        event,\n        \"Access-Control-Allow-Methods\",\n        \"GET,HEAD,POST,PUT,PATCH,DELETE,OPTIONS\",\n      );\n      setResponseHeader(\n        event,\n        \"Access-Control-Allow-Headers\",\n        MCP_EMBED_CORS_ALLOW_HEADERS,\n      );\n    }\n    if (isHttpsRequest(event)) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Strict-Transport-Security\", HSTS);\n    }\n    // Continue to the next handler — we only set headers, don't return a body.\n    return undefined;\n  });\n}\n"]}

package/dist/server/self-dispatch.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/server/self-dispatch.js

@@ -71,6 +71,17 @@ export function resolveSelfDispatchBaseUrl(event) {
     const host = readHeader(event, "host") || `localhost:${process.env.PORT || 3000}`;
     return withConfiguredAppBasePath(`${proto}://${host}`);
 }
+async function dispatchResponseError(path, res) {
+    let body = "";
+    try {
+        body = (await res.text()).trim();
+    }
+    catch {
+        body = "";
+    }
+    const detail = body ? `: ${body.slice(0, 300)}` : "";
+    return new Error(`Self-dispatch to ${path} returned HTTP ${res.status} ${res.statusText}${detail}`);
+}
 /**
  * Fire a fresh, HMAC-signed POST to a processor route on this same deployment.
  * Fire-and-forget: the dispatch is NOT awaited to completion (the processed run
@@ -101,7 +112,12 @@ export async function fireInternalDispatch(options) {
         method: "POST",
         headers,
         body: JSON.stringify({ taskId: options.taskId, ...(options.body ?? {}) }),
-    }).catch((err) => {
+    }).then(async (res) => {
+        if (!res.ok) {
+            throw await dispatchResponseError(options.path, res);
+        }
+    });
+    dispatchPromise.catch((err) => {
         console.error(`[self-dispatch] dispatch to ${options.path} failed:`, err);
     });
     const settleMs = options.settleMs ?? DEFAULT_DISPATCH_SETTLE_MS;

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Extracted here so\n * A2A, integration webhooks, and Agent Teams sub-agents share one tested\n * implementation.\n */\nimport { withConfiguredAppBasePath } from \"./app-base-path.js\";\nimport { isLocalDatabase } from \"../db/client.js\";\nimport { signInternalToken } from \"../integrations/internal-token.js\";\n\n/**\n * On serverless, returning from the dispatching handler before the outbound\n * TCP handshake starts can freeze the function with the dispatch request stuck\n * in the queue. Racing the fetch against a short timer gives the request a\n * chance to leave the box at the cost of a little added latency on the\n * dispatching call. Mirrors the 250ms used by the A2A/webhook paths.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_DISPATCH_SETTLE_MS = 250;\n\nfunction readHeader(event: any, name: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    const headers = event?.node?.req?.headers ?? event?.headers;\n    if (!headers) return undefined;\n    if (typeof headers.get === \"function\") {\n      return headers.get(name) ?? undefined;\n    }\n    const map = headers as Record<string, string | undefined>;\n    return map[name] ?? map[String(name).toLowerCase()];\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the base URL to fire a self-dispatch request at. Prefers explicit env\n * vars (most reliable on serverless, where inbound host headers can be the\n * platform's internal hostname), falling back to the inbound request headers\n * and finally localhost in dev.\n *\n * Throws in production / shared deployments when no env var is set — a silent\n * fallback to a bad host there would drop background work invisibly.\n */\nexport function resolveSelfDispatchBaseUrl(event?: any): string {\n  const fromEnv =\n    process.env.APP_URL ||\n    process.env.URL ||\n    process.env.DEPLOY_URL ||\n    process.env.BETTER_AUTH_URL;\n  if (fromEnv) return withConfiguredAppBasePath(String(fromEnv));\n\n  if (process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\" || !isLocalDatabase()) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"Self-dispatch requires APP_URL, URL, DEPLOY_URL, or BETTER_AUTH_URL in \" +\n        \"production/shared deployments so background work can reach this \" +\n        \"deployment's own URL.\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const proto = readHeader(event, \"x-forwarded-proto\") || \"http\";\n  const host =\n    readHeader(event, \"host\") || `localhost:${process.env.PORT || 3000}`;\n  return withConfiguredAppBasePath(`${proto}://${host}`);\n}\n\nexport interface FireInternalDispatchOptions {\n  /** Base URL of this deployment. Defaults to `resolveSelfDispatchBaseUrl(event)`. */\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  /** Request event used to derive the base URL when `baseUrl` is omitted. */\n  event?: any;\n  /** Framework route path to POST to (e.g. \"/_agent-native/agent-teams/_process-run\"). */\n  path: string;\n  /** Task/run id the processor will claim. Used to sign the HMAC token and as the default body. */\n  taskId: string;\n  /** Extra fields merged into the JSON body alongside `{ taskId }`. */\n  body?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Max ms to wait for the outbound request to leave the box. 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DEFAULT_DISPATCH_SETTLE_MS;\n  await Promise.race([\n    dispatchPromise,\n    new Promise<void>((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, settleMs)),\n  ]);\n}\n"]}
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Extracted here so\n * A2A, integration webhooks, and Agent Teams sub-agents share one tested\n * implementation.\n */\nimport { withConfiguredAppBasePath } from \"./app-base-path.js\";\nimport { isLocalDatabase } from \"../db/client.js\";\nimport { signInternalToken } from \"../integrations/internal-token.js\";\n\n/**\n * On serverless, returning from the dispatching handler before the outbound\n * TCP handshake starts can freeze the function with the dispatch request stuck\n * in the queue. Racing the fetch against a short timer gives the request a\n * chance to leave the box at the cost of a little added latency on the\n * dispatching call. 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Prefers explicit env\n * vars (most reliable on serverless, where inbound host headers can be the\n * platform's internal hostname), falling back to the inbound request headers\n * and finally localhost in dev.\n *\n * Throws in production / shared deployments when no env var is set — a silent\n * fallback to a bad host there would drop background work invisibly.\n */\nexport function resolveSelfDispatchBaseUrl(event?: any): string {\n  const fromEnv =\n    process.env.APP_URL ||\n    process.env.URL ||\n    process.env.DEPLOY_URL ||\n    process.env.BETTER_AUTH_URL;\n  if (fromEnv) return withConfiguredAppBasePath(String(fromEnv));\n\n  if (process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\" || !isLocalDatabase()) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"Self-dispatch requires APP_URL, URL, DEPLOY_URL, or BETTER_AUTH_URL in \" +\n        \"production/shared deployments so background work can reach this \" +\n        \"deployment's own URL.\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  const proto = readHeader(event, \"x-forwarded-proto\") || \"http\";\n  const host =\n    readHeader(event, \"host\") || `localhost:${process.env.PORT || 3000}`;\n  return withConfiguredAppBasePath(`${proto}://${host}`);\n}\n\nexport interface FireInternalDispatchOptions {\n  /** Base URL of this deployment. Defaults to `resolveSelfDispatchBaseUrl(event)`. */\n  baseUrl?: string;\n  /** Request event used to derive the base URL when `baseUrl` is omitted. */\n  event?: any;\n  /** Framework route path to POST to (e.g. \"/_agent-native/agent-teams/_process-run\"). */\n  path: string;\n  /** Task/run id the processor will claim. Used to sign the HMAC token and as the default body. */\n  taskId: string;\n  /** Extra fields merged into the JSON body alongside `{ taskId }`. */\n  body?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Max ms to wait for the outbound request to leave the box. Default 250ms. */\n  settleMs?: number;\n}\n\nasync function dispatchResponseError(\n  path: string,\n  res: Response,\n): Promise<Error> {\n  let body = \"\";\n  try {\n    body = (await res.text()).trim();\n  } catch {\n    body = \"\";\n  }\n  const detail = body ? `: ${body.slice(0, 300)}` : \"\";\n  return new Error(\n    `Self-dispatch to ${path} returned HTTP ${res.status} ${res.statusText}${detail}`,\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a fresh, HMAC-signed POST to a processor route on this same deployment.\n * Fire-and-forget: the dispatch is NOT awaited to completion (the processed run\n * may take minutes); it is only raced against a short settle timer so the\n * request reliably leaves a serverless box before it freezes.\n *\n * When `A2A_SECRET` is unset (local dev), the request is sent unsigned — the\n * processor accepts unsigned dispatches in dev and relies on the SQL atomic\n * claim for double-processing protection, mirroring the A2A/webhook flow.\n */\nexport async function fireInternalDispatch(\n  options: FireInternalDispatchOptions,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const baseUrl = options.baseUrl ?? resolveSelfDispatchBaseUrl(options.event);\n  const url = `${baseUrl}${options.path}`;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n  };\n  try {\n    headers[\"Authorization\"] = `Bearer ${signInternalToken(options.taskId)}`;\n  } catch (err) {\n    // Distinguish the documented \"no A2A_SECRET in dev\" path from a real\n    // signing failure, so a malformed secret doesn't fail invisibly.\n    if (err instanceof Error && !/A2A_SECRET/i.test(err.message)) {\n      console.error(\n        `[self-dispatch] signInternalToken failed unexpectedly for ${options.taskId}:`,\n        err,\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  const dispatchPromise = fetch(url, {\n    method: \"POST\",\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({ taskId: options.taskId, ...(options.body ?? {}) }),\n  }).then(async (res) => {\n    if (!res.ok) {\n      throw await dispatchResponseError(options.path, res);\n    }\n  });\n  dispatchPromise.catch((err) => {\n    console.error(`[self-dispatch] dispatch to ${options.path} failed:`, err);\n  });\n\n  const settleMs = options.settleMs ?? DEFAULT_DISPATCH_SETTLE_MS;\n  await Promise.race([\n    dispatchPromise,\n    new Promise<void>((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, settleMs)),\n  ]);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/server/ssr-handler.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/server/ssr-handler.js

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import { createRequestHandler } from "react-router";
 import { defineEventHandler } from "h3";
 import { getSentryClientConfigScript } from "./sentry-config.js";
 import { BETTER_AUTH_COOKIE_PREFIX, COOKIE_NAME, getSession } from "./auth.js";
-import { hasAuthContextAccess, runWithRequestContext, } from "./request-context.js";
+import { runWithRequestContext } from "./request-context.js";
 import { requestHasEmbedAuthMarker } from "./embed-session.js";
 import { EMBED_SESSION_COOKIE, EMBED_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM, } from "../shared/embed-auth.js";
 import { AGENT_NATIVE_SOCIAL_IMAGE_ALT, AGENT_NATIVE_SOCIAL_IMAGE_HEIGHT, AGENT_NATIVE_SOCIAL_IMAGE_PATH, AGENT_NATIVE_SOCIAL_IMAGE_TYPE, AGENT_NATIVE_SOCIAL_IMAGE_WIDTH, } from "../shared/social-meta.js";
@@ -190,17 +190,9 @@ function isAuthenticatedCookieName(name) {
         bareName === `${BETTER_AUTH_COOKIE_PREFIX}.session_data` ||
         BETTER_AUTH_SESSION_COOKIE_RE.test(bareName));
 }
-function shouldUseDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, status, pathname, authContextAccessed) {
+function shouldUseDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, status, pathname) {
     if (status < 200 || status >= 400)
         return false;
-    if (authContextAccessed) {
-        // Do not bypass cache just because a browser carries an auth-looking
-        // cookie: public docs/pages can receive stale workspace cookies and should
-        // still warm the CDN. But if SSR code actually reads user/org context,
-        // that route is rendering private data and must not be public-cached.
-        // Move those reads to client-side actions/API to regain CDN caching.
-        return false;
-    }
     const contentType = headers.get("content-type")?.toLowerCase() ?? "";
     if (contentType.includes("text/html")) {
         // SSR HTML is public app shell in this framework; any per-user state is
@@ -219,15 +211,14 @@ function shouldUseDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, status, pathname, authContextAc
     // routes. Keep `.data` on the same short-fresh/long-SWR policy as HTML so
     // route data fetches warm the CDN instead of hammering origin.
     // Do not re-add a blanket cookie/auth-signal bypass here: logged-in browsers
-    // still need CDN-cached public route data. The auth-context leak guard above
-    // is the narrow protection for old SSR loaders that still read user/org data.
+    // still need CDN-cached public route data.
     // Also do not preserve route-level private/no-store for React Router .data:
     // if a route needs per-user data, it belongs behind a client-side action/API
     // call rather than in the shared SSR payload.
     return true;
 }
-function applyDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, status, pathname, authContextAccessed) {
-    if (!shouldUseDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, status, pathname, authContextAccessed)) {
+function applyDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, status, pathname) {
+    if (!shouldUseDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, status, pathname)) {
         return;
     }
     // Netlify Functions/proxies are not cached by default, and production docs
@@ -272,10 +263,10 @@ function isFrameworkOrAssetPath(pathname) {
         pathname === "/favicon.png" ||
         (/\.\w+$/.test(pathname) && !pathname.endsWith(".data")));
 }
-async function rewriteMountedResponse(response, basePath, pathname, requestUrl, requestContext) {
+async function rewriteMountedResponse(response, basePath, pathname, requestUrl) {
     const sentryClientConfigScript = getSentryClientConfigScript();
     const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
-    applyDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, response.status, pathname, hasAuthContextAccess(requestContext));
+    applyDefaultSsrCacheHeader(headers, response.status, pathname);
     applyDefaultSpeculationRulesHeader(headers, response.status, basePath);
     const location = headers.get("location");
     if (location?.startsWith("/") && !location.startsWith("//")) {
@@ -342,9 +333,9 @@ export function createH3SSRHandler(getBuild) {
                     status: response.status,
                     statusText: response.statusText,
                     headers: response.headers,
-                }), basePath, p, request.url, ctx);
+                }), basePath, p, request.url);
             }
-            return await rewriteMountedResponse(await runWithRequestContext(ctx, () => handler(request)), basePath, p, request.url, ctx);
+            return await rewriteMountedResponse(await runWithRequestContext(ctx, () => handler(request)), basePath, p, request.url);
         }
         catch (err) {
             // Log the full stack server-side, but never leak it to the client.