@agent-native/core 0.212.1 → 0.214.0

package/dist/workspace-connections/actions/list-workspace-user-groups.d.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 declare const _default: import("../../action.js").ActionDefinition<Record<string, never>, {
-    memberEmails: any[];
     id: string;
     orgId: string;
     name: string;
     createdByEmail: string;
     createdAt: string;
     updatedAt: string;
+    memberEmails: any[];
 }[]>;
 export default _default;

package/dist/workspace-connections/groups.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { ensureIndexExists, ensureTableExists } from "../db/ddl-guard.js";
 import { defineStore } from "../db/store-registry.js";
 import { fromMigrationEntries } from "../db/versioned-store-migrations.js";
 import { isOrgMember } from "../org/membership.js";
+import { readOrgMemberRole } from "../server/personal-provider-key-policy.js";
 import { getRequestOrgId, getRequestUserEmail, } from "../server/request-context.js";
 import { WORKSPACE_CONNECTIONS_MIGRATIONS, WORKSPACE_CONNECTIONS_MIGRATIONS_TABLE, } from "./migrations.js";
 export function workspaceUserGroupsTable() {
@@ -216,17 +217,7 @@ export async function workspaceUserGroupRole(orgId, userEmail) {
     if (!normalizedOrgId || !normalizedEmail) {
         return null;
     }
-    const { rows } = await getDbExec().execute({
-        sql: `SELECT role FROM org_members
-          WHERE org_id = ? AND LOWER(email) = ?
-            AND federation_removal_pending_at IS NULL
-          LIMIT 1`,
-        args: [normalizedOrgId, normalizedEmail],
-    });
-    const role = String(rows[0]?.role ?? "");
-    return role === "owner" || role === "admin" || role === "member"
-        ? role
-        : null;
+    return readOrgMemberRole(normalizedOrgId, normalizedEmail);
 }
 export async function upsertWorkspaceUserGroup(input) {
     const requestScope = requireWorkspaceUserGroupScope();

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@agent-native/core",
-  "version": "0.212.1",
+  "version": "0.214.0",
   "description": "The agentic application framework for building autonomous agents with intuitive UIs",
   "homepage": "https://github.com/BuilderIO/agent-native#readme",
   "bugs": {
@@ -727,8 +727,8 @@
     "yaml": "^2.9.0",
     "yjs": "^13.6.33",
     "zod": "^4.3.6",
-    "@agent-native/agentkit": "^0.212.1",
-    "@agent-native/recap-cli": "^0.5.80"
+    "@agent-native/agentkit": "^0.214.0",
+    "@agent-native/recap-cli": "^0.5.83"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@ai-sdk/anthropic": "^3.0.71",

package/src/templates/workspace-core/.agents/skills/a2a-protocol/SKILL.md

@@ -144,14 +144,17 @@ The framework supports two credential scopes:
 | Secret | Scope | How it is set |
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | `A2A_SECRET` | User identity across a deployment | env var, **never auto-generated** |
-| org `a2a_secret` | Organization principal only | auto-generated on org creation; Team page UI |
+| org `a2a_secret` | Organization principal, with optional current-member delegation | auto-generated on org creation; Team page UI |
 
-An org-secret JWT proves only that the caller holds the organization's shared
-credential. Its `sub` or email claims are ignored; do not use it to read
+An ordinary org-secret JWT proves only that the caller holds the organization's
+shared credential. Its `sub` or email claims are ignored; do not use it to read
 person-owned data, claim a user's task, invoke a user-scoped action, or carry a
-human approval. Organization-scoped operations can run with this principal.
-Use an `A2A_SECRET`-signed user identity for user-owned operations and
-approval continuations. MCP applies the same distinction.
+human approval. A separate `agent-native-org-member-delegation` assertion may
+carry the identity of any current receiver-org member to a caller holding that
+shared secret, but only when the receiver's owner enables the setting, the org
+secret differs from `A2A_SECRET`, and the audience and short expiry verify. The
+receiver checks the live roster, and delegated org actions are always capped at
+`member`. MCP requests remain organization-scoped.
 
 Organization IDs are local to each app's database. For calls to a peer app,
 bind the token to the trusted `org_domain` and the peer's canonical audience;
@@ -161,16 +164,16 @@ ID. An ID-only token is valid only when both sides intentionally share the same
 local organization ID, such as a credential scoped to one local database.
 
 The org secret is managed at **Team page → A2A secret** (owner only), where it
-can be revealed, copied, regenerated, and pushed to discovered peers. It is a
-fallback for organization-scoped calls, not a fallback user identity.
+can be revealed, copied, regenerated, and pushed to discovered peers. Its
+member-identity delegation setting is owner-only and defaults off.
 
 `A2A_SECRET` is the deploy-level path. `workspace-deploy` refuses a production
 workspace deploy without it and prints the generator command. Peers that must
-trust user identity assertions need the *same* value on both sides. Keep it
-different from every org `a2a_secret`; a shared value cannot distinguish a
-user assertion from an organization credential. An org secret equal to
-`A2A_SECRET`, or a user token signed only with the org secret, is verified as an
-organization principal and reaches the caller as the typed
+trust deployment-secret user assertions need the *same* value on both sides.
+Keep it different from every org `a2a_secret`; a shared value cannot
+distinguish a deployment user assertion from an organization credential. An
+org secret equal to `A2A_SECRET` is verified as an organization principal and
+reaches the caller as the typed
 `permanent_precondition` error ("no verified user"): an admin/ops fix, never a
 retry. Mismatched `A2A_SECRET` values are rejected with `401`
 (`a2a_auth_rejected`).