@agent-native/core 0.131.4 → 0.131.6

package/dist/secrets/crypto.js

@@ -10,24 +10,22 @@
  * existing single-app deployments can keep reading and writing secrets while
  * they migrate to the shared key.
  *
- * The default encryption key is derived from
- * `<APP_NAME>_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` when set, then `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`,
- * then `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. The app-scoped key lets a local multi-app
- * workspace read one app's encrypted production data without replacing the
- * shared local auth secret. Hosted workspace deploys (`AGENT_NATIVE_WORKSPACE`)
- * typically set none of those literal env vars per app; in that case the
- * shared-key variant falls back further to material derived from the
- * workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET` (see `getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret`), so sibling
- * apps in the same workspace still land on the same shared key without any
- * extra configuration. In production we refuse to start without configured
- * key material — a CWD-derived fallback would be effectively static (e.g.
- * `/var/task` on Lambda), so anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt
- * every secret.
+ * The generic encryption key is derived from
+ * `<APP_NAME>_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` when set, then
+ * `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, then `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. Workspace-shared vault
+ * rows use a different precedence: `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, then material
+ * derived from the workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET`, then the app-local auth/key
+ * fallbacks retained for backward-compatible reads. This keeps sibling apps
+ * on one key even when each app correctly has a different auth secret.
+ *
+ * In production we refuse to start without configured key material — a
+ * CWD-derived fallback would be effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on
+ * Lambda), so anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt every secret.
  *
  * Encrypted values are tagged `v1:<iv-hex>:<ct-hex>:<tag-hex>`. The `v1:` prefix
  * lets readers distinguish ciphertext from legacy plaintext during migration.
  */
-import { getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret } from "../server/derived-secret.js";
+import { deriveServerSecret, getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret, } from "../server/derived-secret.js";
 function getNodeCrypto() {
     if (typeof window !== "undefined" ||
         typeof process === "undefined" ||
@@ -66,15 +64,62 @@ function appScopedEncryptionKey() {
         ? process.env[`${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`] // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app encryption material, never a user credential.
         : undefined;
 }
-function sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() {
+/**
+ * Preserve the generic/app-local key precedence. Generic encrypted values are
+ * not a cross-app boundary, and changing their preferred key would strand
+ * existing OAuth tokens and credentials.
+ */
+function genericEncryptionKeyMaterial() {
     if (typeof process === "undefined")
         return undefined;
     return (process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY ||
         process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET ||
         getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret("secrets-encryption"));
 }
-function deriveSecretEncryptionKey(explicit, errorMessage, warningMessage) {
+/**
+ * Vault sharing follows configured A2A trust even on independently deployed
+ * sibling apps that are not launched by the workspace wrapper. The wrapper's
+ * `AGENT_NATIVE_WORKSPACE` flag remains required for auth/OAuth-derived
+ * secrets, but it must not be a hidden prerequisite for decrypting vault rows
+ * when every app already has the same explicit `A2A_SECRET`.
+ */
+function a2aSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() {
+    const workspaceDerived = getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret("secrets-encryption");
+    if (workspaceDerived)
+        return workspaceDerived;
+    if (typeof process === "undefined")
+        return undefined;
+    const rootSecret = process.env.A2A_SECRET?.trim();
+    return rootSecret
+        ? deriveServerSecret(rootSecret, "secrets-encryption")
+        : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Stable materials that may be used for workspace-shared vault rows, ordered
+ * from current preference to legacy compatibility fallbacks.
+ *
+ * `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` deliberately comes after the A2A-derived material:
+ * sibling apps normally have different auth secrets but share A2A trust.
+ */
+function sharedEncryptionKeyMaterials() {
+    if (typeof process === "undefined")
+        return [];
+    const candidates = [
+        process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+        a2aSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(),
+        process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET,
+        appScopedEncryptionKey(),
+    ].filter((value) => Boolean(value));
+    return [...new Set(candidates)];
+}
+function preferredSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() {
+    return sharedEncryptionKeyMaterials()[0];
+}
+function hashSecretEncryptionKey(material) {
     const { createHash } = requireNodeCrypto();
+    return createHash("sha256").update(material).digest();
+}
+function deriveSecretEncryptionKey(explicit, errorMessage, warningMessage) {
     if (!explicit) {
         if (processNodeEnv() === "production") {
             throw new Error(errorMessage);
@@ -86,7 +131,7 @@ function deriveSecretEncryptionKey(explicit, errorMessage, warningMessage) {
         }
     }
     const material = explicit || `agent-native-secrets:${processCwd()}`;
-    return createHash("sha256").update(material).digest();
+    return hashSecretEncryptionKey(material);
 }
 /**
  * Derive the key used by generic encrypted values such as credentials and
@@ -100,7 +145,7 @@ export function getSecretEncryptionKey() {
             .toUpperCase()
             .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, "_")
             .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, "");
-    return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(appScopedEncryptionKey() || sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(), "[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without an encryption key. " +
+    return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(appScopedEncryptionKey() || genericEncryptionKeyMaterial(), "[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without an encryption key. " +
         `Set ${appName ? `${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ` : ""}SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in the deploy environment. ` +
         "The previous CWD-derived fallback was effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), " +
         "which means anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt every secret.", "[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using a machine-local fallback. " +
@@ -109,25 +154,26 @@ export function getSecretEncryptionKey() {
 }
 /**
  * Derive the preferred workspace-shared key used by `app_secrets` rows.
- * Unlike generic column-level encryption, workspace vault data should decrypt
- * in sibling apps, so `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` / `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` take
- * precedence. Hosted workspace deploys (`AGENT_NATIVE_WORKSPACE`) that set
- * neither literal var still get stable shared material derived from the
- * workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET` before falling further back. The app-scoped key
- * remains a compatibility fallback for deployments that have not configured
- * shared material yet; once the shared key is configured, writes use it and
- * reads still fall back to old rows.
+ * Unlike generic column-level encryption, workspace vault data must decrypt
+ * in sibling apps. An explicit `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` wins; hosted
+ * workspaces otherwise derive stable material from their shared `A2A_SECRET`
+ * before considering app-local `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` or app-scoped key
+ * fallbacks. Reads try every configured legacy candidate and report when the
+ * ciphertext should be refreshed under the preferred key.
  */
 export function getSharedSecretEncryptionKey() {
-    return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() || appScopedEncryptionKey(), "[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without encryption key material for workspace secrets. " +
-        "Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, or the app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY in the deploy environment " +
-        "— or, on a hosted workspace deploy, ensure A2A_SECRET is set so shared material can be derived from it.", "[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using app-scoped or machine-local fallback for workspace secrets. " +
-        "Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in every workspace app so sibling apps share vault rows, " +
-        "or rely on A2A_SECRET-derived material on hosted workspace deploys.");
+    return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(preferredSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(), "[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without encryption key material for workspace secrets. " +
+        "Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ensure a hosted workspace has A2A_SECRET, or set BETTER_AUTH_SECRET / an app-scoped " +
+        "*_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY compatibility fallback in the deploy environment.", "[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using app-scoped or machine-local fallback for workspace secrets. " +
+        "Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY or rely on A2A_SECRET-derived material on hosted workspace deploys so sibling apps share vault rows.");
 }
 /** Whether this deployment has stable workspace-shared key material. */
 export function hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial() {
-    return Boolean(sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial());
+    if (typeof process === "undefined")
+        return false;
+    return Boolean(process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY ||
+        a2aSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() ||
+        process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET);
 }
 function encryptWithKey(plaintext, key) {
     const { createCipheriv, randomBytes } = requireNodeCrypto();
@@ -168,7 +214,36 @@ export function encryptSharedSecretValue(plaintext) {
 }
 /** Decrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */
 export function decryptSharedSecretValue(encrypted) {
-    return decryptWithKey(encrypted, getSharedSecretEncryptionKey());
+    return decryptSharedSecretValueDetailed(encrypted).value;
+}
+/**
+ * Decrypt workspace ciphertext with the preferred key first, then configured
+ * legacy candidates. The result never exposes which secret material matched.
+ */
+export function decryptSharedSecretValueDetailed(encrypted) {
+    const preferredKey = getSharedSecretEncryptionKey();
+    const candidateKeys = [preferredKey];
+    for (const material of sharedEncryptionKeyMaterials()) {
+        const candidate = hashSecretEncryptionKey(material);
+        if (!candidateKeys.some((existing) => existing.equals(candidate))) {
+            candidateKeys.push(candidate);
+        }
+    }
+    let lastError;
+    for (const candidate of candidateKeys) {
+        try {
+            return {
+                value: decryptWithKey(encrypted, candidate),
+                needsReencrypt: !candidate.equals(preferredKey),
+            };
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            lastError = error;
+        }
+    }
+    throw lastError instanceof Error
+        ? lastError
+        : new Error("Unable to decrypt workspace secret");
 }
 /**
  * Strict check for a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`: `v1:` followed by

package/dist/secrets/crypto.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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The `app_secrets` storage layer uses the\n * shared-key variant below because workspace-scoped vault rows are readable by\n * sibling apps in the same workspace. When a deployment has not been given\n * shared key material yet, that variant falls back to the app-scoped key so\n * existing single-app deployments can keep reading and writing secrets while\n * they migrate to the shared key.\n *\n * The default encryption key is derived from\n * `<APP_NAME>_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` when set, then `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`,\n * then `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. The app-scoped key lets a local multi-app\n * workspace read one app's encrypted production data without replacing the\n * shared local auth secret. Hosted workspace deploys (`AGENT_NATIVE_WORKSPACE`)\n * typically set none of those literal env vars per app; in that case the\n * shared-key variant falls back further to material derived from the\n * workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET` (see `getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret`), so sibling\n * apps in the same workspace still land on the same shared key without any\n * extra configuration. In production we refuse to start without configured\n * key material — a CWD-derived fallback would be effectively static (e.g.\n * `/var/task` on Lambda), so anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt\n * every secret.\n *\n * Encrypted values are tagged `v1:<iv-hex>:<ct-hex>:<tag-hex>`. The `v1:` prefix\n * lets readers distinguish ciphertext from legacy plaintext during migration.\n */\n\nimport { getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret } from \"../server/derived-secret.js\";\n\ntype NodeCryptoModule = typeof import(\"node:crypto\");\n\nfunction getNodeCrypto(): NodeCryptoModule | undefined {\n  if (\n    typeof window !== \"undefined\" ||\n    typeof process === \"undefined\" ||\n    !process.versions?.node ||\n    typeof process.getBuiltinModule !== \"function\"\n  ) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return process.getBuiltinModule(\"node:crypto\") as\n    | NodeCryptoModule\n    | undefined;\n}\n\nconst nodeCrypto = getNodeCrypto();\n\nlet _warnedFallback = false;\n\nfunction requireNodeCrypto(): NonNullable<typeof nodeCrypto> {\n  if (!nodeCrypto) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"[agent-native/secrets] Secret encryption is only available in server/runtime code.\",\n    );\n  }\n  return nodeCrypto;\n}\n\nfunction processNodeEnv(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  return process.env.NODE_ENV;\n}\n\nfunction processCwd(): string {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return \".\";\n  return process.cwd();\n}\n\nfunction appScopedEncryptionKey(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  const appName = process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.\n    .toUpperCase()\n    .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, \"_\")\n    .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, \"\");\n  return appName\n    ? process.env[`${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`] // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app encryption material, never a user credential.\n    : undefined;\n}\n\nfunction sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  return (\n    process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY ||\n    process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET ||\n    getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret(\"secrets-encryption\")\n  );\n}\n\nfunction deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n  explicit: string | undefined,\n  errorMessage: string,\n  warningMessage: string,\n): Buffer {\n  const { createHash } = requireNodeCrypto();\n\n  if (!explicit) {\n    if (processNodeEnv() === \"production\") {\n      throw new Error(errorMessage);\n    }\n    if (!_warnedFallback) {\n      _warnedFallback = true;\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.warn(warningMessage);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const material = explicit || `agent-native-secrets:${processCwd()}`;\n  return createHash(\"sha256\").update(material).digest();\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the key used by generic encrypted values such as credentials and\n * OAuth tokens. App-specific key material is allowed for these app-local\n * values.\n */\nexport function getSecretEncryptionKey(): Buffer {\n  const appName =\n    typeof process === \"undefined\"\n      ? undefined\n      : process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.\n          .toUpperCase()\n          .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, \"_\")\n          .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, \"\");\n  return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n    appScopedEncryptionKey() || sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(),\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without an encryption key. \" +\n      `Set ${appName ? `${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ` : \"\"}SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in the deploy environment. ` +\n      \"The previous CWD-derived fallback was effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), \" +\n      \"which means anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt every secret.\",\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using a machine-local fallback. \" +\n      \"Set an app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET for production. \" +\n      \"Production deploys without one of these env vars now hard-fail.\",\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the preferred workspace-shared key used by `app_secrets` rows.\n * Unlike generic column-level encryption, workspace vault data should decrypt\n * in sibling apps, so `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` / `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` take\n * precedence. Hosted workspace deploys (`AGENT_NATIVE_WORKSPACE`) that set\n * neither literal var still get stable shared material derived from the\n * workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET` before falling further back. The app-scoped key\n * remains a compatibility fallback for deployments that have not configured\n * shared material yet; once the shared key is configured, writes use it and\n * reads still fall back to old rows.\n */\nexport function getSharedSecretEncryptionKey(): Buffer {\n  return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n    sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() || appScopedEncryptionKey(),\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without encryption key material for workspace secrets. \" +\n      \"Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, or the app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY in the deploy environment \" +\n      \"— or, on a hosted workspace deploy, ensure A2A_SECRET is set so shared material can be derived from it.\",\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using app-scoped or machine-local fallback for workspace secrets. \" +\n      \"Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in every workspace app so sibling apps share vault rows, \" +\n      \"or rely on A2A_SECRET-derived material on hosted workspace deploys.\",\n  );\n}\n\n/** Whether this deployment has stable workspace-shared key material. */\nexport function hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial(): boolean {\n  return Boolean(sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial());\n}\n\nfunction encryptWithKey(plaintext: string, key: Buffer): string {\n  const { createCipheriv, randomBytes } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  const iv = randomBytes(12);\n  const cipher = createCipheriv(\"aes-256-gcm\", key, iv);\n  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, \"utf8\"), cipher.final()]);\n  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();\n  return `v1:${iv.toString(\"hex\")}:${ct.toString(\"hex\")}:${tag.toString(\"hex\")}`;\n}\n\nfunction decryptWithKey(encrypted: string, key: Buffer): string {\n  const { createDecipheriv } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  if (!encrypted.startsWith(\"v1:\")) {\n    throw new Error(\"Unrecognised secret encoding\");\n  }\n  const [, ivHex, ctHex, tagHex] = encrypted.split(\":\");\n  if (!ivHex || !ctHex || !tagHex) {\n    throw new Error(\"Corrupt secret payload\");\n  }\n  const decipher = createDecipheriv(\n    \"aes-256-gcm\",\n    key,\n    Buffer.from(ivHex, \"hex\"),\n  );\n  decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagHex, \"hex\"));\n  const pt = Buffer.concat([\n    decipher.update(Buffer.from(ctHex, \"hex\")),\n    decipher.final(),\n  ]);\n  return pt.toString(\"utf8\");\n}\n\n/** Encrypt a plain-text value with the generic app-local key. */\nexport function encryptSecretValue(plaintext: string): string {\n  return encryptWithKey(plaintext, getSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Decrypt a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`. Throws on tampering. */\nexport function decryptSecretValue(encrypted: string): string {\n  return decryptWithKey(encrypted, getSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Encrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */\nexport function encryptSharedSecretValue(plaintext: string): string {\n  return encryptWithKey(plaintext, getSharedSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Decrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */\nexport function decryptSharedSecretValue(encrypted: string): string {\n  return decryptWithKey(encrypted, getSharedSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/**\n * Strict check for a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`: `v1:` followed by\n * three hex segments. Intentionally strict so a legacy plaintext credential\n * that merely happens to start with `v1:` is treated as plaintext (and read via\n * the legacy fallback) rather than mis-decrypted.\n */\nconst ENCRYPTED_VALUE_RE = /^v1:[0-9a-f]+:[0-9a-f]+:[0-9a-f]+$/;\n\nexport function isEncryptedSecretValue(value: unknown): value is string {\n  return typeof value === \"string\" && ENCRYPTED_VALUE_RE.test(value);\n}\n"]}
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The `app_secrets` storage layer uses the\n * shared-key variant below because workspace-scoped vault rows are readable by\n * sibling apps in the same workspace. When a deployment has not been given\n * shared key material yet, that variant falls back to the app-scoped key so\n * existing single-app deployments can keep reading and writing secrets while\n * they migrate to the shared key.\n *\n * The generic encryption key is derived from\n * `<APP_NAME>_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` when set, then\n * `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, then `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. Workspace-shared vault\n * rows use a different precedence: `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, then material\n * derived from the workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET`, then the app-local auth/key\n * fallbacks retained for backward-compatible reads. This keeps sibling apps\n * on one key even when each app correctly has a different auth secret.\n *\n * In production we refuse to start without configured key material — a\n * CWD-derived fallback would be effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on\n * Lambda), so anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt every secret.\n *\n * Encrypted values are tagged `v1:<iv-hex>:<ct-hex>:<tag-hex>`. The `v1:` prefix\n * lets readers distinguish ciphertext from legacy plaintext during migration.\n */\n\nimport {\n  deriveServerSecret,\n  getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret,\n} from \"../server/derived-secret.js\";\n\ntype NodeCryptoModule = typeof import(\"node:crypto\");\n\nfunction getNodeCrypto(): NodeCryptoModule | undefined {\n  if (\n    typeof window !== \"undefined\" ||\n    typeof process === \"undefined\" ||\n    !process.versions?.node ||\n    typeof process.getBuiltinModule !== \"function\"\n  ) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return process.getBuiltinModule(\"node:crypto\") as\n    | NodeCryptoModule\n    | undefined;\n}\n\nconst nodeCrypto = getNodeCrypto();\n\nlet _warnedFallback = false;\n\nfunction requireNodeCrypto(): NonNullable<typeof nodeCrypto> {\n  if (!nodeCrypto) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"[agent-native/secrets] Secret encryption is only available in server/runtime code.\",\n    );\n  }\n  return nodeCrypto;\n}\n\nfunction processNodeEnv(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  return process.env.NODE_ENV;\n}\n\nfunction processCwd(): string {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return \".\";\n  return process.cwd();\n}\n\nfunction appScopedEncryptionKey(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  const appName = process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.\n    .toUpperCase()\n    .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, \"_\")\n    .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, \"\");\n  return appName\n    ? process.env[`${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`] // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app encryption material, never a user credential.\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Preserve the generic/app-local key precedence. Generic encrypted values are\n * not a cross-app boundary, and changing their preferred key would strand\n * existing OAuth tokens and credentials.\n */\nfunction genericEncryptionKeyMaterial(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  return (\n    process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY ||\n    process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET ||\n    getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret(\"secrets-encryption\")\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Vault sharing follows configured A2A trust even on independently deployed\n * sibling apps that are not launched by the workspace wrapper. The wrapper's\n * `AGENT_NATIVE_WORKSPACE` flag remains required for auth/OAuth-derived\n * secrets, but it must not be a hidden prerequisite for decrypting vault rows\n * when every app already has the same explicit `A2A_SECRET`.\n */\nfunction a2aSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(): string | undefined {\n  const workspaceDerived = getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret(\"secrets-encryption\");\n  if (workspaceDerived) return workspaceDerived;\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  const rootSecret = process.env.A2A_SECRET?.trim();\n  return rootSecret\n    ? deriveServerSecret(rootSecret, \"secrets-encryption\")\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Stable materials that may be used for workspace-shared vault rows, ordered\n * from current preference to legacy compatibility fallbacks.\n *\n * `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` deliberately comes after the A2A-derived material:\n * sibling apps normally have different auth secrets but share A2A trust.\n */\nfunction sharedEncryptionKeyMaterials(): string[] {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return [];\n  const candidates = [\n    process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY,\n    a2aSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(),\n    process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET,\n    appScopedEncryptionKey(),\n  ].filter((value): value is string => Boolean(value));\n  return [...new Set(candidates)];\n}\n\nfunction preferredSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(): string | undefined {\n  return sharedEncryptionKeyMaterials()[0];\n}\n\nfunction hashSecretEncryptionKey(material: string): Buffer {\n  const { createHash } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  return createHash(\"sha256\").update(material).digest();\n}\n\nfunction deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n  explicit: string | undefined,\n  errorMessage: string,\n  warningMessage: string,\n): Buffer {\n  if (!explicit) {\n    if (processNodeEnv() === \"production\") {\n      throw new Error(errorMessage);\n    }\n    if (!_warnedFallback) {\n      _warnedFallback = true;\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.warn(warningMessage);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const material = explicit || `agent-native-secrets:${processCwd()}`;\n  return hashSecretEncryptionKey(material);\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the key used by generic encrypted values such as credentials and\n * OAuth tokens. App-specific key material is allowed for these app-local\n * values.\n */\nexport function getSecretEncryptionKey(): Buffer {\n  const appName =\n    typeof process === \"undefined\"\n      ? undefined\n      : process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.\n          .toUpperCase()\n          .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, \"_\")\n          .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, \"\");\n  return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n    appScopedEncryptionKey() || genericEncryptionKeyMaterial(),\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without an encryption key. \" +\n      `Set ${appName ? `${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ` : \"\"}SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in the deploy environment. ` +\n      \"The previous CWD-derived fallback was effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), \" +\n      \"which means anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt every secret.\",\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using a machine-local fallback. \" +\n      \"Set an app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET for production. \" +\n      \"Production deploys without one of these env vars now hard-fail.\",\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the preferred workspace-shared key used by `app_secrets` rows.\n * Unlike generic column-level encryption, workspace vault data must decrypt\n * in sibling apps. An explicit `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` wins; hosted\n * workspaces otherwise derive stable material from their shared `A2A_SECRET`\n * before considering app-local `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` or app-scoped key\n * fallbacks. Reads try every configured legacy candidate and report when the\n * ciphertext should be refreshed under the preferred key.\n */\nexport function getSharedSecretEncryptionKey(): Buffer {\n  return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n    preferredSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(),\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without encryption key material for workspace secrets. \" +\n      \"Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ensure a hosted workspace has A2A_SECRET, or set BETTER_AUTH_SECRET / an app-scoped \" +\n      \"*_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY compatibility fallback in the deploy environment.\",\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using app-scoped or machine-local fallback for workspace secrets. \" +\n      \"Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY or rely on A2A_SECRET-derived material on hosted workspace deploys so sibling apps share vault rows.\",\n  );\n}\n\n/** Whether this deployment has stable workspace-shared key material. */\nexport function hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial(): boolean {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return false;\n  return Boolean(\n    process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY ||\n    a2aSharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() ||\n    process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET,\n  );\n}\n\nfunction encryptWithKey(plaintext: string, key: Buffer): string {\n  const { createCipheriv, randomBytes } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  const iv = randomBytes(12);\n  const cipher = createCipheriv(\"aes-256-gcm\", key, iv);\n  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, \"utf8\"), cipher.final()]);\n  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();\n  return `v1:${iv.toString(\"hex\")}:${ct.toString(\"hex\")}:${tag.toString(\"hex\")}`;\n}\n\nfunction decryptWithKey(encrypted: string, key: Buffer): string {\n  const { createDecipheriv } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  if (!encrypted.startsWith(\"v1:\")) {\n    throw new Error(\"Unrecognised secret encoding\");\n  }\n  const [, ivHex, ctHex, tagHex] = encrypted.split(\":\");\n  if (!ivHex || !ctHex || !tagHex) {\n    throw new Error(\"Corrupt secret payload\");\n  }\n  const decipher = createDecipheriv(\n    \"aes-256-gcm\",\n    key,\n    Buffer.from(ivHex, \"hex\"),\n  );\n  decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagHex, \"hex\"));\n  const pt = Buffer.concat([\n    decipher.update(Buffer.from(ctHex, \"hex\")),\n    decipher.final(),\n  ]);\n  return pt.toString(\"utf8\");\n}\n\n/** Encrypt a plain-text value with the generic app-local key. */\nexport function encryptSecretValue(plaintext: string): string {\n  return encryptWithKey(plaintext, getSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Decrypt a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`. Throws on tampering. */\nexport function decryptSecretValue(encrypted: string): string {\n  return decryptWithKey(encrypted, getSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Encrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */\nexport function encryptSharedSecretValue(plaintext: string): string {\n  return encryptWithKey(plaintext, getSharedSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Decrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */\nexport function decryptSharedSecretValue(encrypted: string): string {\n  return decryptSharedSecretValueDetailed(encrypted).value;\n}\n\nexport interface DecryptedSharedSecretValue {\n  value: string;\n  /**\n   * True when a legacy app-local candidate decrypted the value. Callers that\n   * own the row should opportunistically re-encrypt it with the preferred\n   * workspace key.\n   */\n  needsReencrypt: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt workspace ciphertext with the preferred key first, then configured\n * legacy candidates. The result never exposes which secret material matched.\n */\nexport function decryptSharedSecretValueDetailed(\n  encrypted: string,\n): DecryptedSharedSecretValue {\n  const preferredKey = getSharedSecretEncryptionKey();\n  const candidateKeys = [preferredKey];\n  for (const material of sharedEncryptionKeyMaterials()) {\n    const candidate = hashSecretEncryptionKey(material);\n    if (!candidateKeys.some((existing) => existing.equals(candidate))) {\n      candidateKeys.push(candidate);\n    }\n  }\n\n  let lastError: unknown;\n  for (const candidate of candidateKeys) {\n    try {\n      return {\n        value: decryptWithKey(encrypted, candidate),\n        needsReencrypt: !candidate.equals(preferredKey),\n      };\n    } catch (error) {\n      lastError = error;\n    }\n  }\n  throw lastError instanceof Error\n    ? lastError\n    : new Error(\"Unable to decrypt workspace secret\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Strict check for a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`: `v1:` followed by\n * three hex segments. Intentionally strict so a legacy plaintext credential\n * that merely happens to start with `v1:` is treated as plaintext (and read via\n * the legacy fallback) rather than mis-decrypted.\n */\nconst ENCRYPTED_VALUE_RE = /^v1:[0-9a-f]+:[0-9a-f]+:[0-9a-f]+$/;\n\nexport function isEncryptedSecretValue(value: unknown): value is string {\n  return typeof value === \"string\" && ENCRYPTED_VALUE_RE.test(value);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/secrets/storage.d.ts

@@ -3,11 +3,9 @@
  *
  * Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The workspace-shared
  * encryption key is derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the
- * existing `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` env var (fallback so templates don't need a
- * second secret during development). Deployments that only have the legacy
- * app-scoped key continue to work until shared key material is configured;
- * once configured, new rows use the shared key and reads retain a legacy-key
- * fallback for existing rows.
+ * workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET`. `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and app-scoped keys remain
+ * read fallbacks for rows written before sibling apps converged on the shared
+ * key. Successful fallback reads race-safely refresh the shared ciphertext.
  *
  * Secret values are NEVER logged and NEVER returned from any route handler.
  */

package/dist/secrets/storage.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"storage.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/secrets/storage.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAaH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AA+FjD;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAI3C;AAMD,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;IACxB,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACZ,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IACnB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACjB;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,eAAgB,SAAQ,SAAS;IAChD,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,kEAAkE;IAClE,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB,8DAA8D;IAC9D,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACvB;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAsB,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAqF3E;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnB;AAmID;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAsB,aAAa,CACjC,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,GACb,OAAO,CAAC,gBAAgB,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CA8BlC;AAED,wEAAwE;AACxE,wBAAsB,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE;IACzC,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACxB,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IACnB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACjB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,CAoCzC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAsB,gBAAgB,CACpC,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,GACb,OAAO,CAAC;IAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAItD;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;IACzB,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACZ,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IACnB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC3B,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC9B,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAClB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACnB;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACrC,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,GACb,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAsC5B;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAC1C,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GACd,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,CAuCvB;AAeD,wBAAsB,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAStE"}

package/dist/secrets/storage.js

@@ -3,18 +3,16 @@
  *
  * Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The workspace-shared
  * encryption key is derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the
- * existing `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` env var (fallback so templates don't need a
- * second secret during development). Deployments that only have the legacy
- * app-scoped key continue to work until shared key material is configured;
- * once configured, new rows use the shared key and reads retain a legacy-key
- * fallback for existing rows.
+ * workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET`. `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and app-scoped keys remain
+ * read fallbacks for rows written before sibling apps converged on the shared
+ * key. Successful fallback reads race-safely refresh the shared ciphertext.
  *
  * Secret values are NEVER logged and NEVER returned from any route handler.
  */
 import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import { getDbExec, isPostgres } from "../db/client.js";
 import { ensureColumnExists, ensureTableExists } from "../db/ddl-guard.js";
-import { encryptSecretValue as encryptLegacyValue, encryptSharedSecretValue as encryptValue, decryptSharedSecretValue as decryptValue, decryptSecretValue as decryptLegacyValue, hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial, } from "./crypto.js";
+import { encryptSecretValue as encryptLegacyValue, encryptSharedSecretValue as encryptValue, decryptSharedSecretValueDetailed as decryptValue, decryptSecretValue as decryptLegacyValue, hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial, } from "./crypto.js";
 import { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL } from "./schema.js";
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Table bootstrap
@@ -139,8 +137,9 @@ export async function writeAppSecret(args) {
     // pointing at data that's no longer current. Siblings then get an honest
     // cache miss (falling back to the legacy column or reporting missing) until
     // the owning app's next read repopulates shared_encrypted_value via
-    // `populateSharedAppSecret`, which only ever fills a NULL column. A
-    // temporary miss is safer than serving rotated-away plaintext.
+    // `populateSharedAppSecret`, which fills a NULL column or compare-and-swap
+    // replaces the exact legacy ciphertext it just decrypted. A temporary miss
+    // is safer than serving rotated-away plaintext.
     const upsertSql = `INSERT INTO app_secrets (id, scope, scope_id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at)
     VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
     ON CONFLICT (scope, scope_id, key) DO UPDATE SET
@@ -183,10 +182,14 @@ export async function writeAppSecret(args) {
 function decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, sharedEncrypted) {
     if (sharedEncrypted) {
         try {
+            const decrypted = decryptValue(sharedEncrypted);
             return {
-                value: decryptValue(sharedEncrypted),
+                value: decrypted.value,
                 usedLegacyKey: false,
-                needsSharedCiphertext: false,
+                needsSharedCiphertext: decrypted.needsReencrypt,
+                sharedCiphertextToReplace: decrypted.needsReencrypt
+                    ? sharedEncrypted
+                    : undefined,
             };
         }
         catch {
@@ -195,10 +198,12 @@ function decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, sharedEncrypted) {
         }
     }
     try {
+        const decrypted = decryptValue(encrypted);
         return {
-            value: decryptValue(encrypted),
+            value: decrypted.value,
             usedLegacyKey: false,
             needsSharedCiphertext: true,
+            sharedCiphertextToReplace: sharedEncrypted ?? null,
         };
     }
     catch {
@@ -206,27 +211,37 @@ function decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, sharedEncrypted) {
             value: decryptLegacyValue(encrypted),
             usedLegacyKey: true,
             needsSharedCiphertext: true,
+            sharedCiphertextToReplace: sharedEncrypted ?? null,
         };
     }
 }
 /**
- * Populate the shared column without touching encrypted_value. This is
- * intentionally best-effort: a read must still succeed if a deployment's DB
- * role cannot update the row. The NULL predicate prevents a concurrent writer
- * from overwriting newly-populated shared ciphertext, and leaving updated_at
- * untouched preserves the row's user-visible ordering/metadata.
+ * Create or refresh the shared column without touching encrypted_value. This
+ * is intentionally best-effort: a read must still succeed if a deployment's
+ * DB role cannot update the row. The compare-and-swap predicate prevents a
+ * concurrent writer from being overwritten, and leaving updated_at untouched
+ * preserves the row's user-visible ordering/metadata.
  */
-async function populateSharedAppSecret(id, value) {
+async function populateSharedAppSecret(id, value, sharedCiphertextToReplace) {
     if (id === undefined ||
         id === null ||
         !hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()) {
         return;
     }
     try {
-        await getDbExec().execute({
-            sql: `UPDATE app_secrets SET shared_encrypted_value = ? WHERE id = ? AND shared_encrypted_value IS NULL`,
-            args: [encryptValue(value), id],
-        });
+        const encrypted = encryptValue(value);
+        if (sharedCiphertextToReplace === null) {
+            await getDbExec().execute({
+                sql: `UPDATE app_secrets SET shared_encrypted_value = ? WHERE id = ? AND shared_encrypted_value IS NULL`,
+                args: [encrypted, id],
+            });
+        }
+        else {
+            await getDbExec().execute({
+                sql: `UPDATE app_secrets SET shared_encrypted_value = ? WHERE id = ? AND shared_encrypted_value = ?`,
+                args: [encrypted, id, sharedCiphertextToReplace],
+            });
+        }
     }
     catch {
         // Migration is opportunistic. Preserve the successful read if the update
@@ -280,7 +295,7 @@ export async function readAppSecret(ref) {
         const encrypted = rows[0].encrypted_value;
         const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, rows[0].shared_encrypted_value);
         if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {
-            await populateSharedAppSecret(rows[0].id, decrypted.value);
+            await populateSharedAppSecret(rows[0].id, decrypted.value, decrypted.sharedCiphertextToReplace ?? null);
         }
         return {
             value: decrypted.value,
@@ -313,7 +328,7 @@ export async function readAppSecrets(args) {
             const encrypted = row.encrypted_value;
             const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, row.shared_encrypted_value);
             if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {
-                await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);
+                await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value, decrypted.sharedCiphertextToReplace ?? null);
             }
             results.set(key, {
                 value: decrypted.value,
@@ -359,7 +374,7 @@ export async function readAppSecretMeta(ref) {
         const encrypted = row.encrypted_value;
         const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, row.shared_encrypted_value);
         if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {
-            await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);
+            await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value, decrypted.sharedCiphertextToReplace ?? null);
         }
         last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);
     }
@@ -396,7 +411,7 @@ export async function listAppSecretsForScope(scope, scopeId) {
             const encrypted = row.encrypted_value;
             const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, row.shared_encrypted_value);
             if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {
-                await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);
+                await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value, decrypted.sharedCiphertextToReplace ?? null);
             }
             last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);
         }

package/dist/secrets/storage.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Storage layer for the framework secrets registry.\n *\n * Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The workspace-shared\n * encryption key is derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the\n * existing `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` env var (fallback so templates don't need a\n * second secret during development). Deployments that only have the legacy\n * app-scoped key continue to work until shared key material is configured;\n * once configured, new rows use the shared key and reads retain a legacy-key\n * fallback for existing rows.\n *\n * Secret values are NEVER logged and NEVER returned from any route handler.\n */\n\nimport { randomUUID } from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport { getDbExec, isPostgres } from \"../db/client.js\";\nimport { ensureColumnExists, ensureTableExists } from \"../db/ddl-guard.js\";\nimport {\n  encryptSecretValue as encryptLegacyValue,\n  encryptSharedSecretValue as encryptValue,\n  decryptSharedSecretValue as decryptValue,\n  decryptSecretValue as decryptLegacyValue,\n  hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial,\n} from \"./crypto.js\";\nimport type { SecretScope } from \"./register.js\";\nimport { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL } from \"./schema.js\";\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Table bootstrap\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nlet _initPromise: Promise<void> | undefined;\n\nasync function ensureTable(): Promise<void> {\n  if (!_initPromise) {\n    _initPromise = (async () => {\n      const client = getDbExec();\n      // Postgres version of the CREATE TABLE — the generic `INTEGER` maps to\n      // BIGINT on Postgres, which we need for millisecond timestamps.\n      const createSql = isPostgres()\n        ? APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL.replace(/\\bINTEGER\\b/g, \"BIGINT\")\n        : APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL;\n\n      if (isPostgres()) {\n        // Hot path: in production the table and both additive columns are\n        // virtually always already present. Issuing `CREATE`/`ALTER` would\n        // still take an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock — which, in a fresh background\n        // worker process behind a concurrent connection on the shared Neon DB,\n        // can block ~indefinitely. `ensureTableExists` / `ensureColumnExists`\n        // check `information_schema` first (a plain read, no lock) and run DDL\n        // ONLY for what is actually missing, wrapping any DDL that must run in a\n        // transaction-scoped `lock_timeout` so a contended lock fails fast. They\n        // also re-probe after a swallowed lock-timeout and THROW if the schema\n        // is still missing, so a timed-out DDL never poisons this init memo.\n        await ensureTableExists(\"app_secrets\", createSql);\n        await ensureColumnExists(\n          \"app_secrets\",\n          \"description\",\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS description TEXT`,\n        );\n        await ensureColumnExists(\n          \"app_secrets\",\n          \"url_allowlist\",\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS url_allowlist TEXT`,\n        );\n        await ensureColumnExists(\n          \"app_secrets\",\n          \"shared_encrypted_value\",\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS shared_encrypted_value TEXT`,\n        );\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // SQLite (local dev): no ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock problem, keep the original\n      // create-then-additive-alter behaviour. SQLite has no\n      // `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`, so the ALTERs stay wrapped in try/catch.\n      await client.execute(createSql);\n\n      // Additive migration: description column (for ad-hoc keys)\n      try {\n        await client.execute(\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN description TEXT`,\n        );\n      } catch {\n        // Column already exists — expected\n      }\n\n      // Additive migration: url_allowlist column\n      try {\n        await client.execute(\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN url_allowlist TEXT`,\n        );\n      } catch {\n        // Column already exists — expected\n      }\n\n      // Additive migration: workspace-shared ciphertext. Keep the legacy\n      // encrypted_value column so older app versions remain readable.\n      try {\n        await client.execute(\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN shared_encrypted_value TEXT`,\n        );\n      } catch {\n        // Column already exists — expected\n      }\n    })().catch((err) => {\n      _initPromise = undefined;\n      throw err;\n    });\n  }\n  return _initPromise;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Encryption — see ./crypto.ts. Keep encrypted_value on the legacy app-key\n// format for mixed-version deployments, and add shared_encrypted_value when a\n// stable workspace key is configured so sibling apps can read the same row.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Return the last 4 characters of a secret, with any leading characters\n * masked. Used to show a preview without leaking the value.\n */\nexport function last4(value: string): string {\n  if (!value) return \"\";\n  if (value.length <= 4) return \"••••\";\n  return \"••••\" + value.slice(-4);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// CRUD\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface SecretRef {\n  key: string;\n  scope: SecretScope;\n  scopeId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface WriteSecretArgs extends SecretRef {\n  value: string;\n  /** Optional human-readable description (used for ad-hoc keys). */\n  description?: string;\n  /** Optional JSON-stringified array of allowed URL origins. */\n  urlAllowlist?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Write (insert or update) a secret. The value is encrypted before being\n * stored — the caller's plaintext is never persisted. Returns the new\n * record's id.\n */\nexport async function writeAppSecret(args: WriteSecretArgs): Promise<string> {\n  await ensureTable();\n  const { key, value, scope, scopeId, description, urlAllowlist } = args;\n  if (!key || !value || !scope || !scopeId) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"writeAppSecret: key, value, scope, and scopeId are all required\",\n    );\n  }\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  const now = Date.now();\n  // Dual-write during rollout: old readers continue using encrypted_value,\n  // while new readers prefer the nullable shared ciphertext. An app-only\n  // deployment leaves the shared column null; on an update, a writer without\n  // shared key material clears any existing shared ciphertext rather than\n  // preserving it (see the upsert SQL below for why).\n  const encrypted = encryptLegacyValue(value);\n  const sharedEncrypted = hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()\n    ? encryptValue(value)\n    : null;\n  const id = randomUUID();\n\n  // Atomic upsert by (scope, scope_id, key). Previously this was a\n  // SELECT-then-branch (UPDATE if found, else INSERT): under concurrent\n  // writers for the same key both could see \"no row\" and both attempt\n  // INSERT, and the loser threw a raw UNIQUE(scope, scope_id, key)\n  // constraint violation (a user-facing 500) instead of updating. A single\n  // `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE` closes that window — it's one\n  // statement, so there's no gap between \"check\" and \"act\". `id` is\n  // deliberately left out of the `DO UPDATE SET` list so an existing row\n  // keeps its original id (any stored references stay stable); only a\n  // genuinely new row gets the freshly generated `id`. This syntax is\n  // portable across SQLite (UPSERT since 3.24) and Postgres.\n  //\n  // shared_encrypted_value is overwritten with `excluded.shared_encrypted_value`\n  // (NULL when this writer lacks shared key material) rather than preserved\n  // via COALESCE. Preserving an existing shared ciphertext across a value\n  // update would let a sibling app silently decrypt a STALE value after the\n  // owner rotates it — a material-less writer has no way to produce the new\n  // shared ciphertext, so it must clear the old one instead of leaving it\n  // pointing at data that's no longer current. Siblings then get an honest\n  // cache miss (falling back to the legacy column or reporting missing) until\n  // the owning app's next read repopulates shared_encrypted_value via\n  // `populateSharedAppSecret`, which only ever fills a NULL column. A\n  // temporary miss is safer than serving rotated-away plaintext.\n  const upsertSql = `INSERT INTO app_secrets (id, scope, scope_id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at)\n    VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)\n    ON CONFLICT (scope, scope_id, key) DO UPDATE SET\n      encrypted_value = excluded.encrypted_value,\n      shared_encrypted_value = excluded.shared_encrypted_value,\n      description = excluded.description,\n      url_allowlist = excluded.url_allowlist,\n      updated_at = excluded.updated_at`;\n  const upsertArgs = [\n    id,\n    scope,\n    scopeId,\n    key,\n    encrypted,\n    sharedEncrypted,\n    description ?? null,\n    urlAllowlist ?? null,\n    now,\n    now,\n  ];\n\n  if (isPostgres()) {\n    const { rows } = await client.execute({\n      sql: `${upsertSql} RETURNING id`,\n      args: upsertArgs,\n    });\n    return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);\n  }\n\n  // SQLite: RETURNING support varies across better-sqlite3/libsql builds, so\n  // (matching the convention elsewhere in this codebase, e.g.\n  // integrations/pending-tasks-store.ts) re-read the id afterward instead of\n  // relying on it. The row is guaranteed to exist at this point, so this is\n  // a plain lookup rather than a TOCTOU-prone gate on the write itself.\n  await client.execute({ sql: upsertSql, args: upsertArgs });\n  const { rows } = await client.execute({\n    sql: `SELECT id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n  });\n  return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);\n}\n\nexport interface ReadSecretResult {\n  value: string;\n  last4: string;\n  updatedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the shared-key format and retain compatibility with rows written before\n * app_secrets moved to its workspace-shared encryption boundary. The legacy\n * fallback is only useful when the current app owns the old row; sibling apps\n * will receive shared-key ciphertext after the next vault sync or update.\n */\ninterface DecryptedAppSecretValue {\n  value: string;\n  /** True when the app-scoped fallback decrypted encrypted_value. */\n  usedLegacyKey: boolean;\n  /** True when shared_encrypted_value was not the source of the plaintext. */\n  needsSharedCiphertext: boolean;\n}\n\nfunction decryptAppSecretValue(\n  encrypted: string,\n  sharedEncrypted?: string | null,\n): DecryptedAppSecretValue {\n  if (sharedEncrypted) {\n    try {\n      return {\n        value: decryptValue(sharedEncrypted),\n        usedLegacyKey: false,\n        needsSharedCiphertext: false,\n      };\n    } catch {\n      // Fall through to the legacy column. A partially migrated row may have\n      // a stale shared ciphertext while the old app-key value is valid.\n    }\n  }\n  try {\n    return {\n      value: decryptValue(encrypted),\n      usedLegacyKey: false,\n      needsSharedCiphertext: true,\n    };\n  } catch {\n    return {\n      value: decryptLegacyValue(encrypted),\n      usedLegacyKey: true,\n      needsSharedCiphertext: true,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Populate the shared column without touching encrypted_value. This is\n * intentionally best-effort: a read must still succeed if a deployment's DB\n * role cannot update the row. The NULL predicate prevents a concurrent writer\n * from overwriting newly-populated shared ciphertext, and leaving updated_at\n * untouched preserves the row's user-visible ordering/metadata.\n */\nasync function populateSharedAppSecret(\n  id: unknown,\n  value: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (\n    id === undefined ||\n    id === null ||\n    !hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()\n  ) {\n    return;\n  }\n  try {\n    await getDbExec().execute({\n      sql: `UPDATE app_secrets SET shared_encrypted_value = ? WHERE id = ? AND shared_encrypted_value IS NULL`,\n      args: [encryptValue(value), id],\n    });\n  } catch {\n    // Migration is opportunistic. Preserve the successful read if the update\n    // is unavailable due to a read-only role, transient DB failure, or race.\n  }\n}\n\ntype AppSecretsReadQuery = { sql: string; args: unknown[] };\n\n/**\n * True only when the database says the app_secrets table itself is missing.\n * Other query failures must propagate unchanged: attempting schema bootstrap\n * for connectivity, permission, or syntax errors both hides the real failure\n * and can introduce DDL onto a latency-sensitive read path.\n */\nfunction isMissingAppSecretsTableError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!(error instanceof Error)) return false;\n  const code = String((error as Error & { code?: unknown }).code ?? \"\");\n  const message = error.message.toLowerCase();\n  const namesAppSecrets = /(?:app_secrets|\"app_secrets\")/.test(message);\n\n  if (code === \"42P01\") return namesAppSecrets;\n  return (\n    namesAppSecrets &&\n    (message.includes(\"no such table\") ||\n      (message.includes(\"relation\") && message.includes(\"does not exist\")))\n  );\n}\n\n/** Execute a read without schema probes on the normal path. */\nasync function executeAppSecretsRead(query: AppSecretsReadQuery) {\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  try {\n    return await client.execute(query);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (!isMissingAppSecretsTableError(error)) throw error;\n    await ensureTable();\n    return client.execute(query);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a secret's plaintext value. Returns null when not found. The caller\n * is responsible for never logging the returned value.\n */\nexport async function readAppSecret(\n  ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<ReadSecretResult | null> {\n  const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n  const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({\n    sql: `SELECT encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, updated_at, id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n  });\n  if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n  try {\n    const encrypted = rows[0].encrypted_value as string;\n    const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n      encrypted,\n      rows[0].shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n    );\n    if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n      await populateSharedAppSecret(rows[0].id, decrypted.value);\n    }\n    return {\n      value: decrypted.value,\n      last4: last4(decrypted.value),\n      updatedAt: Number(rows[0].updated_at ?? 0),\n    };\n  } catch {\n    // Decryption failure — key rotated, tampered row, etc. Don't throw up the\n    // stack in a way that could leak the ciphertext; just report missing.\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Read several keys from one scope in a single database round trip. */\nexport async function readAppSecrets(args: {\n  keys: readonly string[];\n  scope: SecretScope;\n  scopeId: string;\n}): Promise<Map<string, ReadSecretResult>> {\n  const keys = [...new Set(args.keys.filter(Boolean))];\n  if (keys.length === 0) return new Map();\n\n  const placeholders = keys.map(() => \"?\").join(\", \");\n  const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({\n    sql: `SELECT key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, updated_at, id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key IN (${placeholders})`,\n    args: [args.scope, args.scopeId, ...keys],\n  });\n  const results = new Map<string, ReadSecretResult>();\n  for (const row of rows) {\n    const key = String(row.key ?? \"\");\n    if (!key) continue;\n    try {\n      const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n      const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n        encrypted,\n        row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n      );\n      if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n        await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);\n      }\n      results.set(key, {\n        value: decrypted.value,\n        last4: last4(decrypted.value),\n        updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n      });\n    } catch {\n      // Match readAppSecret: corrupted or stale ciphertext behaves as missing.\n    }\n  }\n  return results;\n}\n\n/**\n * Return just the metadata for a secret (no value). Used by the list route so\n * the UI can show the \"Set\" pill and last-4 without the decrypted value going\n * over the wire.\n */\nexport async function getAppSecretMeta(\n  ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<{ last4: string; updatedAt: number } | null> {\n  const result = await readAppSecret(ref);\n  if (!result) return null;\n  return { last4: result.last4, updatedAt: result.updatedAt };\n}\n\nexport interface SecretMeta {\n  key: string;\n  scope: SecretScope;\n  scopeId: string;\n  last4: string;\n  description: string | null;\n  urlAllowlist: string[] | null;\n  createdAt: number;\n  updatedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a secret's metadata, including ad-hoc fields (description, allowlist),\n * without ever decrypting or returning the plaintext value. Used by the\n * ad-hoc list route and any UI that wants to render a key tile.\n */\nexport async function readAppSecretMeta(\n  ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<SecretMeta | null> {\n  await ensureTable();\n  const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  const { rows } = await client.execute({\n    sql: `SELECT id, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n  });\n  if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n  const row = rows[0];\n  let last4Value = \"\";\n  try {\n    const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n    const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n      encrypted,\n      row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n    );\n    if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n      await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);\n    }\n    last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);\n  } catch {\n    last4Value = \"\";\n  }\n  return {\n    key,\n    scope,\n    scopeId,\n    last4: last4Value,\n    description: (row.description as string | null) ?? null,\n    urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist as string | null),\n    createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),\n    updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * List all secrets for a given scope. Returns metadata only — values are\n * never decrypted or returned. Used by the ad-hoc list route to surface\n * user-created keys.\n */\nexport async function listAppSecretsForScope(\n  scope: SecretScope,\n  scopeId: string,\n): Promise<SecretMeta[]> {\n  await ensureTable();\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  const { rows } = await client.execute({\n    sql: `SELECT id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId],\n  });\n  const results: SecretMeta[] = [];\n  for (const row of rows) {\n    let last4Value = \"\";\n    try {\n      const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n      const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n        encrypted,\n        row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n      );\n      if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n        await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);\n      }\n      last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);\n    } catch {\n      last4Value = \"\";\n    }\n    results.push({\n      key: row.key as string,\n      scope,\n      scopeId,\n      last4: last4Value,\n      description: (row.description as string | null) ?? null,\n      urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist as string | null),\n      createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),\n      updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n    });\n  }\n  return results;\n}\n\nfunction parseAllowlist(raw: string | null): string[] | null {\n  if (!raw) return null;\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n    if (Array.isArray(parsed) && parsed.every((v) => typeof v === \"string\")) {\n      return parsed;\n    }\n    return null;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function deleteAppSecret(ref: SecretRef): Promise<boolean> {\n  await ensureTable();\n  const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  const { rowsAffected } = await client.execute({\n    sql: `DELETE FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ?`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n  });\n  return rowsAffected > 0;\n}\n"]}
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* Storage layer for the framework secrets registry.\n *\n * Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The workspace-shared\n * encryption key is derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the\n * workspace-wide `A2A_SECRET`. `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` and app-scoped keys remain\n * read fallbacks for rows written before sibling apps converged on the shared\n * key. Successful fallback reads race-safely refresh the shared ciphertext.\n *\n * Secret values are NEVER logged and NEVER returned from any route handler.\n */\n\nimport { randomUUID } from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport { getDbExec, isPostgres } from \"../db/client.js\";\nimport { ensureColumnExists, ensureTableExists } from \"../db/ddl-guard.js\";\nimport {\n  encryptSecretValue as encryptLegacyValue,\n  encryptSharedSecretValue as encryptValue,\n  decryptSharedSecretValueDetailed as decryptValue,\n  decryptSecretValue as decryptLegacyValue,\n  hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial,\n} from \"./crypto.js\";\nimport type { SecretScope } from \"./register.js\";\nimport { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL } from \"./schema.js\";\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Table bootstrap\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nlet _initPromise: Promise<void> | undefined;\n\nasync function ensureTable(): Promise<void> {\n  if (!_initPromise) {\n    _initPromise = (async () => {\n      const client = getDbExec();\n      // Postgres version of the CREATE TABLE — the generic `INTEGER` maps to\n      // BIGINT on Postgres, which we need for millisecond timestamps.\n      const createSql = isPostgres()\n        ? APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL.replace(/\\bINTEGER\\b/g, \"BIGINT\")\n        : APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL;\n\n      if (isPostgres()) {\n        // Hot path: in production the table and both additive columns are\n        // virtually always already present. Issuing `CREATE`/`ALTER` would\n        // still take an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock — which, in a fresh background\n        // worker process behind a concurrent connection on the shared Neon DB,\n        // can block ~indefinitely. `ensureTableExists` / `ensureColumnExists`\n        // check `information_schema` first (a plain read, no lock) and run DDL\n        // ONLY for what is actually missing, wrapping any DDL that must run in a\n        // transaction-scoped `lock_timeout` so a contended lock fails fast. They\n        // also re-probe after a swallowed lock-timeout and THROW if the schema\n        // is still missing, so a timed-out DDL never poisons this init memo.\n        await ensureTableExists(\"app_secrets\", createSql);\n        await ensureColumnExists(\n          \"app_secrets\",\n          \"description\",\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS description TEXT`,\n        );\n        await ensureColumnExists(\n          \"app_secrets\",\n          \"url_allowlist\",\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS url_allowlist TEXT`,\n        );\n        await ensureColumnExists(\n          \"app_secrets\",\n          \"shared_encrypted_value\",\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS shared_encrypted_value TEXT`,\n        );\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // SQLite (local dev): no ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock problem, keep the original\n      // create-then-additive-alter behaviour. SQLite has no\n      // `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`, so the ALTERs stay wrapped in try/catch.\n      await client.execute(createSql);\n\n      // Additive migration: description column (for ad-hoc keys)\n      try {\n        await client.execute(\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN description TEXT`,\n        );\n      } catch {\n        // Column already exists — expected\n      }\n\n      // Additive migration: url_allowlist column\n      try {\n        await client.execute(\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN url_allowlist TEXT`,\n        );\n      } catch {\n        // Column already exists — expected\n      }\n\n      // Additive migration: workspace-shared ciphertext. Keep the legacy\n      // encrypted_value column so older app versions remain readable.\n      try {\n        await client.execute(\n          `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN shared_encrypted_value TEXT`,\n        );\n      } catch {\n        // Column already exists — expected\n      }\n    })().catch((err) => {\n      _initPromise = undefined;\n      throw err;\n    });\n  }\n  return _initPromise;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Encryption — see ./crypto.ts. Keep encrypted_value on the legacy app-key\n// format for mixed-version deployments, and add shared_encrypted_value when a\n// stable workspace key is configured so sibling apps can read the same row.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Return the last 4 characters of a secret, with any leading characters\n * masked. Used to show a preview without leaking the value.\n */\nexport function last4(value: string): string {\n  if (!value) return \"\";\n  if (value.length <= 4) return \"••••\";\n  return \"••••\" + value.slice(-4);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// CRUD\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface SecretRef {\n  key: string;\n  scope: SecretScope;\n  scopeId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface WriteSecretArgs extends SecretRef {\n  value: string;\n  /** Optional human-readable description (used for ad-hoc keys). */\n  description?: string;\n  /** Optional JSON-stringified array of allowed URL origins. */\n  urlAllowlist?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Write (insert or update) a secret. The value is encrypted before being\n * stored — the caller's plaintext is never persisted. Returns the new\n * record's id.\n */\nexport async function writeAppSecret(args: WriteSecretArgs): Promise<string> {\n  await ensureTable();\n  const { key, value, scope, scopeId, description, urlAllowlist } = args;\n  if (!key || !value || !scope || !scopeId) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"writeAppSecret: key, value, scope, and scopeId are all required\",\n    );\n  }\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  const now = Date.now();\n  // Dual-write during rollout: old readers continue using encrypted_value,\n  // while new readers prefer the nullable shared ciphertext. An app-only\n  // deployment leaves the shared column null; on an update, a writer without\n  // shared key material clears any existing shared ciphertext rather than\n  // preserving it (see the upsert SQL below for why).\n  const encrypted = encryptLegacyValue(value);\n  const sharedEncrypted = hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()\n    ? encryptValue(value)\n    : null;\n  const id = randomUUID();\n\n  // Atomic upsert by (scope, scope_id, key). Previously this was a\n  // SELECT-then-branch (UPDATE if found, else INSERT): under concurrent\n  // writers for the same key both could see \"no row\" and both attempt\n  // INSERT, and the loser threw a raw UNIQUE(scope, scope_id, key)\n  // constraint violation (a user-facing 500) instead of updating. A single\n  // `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE` closes that window — it's one\n  // statement, so there's no gap between \"check\" and \"act\". `id` is\n  // deliberately left out of the `DO UPDATE SET` list so an existing row\n  // keeps its original id (any stored references stay stable); only a\n  // genuinely new row gets the freshly generated `id`. This syntax is\n  // portable across SQLite (UPSERT since 3.24) and Postgres.\n  //\n  // shared_encrypted_value is overwritten with `excluded.shared_encrypted_value`\n  // (NULL when this writer lacks shared key material) rather than preserved\n  // via COALESCE. Preserving an existing shared ciphertext across a value\n  // update would let a sibling app silently decrypt a STALE value after the\n  // owner rotates it — a material-less writer has no way to produce the new\n  // shared ciphertext, so it must clear the old one instead of leaving it\n  // pointing at data that's no longer current. Siblings then get an honest\n  // cache miss (falling back to the legacy column or reporting missing) until\n  // the owning app's next read repopulates shared_encrypted_value via\n  // `populateSharedAppSecret`, which fills a NULL column or compare-and-swap\n  // replaces the exact legacy ciphertext it just decrypted. A temporary miss\n  // is safer than serving rotated-away plaintext.\n  const upsertSql = `INSERT INTO app_secrets (id, scope, scope_id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at)\n    VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)\n    ON CONFLICT (scope, scope_id, key) DO UPDATE SET\n      encrypted_value = excluded.encrypted_value,\n      shared_encrypted_value = excluded.shared_encrypted_value,\n      description = excluded.description,\n      url_allowlist = excluded.url_allowlist,\n      updated_at = excluded.updated_at`;\n  const upsertArgs = [\n    id,\n    scope,\n    scopeId,\n    key,\n    encrypted,\n    sharedEncrypted,\n    description ?? null,\n    urlAllowlist ?? null,\n    now,\n    now,\n  ];\n\n  if (isPostgres()) {\n    const { rows } = await client.execute({\n      sql: `${upsertSql} RETURNING id`,\n      args: upsertArgs,\n    });\n    return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);\n  }\n\n  // SQLite: RETURNING support varies across better-sqlite3/libsql builds, so\n  // (matching the convention elsewhere in this codebase, e.g.\n  // integrations/pending-tasks-store.ts) re-read the id afterward instead of\n  // relying on it. The row is guaranteed to exist at this point, so this is\n  // a plain lookup rather than a TOCTOU-prone gate on the write itself.\n  await client.execute({ sql: upsertSql, args: upsertArgs });\n  const { rows } = await client.execute({\n    sql: `SELECT id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n  });\n  return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);\n}\n\nexport interface ReadSecretResult {\n  value: string;\n  last4: string;\n  updatedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the shared-key format and retain compatibility with rows written before\n * app_secrets moved to its workspace-shared encryption boundary. The legacy\n * fallback is only useful when the current app owns the old row; sibling apps\n * will receive shared-key ciphertext after the next vault sync or update.\n */\ninterface DecryptedAppSecretValue {\n  value: string;\n  /** True when the app-scoped fallback decrypted encrypted_value. */\n  usedLegacyKey: boolean;\n  /** True when shared_encrypted_value needs to be created or refreshed. */\n  needsSharedCiphertext: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Existing ciphertext that must still match before a refresh. Null means the\n   * migration may only fill an empty shared column.\n   */\n  sharedCiphertextToReplace?: string | null;\n}\n\nfunction decryptAppSecretValue(\n  encrypted: string,\n  sharedEncrypted?: string | null,\n): DecryptedAppSecretValue {\n  if (sharedEncrypted) {\n    try {\n      const decrypted = decryptValue(sharedEncrypted);\n      return {\n        value: decrypted.value,\n        usedLegacyKey: false,\n        needsSharedCiphertext: decrypted.needsReencrypt,\n        sharedCiphertextToReplace: decrypted.needsReencrypt\n          ? sharedEncrypted\n          : undefined,\n      };\n    } catch {\n      // Fall through to the legacy column. A partially migrated row may have\n      // a stale shared ciphertext while the old app-key value is valid.\n    }\n  }\n  try {\n    const decrypted = decryptValue(encrypted);\n    return {\n      value: decrypted.value,\n      usedLegacyKey: false,\n      needsSharedCiphertext: true,\n      sharedCiphertextToReplace: sharedEncrypted ?? null,\n    };\n  } catch {\n    return {\n      value: decryptLegacyValue(encrypted),\n      usedLegacyKey: true,\n      needsSharedCiphertext: true,\n      sharedCiphertextToReplace: sharedEncrypted ?? null,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Create or refresh the shared column without touching encrypted_value. This\n * is intentionally best-effort: a read must still succeed if a deployment's\n * DB role cannot update the row. The compare-and-swap predicate prevents a\n * concurrent writer from being overwritten, and leaving updated_at untouched\n * preserves the row's user-visible ordering/metadata.\n */\nasync function populateSharedAppSecret(\n  id: unknown,\n  value: string,\n  sharedCiphertextToReplace: string | null,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (\n    id === undefined ||\n    id === null ||\n    !hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()\n  ) {\n    return;\n  }\n  try {\n    const encrypted = encryptValue(value);\n    if (sharedCiphertextToReplace === null) {\n      await getDbExec().execute({\n        sql: `UPDATE app_secrets SET shared_encrypted_value = ? WHERE id = ? AND shared_encrypted_value IS NULL`,\n        args: [encrypted, id],\n      });\n    } else {\n      await getDbExec().execute({\n        sql: `UPDATE app_secrets SET shared_encrypted_value = ? WHERE id = ? AND shared_encrypted_value = ?`,\n        args: [encrypted, id, sharedCiphertextToReplace],\n      });\n    }\n  } catch {\n    // Migration is opportunistic. Preserve the successful read if the update\n    // is unavailable due to a read-only role, transient DB failure, or race.\n  }\n}\n\ntype AppSecretsReadQuery = { sql: string; args: unknown[] };\n\n/**\n * True only when the database says the app_secrets table itself is missing.\n * Other query failures must propagate unchanged: attempting schema bootstrap\n * for connectivity, permission, or syntax errors both hides the real failure\n * and can introduce DDL onto a latency-sensitive read path.\n */\nfunction isMissingAppSecretsTableError(error: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!(error instanceof Error)) return false;\n  const code = String((error as Error & { code?: unknown }).code ?? \"\");\n  const message = error.message.toLowerCase();\n  const namesAppSecrets = /(?:app_secrets|\"app_secrets\")/.test(message);\n\n  if (code === \"42P01\") return namesAppSecrets;\n  return (\n    namesAppSecrets &&\n    (message.includes(\"no such table\") ||\n      (message.includes(\"relation\") && message.includes(\"does not exist\")))\n  );\n}\n\n/** Execute a read without schema probes on the normal path. */\nasync function executeAppSecretsRead(query: AppSecretsReadQuery) {\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  try {\n    return await client.execute(query);\n  } catch (error) {\n    if (!isMissingAppSecretsTableError(error)) throw error;\n    await ensureTable();\n    return client.execute(query);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a secret's plaintext value. Returns null when not found. The caller\n * is responsible for never logging the returned value.\n */\nexport async function readAppSecret(\n  ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<ReadSecretResult | null> {\n  const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n  const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({\n    sql: `SELECT encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, updated_at, id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n  });\n  if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n  try {\n    const encrypted = rows[0].encrypted_value as string;\n    const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n      encrypted,\n      rows[0].shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n    );\n    if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n      await populateSharedAppSecret(\n        rows[0].id,\n        decrypted.value,\n        decrypted.sharedCiphertextToReplace ?? null,\n      );\n    }\n    return {\n      value: decrypted.value,\n      last4: last4(decrypted.value),\n      updatedAt: Number(rows[0].updated_at ?? 0),\n    };\n  } catch {\n    // Decryption failure — key rotated, tampered row, etc. Don't throw up the\n    // stack in a way that could leak the ciphertext; just report missing.\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/** Read several keys from one scope in a single database round trip. */\nexport async function readAppSecrets(args: {\n  keys: readonly string[];\n  scope: SecretScope;\n  scopeId: string;\n}): Promise<Map<string, ReadSecretResult>> {\n  const keys = [...new Set(args.keys.filter(Boolean))];\n  if (keys.length === 0) return new Map();\n\n  const placeholders = keys.map(() => \"?\").join(\", \");\n  const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({\n    sql: `SELECT key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, updated_at, id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key IN (${placeholders})`,\n    args: [args.scope, args.scopeId, ...keys],\n  });\n  const results = new Map<string, ReadSecretResult>();\n  for (const row of rows) {\n    const key = String(row.key ?? \"\");\n    if (!key) continue;\n    try {\n      const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n      const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n        encrypted,\n        row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n      );\n      if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n        await populateSharedAppSecret(\n          row.id,\n          decrypted.value,\n          decrypted.sharedCiphertextToReplace ?? null,\n        );\n      }\n      results.set(key, {\n        value: decrypted.value,\n        last4: last4(decrypted.value),\n        updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n      });\n    } catch {\n      // Match readAppSecret: corrupted or stale ciphertext behaves as missing.\n    }\n  }\n  return results;\n}\n\n/**\n * Return just the metadata for a secret (no value). Used by the list route so\n * the UI can show the \"Set\" pill and last-4 without the decrypted value going\n * over the wire.\n */\nexport async function getAppSecretMeta(\n  ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<{ last4: string; updatedAt: number } | null> {\n  const result = await readAppSecret(ref);\n  if (!result) return null;\n  return { last4: result.last4, updatedAt: result.updatedAt };\n}\n\nexport interface SecretMeta {\n  key: string;\n  scope: SecretScope;\n  scopeId: string;\n  last4: string;\n  description: string | null;\n  urlAllowlist: string[] | null;\n  createdAt: number;\n  updatedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a secret's metadata, including ad-hoc fields (description, allowlist),\n * without ever decrypting or returning the plaintext value. Used by the\n * ad-hoc list route and any UI that wants to render a key tile.\n */\nexport async function readAppSecretMeta(\n  ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<SecretMeta | null> {\n  await ensureTable();\n  const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  const { rows } = await client.execute({\n    sql: `SELECT id, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n  });\n  if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n  const row = rows[0];\n  let last4Value = \"\";\n  try {\n    const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n    const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n      encrypted,\n      row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n    );\n    if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n      await populateSharedAppSecret(\n        row.id,\n        decrypted.value,\n        decrypted.sharedCiphertextToReplace ?? null,\n      );\n    }\n    last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);\n  } catch {\n    last4Value = \"\";\n  }\n  return {\n    key,\n    scope,\n    scopeId,\n    last4: last4Value,\n    description: (row.description as string | null) ?? null,\n    urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist as string | null),\n    createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),\n    updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * List all secrets for a given scope. Returns metadata only — values are\n * never decrypted or returned. Used by the ad-hoc list route to surface\n * user-created keys.\n */\nexport async function listAppSecretsForScope(\n  scope: SecretScope,\n  scopeId: string,\n): Promise<SecretMeta[]> {\n  await ensureTable();\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  const { rows } = await client.execute({\n    sql: `SELECT id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId],\n  });\n  const results: SecretMeta[] = [];\n  for (const row of rows) {\n    let last4Value = \"\";\n    try {\n      const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n      const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n        encrypted,\n        row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n      );\n      if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n        await populateSharedAppSecret(\n          row.id,\n          decrypted.value,\n          decrypted.sharedCiphertextToReplace ?? null,\n        );\n      }\n      last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);\n    } catch {\n      last4Value = \"\";\n    }\n    results.push({\n      key: row.key as string,\n      scope,\n      scopeId,\n      last4: last4Value,\n      description: (row.description as string | null) ?? null,\n      urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist as string | null),\n      createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),\n      updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n    });\n  }\n  return results;\n}\n\nfunction parseAllowlist(raw: string | null): string[] | null {\n  if (!raw) return null;\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n    if (Array.isArray(parsed) && parsed.every((v) => typeof v === \"string\")) {\n      return parsed;\n    }\n    return null;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\nexport async function deleteAppSecret(ref: SecretRef): Promise<boolean> {\n  await ensureTable();\n  const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n  const client = getDbExec();\n  const { rowsAffected } = await client.execute({\n    sql: `DELETE FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ?`,\n    args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n  });\n  return rowsAffected > 0;\n}\n"]}