@agent-native/core 0.120.4 → 0.121.1

package/dist/server/short-lived-token.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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* Short-lived HMAC-signed access tokens for media URLs.\n *\n * Used by clips and calls to mint a single-use bearer token after a password\n * gate passes, then bake `?t=<token>` into the video/blob URL handed to the\n * `<video>` element — instead of `?password=<plaintext>` (which ends up in\n * browser history, CDN logs, and Referer headers).\n *\n * Token shape: `<payloadB64Url>.<sigB64Url>`\n *   payload = base64url(JSON.stringify({ resourceId, viewerEmail?, exp }))\n *   sig     = base64url(HMAC-SHA256(payload, key))\n *\n * Key resolution mirrors `google-oauth.ts:getStateSigningKey`:\n *   1. OAUTH_STATE_SECRET (preferred — dedicated to short-lived signing)\n *   2. BETTER_AUTH_SECRET (already used as a server secret)\n *   3. Hosted workspace deploys derive a per-purpose key from A2A_SECRET\n *   4. In dev only, an ephemeral random key (per-process)\n *\n * In production, throws if no usable server secret is set.\n */\n\nimport crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport { getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret } from \"./derived-secret.js\";\n\n/** Default token TTL, in seconds. 10 minutes covers a typical video session. */\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 600;\n\n/**\n * Inputs for {@link signShortLivedToken}.\n */\nexport interface ShortLivedTokenClaims {\n  /** Resource id the token authorises (recording id, call id, snippet id, …). */\n  resourceId: string;\n  /** Optional viewer email for audit / analytics — not used for authorisation. */\n  viewerEmail?: string;\n  /** Override default TTL (seconds). */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n}\n\ninterface DecodedClaims {\n  resourceId: string;\n  viewerEmail?: string;\n  exp: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link verifyShortLivedToken}. Discriminated by the literal\n * `ok` field so callers can `if (!result.ok) return …`.\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true; viewerEmail?: string }\n  | { ok: false; reason: string };\n\nlet _devSigningKey: string | undefined;\n\nfunction getSigningKey(): string {\n  const secret =\n    process.env.OAUTH_STATE_SECRET ||\n    process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET ||\n    getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret(\"short-lived-token\");\n  if (secret) return secret;\n\n  if (process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\") {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"Short-lived token signing requires a server secret. \" +\n        \"Set OAUTH_STATE_SECRET, BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, or A2A_SECRET in production workspace deploys.\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!_devSigningKey) {\n    _devSigningKey = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString(\"hex\");\n  }\n  return _devSigningKey;\n}\n\nfunction base64UrlEncode(buf: Buffer | string): string {\n  const b = typeof buf === \"string\" ? Buffer.from(buf, \"utf8\") : buf;\n  return b\n    .toString(\"base64\")\n    .replace(/\\+/g, \"-\")\n    .replace(/\\//g, \"_\")\n    .replace(/=+$/g, \"\");\n}\n\nfunction base64UrlDecode(s: string): Buffer {\n  // Re-pad to a multiple of 4 so Buffer.from('base64') decodes cleanly.\n  const padded = s + \"=\".repeat((4 - (s.length % 4)) % 4);\n  return Buffer.from(padded.replace(/-/g, \"+\").replace(/_/g, \"/\"), \"base64\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a signed token authorising read access to `claims.resourceId` until\n * `exp = now + ttl`. The result is safe to drop into a query string —\n * `?t=<token>` — and verified by {@link verifyShortLivedToken} on the\n * downstream route.\n */\nexport function signShortLivedToken(claims: ShortLivedTokenClaims): string {\n  const ttl = claims.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const payload: DecodedClaims = {\n    resourceId: claims.resourceId,\n    exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + ttl,\n  };\n  if (claims.viewerEmail) payload.viewerEmail = claims.viewerEmail;\n\n  const payloadStr = base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(payload));\n  const sig = base64UrlEncode(\n    crypto.createHmac(\"sha256\", getSigningKey()).update(payloadStr).digest(),\n  );\n  return `${payloadStr}.${sig}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a token previously produced by {@link signShortLivedToken}.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true, viewerEmail? }` only when:\n *  - the token has the expected shape (`<payload>.<sig>`),\n *  - the signature matches via constant-time comparison,\n *  - the token has not expired,\n *  - the embedded `resourceId` matches `expectedResourceId`.\n *\n * Otherwise returns `{ ok: false, reason: <error string> }`. Callers should\n * not surface the reason to viewers (it's useful for server-side logs only).\n */\nexport function verifyShortLivedToken(\n  token: string,\n  expectedResourceId: string,\n): VerifyResult {\n  if (typeof token !== \"string\" || !token.includes(\".\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n  }\n  const [payloadStr, sig] = token.split(\".\", 2);\n  if (!payloadStr || !sig) return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n\n  const expected = base64UrlEncode(\n    crypto.createHmac(\"sha256\", getSigningKey()).update(payloadStr).digest(),\n  );\n\n  // Constant-time compare. Length-mismatched inputs would throw under\n  // `crypto.timingSafeEqual`, so we check length first and fall back to a\n  // dummy compare to keep timing roughly constant on the failure path.\n  const sigBuf = Buffer.from(sig, \"utf8\");\n  const expBuf = Buffer.from(expected, \"utf8\");\n  if (sigBuf.length !== expBuf.length) {\n    crypto.timingSafeEqual(expBuf, expBuf); // burn ~equal cycles\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_signature\" };\n  }\n  if (!crypto.timingSafeEqual(sigBuf, expBuf)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_signature\" };\n  }\n\n  let claims: DecodedClaims;\n  try {\n    claims = JSON.parse(base64UrlDecode(payloadStr).toString(\"utf8\"));\n  } catch {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n\n  if (typeof claims.exp !== \"number\") {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n  if (claims.exp * 1000 < Date.now()) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"expired\" };\n  }\n  if (claims.resourceId !== expectedResourceId) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"wrong_resource\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true, viewerEmail: claims.viewerEmail };\n}\n\n// ── Realtime subscribe tokens ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// An identity-bearing extension of the same HMAC discipline, used by the hosted\n// Realtime Gateway. Differs from the media token above in three ways the gateway\n// depends on:\n//   1. It is signed with a caller-supplied PER-PROJECT key (the app's HMAC\n//      secret), not the single deployment-wide `getSigningKey()`. The app server\n//      mints with it; the gateway (a second issuer for stream rotation) verifies\n//      and re-mints with the same per-project key. A token minted for project A\n//      fails signature verification against project B's key.\n//   2. It carries authorization-bearing identity (`owner`/`orgId`) that the\n//      gateway feeds to `canSeeChangeForUser` — the media token's `viewerEmail`\n//      is audit-only by contract, so a new field is required, not repurposed.\n//   3. It binds `projectId` as the channel and stamps a `typ` discriminator, so\n//      it is verified against the connect channel and cannot be replayed as a\n//      media token (or vice-versa) even if keys ever overlapped.\n\n/** Payload `typ` discriminator for realtime subscribe tokens. */\nexport const REALTIME_SUBSCRIBE_TOKEN_TYPE = \"rt-subscribe\";\nconst DEFAULT_REALTIME_TTL_SECONDS = 600;\n\n/** Inputs for {@link signRealtimeSubscribeToken}. */\nexport interface RealtimeSubscribeClaims {\n  /** Channel — one Neon project per app. Verified at connect, not just carried. */\n  projectId: string;\n  /**\n   * App end-user session email (NOT a Builder.io account — see the tech spec).\n   * Fed to `canSeeChangeForUser`. Present in v0.\n   */\n  owner?: string;\n  /** Framework org id for the app's end-user. */\n  orgId?: string;\n  /** Override default TTL (seconds). */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n}\n\ninterface DecodedRealtimeClaims {\n  typ: string;\n  projectId: string;\n  owner?: string;\n  orgId?: string;\n  exp: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link verifyRealtimeSubscribeToken}. On success it returns the\n * identity claims the gateway uses to scope delivery.\n */\nexport type RealtimeVerifyResult =\n  | {\n      ok: true;\n      projectId: string;\n      owner?: string;\n      orgId?: string;\n      exp: number;\n    }\n  | { ok: false; reason: string };\n\nfunction hmacB64(payloadStr: string, key: string): string {\n  return base64UrlEncode(\n    crypto.createHmac(\"sha256\", key).update(payloadStr).digest(),\n  );\n}\n\nfunction timingSafeEqualB64(sig: string, expected: string): boolean {\n  const sigBuf = Buffer.from(sig, \"utf8\");\n  const expBuf = Buffer.from(expected, \"utf8\");\n  if (sigBuf.length !== expBuf.length) {\n    crypto.timingSafeEqual(expBuf, expBuf); // burn ~equal cycles\n    return false;\n  }\n  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(sigBuf, expBuf);\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a realtime subscribe token for `claims.projectId`, signed with the\n * app's per-project `key`. Safe to place on the connect query string (short\n * TTL, single-purpose, channel-bound). Verified by\n * {@link verifyRealtimeSubscribeToken} at connect.\n */\nexport function signRealtimeSubscribeToken(\n  claims: RealtimeSubscribeClaims,\n  key: string,\n): string {\n  if (!key) throw new Error(\"signRealtimeSubscribeToken requires a key\");\n  // Fail closed: a token with neither owner nor orgId carries no authorization\n  // identity, so canSeeChangeForUser would only ever match global/unowned\n  // events. Every issuer (mint endpoint + the gateway's rotation re-mint) must\n  // supply at least one identity claim.\n  if (!claims.owner && !claims.orgId) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"signRealtimeSubscribeToken requires an owner or orgId claim\",\n    );\n  }\n  const ttl = claims.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_REALTIME_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const payload: DecodedRealtimeClaims = {\n    typ: REALTIME_SUBSCRIBE_TOKEN_TYPE,\n    projectId: claims.projectId,\n    exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + ttl,\n  };\n  if (claims.owner) payload.owner = claims.owner;\n  if (claims.orgId) payload.orgId = claims.orgId;\n\n  const payloadStr = base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(payload));\n  return `${payloadStr}.${hmacB64(payloadStr, key)}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a realtime subscribe token against the app's per-project `key` and the\n * connect channel `projectId`. Returns the identity claims only when the shape,\n * signature (constant-time), `typ`, `exp`, and `projectId` binding all hold.\n */\nexport function verifyRealtimeSubscribeToken(\n  token: string,\n  expected: { projectId: string; key: string },\n): RealtimeVerifyResult {\n  if (!expected.key) return { ok: false, reason: \"no_key\" };\n  if (typeof token !== \"string\" || !token.includes(\".\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n  }\n  const [payloadStr, sig] = token.split(\".\", 2);\n  if (!payloadStr || !sig) return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n\n  if (!timingSafeEqualB64(sig, hmacB64(payloadStr, expected.key))) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_signature\" };\n  }\n\n  let claims: DecodedRealtimeClaims;\n  try {\n    claims = JSON.parse(base64UrlDecode(payloadStr).toString(\"utf8\"));\n  } catch {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n\n  if (claims.typ !== REALTIME_SUBSCRIBE_TOKEN_TYPE) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"wrong_type\" };\n  }\n  if (typeof claims.exp !== \"number\") {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n  if (claims.exp * 1000 < Date.now()) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"expired\" };\n  }\n  if (claims.projectId !== expected.projectId) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"wrong_project\" };\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    projectId: claims.projectId,\n    owner: claims.owner,\n    orgId: claims.orgId,\n    exp: claims.exp,\n  };\n}\n"]}
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* Short-lived HMAC-signed access tokens for media URLs.\n *\n * Used by clips and calls to mint a single-use bearer token after a password\n * gate passes, then bake `?t=<token>` into the video/blob URL handed to the\n * `<video>` element — instead of `?password=<plaintext>` (which ends up in\n * browser history, CDN logs, and Referer headers).\n *\n * Token shape: `<payloadB64Url>.<sigB64Url>`\n *   payload = base64url(JSON.stringify({ resourceId, viewerEmail?, exp }))\n *   sig     = base64url(HMAC-SHA256(payload, key))\n *\n * Key resolution mirrors `google-oauth.ts:getStateSigningKey`:\n *   1. OAUTH_STATE_SECRET (preferred — dedicated to short-lived signing)\n *   2. BETTER_AUTH_SECRET (already used as a server secret)\n *   3. Hosted workspace deploys derive a per-purpose key from A2A_SECRET\n *   4. In dev only, an ephemeral random key (per-process)\n *\n * In production, throws if no usable server secret is set.\n */\n\nimport crypto from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport { getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret } from \"./derived-secret.js\";\n\n/** Default token TTL, in seconds. 10 minutes covers a typical video session. */\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 600;\n\n/**\n * Inputs for {@link signShortLivedToken}.\n */\nexport interface ShortLivedTokenClaims {\n  /** Resource id the token authorises (recording id, call id, snippet id, …). */\n  resourceId: string;\n  /** Optional viewer email for audit / analytics — not used for authorisation. */\n  viewerEmail?: string;\n  /** Override default TTL (seconds). */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n}\n\ninterface DecodedClaims {\n  resourceId: string;\n  viewerEmail?: string;\n  exp: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link verifyShortLivedToken}. Discriminated by the literal\n * `ok` field so callers can `if (!result.ok) return …`.\n */\nexport type VerifyResult =\n  | { ok: true; viewerEmail?: string }\n  | { ok: false; reason: string };\n\nlet _devSigningKey: string | undefined;\n\nfunction getSigningKey(): string {\n  const secret =\n    process.env.OAUTH_STATE_SECRET ||\n    process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET ||\n    getWorkspaceA2ADerivedSecret(\"short-lived-token\");\n  if (secret) return secret;\n\n  if (process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\") {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"Short-lived token signing requires a server secret. \" +\n        \"Set OAUTH_STATE_SECRET, BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, or A2A_SECRET in production workspace deploys.\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!_devSigningKey) {\n    _devSigningKey = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString(\"hex\");\n  }\n  return _devSigningKey;\n}\n\nfunction base64UrlEncode(buf: Buffer | string): string {\n  const b = typeof buf === \"string\" ? Buffer.from(buf, \"utf8\") : buf;\n  return b\n    .toString(\"base64\")\n    .replace(/\\+/g, \"-\")\n    .replace(/\\//g, \"_\")\n    .replace(/=+$/g, \"\");\n}\n\nfunction base64UrlDecode(s: string): Buffer {\n  // Re-pad to a multiple of 4 so Buffer.from('base64') decodes cleanly.\n  const padded = s + \"=\".repeat((4 - (s.length % 4)) % 4);\n  return Buffer.from(padded.replace(/-/g, \"+\").replace(/_/g, \"/\"), \"base64\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a signed token authorising read access to `claims.resourceId` until\n * `exp = now + ttl`. The result is safe to drop into a query string —\n * `?t=<token>` — and verified by {@link verifyShortLivedToken} on the\n * downstream route.\n */\nexport function signShortLivedToken(claims: ShortLivedTokenClaims): string {\n  const ttl = claims.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const payload: DecodedClaims = {\n    resourceId: claims.resourceId,\n    exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + ttl,\n  };\n  if (claims.viewerEmail) payload.viewerEmail = claims.viewerEmail;\n\n  const payloadStr = base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(payload));\n  const sig = base64UrlEncode(\n    crypto.createHmac(\"sha256\", getSigningKey()).update(payloadStr).digest(),\n  );\n  return `${payloadStr}.${sig}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a token previously produced by {@link signShortLivedToken}.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true, viewerEmail? }` only when:\n *  - the token has the expected shape (`<payload>.<sig>`),\n *  - the signature matches via constant-time comparison,\n *  - the token has not expired,\n *  - the embedded `resourceId` matches `expectedResourceId`.\n *\n * Otherwise returns `{ ok: false, reason: <error string> }`. Callers should\n * not surface the reason to viewers (it's useful for server-side logs only).\n */\nexport function verifyShortLivedToken(\n  token: string,\n  expectedResourceId: string,\n): VerifyResult {\n  if (typeof token !== \"string\" || !token.includes(\".\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n  }\n  const [payloadStr, sig] = token.split(\".\", 2);\n  if (!payloadStr || !sig) return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n\n  const expected = base64UrlEncode(\n    crypto.createHmac(\"sha256\", getSigningKey()).update(payloadStr).digest(),\n  );\n\n  // Constant-time compare. Length-mismatched inputs would throw under\n  // `crypto.timingSafeEqual`, so we check length first and fall back to a\n  // dummy compare to keep timing roughly constant on the failure path.\n  const sigBuf = Buffer.from(sig, \"utf8\");\n  const expBuf = Buffer.from(expected, \"utf8\");\n  if (sigBuf.length !== expBuf.length) {\n    crypto.timingSafeEqual(expBuf, expBuf); // burn ~equal cycles\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_signature\" };\n  }\n  if (!crypto.timingSafeEqual(sigBuf, expBuf)) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_signature\" };\n  }\n\n  let claims: DecodedClaims;\n  try {\n    claims = JSON.parse(base64UrlDecode(payloadStr).toString(\"utf8\"));\n  } catch {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n\n  if (typeof claims.exp !== \"number\") {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n  if (claims.exp * 1000 < Date.now()) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"expired\" };\n  }\n  if (claims.resourceId !== expectedResourceId) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"wrong_resource\" };\n  }\n\n  return { ok: true, viewerEmail: claims.viewerEmail };\n}\n\n// ── Realtime subscribe tokens ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// An identity-bearing extension of the same HMAC discipline, used by the hosted\n// Realtime Gateway. Differs from the media token above in three ways the gateway\n// depends on:\n//   1. It is signed with a caller-supplied PER-PROJECT key (the app's HMAC\n//      secret), not the single deployment-wide `getSigningKey()`. The app server\n//      mints with it; the gateway (a second issuer for stream rotation) verifies\n//      and re-mints with the same per-project key. A token minted for project A\n//      fails signature verification against project B's key.\n//   2. It carries authorization-bearing identity (`owner`/`orgId`) that the\n//      gateway feeds to `canSeeChangeForUser` — the media token's `viewerEmail`\n//      is audit-only by contract, so a new field is required, not repurposed.\n//   3. It binds `projectId` as the channel and stamps a `typ` discriminator, so\n//      it is verified against the connect channel and cannot be replayed as a\n//      media token (or vice-versa) even if keys ever overlapped.\n\n/** Payload `typ` discriminator for realtime subscribe tokens. */\nexport const REALTIME_SUBSCRIBE_TOKEN_TYPE = \"rt-subscribe\";\nconst DEFAULT_REALTIME_TTL_SECONDS = 600;\n\n/** Inputs for {@link signRealtimeSubscribeToken}. */\nexport interface RealtimeSubscribeClaims {\n  /** Channel — one Neon project per app. Verified at connect, not just carried. */\n  projectId: string;\n  /**\n   * App end-user session email (NOT a Builder.io account — see the tech spec).\n   * Fed to `canSeeChangeForUser`. Present in v0.\n   */\n  owner?: string;\n  /** Framework org id for the app's end-user. */\n  orgId?: string;\n  /** Override default TTL (seconds). */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n}\n\ninterface DecodedRealtimeClaims {\n  typ: string;\n  projectId: string;\n  owner?: string;\n  orgId?: string;\n  exp: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link verifyRealtimeSubscribeToken}. On success it returns the\n * identity claims the gateway uses to scope delivery.\n */\nexport type RealtimeVerifyResult =\n  | {\n      ok: true;\n      projectId: string;\n      owner?: string;\n      orgId?: string;\n      exp: number;\n    }\n  | { ok: false; reason: string };\n\nfunction hmacB64(payloadStr: string, key: string): string {\n  return base64UrlEncode(\n    crypto.createHmac(\"sha256\", key).update(payloadStr).digest(),\n  );\n}\n\nfunction timingSafeEqualB64(sig: string, expected: string): boolean {\n  const sigBuf = Buffer.from(sig, \"utf8\");\n  const expBuf = Buffer.from(expected, \"utf8\");\n  if (sigBuf.length !== expBuf.length) {\n    crypto.timingSafeEqual(expBuf, expBuf); // burn ~equal cycles\n    return false;\n  }\n  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(sigBuf, expBuf);\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a realtime subscribe token for `claims.projectId`, signed with the\n * app's per-project `key`. Safe to place on the connect query string (short\n * TTL, single-purpose, channel-bound). Verified by\n * {@link verifyRealtimeSubscribeToken} at connect.\n */\nexport function signRealtimeSubscribeToken(\n  claims: RealtimeSubscribeClaims,\n  key: string,\n): string {\n  if (!key) throw new Error(\"signRealtimeSubscribeToken requires a key\");\n  // Fail closed: a token with neither owner nor orgId carries no authorization\n  // identity, so canSeeChangeForUser would only ever match global/unowned\n  // events. Every issuer (mint endpoint + the gateway's rotation re-mint) must\n  // supply at least one identity claim.\n  if (!claims.owner && !claims.orgId) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"signRealtimeSubscribeToken requires an owner or orgId claim\",\n    );\n  }\n  const ttl = claims.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_REALTIME_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const payload: DecodedRealtimeClaims = {\n    typ: REALTIME_SUBSCRIBE_TOKEN_TYPE,\n    projectId: claims.projectId,\n    exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + ttl,\n  };\n  if (claims.owner) payload.owner = claims.owner;\n  if (claims.orgId) payload.orgId = claims.orgId;\n\n  const payloadStr = base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(payload));\n  return `${payloadStr}.${hmacB64(payloadStr, key)}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a realtime subscribe token against the app's per-project `key` and the\n * connect channel `projectId`. Returns the identity claims only when the shape,\n * signature (constant-time), `typ`, `exp`, and `projectId` binding all hold.\n */\nexport function verifyRealtimeSubscribeToken(\n  token: string,\n  expected: { projectId: string; key: string },\n): RealtimeVerifyResult {\n  if (!expected.key) return { ok: false, reason: \"no_key\" };\n  if (typeof token !== \"string\" || !token.includes(\".\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n  }\n  const [payloadStr, sig] = token.split(\".\", 2);\n  if (!payloadStr || !sig) return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n\n  if (!timingSafeEqualB64(sig, hmacB64(payloadStr, expected.key))) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_signature\" };\n  }\n\n  let claims: DecodedRealtimeClaims;\n  try {\n    claims = JSON.parse(base64UrlDecode(payloadStr).toString(\"utf8\"));\n  } catch {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n\n  if (claims.typ !== REALTIME_SUBSCRIBE_TOKEN_TYPE) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"wrong_type\" };\n  }\n  if (typeof claims.exp !== \"number\") {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n  if (claims.exp * 1000 < Date.now()) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"expired\" };\n  }\n  if (claims.projectId !== expected.projectId) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"wrong_project\" };\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    projectId: claims.projectId,\n    owner: claims.owner,\n    orgId: claims.orgId,\n    exp: claims.exp,\n  };\n}\n\n// ── Gateway access-check tokens ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n//\n// The hosted gateway has no access to an app's shareable-resource registry, so\n// it cannot resolve sharee visibility itself. It signs one of these with the\n// app's per-project key and calls the app's `/_agent-native/can-see`, which runs\n// `resolveAccess` and answers. The full access query is bound into the token so\n// the app authenticates the params, not merely the caller.\n\n/** Payload `typ` discriminator for gateway access-check tokens. */\nexport const GATEWAY_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE = \"rt-access-check\";\n/** Short TTL: minted per check, used immediately server-to-server. */\nconst DEFAULT_GATEWAY_ACCESS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\n\n/** Inputs for {@link signGatewayAccessToken}. */\nexport interface GatewayAccessClaims {\n  projectId: string;\n  resourceType: string;\n  resourceId: string;\n  /** App end-user whose visibility of the resource is being checked. */\n  userEmail: string;\n  orgId?: string;\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n}\n\ninterface DecodedGatewayAccessClaims {\n  typ: string;\n  projectId: string;\n  resourceType: string;\n  resourceId: string;\n  userEmail: string;\n  orgId?: string;\n  exp: number;\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link verifyGatewayAccessToken}; on success carries the bound query. */\nexport type GatewayAccessVerifyResult =\n  | {\n      ok: true;\n      projectId: string;\n      resourceType: string;\n      resourceId: string;\n      userEmail: string;\n      orgId?: string;\n    }\n  | { ok: false; reason: string };\n\n/** Mint a gateway access-check token, signed with the app's per-project `key`. */\nexport function signGatewayAccessToken(\n  claims: GatewayAccessClaims,\n  key: string,\n): string {\n  if (!key) throw new Error(\"signGatewayAccessToken requires a key\");\n  const ttl = claims.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_GATEWAY_ACCESS_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const payload: DecodedGatewayAccessClaims = {\n    typ: GATEWAY_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE,\n    projectId: claims.projectId,\n    resourceType: claims.resourceType,\n    resourceId: claims.resourceId,\n    userEmail: claims.userEmail,\n    exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + ttl,\n  };\n  if (claims.orgId) payload.orgId = claims.orgId;\n  const payloadStr = base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(payload));\n  return `${payloadStr}.${hmacB64(payloadStr, key)}`;\n}\n\n/** Verify a gateway access-check token against the app's per-project `key`. */\nexport function verifyGatewayAccessToken(\n  token: string,\n  key: string,\n  expectedProjectId?: string,\n): GatewayAccessVerifyResult {\n  if (!key) return { ok: false, reason: \"no_key\" };\n  if (typeof token !== \"string\" || !token.includes(\".\")) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n  }\n  const [payloadStr, sig] = token.split(\".\", 2);\n  if (!payloadStr || !sig) return { ok: false, reason: \"malformed\" };\n\n  if (!timingSafeEqualB64(sig, hmacB64(payloadStr, key))) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_signature\" };\n  }\n\n  let claims: DecodedGatewayAccessClaims;\n  try {\n    claims = JSON.parse(base64UrlDecode(payloadStr).toString(\"utf8\"));\n  } catch {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n\n  if (claims.typ !== GATEWAY_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"wrong_type\" };\n  }\n  if (typeof claims.exp !== \"number\")\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  if (claims.exp * 1000 < Date.now()) return { ok: false, reason: \"expired\" };\n  if (\n    !claims.projectId ||\n    !claims.resourceType ||\n    !claims.resourceId ||\n    !claims.userEmail\n  ) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"bad_payload\" };\n  }\n  // Optional channel binding, mirroring verifyRealtimeSubscribeToken. The\n  // per-project key already scopes verification to one app; this is belt-and-\n  // suspenders for a future multi-tenant secret store. Skipped when the caller\n  // can't cheaply resolve its own project id (scoped-secret apps).\n  if (expectedProjectId && claims.projectId !== expectedProjectId) {\n    return { ok: false, reason: \"wrong_project\" };\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    projectId: claims.projectId,\n    resourceType: claims.resourceType,\n    resourceId: claims.resourceId,\n    userEmail: claims.userEmail,\n    orgId: claims.orgId,\n  };\n}\n"]}

package/dist/server/transcribe-voice.d.ts

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ export declare function createTranscribeVoiceHandler(): import("h3").EventHandle
     error: string;
     text?: undefined;
 } | {
-    error?: undefined;
     text: string;
+    error?: undefined;
 }>>;
 //# sourceMappingURL=transcribe-voice.d.ts.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@agent-native/core",
-  "version": "0.120.4",
+  "version": "0.121.1",
   "description": "Framework for agent-native application development — where AI agents and UI share SQL state, actions, and context",
   "homepage": "https://github.com/BuilderIO/agent-native#readme",
   "bugs": {

package/src/agent/durable-background.ts

@@ -114,10 +114,15 @@ function isNetlifyHostedRuntimeForDispatch(): boolean {
   if (process.env.NETLIFY_LOCAL === "true") return false;
   if (process.env.NETLIFY === "false") return false;
   if (process.env.NETLIFY && process.env.NETLIFY !== "false") return true;
-  // Netlify sets AWS Lambda runtime env on deployed Functions, but the build-time
-  // NETLIFY flag is not always present in the runtime isolate. Treat Lambda as
-  // Netlify here unless Netlify was explicitly disabled above; non-Netlify AWS
-  // falls back inline if the /.netlify/functions dispatch fast-fails.
+  // NETLIFY is a build-only read-only variable. In deployed Functions Netlify
+  // documents URL, SITE_NAME, and SITE_ID as the runtime read-only variables;
+  // SITE_ID is the unambiguous host marker. Lambda compatibility mode also
+  // exposes AWS runtime variables, so keep the function-name fallback for older
+  // deploys. Without either check a modern Netlify Function silently selects the
+  // portable framework route even though the emitted background function exists.
+  if (process.env.SITE_ID) return true; // guard:allow-env-credential -- Netlify's read-only public site identifier is a runtime host marker, not a user credential.
+  // Non-Netlify AWS falls back inline if the /.netlify/functions dispatch
+  // fast-fails.
   return Boolean(process.env.AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_NAME);
 }
 
@@ -202,6 +207,9 @@ export const AGENT_CHAT_BACKGROUND_RUN_FIELD = "__backgroundRun";
  * what "hosted" means.
  */
 export function isHostedRuntimeForDurableBackground(): boolean {
+  if (process.env.NETLIFY_LOCAL === "true") return false;
+  if (process.env.NETLIFY === "false") return false;
+  if (process.env.SITE_ID) return true; // guard:allow-env-credential -- Netlify's read-only public site identifier is a runtime host marker, not a user credential.
   if (
     process.env.NETLIFY &&
     process.env.NETLIFY !== "false" &&

package/src/agent/run-manager.ts

@@ -319,6 +319,9 @@ export interface ResolveRunSoftTimeoutOptions {
  * that clamp (and the platform wall behind it) exists.
  */
 export function isHostedRuntime(): boolean {
+  if (process.env.NETLIFY_LOCAL === "true") return false;
+  if (process.env.NETLIFY === "false") return false;
+  if (process.env.SITE_ID) return true; // guard:allow-env-credential -- Netlify's read-only public site identifier is a runtime host marker, not a user credential.
   if (
     process.env.NETLIFY &&
     process.env.NETLIFY !== "false" &&

package/src/client/use-db-sync.ts

@@ -330,9 +330,11 @@ class SyncTransport {
 
   private get activeSseUrl(): string | false {
     if (this.mode === "hosted" && this.gateway) {
-      return this.token
-        ? `${this.gateway.sseUrl}?token=${encodeURIComponent(this.token)}`
-        : this.gateway.sseUrl;
+      if (!this.token) return this.gateway.sseUrl;
+      const base = `${this.gateway.sseUrl}?token=${encodeURIComponent(this.token)}`;
+      // Cursor lets the gateway replay the reconnect gap on connect instead of
+      // deferring it to the next poll; 0 on first connect means nothing to replay.
+      return this.versionRef > 0 ? `${base}&since=${this.versionRef}` : base;
     }
     return this.sseUrl;
   }
@@ -656,27 +658,27 @@ class SyncTransport {
       this.schedulePoll();
     };
     source.onerror = () => {
+      // A replaced/closed source can still fire late; ignore it so it can't
+      // flip the connected state or tear down the current stream.
+      if (this.eventSource !== source) return;
       this.setSseConnected(false);
-      // When the browser gives up permanently (HTTP error → readyState
-      // CLOSED), it won't auto-reconnect. Drop the ref so a later
-      // connectEvents() (on focus/visibility) can establish a fresh stream;
-      // otherwise the non-null closed `eventSource` blocks reconnection and
-      // we'd be stuck on polling-only forever.
+      if (this.mode === "hosted" && this.gateway) {
+        // Browser auto-reconnect reuses the URL frozen at construction, so it
+        // would replay from a stale `since`. Own the reconnect so the next
+        // connect rebuilds activeSseUrl from the current versionRef. CLOSED also
+        // refreshes the token (expired/rotated/deploy); CONNECTING keeps it. A
+        // successful reconnect resets the count in onopen; a hard-down gateway
+        // trips the threshold and health-gates to local.
+        if (source.readyState === EventSource.CLOSED) this.token = null;
+        this.closeEvents();
+        this.onGatewayTransientFailure();
+        if (this.mode === "hosted") this.scheduleGatewayReconnect();
+        return;
+      }
+      // Local mode: native EventSource reconnect is fine. Drop a CLOSED ref so a
+      // later connectEvents() (focus/visibility) can establish a fresh stream.
       if (source.readyState === EventSource.CLOSED) {
         this.eventSource = null;
-        if (this.mode === "hosted" && this.gateway) {
-          // A closed gateway stream is most likely an expired token or a
-          // request-timeout/deploy cycle. Re-mint and reconnect with jitter;
-          // this is NOT the poll-401 cooldown path. Each closed stream counts
-          // toward the unhealthy threshold so a hard-down gateway (or one
-          // rejecting our tokens) health-gates to local instead of looping
-          // mint+connect forever; a successful reconnect resets the count in
-          // onopen above.
-          this.token = null;
-          this.onGatewayTransientFailure();
-          if (this.mode === "hosted") this.scheduleGatewayReconnect();
-          return;
-        }
       }
       this.schedulePoll();
     };

package/src/deploy/build.ts

@@ -2447,6 +2447,7 @@ export const config = {
   name: "agent-native server keep warm",
   generator: "agent-native build",
   schedule: "* * * * *",
+  nodeBundler: "none",
 };
 `;
 

package/src/server/core-routes-plugin.ts

@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ import {
   markDefaultPluginProvided,
   trackPluginInit,
 } from "./framework-request-handler.js";
+import { createGatewayAccessCheckHandler } from "./gateway-access-check.js";
 import { getAppBasePath, getOrigin } from "./google-oauth.js";
 import { createGoogleRealtimeSessionHandler } from "./google-realtime-session.js";
 import {
@@ -1429,6 +1430,8 @@ export function createCoreRoutesPlugin(
         `${P}/realtime-token`,
         createRealtimeTokenHandler(),
       );
+      // Sharee visibility check for the hosted gateway
+      getH3App(nitroApp).use(`${P}/can-see`, createGatewayAccessCheckHandler());
 
       // SSE
       if (!options.disableSSE) {

package/src/server/gateway-access-check.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * `GET /_agent-native/can-see` — the hosted Realtime Gateway's sharee-visibility
+ * check. Verifies a gateway access-check token (rationale in
+ * short-lived-token.ts), runs the app's own `resolveAccess`, answers
+ * `{ allowed }`, and fails closed.
+ */
+
+import {
+  defineEventHandler,
+  getMethod,
+  getQuery,
+  type H3Event,
+  setResponseHeader,
+  setResponseStatus,
+} from "h3";
+
+import { resolveAccess } from "../sharing/access.js";
+import { getBuilderBranchProjectId } from "./builder-browser.js";
+import { getRealtimeSigningSecret } from "./realtime-token.js";
+import { runWithRequestContext } from "./request-context.js";
+import { verifyGatewayAccessToken } from "./short-lived-token.js";
+
+export function createGatewayAccessCheckHandler() {
+  return defineEventHandler(async (event: H3Event) => {
+    setResponseHeader(event, "Cache-Control", "private, no-store");
+
+    if (getMethod(event) !== "GET") {
+      setResponseStatus(event, 405);
+      return { error: "Method not allowed" };
+    }
+
+    const secret = getRealtimeSigningSecret();
+    if (!secret) {
+      setResponseStatus(event, 404);
+      return { error: "Realtime gateway not configured" };
+    }
+
+    const token = getQuery(event).token;
+    // Sync, env-only: binds the token's channel when this app's project id is
+    // known, and no-ops (undefined) for scoped-secret apps where it isn't.
+    const expectedProjectId = getBuilderBranchProjectId() || undefined;
+    const verified =
+      typeof token === "string"
+        ? verifyGatewayAccessToken(token, secret, expectedProjectId)
+        : ({ ok: false, reason: "missing" } as const);
+    if (!verified.ok) {
+      setResponseStatus(event, 401);
+      return { error: "Unauthorized" };
+    }
+
+    const { resourceType, resourceId, userEmail, orgId } = verified;
+    return runWithRequestContext({ userEmail, orgId }, async () => {
+      try {
+        const access = await resolveAccess(
+          resourceType,
+          resourceId,
+          { userEmail, orgId },
+          { skipResourceBody: true },
+        );
+        return { allowed: access != null };
+      } catch {
+        // Unknown resource type or lookup failure: fail closed.
+        return { allowed: false };
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}