@agent-native/core 0.12.21 → 0.12.22

package/dist/server/security-headers.d.ts

@@ -28,10 +28,11 @@
  *   - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` — strips path/query
  *     from outbound Referer headers when the request crosses origin, so a
  *     public-share viewer's outbound link clicks never leak the share token.
- *   - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(),
- *     screen-wake-lock=()` — blocks iframed children from inheriting camera
- *     / mic / location grants. Templates that need camera/mic for recording
- *     UI override this on their own routes.
+ *   - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(),
+ *     screen-wake-lock=()` — allows the app shell to request microphone access
+ *     for composer dictation while keeping camera/location/wake-lock blocked
+ *     by default. Templates that need broader media capture for recording UI
+ *     override this on their own routes.
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` — isolates window.opener so
  *     a popup-window opener reference can't read or modify our document.
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site` — prevents other origins from

package/dist/server/security-headers.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"security-headers.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/server/security-headers.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6CG;AA6BH;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,+BAA+B,8EAqB9C"}

package/dist/server/security-headers.js

@@ -28,10 +28,11 @@
  *   - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` — strips path/query
  *     from outbound Referer headers when the request crosses origin, so a
  *     public-share viewer's outbound link clicks never leak the share token.
- *   - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(),
- *     screen-wake-lock=()` — blocks iframed children from inheriting camera
- *     / mic / location grants. Templates that need camera/mic for recording
- *     UI override this on their own routes.
+ *   - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(),
+ *     screen-wake-lock=()` — allows the app shell to request microphone access
+ *     for composer dictation while keeping camera/location/wake-lock blocked
+ *     by default. Templates that need broader media capture for recording UI
+ *     override this on their own routes.
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` — isolates window.opener so
  *     a popup-window opener reference can't read or modify our document.
  *   - `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site` — prevents other origins from
@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@
  */
 import { defineEventHandler, setResponseHeader } from "h3";
 const HSTS = "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload";
-const PERMISSIONS_POLICY = "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), screen-wake-lock=()";
+const PERMISSIONS_POLICY = "camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(), screen-wake-lock=()";
 /**
  * Returns true when the request was received over HTTPS. We trust both the
  * underlying connection (when the server is terminating TLS itself) and the

package/dist/server/security-headers.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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These headers are layered defenses: each one mitigates a specific\n * class of attack, and together they harden the surface against clickjacking,\n * MIME-sniffing, referrer leakage, mixed-content downgrades, and cross-origin\n * window/embed access.\n *\n * The headers we emit:\n *\n *   - `Strict-Transport-Security` — forces HTTPS for the browser's lifetime\n *     of the cached value, preventing SSL-strip MITM. Only emitted when the\n *     request scheme is `https` (we don't want to break local-dev HTTP, and\n *     emitting HSTS over HTTP is a no-op per the spec but causes confusion).\n *   - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` — disables browser MIME sniffing so\n *     a tool /render route serving user-authored HTML can't be misinterpreted\n *     as some other content type by a clever Accept header.\n *   - `X-Frame-Options: DENY` — prevents the entire app from being iframed by\n *     other origins (clickjacking the agent chat, booking pages, etc.). The\n *     tool /render endpoint and any other route that legitimately needs to be\n *     embedded in the same-origin app shell can opt out by setting its own\n *     header inside the route handler — h3's `setResponseHeader` overwrites,\n *     so a route emitting `SAMEORIGIN` wins over our middleware default.\n *     We skip this header entirely in dev (NODE_ENV !== \"production\") so the\n *     desktop app's local dev frame (localhost:3334) can iframe templates\n *     running on other localhost ports (e.g. mail at 8085).\n *   - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` — strips path/query\n *     from outbound Referer headers when the request crosses origin, so a\n *     public-share viewer's outbound link clicks never leak the share token.\n *   - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(),\n *     screen-wake-lock=()` — blocks iframed children from inheriting camera\n *     / mic / location grants. Templates that need camera/mic for recording\n *     UI override this on their own routes.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` — isolates window.opener so\n *     a popup-window opener reference can't read or modify our document.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site` — prevents other origins from\n *     embedding our endpoints as `<img>` / `<script>` / `<audio>`, blocking\n *     the simplest data-leak chain when combined with auth cookies.\n *\n * NOTE: We don't set `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy` because it requires every\n * embedded subresource to opt in via CORP/CORS, which would break Builder's\n * iframe editor and template embed use cases. COOP + CORP without COEP gives\n * us most of the protection.\n */\n\nimport { defineEventHandler, setResponseHeader } from \"h3\";\n\nconst HSTS = \"max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\";\nconst PERMISSIONS_POLICY =\n  \"camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), screen-wake-lock=()\";\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the request was received over HTTPS. We trust both the\n * underlying connection (when the server is terminating TLS itself) and the\n * `x-forwarded-proto` header (set by Netlify, Vercel, Cloudflare, and any\n * other reverse proxy that fronts the framework).\n */\nfunction isHttpsRequest(event: any): boolean {\n  const xfp =\n    event?.node?.req?.headers?.[\"x-forwarded-proto\"] ??\n    event?.headers?.get?.(\"x-forwarded-proto\");\n  if (typeof xfp === \"string\" && xfp.split(\",\")[0].trim() === \"https\")\n    return true;\n  if (Array.isArray(xfp) && xfp[0] === \"https\") return true;\n  // h3 sets `event.url.protocol` to \"http:\" or \"https:\".\n  const proto = event?.url?.protocol;\n  if (proto === \"https:\") return true;\n  // Direct Node `req.connection.encrypted` (older runtimes).\n  if (event?.node?.req?.connection?.encrypted) return true;\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the security-headers h3 middleware. Mount this BEFORE other route\n * handlers so the headers are present on every response (including 4xx/5xx\n * error pages). Route handlers that need to relax a specific header (e.g.\n * `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on the tool render route) can call\n * `setResponseHeader` after this runs — the latest write wins.\n */\nexport function createSecurityHeadersMiddleware() {\n  const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\";\n  return defineEventHandler((event) => {\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"X-Content-Type-Options\", \"nosniff\");\n    if (isProduction) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"X-Frame-Options\", \"DENY\");\n    }\n    setResponseHeader(\n      event,\n      \"Referrer-Policy\",\n      \"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\",\n    );\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Permissions-Policy\", PERMISSIONS_POLICY);\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy\", \"same-origin\");\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy\", \"same-site\");\n    if (isHttpsRequest(event)) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Strict-Transport-Security\", HSTS);\n    }\n    // Continue to the next handler — we only set headers, don't return a body.\n    return undefined;\n  });\n}\n"]}
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The\n *     tool /render endpoint and any other route that legitimately needs to be\n *     embedded in the same-origin app shell can opt out by setting its own\n *     header inside the route handler — h3's `setResponseHeader` overwrites,\n *     so a route emitting `SAMEORIGIN` wins over our middleware default.\n *     We skip this header entirely in dev (NODE_ENV !== \"production\") so the\n *     desktop app's local dev frame (localhost:3334) can iframe templates\n *     running on other localhost ports (e.g. mail at 8085).\n *   - `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` — strips path/query\n *     from outbound Referer headers when the request crosses origin, so a\n *     public-share viewer's outbound link clicks never leak the share token.\n *   - `Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(),\n *     screen-wake-lock=()` — allows the app shell to request microphone access\n *     for composer dictation while keeping camera/location/wake-lock blocked\n *     by default. Templates that need broader media capture for recording UI\n *     override this on their own routes.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` — isolates window.opener so\n *     a popup-window opener reference can't read or modify our document.\n *   - `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-site` — prevents other origins from\n *     embedding our endpoints as `<img>` / `<script>` / `<audio>`, blocking\n *     the simplest data-leak chain when combined with auth cookies.\n *\n * NOTE: We don't set `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy` because it requires every\n * embedded subresource to opt in via CORP/CORS, which would break Builder's\n * iframe editor and template embed use cases. COOP + CORP without COEP gives\n * us most of the protection.\n */\n\nimport { defineEventHandler, setResponseHeader } from \"h3\";\n\nconst HSTS = \"max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\";\nconst PERMISSIONS_POLICY =\n  \"camera=(), microphone=(self), geolocation=(), screen-wake-lock=()\";\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the request was received over HTTPS. We trust both the\n * underlying connection (when the server is terminating TLS itself) and the\n * `x-forwarded-proto` header (set by Netlify, Vercel, Cloudflare, and any\n * other reverse proxy that fronts the framework).\n */\nfunction isHttpsRequest(event: any): boolean {\n  const xfp =\n    event?.node?.req?.headers?.[\"x-forwarded-proto\"] ??\n    event?.headers?.get?.(\"x-forwarded-proto\");\n  if (typeof xfp === \"string\" && xfp.split(\",\")[0].trim() === \"https\")\n    return true;\n  if (Array.isArray(xfp) && xfp[0] === \"https\") return true;\n  // h3 sets `event.url.protocol` to \"http:\" or \"https:\".\n  const proto = event?.url?.protocol;\n  if (proto === \"https:\") return true;\n  // Direct Node `req.connection.encrypted` (older runtimes).\n  if (event?.node?.req?.connection?.encrypted) return true;\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the security-headers h3 middleware. Mount this BEFORE other route\n * handlers so the headers are present on every response (including 4xx/5xx\n * error pages). Route handlers that need to relax a specific header (e.g.\n * `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` on the tool render route) can call\n * `setResponseHeader` after this runs — the latest write wins.\n */\nexport function createSecurityHeadersMiddleware() {\n  const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV === \"production\";\n  return defineEventHandler((event) => {\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"X-Content-Type-Options\", \"nosniff\");\n    if (isProduction) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"X-Frame-Options\", \"DENY\");\n    }\n    setResponseHeader(\n      event,\n      \"Referrer-Policy\",\n      \"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\",\n    );\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Permissions-Policy\", PERMISSIONS_POLICY);\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy\", \"same-origin\");\n    setResponseHeader(event, \"Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy\", \"same-site\");\n    if (isHttpsRequest(event)) {\n      setResponseHeader(event, \"Strict-Transport-Security\", HSTS);\n    }\n    // Continue to the next handler — we only set headers, don't return a body.\n    return undefined;\n  });\n}\n"]}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@agent-native/core",
-  "version": "0.12.21",
+  "version": "0.12.22",
   "type": "module",
   "description": "Framework for agent-native application development — where AI agents and UI share state via files",
   "license": "MIT",