@agent-ix/spec-objects-security 0.4.1 → 0.8.0

package/skeletons/password_policy.md

@@ -1,26 +1,41 @@
 ---
-id: PASSPOL-001
-title: "Atlas local-account password policy"
+id: PWD-001
+title: "TenantPasswordPolicy"
 type: password_policy
+object: password_policy
 ---
-<!-- password_policy authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part
-     with substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type:
-       password_policy).
-     - A "Rules" section MUST enumerate the enforced password rules. -->
-# [PASSPOL-001] Atlas local-account password policy
-
-Applies to break-glass local accounts only; regular tenant users authenticate
-through their IdP (AUTHFLOW-001). Aligned with NIST SP 800-63B: length over
-composition, breach screening over forced rotation.
+<!-- password_policy authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
+     substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: password_policy,
+       object: password_policy.
+     - "## Rules" (H2, required): the rules in prose.
+     - "## Invariants" (H2): PasswordPolicy.json requires at least one clause. -->
+# [PWD-001] TenantPasswordPolicy
 
 ## Rules
 
-- Minimum length 12 characters, maximum 128; all printable Unicode accepted
-- Candidate passwords are checked against the haveibeenpwned k-anonymity API
-  and rejected when previously breached
-- No mandatory periodic rotation; rotation is forced only on suspected
-  compromise
-- Hashing: argon2id with memory 64 MiB, iterations 3, parallelism 4
-- Rate limiting: 10 failed attempts per account per 15 minutes, then lockout
-  with audit event emission
+- At least 12 characters, with no composition rule beyond length.
+- Checked against the breached-password corpus at set time and at each login.
+- No forced periodic expiry; rotation is event-driven on suspected compromise.
+- Stored only as an Argon2id digest, never reversibly.
+
+## Invariants
+
+The clauses this policy asserts. Each clause owns one `ocl` fence under its
+own `### <clauseId>` heading.
+
+### MinimumLengthIsTwelve
+
+```ocl
+context TenantPasswordPolicy
+inv MinimumLengthIsTwelve:
+  self.minimum_length >= 12
+```
+
+### NoReversibleStorage
+
+```ocl
+context TenantPasswordPolicy
+inv NoReversibleStorage:
+  self.storage_scheme = 'argon2id'
+```

package/skeletons/permission.md

@@ -1,18 +1,24 @@
 ---
 id: PERM-001
-title: "Read tenant documents"
+title: "ExportTenantData"
 type: permission
-resource: document
-verb: read
+object: permission
+resource: "tenant/records"
+verb: export
 ---
-<!-- permission authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part with
+<!-- permission authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
      substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type: permission).
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry resource and verb (the protected resource kind and
-       the action this permission grants on it). -->
-# [PERM-001] Read tenant documents
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: permission, object: permission,
+       resource (what is acted on) and verb (the action).
+     - "## Properties" (H2): the typed declaration. Permission.json forbids
+       `operations` and `relations`. -->
+# [PERM-001] ExportTenantData
 
-Grants read access to `document` resources within the caller's tenant. Checked
-by the Atlas policy engine on every `GET /api/documents/*` request; the
-permission is satisfied only when the resource's `tenant_id` matches the
-caller's `tenant_id` claim.
+## Properties
+
+| Field | Type | Multiplicity | Constraints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| permission_id | UUID | 1..1 | identity |
+| resource | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| verb | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| requires_reauthentication | Boolean | 1..1 |  |

package/skeletons/policy.md

@@ -1,25 +1,41 @@
 ---
 id: POL-001
-title: "Access token lifetime policy"
+title: "LeastPrivilegeAccessPolicy"
 type: policy
+object: policy
 ---
-<!-- policy authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part with
+<!-- policy authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
      substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type: policy).
-     - A "Policy" section MUST state the normative policy text. -->
-# [POL-001] Access token lifetime policy
-
-Platform-wide policy governing bearer token lifetimes for Atlas first-party
-and integration clients, owned by the security council.
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: policy, object: policy.
+     - "## Policy" (H2, required): the rule in prose.
+     - "## Invariants" (H2): Policy.json requires at least one clause — a
+       policy that constrains nothing is prose. -->
+# [POL-001] LeastPrivilegeAccessPolicy
 
 ## Policy
 
-- Access tokens SHALL expire no later than 15 minutes after issuance.
-- Refresh tokens SHALL be single-use and rotated on every exchange (CTRL-001),
-  with an absolute family lifetime of 30 days.
-- Integration tokens issued for SCOPE-001 SHALL be bound to the requesting
-  client via DPoP or mTLS sender constraint.
-- Token lifetimes SHALL NOT be extended per tenant without a documented risk
-  acceptance referencing the affected risk register entries (e.g. RISK-001).
-- Violations surface as audit findings (FIND-001 family) and block release
-  until remediated or formally accepted.
+Every principal holds the smallest set of permissions that lets it complete
+its task, for the shortest time that task takes. A grant that is not exercised
+within 90 days is revoked automatically, and every standing administrative
+grant is reviewed quarterly by the tenant owner.
+
+## Invariants
+
+The clauses this policy asserts. Each clause owns one `ocl` fence under its
+own `### <clauseId>` heading.
+
+### NoStandingAdministrativeGrant
+
+```ocl
+context LeastPrivilegeAccessPolicy
+inv NoStandingAdministrativeGrant:
+  TenantAdministrator.allInstances()->forAll(r | r.assignable_by_self_service = false)
+```
+
+### UnusedGrantsExpire
+
+```ocl
+context LeastPrivilegeAccessPolicy
+inv UnusedGrantsExpire:
+  TenantReadScope.allInstances()->forAll(s | s.includes_write = false)
+```

package/skeletons/risk.md

@@ -1,20 +1,26 @@
 ---
 id: RISK-001
-title: "Tenant account takeover via token theft"
+title: "TenantDataExfiltration"
 type: risk
-likelihood: medium
-impact: high
+object: risk
+likelihood: possible
+impact: major
 ---
-<!-- risk authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part with
+<!-- risk authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
      substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type: risk),
-       likelihood and impact (qualitative ratings driving the risk score). -->
-# [RISK-001] Tenant account takeover via token theft
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: risk, object: risk,
+       likelihood and impact.
+     - "## Properties" (H2): the typed declaration. Risk.json requires both a
+       `likelihood` row and an `impact` row: a risk scored on one axis is
+       not scored. -->
+# [RISK-001] TenantDataExfiltration
 
-Business risk that an attacker realizes THREAT-001 and operates inside a
-tenant with the victim's permissions, exposing Confidential PII (CLASS-001)
-and enabling data exfiltration through the public API. Likelihood is rated
-medium given commodity infostealer malware; impact is high because a single
-takeover crosses into regulated personal data. Primary treatment is CTRL-001;
-residual risk after rotation and reuse detection is accepted at low/high and
-reviewed quarterly by the security council.
+## Properties
+
+| Field | Type | Multiplicity | Constraints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| risk_id | UUID | 1..1 | identity |
+| likelihood | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| impact | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| assessed_at | Timestamp | 1..1 |  |
+| affected_asset | TenantDatabase | 0..1 |  |

package/skeletons/role.md

@@ -1,21 +1,28 @@
 ---
 id: ROLE-001
-title: "Tenant Auditor role"
+title: "TenantAdministrator"
 type: role
+object: role
 ---
-<!-- role authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part with
+<!-- role authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
      substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type: role).
-     - A "Permissions" section MUST list the permissions bound to the role. -->
-# [ROLE-001] Tenant Auditor role
-
-Read-only compliance role assigned to external auditors invited into a tenant.
-Members can inspect configuration and audit trails but can never mutate state
-or read secret material.
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: role, object: role.
+     - "## Permissions" (H2, required): the permissions this role grants.
+     - "## Properties" (H2): the typed declaration. A role is a grant set,
+       so Role.json forbids `operations`. -->
+# [ROLE-001] TenantAdministrator
 
 ## Permissions
 
-- PERM-001 — `document:read` within the tenant
-- `audit_log:read` — query the tenant's audit event stream
-- `policy:read` — view security policies in effect for the tenant
-- `member:list` — enumerate tenant members and their role bindings
+- ExportTenantData — export the tenant's records for portability requests.
+- Manage tenant members, their roles and their MFA enrolment.
+- Read the tenant audit trail; the role grants no write on it.
+
+## Properties
+
+| Field | Type | Multiplicity | Constraints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| role_id | UUID | 1..1 | identity |
+| name | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1, maxLength: 64 |
+| granted_permission | ExportTenantData | 0..1 |  |
+| assignable_by_self_service | Boolean | 1..1 |  |

package/skeletons/scope.md

@@ -1,20 +1,26 @@
 ---
 id: SCOPE-001
-title: "documents:read OAuth scope"
+title: "TenantReadScope"
 type: scope
+object: scope
 ---
-<!-- scope authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part with
+<!-- scope authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
      substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type: scope).
-     - A "Grants" section MUST list the permissions this scope confers. -->
-# [SCOPE-001] documents:read OAuth scope
-
-OAuth 2.0 scope requested by third-party integrations that need read-only
-access to a tenant's document library through the Atlas public API.
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: scope, object: scope.
+     - "## Grants" (H2, required): what a bearer of this scope may do.
+     - "## Properties" (H2): the typed declaration. -->
+# [SCOPE-001] TenantReadScope
 
 ## Grants
 
-- PERM-001 — read tenant documents (`document:read`)
-- Listing document metadata via `GET /api/documents`
-- Downloading rendered document content via `GET /api/documents/{id}/content`
-- Excludes all write verbs; mutations require the separate `documents:write` scope
+- Read access to the tenant's own records and audit trail.
+- No write, no export, and no access to any other tenant.
+- Downgrades to nothing when the grant family is revoked.
+
+## Properties
+
+| Field | Type | Multiplicity | Constraints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| scope_id | UUID | 1..1 | identity |
+| name | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1, maxLength: 64 |
+| includes_write | Boolean | 1..1 |  |

package/skeletons/secret.md

@@ -1,25 +1,32 @@
 ---
 id: SECRET-001
-title: "Atlas OIDC client secret"
+title: "AtlasOidcClientSecret"
 type: secret
+object: secret
 ---
-<!-- secret authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part with
+<!-- secret authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
      substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type: secret).
-     - A "Rotation" section MUST describe how and how often the secret rotates. -->
-# [SECRET-001] Atlas OIDC client secret
-
-Confidential client secret used by the Atlas backend to authenticate at the
-tenant IdP token endpoint during the authorization code exchange. Stored in
-Vault at `secret/atlas/oidc/client-secret`; never present in environment files
-or images.
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: secret, object: secret.
+     - "## Rotation" (H2, required): how and how often the secret rotates.
+     - "## Properties" (H2): the typed declaration. Secret.json admits no
+       field carrying a default, so the material can never be embedded here —
+       a secret is named by its locator only. -->
+# [SECRET-001] AtlasOidcClientSecret
 
 ## Rotation
 
-- Rotated every 90 days by the `secret-rotator` job, which registers a new
+- Rotated every 90 days by the `secret-rotator` job, which registers the new
   secret with the IdP before revoking the old one.
-- Dual-secret overlap window of 24 hours so in-flight token exchanges complete
-  against either value.
-- Emergency rotation is triggered manually via `atlasctl secrets rotate
-  oidc-client` and completes in under 5 minutes.
-- Every rotation emits an `secret.rotated` audit event (AUDIT-001 family).
+- Dual-secret overlap window of 24 hours so in-flight exchanges complete.
+- Emergency rotation completes in under 5 minutes.
+- Every rotation emits a `secret.rotated` audit event.
+
+## Properties
+
+| Field | Type | Multiplicity | Constraints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| secret_id | UUID | 1..1 | identity |
+| locator | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| lifecycle | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| rotation_period | Duration | 1..1 |  |
+| overlap_window | Duration | 0..1 |  |

package/skeletons/secret.sysml.md

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+---
+id: SECRET-001
+title: "AtlasOidcClientSecret"
+type: secret
+object: secret
+---
+<!-- secret authoring skeleton, alternate Properties form. Declares exactly the
+     same fields as secret.md, authored as one ```sysml``` fence instead of the
+     typed table (FR-005-AC-2). No row carries a value: a secret is named by
+     its locator only (FR-006). -->
+# [SECRET-001] AtlasOidcClientSecret
+
+## Rotation
+
+- Rotated every 90 days by the `secret-rotator` job, which registers the new
+  secret with the IdP before revoking the old one.
+- Dual-secret overlap window of 24 hours so in-flight exchanges complete.
+- Emergency rotation completes in under 5 minutes.
+- Every rotation emits a `secret.rotated` audit event.
+
+## Properties
+
+```sysml
+attribute secret_id : UUID[1..1] { identity }
+attribute locator : String[1..1] { minLength: 1 }
+attribute lifecycle : String[1..1] { minLength: 1 }
+attribute rotation_period : Duration[1..1]
+attribute overlap_window : Duration[0..1]
+```

package/skeletons/session_config.md

@@ -1,24 +1,41 @@
 ---
-id: SESSION-001
-title: "Atlas web session configuration"
+id: SESS-001
+title: "TenantSessionConfig"
 type: session_config
+object: session_config
 ---
-<!-- session_config authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part
-     with substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type:
-       session_config).
-     - A "Settings" section MUST enumerate the effective session parameters. -->
-# [SESSION-001] Atlas web session configuration
-
-Server-side session established after AUTHFLOW-001 completes. Session state
-lives in the session store (ASSET-001); the browser holds only an opaque
-identifier.
+<!-- session_config authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
+     substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: session_config,
+       object: session_config.
+     - "## Settings" (H2, required): the settings in prose.
+     - "## Invariants" (H2): SessionConfig.json requires at least one clause. -->
+# [SESS-001] TenantSessionConfig
 
 ## Settings
 
-- Cookie name: `__Host-atlas_session` (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Path=/)
-- Idle timeout: 30 minutes, sliding on authenticated requests
-- Absolute lifetime: 12 hours, after which re-authentication is required
-- Session identifier: 256-bit random value, regenerated on login and on
-  privilege elevation
-- Concurrent session cap: 5 per user; the oldest session is evicted on overflow
+- Idle timeout 30 minutes; absolute lifetime 12 hours.
+- Cookie flags `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Lax`, host-only.
+- Session identifier rotates on every privilege change.
+- Bound to AuthorizationCodeWithPkce; no session outlives its grant family.
+
+## Invariants
+
+The clauses this configuration asserts. Each clause owns one `ocl` fence under
+its own `### <clauseId>` heading.
+
+### IdleTimeoutIsShorterThanAbsoluteLifetime
+
+```ocl
+context TenantSessionConfig
+inv IdleTimeoutIsShorterThanAbsoluteLifetime:
+  self.idle_timeout < self.absolute_lifetime
+```
+
+### IdentifierRotatesOnPrivilegeChange
+
+```ocl
+context TenantSessionConfig
+inv IdentifierRotatesOnPrivilegeChange:
+  self.rotate_on_privilege_change
+```

package/skeletons/threat.md

@@ -1,19 +1,30 @@
 ---
 id: THREAT-001
-title: "Stolen refresh token replay"
+title: "RefreshTokenReplay"
 type: threat
+object: threat
 stride_category: Spoofing
 vector: "exfiltrated refresh token replayed from attacker infrastructure"
 ---
-<!-- threat authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part with
+<!-- threat authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
      substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type: threat),
-       stride_category (STRIDE class) and vector (the attack vector). -->
-# [THREAT-001] Stolen refresh token replay
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: threat, object: threat,
+       stride_category (STRIDE class) and vector (the attack vector).
+     - "## Properties" (H2): the typed declaration. Threat.json requires an
+       identity row AND a `stride_category` row: a threat nobody classified
+       is not a threat statement. -->
+# [THREAT-001] RefreshTokenReplay
 
-An attacker who exfiltrates a refresh token (malware on the user device, log
-leakage, or proxy compromise) replays it against the token endpoint to mint
-fresh access tokens and impersonate the user across tenant APIs. Detection is
-hard because requests are well-formed; mitigation relies on refresh token
-rotation with reuse detection (CTRL-001) and the trust boundary controls in
-BOUND-001. Realized risk is tracked as RISK-001.
+An attacker who exfiltrates a refresh token replays it against the token
+endpoint to mint fresh access tokens and impersonate the user across tenant
+APIs. Detection is hard because the requests are well formed; mitigation
+relies on RefreshTokenRotation and the TenantNetworkEdge controls.
+
+## Properties
+
+| Field | Type | Multiplicity | Constraints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| threat_id | UUID | 1..1 | identity |
+| stride_category | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| vector | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| first_observed_at | Timestamp | 0..1 |  |

package/skeletons/threat.sysml.md

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+---
+id: THREAT-001
+title: "RefreshTokenReplay"
+type: threat
+object: threat
+stride_category: Spoofing
+vector: "exfiltrated refresh token replayed from attacker infrastructure"
+---
+<!-- threat authoring skeleton, alternate Properties form. Declares exactly the
+     same fields as threat.md, authored as one ```sysml``` fence instead of the
+     typed table (FR-005-AC-2). -->
+# [THREAT-001] RefreshTokenReplay
+
+An attacker who exfiltrates a refresh token replays it against the token
+endpoint to mint fresh access tokens and impersonate the user across tenant
+APIs. Detection is hard because the requests are well formed; mitigation
+relies on RefreshTokenRotation and the TenantNetworkEdge controls.
+
+## Properties
+
+```sysml
+attribute threat_id : UUID[1..1] { identity }
+attribute stride_category : String[1..1] { minLength: 1 }
+attribute vector : String[1..1] { minLength: 1 }
+attribute first_observed_at : Timestamp[0..1]
+```

package/skeletons/trust_boundary.md

@@ -1,26 +1,61 @@
 ---
 id: BOUND-001
-title: "Edge to auth-service trust boundary"
+title: "TenantNetworkEdge"
 type: trust_boundary
+object: trust_boundary
 ---
-<!-- trust_boundary authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part
-     with substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type:
-       trust_boundary).
-     - A "Boundary" section MUST carry a ```mermaid code block drawing the
-       boundary between zones. -->
-# [BOUND-001] Edge to auth-service trust boundary
-
-Separates the untrusted internet, the DMZ-hosted API gateway, and the trusted
-private subnet where the Atlas auth service and session store run. Everything
-crossing inward is re-authenticated: the gateway terminates TLS and the auth
-service only accepts mTLS connections from the gateway.
+<!-- trust_boundary authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
+     substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: trust_boundary,
+       object: trust_boundary.
+     - "## Boundary" (H2, required) holds a fenced `mermaid` diagram.
+     - "## Properties" (H2): requires an identity row and a `trust_level` row.
+     - "## Invariants" (H2): TrustBoundary.json requires at least one clause —
+       a boundary that admits every crossing is not a boundary. -->
+# [BOUND-001] TenantNetworkEdge
 
 ## Boundary
 
 ```mermaid
 flowchart LR
-    Browser["Tenant browser (untrusted)"] -->|HTTPS| Gateway["API gateway (DMZ)"]
-    Gateway -->|mTLS| AuthSvc["Auth service (trusted subnet)"]
-    AuthSvc -->|private VPC peering| SessionDB[("Session store")]
+  subgraph untrusted[Internet]
+    client[Tenant browser]
+  end
+  subgraph trusted[Tenant VPC]
+    api[Token endpoint]
+    db[(Tenant database)]
+  end
+  client -->|TLS 1.3, authenticated| api
+  api --> db
+```
+
+## Properties
+
+| Field | Type | Multiplicity | Constraints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| boundary_id | UUID | 1..1 | identity |
+| trust_level | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| ingress_protocol | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| mutual_tls_required | Boolean | 1..1 |  |
+
+## Invariants
+
+The clauses this boundary enforces on every crossing. Each clause owns one
+`ocl` fence under its own `### <clauseId>` heading; the fence text is carried
+verbatim and never evaluated here.
+
+### EveryCrossingIsAuthenticated
+
+```ocl
+context TenantNetworkEdge
+inv EveryCrossingIsAuthenticated:
+  self.ingress_protocol <> 'plaintext'
+```
+
+### UntrustedSideNeverReachesTheDatabase
+
+```ocl
+context TenantNetworkEdge
+inv UntrustedSideNeverReachesTheDatabase:
+  self.trust_level = 'untrusted' implies self.mutual_tls_required
 ```

package/skeletons/vulnerability.md

@@ -1,21 +1,24 @@
 ---
 id: VULN-001
-title: "Session store affected by lua sandbox escape"
+title: "UnrotatedRefreshToken"
 type: vulnerability
-cve_id: CVE-2024-31449
+object: vulnerability
 severity: high
+cve_id: "CVE-2026-00000"
 ---
-<!-- vulnerability authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every part
-     with substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
-     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type (type:
-       vulnerability) and severity; cve_id links the public advisory when one
-       exists. -->
-# [VULN-001] Session store affected by lua sandbox escape
+<!-- vulnerability authoring skeleton (spec-objects-security). Fill every section with
+     substantive content. Contract (manifest body_extraction asserts):
+     - Frontmatter MUST carry id, title, type: vulnerability,
+       object: vulnerability and severity; cve_id is optional.
+     - "## Properties" (H2): the typed declaration. Vulnerability.json
+       requires a `severity` row, so an unscored weakness is refused. -->
+# [VULN-001] UnrotatedRefreshToken
 
-The Redis instance backing the Atlas session store (ASSET-001) runs a version
-affected by CVE-2024-31449, where an authenticated client can craft a Lua
-script that escapes the sandbox and executes arbitrary code. Exploitation
-requires script-eval privileges inside the private subnet, so exposure is
-limited by BOUND-001, but a compromised service credential would yield full
-session-store control. Remediation: upgrade to a patched Redis release and
-disable `EVAL` for application credentials; tracked to closure in FIND-001.
+## Properties
+
+| Field | Type | Multiplicity | Constraints |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| vulnerability_id | UUID | 1..1 | identity |
+| severity | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| affected_component | String | 1..1 | minLength: 1 |
+| disclosed_at | Timestamp | 0..1 |  |