@agent-finops/core 0.6.0 → 0.6.1

package/dist/activitySnapshotCache.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+import { type ActivitySnapshot, type ActivitySnapshotRefreshErrorCode } from "./activitySnapshot.js";
+export declare const activitySnapshotCacheEnvironmentVariable = "AIBILL_CACHE_DIR";
+export declare const activitySnapshotCacheFileName = "statusline-v1.json";
+export declare const activitySnapshotCacheMaxBytes: number;
+export type ActivitySnapshotCacheOptions = {
+    /** Test/embedding override. Production defaults to ~/.aibill/cache. */
+    cacheDirectory?: string;
+    /** Test-only home override for validating the default private path. */
+    homeDirectory?: string;
+    /** Bounded wait for a concurrent writer. */
+    lockTimeoutMs?: number;
+};
+export type ActivitySnapshotCacheReadErrorCode = "unsafe_directory" | "unsafe_file" | "oversized" | "malformed" | "unsupported_version" | "permission" | "io";
+export type ActivitySnapshotCacheReadResult = {
+    status: "ok";
+    snapshot: ActivitySnapshot;
+} | {
+    status: "missing";
+} | {
+    status: "error";
+    code: ActivitySnapshotCacheReadErrorCode;
+};
+export type ActivitySnapshotCacheWriteResult = {
+    status: "written";
+    snapshot: ActivitySnapshot;
+} | {
+    status: "skipped_older";
+    snapshot: ActivitySnapshot;
+};
+export declare class ActivitySnapshotCacheError extends Error {
+    readonly code: ActivitySnapshotCacheReadErrorCode | "lock_timeout" | "invalid_snapshot";
+    constructor(code: ActivitySnapshotCacheError["code"], message: string);
+}
+/** Resolve the fixed cache filename without creating or trusting it. */
+export declare function activitySnapshotCachePath(options?: ActivitySnapshotCacheOptions): string;
+/**
+ * Read at most 64 KiB and validate the complete strict v1 contract. All
+ * expected unsafe/malformed states are returned as data so status surfaces can
+ * fail closed without printing local filesystem details.
+ */
+export declare function readActivitySnapshot(options?: ActivitySnapshotCacheOptions): Promise<ActivitySnapshotCacheReadResult>;
+/**
+ * Atomically publish a valid snapshot. Writers serialize through one bounded
+ * private lock; comparison happens while the lock is held so a late, older
+ * scan cannot replace newer evidence.
+ */
+export declare function writeActivitySnapshot(snapshot: ActivitySnapshot, options?: ActivitySnapshotCacheOptions): Promise<ActivitySnapshotCacheWriteResult>;
+/**
+ * Preserve the last-good financial values after a failed refresh. Only the
+ * typed attempt timestamp and sanitized error code change. With no prior good
+ * value, write a bounded error snapshot instead of manufacturing data.
+ */
+export declare function recordActivitySnapshotRefreshFailure(attemptedAt: string, errorCode: ActivitySnapshotRefreshErrorCode, options?: ActivitySnapshotCacheOptions): Promise<ActivitySnapshotCacheWriteResult>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=activitySnapshotCache.d.ts.map

package/dist/activitySnapshotCache.js

@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+import { constants } from "node:fs";
+import { open, lstat, mkdir, chmod, realpath, rename, unlink } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { setTimeout as delay } from "node:timers/promises";
+import { activitySnapshotSchema, createActivitySnapshotError } from "./activitySnapshot.js";
+export const activitySnapshotCacheEnvironmentVariable = "AIBILL_CACHE_DIR";
+export const activitySnapshotCacheFileName = "statusline-v1.json";
+export const activitySnapshotCacheMaxBytes = 64 * 1_024;
+const lockFileName = ".statusline-v1.lock";
+const defaultLockTimeoutMs = 2_000;
+const staleLockMs = 15_000;
+const lockPollMs = 20;
+const lockMetadataMaxBytes = 512;
+export class ActivitySnapshotCacheError extends Error {
+    code;
+    constructor(code, message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = "ActivitySnapshotCacheError";
+        this.code = code;
+    }
+}
+/** Resolve the fixed cache filename without creating or trusting it. */
+export function activitySnapshotCachePath(options = {}) {
+    return join(configuredCacheDirectory(options), activitySnapshotCacheFileName);
+}
+/**
+ * Read at most 64 KiB and validate the complete strict v1 contract. All
+ * expected unsafe/malformed states are returned as data so status surfaces can
+ * fail closed without printing local filesystem details.
+ */
+export async function readActivitySnapshot(options = {}) {
+    let directory;
+    try {
+        directory = await resolveCacheDirectory(false, options);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (isNodeError(error, "ENOENT"))
+            return { status: "missing" };
+        return { status: "error", code: cacheReadErrorCode(error, "unsafe_directory") };
+    }
+    return readSnapshotFile(directory);
+}
+/**
+ * Atomically publish a valid snapshot. Writers serialize through one bounded
+ * private lock; comparison happens while the lock is held so a late, older
+ * scan cannot replace newer evidence.
+ */
+export async function writeActivitySnapshot(snapshot, options = {}) {
+    let candidate;
+    try {
+        candidate = activitySnapshotSchema.parse(snapshot);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("invalid_snapshot", "Activity snapshot does not match the strict v1 contract.");
+    }
+    return withWriterLock(options, async (directory) => {
+        const existing = await readSnapshotFile(directory);
+        if (existing.status === "ok" && !isNewer(candidate, existing.snapshot)) {
+            return { status: "skipped_older", snapshot: existing.snapshot };
+        }
+        if (existing.status === "error" &&
+            (existing.code === "unsafe_file" || existing.code === "permission" ||
+                existing.code === "unsupported_version")) {
+            throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError(existing.code, "Refusing to replace an unsafe or inaccessible activity snapshot cache file.");
+        }
+        await atomicWriteSnapshot(directory, candidate);
+        return { status: "written", snapshot: candidate };
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Preserve the last-good financial values after a failed refresh. Only the
+ * typed attempt timestamp and sanitized error code change. With no prior good
+ * value, write a bounded error snapshot instead of manufacturing data.
+ */
+export async function recordActivitySnapshotRefreshFailure(attemptedAt, errorCode, options = {}) {
+    const parsedAttempt = new Date(attemptedAt);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(parsedAttempt.getTime())) {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("invalid_snapshot", "Refresh attempt time must be a valid ISO timestamp.");
+    }
+    const normalizedAttempt = parsedAttempt.toISOString();
+    return withWriterLock(options, async (directory) => {
+        const existing = await readSnapshotFile(directory);
+        if (existing.status === "ok") {
+            const newestExistingEvent = Math.max(Date.parse(existing.snapshot.lastAttemptAt), Date.parse(existing.snapshot.generatedAt));
+            if (Date.parse(normalizedAttempt) <= newestExistingEvent) {
+                return { status: "skipped_older", snapshot: existing.snapshot };
+            }
+            const failed = activitySnapshotSchema.parse({
+                ...existing.snapshot,
+                lastAttemptAt: normalizedAttempt,
+                refresh: { status: "error", errorCode }
+            });
+            await atomicWriteSnapshot(directory, failed);
+            return { status: "written", snapshot: failed };
+        }
+        if (existing.status === "error" &&
+            (existing.code === "unsafe_file" || existing.code === "permission" ||
+                existing.code === "unsupported_version")) {
+            throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError(existing.code, "Refusing to replace an unsafe or inaccessible activity snapshot cache file.");
+        }
+        const failed = createActivitySnapshotError(normalizedAttempt, errorCode);
+        await atomicWriteSnapshot(directory, failed);
+        return { status: "written", snapshot: failed };
+    });
+}
+async function withWriterLock(options, operation) {
+    const directory = await resolveCacheDirectory(true, options);
+    const lockPath = join(directory, lockFileName);
+    const timeout = boundedLockTimeout(options.lockTimeoutMs);
+    const started = Date.now();
+    let lockHandle;
+    let lockIdentity;
+    while (!lockHandle) {
+        let candidateHandle;
+        let candidateIdentity;
+        try {
+            const owner = { pid: process.pid, token: randomUUID() };
+            candidateHandle = await open(lockPath, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | noFollowFlag(), 0o600);
+            const candidateInfo = await candidateHandle.stat();
+            candidateIdentity = { ...owner, dev: candidateInfo.dev, ino: candidateInfo.ino };
+            await candidateHandle.writeFile(`${JSON.stringify(owner)}\n`, "utf8");
+            await candidateHandle.sync();
+            lockHandle = candidateHandle;
+            lockIdentity = candidateIdentity;
+            candidateHandle = undefined;
+            candidateIdentity = undefined;
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            await candidateHandle?.close().catch(() => undefined);
+            if (candidateIdentity)
+                await releaseOwnedLock(lockPath, candidateIdentity);
+            if (!isNodeError(error, "EEXIST")) {
+                if (isNodeError(error, "ELOOP")) {
+                    throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_file", "Activity snapshot writer lock is a symbolic link.");
+                }
+                throw error;
+            }
+            await removeStaleLock(lockPath);
+            if (Date.now() - started >= timeout) {
+                throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("lock_timeout", "Timed out waiting for the activity snapshot writer lock.");
+            }
+            await delay(lockPollMs);
+        }
+    }
+    try {
+        return await operation(directory);
+    }
+    finally {
+        await lockHandle.close().catch(() => undefined);
+        if (lockIdentity)
+            await releaseOwnedLock(lockPath, lockIdentity);
+    }
+}
+async function readSnapshotFile(directory) {
+    const filePath = join(directory, activitySnapshotCacheFileName);
+    let fileInfo;
+    try {
+        fileInfo = await lstat(filePath);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (isNodeError(error, "ENOENT"))
+            return { status: "missing" };
+        return { status: "error", code: cacheReadErrorCode(error, "io") };
+    }
+    if (fileInfo.isSymbolicLink() || !fileInfo.isFile()) {
+        return { status: "error", code: "unsafe_file" };
+    }
+    if (!hasPrivatePermissions(fileInfo.mode)) {
+        return { status: "error", code: "unsafe_file" };
+    }
+    if (fileInfo.size > activitySnapshotCacheMaxBytes) {
+        return { status: "error", code: "oversized" };
+    }
+    let handle;
+    try {
+        handle = await open(filePath, constants.O_RDONLY | noFollowFlag());
+        const openedInfo = await handle.stat();
+        if (!openedInfo.isFile())
+            return { status: "error", code: "unsafe_file" };
+        if (!hasPrivatePermissions(openedInfo.mode)) {
+            return { status: "error", code: "unsafe_file" };
+        }
+        if (openedInfo.size > activitySnapshotCacheMaxBytes) {
+            return { status: "error", code: "oversized" };
+        }
+        // Bound the actual read, not only the preceding stat: the file may grow
+        // after inspection. One extra byte is enough to detect overflow without
+        // ever allocating or reading an attacker-controlled whole file.
+        const bounded = Buffer.allocUnsafe(activitySnapshotCacheMaxBytes + 1);
+        let bytesRead = 0;
+        while (bytesRead < bounded.length) {
+            const result = await handle.read(bounded, bytesRead, bounded.length - bytesRead, bytesRead);
+            if (result.bytesRead === 0)
+                break;
+            bytesRead += result.bytesRead;
+        }
+        if (bytesRead > activitySnapshotCacheMaxBytes) {
+            return { status: "error", code: "oversized" };
+        }
+        const contents = bounded.subarray(0, bytesRead).toString("utf8");
+        let value;
+        try {
+            value = JSON.parse(contents);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return { status: "error", code: "malformed" };
+        }
+        if (isRecord(value) && value.schemaVersion !== undefined && value.schemaVersion !== 1) {
+            return { status: "error", code: "unsupported_version" };
+        }
+        const parsed = activitySnapshotSchema.safeParse(value);
+        return parsed.success
+            ? { status: "ok", snapshot: parsed.data }
+            : { status: "error", code: "malformed" };
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (isNodeError(error, "ELOOP"))
+            return { status: "error", code: "unsafe_file" };
+        return { status: "error", code: cacheReadErrorCode(error, "io") };
+    }
+    finally {
+        await handle?.close().catch(() => undefined);
+    }
+}
+async function atomicWriteSnapshot(directory, snapshot) {
+    const contents = `${JSON.stringify(snapshot)}\n`;
+    if (Buffer.byteLength(contents, "utf8") > activitySnapshotCacheMaxBytes) {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("invalid_snapshot", "Activity snapshot exceeds the 64 KiB cache limit.");
+    }
+    const filePath = join(directory, activitySnapshotCacheFileName);
+    const existing = await lstat(filePath).catch((error) => {
+        if (isNodeError(error, "ENOENT"))
+            return undefined;
+        throw error;
+    });
+    if (existing?.isSymbolicLink() || (existing && !existing.isFile())) {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_file", "Activity snapshot cache path is not a regular file.");
+    }
+    const temporaryPath = join(directory, `.${activitySnapshotCacheFileName}.${process.pid}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`);
+    let handle;
+    try {
+        handle = await open(temporaryPath, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | noFollowFlag(), 0o600);
+        await handle.writeFile(contents, "utf8");
+        await handle.sync();
+        await handle.close();
+        handle = undefined;
+        await rename(temporaryPath, filePath);
+        await chmod(filePath, 0o600);
+        await syncDirectory(directory);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        await handle?.close().catch(() => undefined);
+        await unlink(temporaryPath).catch(() => undefined);
+        throw error;
+    }
+}
+async function resolveCacheDirectory(create, options) {
+    const usesDefaultDirectory = !options.cacheDirectory?.trim() &&
+        !process.env[activitySnapshotCacheEnvironmentVariable]?.trim();
+    if (usesDefaultDirectory) {
+        await ensureDefaultParent(options.homeDirectory ?? homedir(), create);
+    }
+    const requested = configuredCacheDirectory(options);
+    let info = await lstat(requested).catch((error) => {
+        if (isNodeError(error, "ENOENT"))
+            return undefined;
+        throw error;
+    });
+    if (!info && create) {
+        if (usesDefaultDirectory) {
+            await mkdir(requested, { mode: 0o700 }).catch((error) => {
+                if (!isNodeError(error, "EEXIST"))
+                    throw error;
+            });
+        }
+        else {
+            await mkdir(requested, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+        }
+        info = await lstat(requested);
+    }
+    if (!info) {
+        const error = new Error("Activity snapshot cache directory does not exist.");
+        error.code = "ENOENT";
+        throw error;
+    }
+    if (info.isSymbolicLink() || !info.isDirectory()) {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_directory", "Activity snapshot cache directory is not a real directory.");
+    }
+    if (!create && !hasPrivatePermissions(info.mode)) {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_directory", "Activity snapshot cache directory is not private.");
+    }
+    const canonical = await realpath(requested);
+    const confirmed = await lstat(requested);
+    if (confirmed.isSymbolicLink() || !confirmed.isDirectory()) {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_directory", "Activity snapshot cache directory changed during validation.");
+    }
+    if (create)
+        await chmod(canonical, 0o700);
+    return canonical;
+}
+async function ensureDefaultParent(homeDirectory, create) {
+    const parent = join(homeDirectory, ".aibill");
+    let info = await lstat(parent).catch((error) => {
+        if (isNodeError(error, "ENOENT"))
+            return undefined;
+        throw error;
+    });
+    if (!info && create) {
+        await mkdir(parent, { mode: 0o700 }).catch((error) => {
+            // Two first-ever writers may both observe ENOENT. The winner creates
+            // the directory; the loser must re-validate it rather than fail.
+            if (!isNodeError(error, "EEXIST"))
+                throw error;
+        });
+        info = await lstat(parent);
+    }
+    if (!info) {
+        const error = new Error("The private aibill directory does not exist.");
+        error.code = "ENOENT";
+        throw error;
+    }
+    if (info.isSymbolicLink() || !info.isDirectory()) {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_directory", "The private aibill directory is not a real directory.");
+    }
+    if (!create && !hasPrivatePermissions(info.mode)) {
+        throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_directory", "The private aibill directory is not private.");
+    }
+    if (create)
+        await chmod(parent, 0o700);
+}
+function configuredCacheDirectory(options) {
+    const configured = options.cacheDirectory?.trim() ||
+        process.env[activitySnapshotCacheEnvironmentVariable]?.trim();
+    const value = configured && configured.length > 0
+        ? configured
+        : join(options.homeDirectory ?? homedir(), ".aibill", "cache");
+    return resolve(value);
+}
+async function removeStaleLock(lockPath) {
+    let handle;
+    try {
+        handle = await open(lockPath, constants.O_RDONLY | noFollowFlag());
+        const info = await handle.stat();
+        if (!info.isFile() || !hasPrivatePermissions(info.mode)) {
+            throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_file", "Activity snapshot writer lock is not a private regular file.");
+        }
+        if (Date.now() - info.mtimeMs <= staleLockMs)
+            return;
+        const owner = await readLockOwner(handle);
+        // Age alone never proves abandonment: a live writer may be paused while
+        // holding the lock. Unknown/malformed ownership also fails closed.
+        if (!owner || processIsAlive(owner.pid))
+            return;
+        await handle.close();
+        handle = undefined;
+        await releaseOwnedLock(lockPath, { ...owner, dev: info.dev, ino: info.ino });
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (isNodeError(error, "ENOENT"))
+            return;
+        if (isNodeError(error, "ELOOP")) {
+            throw new ActivitySnapshotCacheError("unsafe_file", "Activity snapshot writer lock is a symbolic link.");
+        }
+        throw error;
+    }
+    finally {
+        await handle?.close().catch(() => undefined);
+    }
+}
+async function releaseOwnedLock(lockPath, identity) {
+    let handle;
+    try {
+        handle = await open(lockPath, constants.O_RDONLY | noFollowFlag());
+        const info = await handle.stat();
+        if (!info.isFile() || info.dev !== identity.dev || info.ino !== identity.ino)
+            return;
+        const owner = await readLockOwner(handle);
+        if (!owner || owner.pid !== identity.pid || owner.token !== identity.token)
+            return;
+        await handle.close();
+        handle = undefined;
+        const confirmed = await lstat(lockPath).catch((error) => {
+            if (isNodeError(error, "ENOENT"))
+                return undefined;
+            throw error;
+        });
+        if (!confirmed || confirmed.isSymbolicLink() ||
+            confirmed.dev !== identity.dev || confirmed.ino !== identity.ino) {
+            return;
+        }
+        // A live owner cannot be legitimately evicted, so once both inode and
+        // unguessable token match, unlinking cannot release another writer's lock.
+        await unlink(lockPath).catch((error) => {
+            if (!isNodeError(error, "ENOENT"))
+                throw error;
+        });
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (!isNodeError(error, "ENOENT") && !isNodeError(error, "ELOOP"))
+            throw error;
+    }
+    finally {
+        await handle?.close().catch(() => undefined);
+    }
+}
+async function readLockOwner(handle) {
+    const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(lockMetadataMaxBytes + 1);
+    const result = await handle.read(buffer, 0, buffer.length, 0);
+    if (result.bytesRead === 0 || result.bytesRead > lockMetadataMaxBytes)
+        return undefined;
+    let value;
+    try {
+        value = JSON.parse(buffer.subarray(0, result.bytesRead).toString("utf8"));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    if (!isRecord(value) || !Number.isSafeInteger(value.pid) ||
+        value.pid <= 0 || typeof value.token !== "string" ||
+        value.token.length < 16 || value.token.length > 128) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return { pid: value.pid, token: value.token };
+}
+function processIsAlive(pid) {
+    try {
+        process.kill(pid, 0);
+        return true;
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        return !isNodeError(error, "ESRCH");
+    }
+}
+async function syncDirectory(directory) {
+    let handle;
+    try {
+        handle = await open(directory, constants.O_RDONLY);
+        await handle.sync().catch((error) => {
+            if (!isNodeError(error, "EINVAL") && !isNodeError(error, "ENOTSUP"))
+                throw error;
+        });
+    }
+    finally {
+        await handle?.close().catch(() => undefined);
+    }
+}
+function isNewer(candidate, existing) {
+    const attemptDifference = Date.parse(candidate.lastAttemptAt) - Date.parse(existing.lastAttemptAt);
+    if (attemptDifference !== 0)
+        return attemptDifference > 0;
+    const generatedDifference = Date.parse(candidate.generatedAt) - Date.parse(existing.generatedAt);
+    if (generatedDifference !== 0)
+        return generatedDifference > 0;
+    return false;
+}
+function boundedLockTimeout(value) {
+    if (value === undefined)
+        return defaultLockTimeoutMs;
+    if (!Number.isFinite(value))
+        return defaultLockTimeoutMs;
+    return Math.max(0, Math.min(10_000, Math.floor(value)));
+}
+function cacheReadErrorCode(error, fallback) {
+    if (error instanceof ActivitySnapshotCacheError &&
+        (error.code === "unsafe_directory" || error.code === "unsafe_file" ||
+            error.code === "oversized" || error.code === "malformed" ||
+            error.code === "unsupported_version" || error.code === "permission" ||
+            error.code === "io")) {
+        return error.code;
+    }
+    if (isNodeError(error, "EACCES") || isNodeError(error, "EPERM"))
+        return "permission";
+    return fallback;
+}
+function noFollowFlag() {
+    return typeof constants.O_NOFOLLOW === "number" ? constants.O_NOFOLLOW : 0;
+}
+function hasPrivatePermissions(mode) {
+    return process.platform === "win32" || (mode & 0o077) === 0;
+}
+function isRecord(value) {
+    return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+function isNodeError(error, code) {
+    return error instanceof Error && error.code === code;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=activitySnapshotCache.js.map

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 export * from "./analyze.js";
 export * from "./agentInventory.js";
+export * from "./activitySnapshot.js";
+export * from "./activitySnapshotCache.js";
 export * from "./attribution.js";
 export * from "./credentialDetection.js";
 export * from "./contextHealth.js";

package/dist/index.js

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 export * from "./analyze.js";
 export * from "./agentInventory.js";
+export * from "./activitySnapshot.js";
+export * from "./activitySnapshotCache.js";
 export * from "./attribution.js";
 export * from "./credentialDetection.js";
 export * from "./contextHealth.js";

package/dist/localAgentLogs.d.ts

@@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ export type LocalAgentLogOptions = {
     /** Collect privacy-safe Codex invocation summaries during the same JSON pass. */
     collectCodexInvocationEvidence?: boolean;
 };
+/**
+ * Options accepted by the financial-only loader. Invocation collection is
+ * intentionally unavailable: this path reads only the evidence needed for a
+ * financial snapshot and transcript-reported plan limits.
+ */
+export type LocalAgentFinancialLogOptions = Omit<LocalAgentLogOptions, "collectCodexInvocationEvidence">;
 export type LocalAgentLogDiagnosticCode = "directory_missing" | "directory_unreadable" | "file_unreadable" | "malformed_jsonl" | "unsupported_token_shape";
 export type LocalAgentLogDiagnostic = {
     agent: LocalAgentCall["agent"];
@@ -123,9 +129,22 @@ export type LocalAgentSourceScan = {
     directoryStatus: "readable" | "missing" | "unreadable";
     filesDiscovered: number;
     filesParsed: number;
+    /** Malformed lines observed inside `jsonlValidationCoverage`. */
     malformedLines: number;
     unreadableFiles: number;
     unsupportedUsageSnapshots: number;
+    /** Regular files safely excluded because their metadata predates `sinceIso`. */
+    filesSkippedBeforeWindow?: number;
+    /** Codex files resolved from bounded head/tail financial evidence. */
+    filesReadFinancially?: number;
+    /** Bytes not replayed as events after the required Codex financial state was proved. */
+    bytesSkippedAsNonFinancialHistory?: number;
+    /** JSONL lines classified from their envelope and skipped before JSON decoding. */
+    nonFinancialLinesPrefiltered?: number;
+    /** Bytes covered by the non-financial event prefilter. */
+    nonFinancialBytesPrefiltered?: number;
+    /** Whether JSON syntax was checked for every line or financial events only. */
+    jsonlValidationCoverage?: "complete" | "financial_events_only";
 };
 export type LocalAgentLogResult = {
     records: UsageRecord[];
@@ -159,6 +178,17 @@ export declare function parseClaudeCodeTranscript(content: string, filePath?: st
 export declare function parseCodexRollout(content: string, onEntry?: (entry: Record<string, unknown>) => void, onDiagnostic?: TranscriptParseDiagnosticHandler): LocalAgentCall[];
 /** Scan this machine's agent logs and return aggregated UsageRecords. */
 export declare function loadLocalAgentUsage(options?: LocalAgentLogOptions): Promise<LocalAgentLogResult>;
+/**
+ * Stream only the financial evidence required by init/status snapshots.
+ *
+ * Unlike `loadLocalAgentUsage`, this path never derives prompts, file focus,
+ * tool activity, or invocation evidence. It deliberately returns the same
+ * result contract so callers can preserve the existing evidence and
+ * diagnostics vocabulary without maintaining a second loader schema. Codex
+ * project attribution intentionally uses only root metadata; home-launched
+ * tool-workdir inference remains exclusive to the full qualitative loader.
+ */
+export declare function loadLocalAgentFinancialUsage(options?: LocalAgentFinancialLogOptions): Promise<LocalAgentLogResult>;
 /** Aggregate per-call usage into one UsageRecord per day+agent+model+project. */
 export declare function aggregateCalls(calls: LocalAgentCall[]): UsageRecord[];
 /**