@agent-compose/sdk 0.8.4 → 0.8.6

package/dist/types/api-factory.d.ts

@@ -100,9 +100,15 @@ export interface RegisterWorkflowInput {
 export interface TemplateRow {
     name: string;
     version: string;
-    factorySlug: string;
+    /** Owning factory's slug. `null` on platform-published rows — a published
+     *  default belongs to no single factory and is invokable via any slug. */
+    factorySlug: string | null;
     /** Share scope (ADR-0045) — `null` = unscoped/grandfathered team tier. */
     scope: ArtifactScope | null;
+    /** `factory` = registered in a factory of the caller's team; `published` =
+     *  platform default (team-wide read+invoke in EVERY factory, never write;
+     *  fork it to edit under a new name). Optional: older servers omit it. */
+    origin?: "factory" | "published";
 }
 /** Template detail (`GET /factories/:slug/templates/:name`) — the typed
  *  subset the SDK pins; the route returns additional registration fields
@@ -122,6 +128,17 @@ export interface TemplateDetail {
 export interface ListTemplatesOptions {
     factorySlug?: string;
 }
+/** One connector grant, as `GET /api/v1/connectors` returns it (wire shape
+ *  verbatim — snake_case): the caller's own grants and the workspace's
+ *  GitHub installations, never a teammate's other accounts. The typed
+ *  subset the SDK pins; additional fields flow through untyped. */
+export interface ConnectorGrantSummary {
+    id: string;
+    provider: string;
+    external_account_label: string | null;
+    status: "active" | "revoked" | "reauth_required";
+    connected_by_user_id: string;
+}
 /** Public "anyone with the link" state — the additive `public` field on file
  *  rows (list/ls/search). The token is the whole capability, so an enabled
  *  row carries it ONLY for viewers holding the document's share authority
@@ -350,8 +367,77 @@ export type SessionSecretInput = {
  *  single-use page a session writer opens to provide the named values. */
 export interface SessionSecretRequestCreated {
     requestId: string;
-    url: string;
+    /** The single-use link, the owner's to tap. Null on a DEDUPED answer: the
+     *  open ask's link already went out and nothing new exists to send. */
+    url: string | null;
     expiresAt: string;
+    /** True = a standing auto-approve set already filled the request at the
+     *  mint — nothing is pending; source the session env now. */
+    autoApproved?: boolean;
+    /** Set with autoApproved when the grant came from this work's earlier
+     *  worker (the same person's grant, carried with no card): who gave it. */
+    carried?: {
+        grantedByName: string | null;
+    };
+    /** True = an OPEN request of the same kind (or the same key set) already
+     *  stood on this session, and this answer IS that request: no new row, no
+     *  new card, nobody asked again. `keys` are the open request's key names,
+     *  the names the values land under; `note` says what to do. */
+    deduped?: boolean;
+    keys?: string[];
+    kind?: VaultRequestKind | null;
+    note?: string;
+    /** Who holds the ask: the thread's agent (it raises the card once), the
+     *  owner's assistant, or nobody (no owner, no agent). */
+    routedTo?: "agent" | "owner" | null;
+    /** A chat's worker: its card is in the chat, where the work was asked for. */
+    card?: "in the chat";
+}
+/** What KIND of credential a vault request asks for (advisory): the vault
+ *  page leads with the user's MATCHING standing entries. */
+export type VaultRequestKind = "login" | "password" | "api_key" | "payment_card" | "env_file" | "note" | "other";
+/** How one requested key is delivered to the session: BROKERED — the egress
+ *  edge adds `headerName: [scheme ]<value>` on requests to `host`, and the
+ *  value never enters the machine; INJECTED — the value lands in the session
+ *  env file. An `api_key` request declares one per key. */
+export type VaultKeyShape = {
+    mode: "brokered";
+    host: string;
+    headerName: string;
+    scheme?: string;
+} | {
+    mode: "injected";
+};
+/** The STANDING entry a request is for, named by its label and/or (a card)
+ *  its last four digits — at least one. The card and the vault page lead
+ *  with that entry, so the person sees which saved credential is meant. */
+export interface RequestedVaultEntry {
+    label?: string;
+    last4?: string;
+}
+/** A saved payment card's receipts: its network (from the number's issuer
+ *  prefix; null when unknown) and its last four. Never more. */
+export interface VaultCardHint {
+    brand: string | null;
+    last4: string;
+}
+/** One STANDING vault entry usable for a session (the catalog read,
+ *  2026-08-31) — labels, kinds, identifiers and field NAMES only; values
+ *  are write-only and never on this wire. */
+export interface VaultCatalogEntry {
+    label: string;
+    kind: string;
+    fieldKeys: string[];
+    via: "owner" | "member" | "project";
+    ownerName: string | null;
+    projectName: string | null;
+    lastUsedAt: string | null;
+    /** The account the entry belongs to, or a card's network and last four
+     *  ("Amex •••• 1002") — how look-alike labels are told apart. Absent on
+     *  an older server. */
+    identifier?: string | null;
+    /** The card's receipts when the entry is a card; null otherwise. */
+    card?: VaultCardHint | null;
 }
 /** A vault link's polled status. */
 export interface SessionSecretRequestStatus {
@@ -359,9 +445,34 @@ export interface SessionSecretRequestStatus {
     status: "pending" | "fulfilled" | "cancelled" | "expired";
     keys: string[];
     expiresAt: string;
+    /** Cancellation attribution (task #111) — present on cancelled rows:
+     *  who ended the ask ('human' = denied; 'agent' = withdrawn) and why. */
+    cancelledVia?: "human" | "agent" | "thread_agent";
+    cancelReason?: string | null;
+    /** The denying human's display name (best-effort; 'human' via only). */
+    deniedByName?: string | null;
+    /** Newest USER message in the session SINCE the mint (pending rows only)
+     *  — the chat-interrupt probe: the human may be answering in chat while
+     *  the agent blocks on --wait. */
+    userMessageAt?: string;
+}
+/** One OPEN vault request, as the list endpoint returns it — receipts
+ *  only (keys + reason + clocks), never values. */
+export interface SessionSecretRequestSummary {
+    requestId: string;
+    keys: string[];
+    /** What kind of credential the ask is for; null when the requester did not say. */
+    kind: VaultRequestKind | null;
+    reason: string | null;
+    expiresAt: string;
+    createdAt: string;
 }
 export interface CreateApiKeyInput {
     name?: string;
+    /** Omitted → `read` alone (the read-only default). Anything more —
+     *  `invoke`, `manage`, `admin` — is chosen explicitly, and the server
+     *  refuses any scope the minter does not hold (403 `scope_not_held`).
+     *  `events:read` / `events:write` are deprecated but still accepted. */
     scopes?: string[];
     expiresAt?: string;
     factorySlug?: string;
@@ -427,6 +538,9 @@ export interface UsageResponse {
  *  app-level (the platform GitHub App's own webhook) or polling — there
  *  is no per-repo webhook setup (retired 2026-08-18). */
 export interface DriveRepoLink {
+    /** Last successful API head read; a deferred attempt does not advance it. */
+    lastHeadObservedAt: string | null;
+    headCheckDeferredUntil: string | null;
     id: string;
     factoryId: string;
     /** Linked directory prefix under the drive root (relative, no slashes
@@ -464,7 +578,16 @@ export interface DriveRepoLink {
     }>;
     lastSyncedGitSha: string | null;
     lastSyncedAcgCommit: string | null;
-    syncState: "idle" | "syncing" | "pushing" | "error" | "conflict" | "diverged" | "reauth_required";
+    /** 'queued': the branch's first sync (or a full re-ingest) is waiting in
+     *  the ingest queue; `ingestPriority` / `ingestQueueAhead` say where. */
+    syncState: "idle" | "queued" | "syncing" | "pushing" | "error" | "conflict" | "diverged" | "reauth_required";
+    /** Drain tier while queued (0 foreground, 1 active, 2 background). */
+    ingestPriority: number | null;
+    ingestQueuedAt: string | null;
+    /** When a runner started this branch's ingest; null when none runs. */
+    ingestClaimedAt: string | null;
+    /** Queued branches of the same repo ahead of this one (list only). */
+    ingestQueueAhead?: number | null;
     /** Human-readable detail when syncState is 'error' or 'conflict'. */
     syncError: string | null;
     createdBy: string | null;
@@ -480,6 +603,21 @@ export interface DriveRepoLink {
  *  auto-unlink; capped at 100 branches). Explicit `trackedBranches`:
  *  index 0 is the PRIMARY and keeps the plain placement; every additional
  *  branch lands at the sibling `dirPrefix@<sanitized-branch>` placement. */
+/** POST /factories/:slug/repo-links/native — a repo whose origin IS the
+ *  platform git plane (no GitHub side). `name` is ONE segment of GitHub's
+ *  repo alphabet; `dirPrefix` defaults to `repos/<name>`. */
+export interface CreateNativeRepoInput {
+    name: string;
+    dirPrefix?: string;
+}
+export interface CreateNativeRepoResult {
+    link: DriveRepoLink;
+    /** Stock-git clone/push URL on the platform origin (credentials are
+     *  minted per operation by `agentc repos git-credential --link`). */
+    repoUrl: string;
+    /** The CLI one-liner: `agentc repos clone <id> --via origin`. */
+    cloneCommand: string;
+}
 export interface CreateDriveRepoLinkInput {
     dirPrefix: string;
     repoFullName: string;
@@ -489,3 +627,45 @@ export interface CreateDriveRepoLinkInput {
     /** Two-way sync ("push-out") — defaults to TRUE for new links. */
     pushOut?: boolean;
 }
+/** A retained merge conflict. Resolution edits a live session branch;
+ * publication still goes through its normal merge and approval gates. */
+/** A project-scoped secret's METADATA (scoped-secrets spec §4.1) — names
+ * only; values are write-only. Reaches SESSIONS linked into the project whose
+ * owner is a live member; workflow runs never receive project secrets. */
+export interface ProjectSecretMeta {
+    id: string;
+    projectId: string;
+    secretKey: string;
+    createdBy: string | null;
+    delivery: "injected" | "brokered";
+    brokerHost: string | null;
+    brokerHeaderName: string | null;
+    brokerHeaderScheme: string | null;
+    createdAt: string | null;
+    updatedAt: string | null;
+}
+export interface ProjectSecretList {
+    secrets: ProjectSecretMeta[];
+    tier: "project";
+    audience: "sessions";
+}
+export interface FactoryFileConflict {
+    id: string;
+    path: string;
+    conversationId: string | null;
+    runId: string | null;
+    runLabel: string | null;
+    reason: "same_region" | "binary" | "delete_vs_edit";
+    oursHash: string | null;
+    theirsHash: string | null;
+    baseHash: string | null;
+    status: string;
+    createdAt: string;
+    resolvesTo: "branch" | "main";
+}
+export interface FactoryFileConflictList {
+    object: "list";
+    data: FactoryFileConflict[];
+    has_more: boolean;
+    next_cursor: string | null;
+}