@agen-ai/acp-registry 0.0.0-stage → 0.4.0

package/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 Trevor Nichols
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

package/README.md

@@ -1,3 +1,348 @@
-# Temporary Holding Version
+# @agen-ai/acp-registry
 
-This version is a temporary placeholder for this package. An operational version to replace this has been submitted for review and is awaiting a staged release.
+Optional ACP catalog validation, search, immutable planning and verified installation for Node.js 22 or newer.
+The coordinated SDK version is `0.4.0`. The package is ESM, MIT licensed and side-effect-free on import.
+The metadata graph depends only on `@agen-ai/validation` and exact `zod@4.4.3`. Explicit Node
+installation uses pinned tar, ZIP and bzip2 readers. Public contracts are plain TypeScript values
+and AgenAI validation issues, with no exposed Zod schemas or Agent Runtime dependency.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+The root parses inert metadata and creates plans. It never fetches, writes files, installs packages,
+spawns processes, chooses credentials or activates an agent. `/node` provides explicit bounded
+fetching and installation into an explicitly opened owned store. Provider composition, credentials
+and process lifetime remain caller-owned.
+
+Catalog labels, licenses, launch metadata and `bundled` flags grant no authority. Digests identify
+inputs; they do not authenticate their publisher. Use an independently trusted source and expected
+artifact evidence appropriate to your host. A plan's `verified: false` never changes. A separate
+installation receipt records verification of its declared obligations against actual artifacts and
+toolchains. This source preparation does not publish the package or authorize a host deployment.
+
+## Parse, search and plan
+
+```ts
+import {
+  createAcpInstallPlan,
+  parseAcpRegistrySnapshot,
+  searchAcpRegistry,
+} from '@agen-ai/acp-registry';
+
+const snapshot = parseAcpRegistrySnapshot({
+  source: {
+    namespace: 'my-company',
+    kind: 'local',
+    channel: 'stable',
+    location: 'approved-catalog-2026-10-09',
+    profile: 'published-v1',
+  },
+  content: catalogJson, // string or Uint8Array supplied by the caller
+});
+const [entry] = searchAcpRegistry(snapshot, {
+  query: 'coding',
+  target: 'linux-x86_64',
+  distributionKinds: ['binary'],
+});
+if (!entry) throw new Error('No approved binary distribution matches.');
+
+const plan = createAcpInstallPlan(snapshot, {
+  entryIdentity: entry.identity,
+  expectedSnapshotDigest: snapshot.digest,
+  expectedEntryDigest: entry.digest,
+  target: 'linux-x86_64',
+  distributionPreference: ['binary'],
+  policy: {
+    network: 'offline',
+    allowedOrigins: [],
+    allowInsecureHttp: false,
+    packageScripts: 'deny',
+    integrity: 'require-expected-sha256',
+    reproducibility: 'require-complete',
+    allowedEnvironmentKeys: [],
+  },
+});
+```
+
+This example requires a matching binary with an expected SHA-256 and no catalog environment keys.
+Missing evidence or a conflicting caller pin throws `AcpRegistryValidationError`; it never silently
+weakens policy. For a binary without catalog integrity, supply `binaryIntegrity` with an independently
+expected digest and the digest of its resolution evidence. Alternatively, explicitly select weaker
+integrity/reproducibility policy and inspect the plan's recorded gaps.
+
+Search matches all whitespace-separated query tokens case-insensitively against ID, name, description
+and authors, then sorts by source-qualified identity. The explicit distribution preference is ranked;
+selection never substitutes another architecture or a distribution outside that list. The six target
+identifiers are `darwin`, `linux` or `windows` followed by `-aarch64` or `-x86_64`. Unsupported Windows
+`.cmd`/`.bat` launches fail explicitly; no implicit shell interpreter is introduced.
+
+Snapshots, entries, search results, distributions and plans are deeply frozen. Serializable values
+are structurally revalidated and their digests recomputed before lookup or planning, so JSON round
+trips remain usable without a hidden object-identity registry. The host must retain its expected
+snapshot and entry pins; recomputing a digest does not establish trust in a modified object.
+
+## Identity and the accepted profile
+
+Source identity includes the caller-selected namespace, local/remote kind, stable/preview channel,
+canonical location and profile. Agent IDs are unique within that source. Changing the source location
+or channel produces a different identity. Redirect destinations never replace the selected source.
+`rawDigest` is SHA-256 over exact accepted UTF-8 bytes, including whitespace and any UTF-8 BOM.
+`snapshot.digest` binds the normalized source, entries and raw digest; `entry.digest` binds the
+normalized entry. Public digests use `sha256:` followed by lowercase hexadecimal. Upstream binary
+`sha256` fields remain normalized bare hexadecimal in distribution metadata.
+
+The `published-v1` profile is grounded in upstream registry commit
+[`7f9be29696108572a2bca70e0563af528073a0c3`](https://github.com/agentclientprotocol/registry/commit/7f9be29696108572a2bca70e0563af528073a0c3),
+its [format](https://github.com/agentclientprotocol/registry/blob/7f9be29696108572a2bca70e0563af528073a0c3/FORMAT.md),
+[agent schema](https://github.com/agentclientprotocol/registry/blob/7f9be29696108572a2bca70e0563af528073a0c3/agent.schema.json),
+and [builder](https://github.com/agentclientprotocol/registry/blob/7f9be29696108572a2bca70e0563af528073a0c3/.github/workflows/build_registry.py).
+It accepts the complete published `{ version: '1.0.0', agents, extensions?: [] }` envelope. The builder
+emits an empty `extensions` array even though that commit's registry JSON Schema omits the field.
+Only the empty form is accepted; extension installation and source-manifest preview overlays are
+unsupported. Stable and preview are separate complete catalogs, selected by the caller.
+
+The committed catalog fixtures are derived from pinned source entries and the builder's output
+shape. They are not downloaded CDN publication bytes and do not establish the freshness or
+authenticity of a live registry response. Retain and approve each actual source snapshot separately.
+
+Agent release versions are opaque dotted numeric identities, including leading-zero date releases
+such as `2026.10.01` and preview suffixes such as `1.2.3-preview.1`. They never resolve a package version.
+Unknown fields, unknown distributions, duplicate agent identities or JSON keys, unsafe paths, NUL,
+invalid UTF-8, unpaired surrogates and malformed URLs are rejected. URLs and argument strings remain
+inert metadata; no shell expansion occurs. Binary paths become contained POSIX-relative paths,
+including normalization of Windows separators. The parser accepts clean HTTP metadata, while all
+network operations require their own explicit transport policy.
+
+Default limits are 8 MiB of input, 1,024 entries, depth 16, 200,000 JSON values, 16 KiB per string,
+128 launch arguments and 128 environment entries. `DEFAULT_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS` exposes these values;
+`limits` can adjust them only within finite package ceilings. Parsing fails as a whole, without
+returning a partially accepted catalog. Validation failures carry immutable `issues` with code,
+path and message.
+
+## Package resolution and reproducibility
+
+`npx` and `uvx` describe catalog distribution kinds, not instructions to run download-on-demand
+launchers. Planning requires an explicit `packageResolution` with the normalized package name,
+exact version and package-owned bin or console-script command. An unversioned name or named tag
+also requires caller-supplied resolution evidence. Exact catalog pins must match the supplied version.
+Supported range syntax remains searchable metadata, but planning rejects it explicitly until range
+resolution semantics are qualified; a digest alone does not prove that a version satisfies a range.
+The command may differ from the package name. Aliases, local paths and VCS specifiers are unsupported.
+No package registry is contacted by planning.
+
+Package plans require exact Node/npm or Python/uv toolchain versions and measured executable digests,
+without embedding machine-specific toolchain paths. Strict package reproducibility requires expected
+artifact integrity, disabled package scripts and a supplied dependency lock. Supported lock input
+profiles are a bounded npm package-lock v3 subset and hashed Python requirements. Both require a
+single declared dependency closure containing the selected package, exact versions, target artifact
+SHA-256 values and a digest of the complete lock document. These are locked inputs with pending
+installer verification, not proof that a resolver or publisher is trustworthy. A top-level version
+alone records a missing dependency closure; enabling scripts records another gap.
+
+The npm profile requires one exact root dependency, contained `node_modules` paths, canonical
+HTTP(S) artifact URLs and strong SHA-256/384/512 SRI. Links, bundled, dev, optional, platform-conditional
+and peer dependency metadata require additional qualification and are rejected. Declared dependency
+names must agree with the lock. The Python profile accepts canonical `name==version` lines with one
+target SHA-256 each, comments and line continuations; direct URLs, options, extras and markers are
+unsupported. Python requirements do not encode dependency edges, so the supplied graph remains
+caller evidence until an installer compares actual package metadata and verifies closure. The same
+installed-artifact verification remains mandatory for npm.
+
+Plans bind the source, accepted snapshot and entry, selected distribution, target and preference,
+literal launch arguments/environment, exact resolution and lock, toolchain identities, expected
+integrity, mapping profile and explicit policy. Repeated equal normalized inputs yield the same plan
+digest. `pinned-binary` describes the payload input only; it does not pin an operating system, shared
+library set or all runtime behavior. Catalog environment variables are launch-only and require an
+exact allowlist; process, shell, installer, proxy and runtime plumbing variables remain reserved.
+
+## Explicit fetching
+
+```ts
+import { fetchAcpRegistrySnapshot } from '@agen-ai/acp-registry/node';
+
+const fetched = await fetchAcpRegistrySnapshot({
+  source: {
+    namespace: 'approved-registry',
+    kind: 'remote',
+    channel: 'stable',
+    location: 'https://registry.example.test/catalog.json',
+    profile: 'published-v1',
+  },
+  trustedOrigins: ['https://registry.example.test'],
+  timeoutMs: 15_000,
+  maxRedirects: 3,
+  signal: abortController.signal,
+});
+```
+
+Fetching requires an exact canonical origin allowlist and validates the initial URL and every
+redirect before contacting it. HTTP requires `allowInsecureHttp: true` in addition to the origin
+allowlist; this also explicitly permits a trusted HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect. Credentials and cookies
+are not forwarded. Origin trust is the caller's network policy, including any private or loopback
+address it chooses; the package does not claim DNS or network sandbox enforcement.
+
+The total deadline defaults to 15 seconds (maximum five minutes), redirects to three (maximum eight),
+and the decoded response byte ceiling follows the catalog limits. Content-Length and streamed bytes
+are checked, including decompressed responses. Only HTTP 200 is accepted. Cancellation, deadline,
+origin, redirect, status and size failures produce `AcpRegistryFetchError` with a stable `code`;
+invalid catalogs retain `AcpRegistryValidationError`. No response diagnostic body is included in
+HTTP-status errors. `fetchedAt` is an observation time, not a freshness or authenticity guarantee.
+
+The result includes the validated snapshot, exact accepted UTF-8 `content`, final URL and observation
+time. Persist content and its source descriptor under caller policy if needed. Fetch failure never
+chooses cached data, changes an installation or activates a provider. No cache directory is created.
+
+
+## Install, retain and launch
+
+The following lifecycle sketch assumes an approved binary plan and independently retained input
+pins. A production host must persist the installation identity/reference and own error recovery.
+
+```ts
+import { parseAgentInstanceId, parseAgentProviderKey } from '@agen-ai/agent-protocol';
+import { createAgentProviderRegistry } from '@agen-ai/agent-runtime';
+import { openAcpInstallationStore } from '@agen-ai/acp-registry/node';
+import { createNodeAcpProviderDriver } from '@agen-ai/provider-acp/node';
+
+const store = await openAcpInstallationStore({ root: '/var/lib/my-host/acp-installations' });
+const receipt = await store.install({
+  plan,
+  expectedPlanDigest: approvedPlanDigest,
+  localArtifacts: [{ path: '/approved-inputs/agent.tar.gz', sha256: approvedArtifactSha256 }],
+  signal: abortController.signal,
+});
+const identity = { planDigest: receipt.plan.digest, installationId: receipt.installationId };
+const reference = await store.acquire({ ...identity, ownerId: 'session-123' });
+// Durably persist the exact reference under the host's ownership before process launch.
+const launch = await store.resolveLaunch(reference);
+const providerKey = parseAgentProviderKey('installed-acp-agent');
+const instanceId = parseAgentInstanceId('installed-agent:primary');
+const driver = createNodeAcpProviderDriver({
+  providerKey,
+  launch: {
+    executable: launch.executable,
+    args: launch.args,
+    env: { HOME: '/var/lib/my-host/agent-home', PATH: '/usr/bin:/bin', ...launch.env },
+    cwd: '/work/project',
+  },
+});
+const registry = await createAgentProviderRegistry({
+  drivers: [driver],
+  definitions: [{ providerKey, instanceId, driverConfiguration: {} }],
+});
+try {
+  const instance = registry.requireInstance(instanceId);
+  // Open a session and consume startTurn().outputs, answering through the execution handle.
+} finally {
+  await registry.dispose();
+  // A failed native cleanup throws above and deliberately leaves the reference retained.
+  await store.release(reference);
+}
+await store.remove(identity);
+```
+
+Persist the exact reference before launching. Keep it until all processes using the installation
+have stopped, including startup that fails before a registry is returned. Failed startup or cleanup
+does not prove quiescence and must not trigger an unconditional reference release or store deletion.
+Retry owned cleanup or establish quiescence through the host before releasing the exact reference.
+Keep that installation reference throughout an execution's pending human requests and later output.
+An independent `resolveRequest` delivery receipt does not complete the turn or release its native
+process. Retain one `startTurn` execution/output reader until actual terminality and cleanup; route
+human decisions through a separately owned handler. The public
+[registry example](../../examples/registry-install-run.ts) composes the shared session helper, and
+the [live-output example](../../examples/live-request-output.ts) isolates that runtime lifecycle.
+The provider launcher supplies no sandbox, account credentials or filesystem/network authority.
+The registry is also usable without the provider package when another explicit process owner
+consumes the verified launch recipe.
+
+Installation and launch require the current OS/architecture to match the plan. The caller supplies
+an absent store directory under an existing owned parent, or reopens a valid owned store. Foreign
+and substituted roots fail closed. The library creates a private stage, verifies every retained file,
+directory and contained symlink, writes a receipt, synchronizes supported filesystems and publishes
+with one same-filesystem rename. POSIX receipts record `synced-rename`; platforms without directory
+synchronization record only `atomic-rename`. Native Windows/macOS qualification is separate from
+Linux source fixtures. Archive paths, links, special files, case collisions, payload size, entry count,
+path depth and decoder output are bounded. Supported binary formats are tar, tar.gz/tgz,
+tar.bz2/tbz2, ZIP and raw executables; ambiguous URLs require `binaryFormat` in the plan. System
+installer formats and implicit shell command expansion are unsupported.
+
+Binary input can be an explicitly mapped local file or a bounded download under the plan's origin,
+HTTP and redirect policy. Expected SHA-256 and measured SHA-256 remain separate receipt facts.
+Permissive missing-integrity plans retain their gap after successful measurement. The receipt binds
+the complete payload inventory, plan, launch recipe and verification evidence. Its content identity
+excludes observation time and machine-specific toolchain paths; its receipt digest binds the complete
+record. Hashes establish byte identity, not publisher authenticity or immunity to same-user tampering.
+Use a host-owned store and trusted toolchain roots; the library does not create an OS sandbox.
+
+`parseAcpInstallPlan(serializedValue, independentlyRetainedDigest)` validates retained plans without
+I/O. Installation reuses this check, derives launch/policy requirements again and rejects a matching
+self-computed digest whose fields contradict those requirements. `read(identity)` verifies the exact
+receipt and complete current payload. For `synced-rename` receipts, reads also synchronize the
+installation and its parent before returning, reestablishing persistence after an earlier rename
+whose final synchronization may have failed. Reads never download repairs. `resolveLaunch(reference)` also
+checks retained toolchain entry hashes and needs a live exact reference. No registry access, latest
+resolution, `npx` or `uvx` invocation occurs during launch. Removal and publication serialize against
+references; changing a plan creates a distinct installation and leaves older referenced payloads usable.
+
+## Explicit package toolchains and artifacts
+
+Call `inspectAcpToolchains({ toolchains, workRoot })` with absolute locations for Node plus the npm CLI
+JavaScript file, or Python plus uv. It runs bounded version probes with an explicit temporary home
+and environment and measures the canonical executable entries. Use the resulting kind/version/SHA
+identities in `createAcpInstallPlan`; provide the locations separately to `store.install`. An entry hash
+does not attest an entire external Node/Python installation, standard library, npm dependency tree or
+OS. Those roots remain caller-managed dependencies. Installation and retained launch reject changed
+entry bytes instead of finding another executable on PATH.
+
+npm receives verified local tarballs through a transformed private lock and runs real `npm ci` in
+offline mode with lifecycle scripts, bin links, audit and funding disabled. The original logical lock
+is retained. Actual manifests, dependency closure, version constraints and the root-owned JavaScript
+bin are checked. Python receives verified wheels and runs real offline `uv pip install` into a retained
+site-packages directory with hash requirements and no index, configuration, cache or source builds.
+Actual metadata and the root-owned console script are checked without importing installed package
+code. The launch bootstrap uses the exact Python executable and its retained payload path.
+
+`localArtifacts` maps approved bytes by URL and/or SHA-256. `packageArtifacts` supplies explicit
+name/version/URL/filename/SHA mappings where required, particularly Python wheel filenames and a
+complete closure for plans without an original lock. Package managers never fetch missing artifacts.
+A plan may explicitly permit the library to download approved artifacts before invoking the offline
+manager. Newly observed closure does not remove a plan's missing-original-lock gap. Enabled scripts,
+Python source distributions, peer/optional/platform-conditioned npm dependencies, and Python
+markers/extras require additional profiles and fail explicitly here. Offline manager flags are not
+network confinement; execution of arbitrary install scripts is deliberately unsupported.
+
+## Limits, failures and recovery
+
+`DEFAULT_ACP_INSTALLATION_LIMITS` exposes finite configurable resource limits: 256 MiB per artifact,
+1 GiB total artifact and payload bytes, 2 GiB decoded archive bytes, 25,000 entries, depth 32,
+4,096-byte paths, three download redirects, two-minute artifact/tool deadlines, 1 MiB combined tool
+output, 16 MiB receipts and 1,024 active references. Larger values remain bounded by package ceilings.
+Errors use `AcpInstallationError` with stable `code`; malformed plans retain registry validation issues.
+Registry and installation failures remain distinct from Agent Protocol V10 operational failures and
+provider retry observations. This package has no runtime dependency or policy for retrying an agent
+turn; retained installation integrity and process quiescence do not settle uncertain native execution.
+
+Identical-plan operations use an exclusive cross-process lock and return `store_busy` when occupied.
+They do not wait indefinitely or replace a lock based on age or PID. Cancellation terminates the directly owned tool and its POSIX process group, closes retained pipes
+and waits for the direct child to exit before cleanup. Processes that deliberately escape that group
+require caller-provided OS containment; Windows does not gain a process-tree sandbox from this API.
+Failed publication never exposes a partial installation. Crash residue remains
+inspectable through `inspectAttempt(planDigest)`. `recoverAttempt({ ...attempt, ownerQuiesced: true })`
+requires the exact retained attempt and caller-established quiescence before cleaning owned residue.
+Unknown or conflicting residue is retained. An active reference blocks removal until its exact owner
+releases it; the library does not infer process lifetime or automatically expire references.
+
+## Real installation test prerequisites
+
+The package tests execute real npm and uv against committed synthetic local tarballs and wheels.
+They require Node/npm, Python and uv on the test host; missing tools fail with an explicit
+prerequisite error. No registry credentials, real agent accounts or inference are involved. Linux
+CI installs Python `3.14.4` and uv `0.11.28` through immutable action revisions before running these
+tests. The standalone SDK CI runs them on Node 22 and 24; its release workflow uses the same
+Python/uv prerequisites. These fixtures qualify the Linux test lane; they do not establish native
+Windows or macOS installation qualification.
+
+Run `pnpm --filter @agen-ai/acp-registry test` after installing those prerequisites. The fixture
+discovery helper measures the actual tool entries and versions before constructing each plan;
+production requires explicit caller-selected paths. `tests/fixtures/install-packages/generate.py`
+recreates the small deterministic fixtures using only the Python standard library. Fixture
+generation never imports package code or invokes package lifecycle scripts.

package/dist/catalog/assert.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+import type { AcpRegistryEntry, AcpRegistrySnapshot } from './contracts.js';
+/** Verifies serializable normalized metadata and self-consistency; it does not authenticate its publisher. */
+export declare function validateAcpRegistryEntry(input: unknown): AcpRegistryEntry;
+/** A retained rawDigest is provenance evidence, never proof that these bytes came from a trusted publisher. */
+export declare function validateAcpRegistrySnapshot(input: unknown): AcpRegistrySnapshot;
+//# sourceMappingURL=assert.d.ts.map

package/dist/catalog/assert.js

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import { MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS } from "./limits.js";
+import { acpRegistryEntryToPublished, normalizeAcpRegistryEntry } from "./normalize.js";
+import { acpRegistrySchemas } from "./schemas.js";
+import { acpRegistrySourceIdentity, parseAcpRegistrySource } from "./source.js";
+import { copyBoundedJson } from "../shared/bounds.js";
+import { canonicalDigest } from "../shared/digest.js";
+import { invalidRegistry, registrySchemaError } from "../shared/errors.js";
+import { deepFreeze } from "../shared/immutable.js";
+function validateAcpRegistryEntry(input) {
+  const captured = copyBoundedJson(input, MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS);
+  const schemas = acpRegistrySchemas(MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS);
+  const result = schemas.normalizedEntry.safeParse(captured);
+  if (!result.success) registrySchemaError(result.error, captured);
+  assertCanonicalEntry(result.data);
+  return deepFreeze(result.data);
+}
+function assertCanonicalEntry(entry) {
+  const sourceIdentity = entry.identity.slice(0, entry.identity.lastIndexOf("/"));
+  const normalized = normalizeAcpRegistryEntry(acpRegistryEntryToPublished(entry), sourceIdentity, "preview", 0);
+  if (canonicalDigest(normalized) !== canonicalDigest(entry)) invalidRegistry("entry_digest_mismatch", ["digest"], "Registry entry metadata, identity or digest is not canonical.");
+}
+function validateAcpRegistrySnapshot(input) {
+  const captured = copyBoundedJson(input, MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS);
+  const result = acpRegistrySchemas(MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS).normalizedSnapshot.safeParse(captured);
+  if (!result.success) registrySchemaError(result.error, captured);
+  const snapshot = result.data;
+  const source = parseAcpRegistrySource(snapshot.source);
+  if (snapshot.sourceIdentity !== acpRegistrySourceIdentity(source) || canonicalDigest(source) !== canonicalDigest(snapshot.source)) {
+    invalidRegistry("source_identity_mismatch", ["sourceIdentity"], "Registry source identity does not match its canonical descriptor.");
+  }
+  let previous = "";
+  for (const [index, entry] of snapshot.entries.entries()) {
+    assertCanonicalEntry(entry);
+    if (entry.id <= previous) invalidRegistry("duplicate_identity", ["entries", index, "id"], "Registry entries must have unique identities in canonical order.");
+    previous = entry.id;
+    if (entry.identity !== `${snapshot.sourceIdentity}/${entry.id}`) invalidRegistry("source_identity_mismatch", ["entries", index, "identity"], "Registry entry belongs to a different source.");
+    if (source.channel === "stable" && entry.version.includes("-")) invalidRegistry("channel_mismatch", ["entries", index, "version"], "Stable catalogs cannot contain preview release identities.");
+  }
+  const { digest, ...body } = snapshot;
+  if (canonicalDigest(body) !== digest) invalidRegistry("snapshot_digest_mismatch", ["digest"], "Registry normalized snapshot digest does not match its metadata.");
+  return deepFreeze(snapshot);
+}
+export {
+  validateAcpRegistryEntry,
+  validateAcpRegistrySnapshot
+};

package/dist/catalog/contracts.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+export type AcpRegistryTarget = 'darwin-aarch64' | 'darwin-x86_64' | 'linux-aarch64' | 'linux-x86_64' | 'windows-aarch64' | 'windows-x86_64';
+export type AcpRegistryDistributionKind = 'binary' | 'npx' | 'uvx';
+export interface AcpRegistrySource {
+    readonly namespace: string;
+    readonly kind: 'remote' | 'local';
+    readonly channel: 'stable' | 'preview';
+    readonly location: string;
+    readonly profile: 'published-v1';
+}
+interface AcpRegistryLaunchArguments {
+    readonly args: readonly string[];
+    readonly env: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
+}
+export interface AcpRegistryBinaryDistribution extends AcpRegistryLaunchArguments {
+    readonly kind: 'binary';
+    readonly target: AcpRegistryTarget;
+    readonly archive: string;
+    readonly sha256?: string;
+    /** A contained POSIX-relative payload path, independent of the host platform. */
+    readonly executable: string;
+}
+export interface AcpRegistryPackageDistribution extends AcpRegistryLaunchArguments {
+    readonly kind: 'npx' | 'uvx';
+    /** Literal catalog metadata; an unversioned specifier has no immutable resolution. */
+    readonly package: string;
+}
+export type AcpRegistryDistribution = AcpRegistryBinaryDistribution | AcpRegistryPackageDistribution;
+export interface AcpRegistryEntry {
+    readonly identity: string;
+    readonly id: string;
+    readonly name: string;
+    readonly version: string;
+    readonly description: string;
+    readonly repository?: string;
+    readonly website?: string;
+    readonly authors: readonly string[];
+    readonly license?: string;
+    readonly licenseUrl?: string;
+    readonly icon?: string;
+    /** Presentation metadata only; it grants no installation or execution authority. */
+    readonly bundled?: boolean;
+    readonly distributions: readonly AcpRegistryDistribution[];
+    readonly digest: string;
+}
+export interface AcpRegistrySnapshot {
+    readonly format: 'acp-registry-published-v1';
+    readonly source: AcpRegistrySource;
+    readonly sourceIdentity: string;
+    /** SHA-256 of the exact accepted UTF-8 input bytes. */
+    readonly rawDigest: string;
+    /** Canonical digest binding the normalized snapshot and its raw-byte provenance. */
+    readonly digest: string;
+    readonly entries: readonly AcpRegistryEntry[];
+}
+export interface AcpRegistryLimits {
+    readonly maxSnapshotBytes: number;
+    readonly maxEntries: number;
+    readonly maxDepth: number;
+    readonly maxValues: number;
+    readonly maxStringBytes: number;
+    readonly maxArgs: number;
+    readonly maxEnvEntries: number;
+}
+export interface ParseAcpRegistrySnapshotInput {
+    readonly source: AcpRegistrySource;
+    readonly content: string | Uint8Array;
+    readonly limits?: Partial<AcpRegistryLimits>;
+}
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=contracts.d.ts.map

package/dist/catalog/launch.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/** Both separators describe contained archive paths; they never choose a host shell or working directory. */
+export declare function normalizeRegistryExecutable(input: string): string;
+export declare function validateRegistryPackage(input: string, kind: 'npx' | 'uvx'): void;
+//# sourceMappingURL=launch.d.ts.map

package/dist/catalog/launch.js

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import { invalidRegistry } from "../shared/errors.js";
+function normalizeRegistryExecutable(input) {
+  const path = input.replaceAll("\\", "/");
+  if (!path || path.startsWith("/") || /[:\0\p{Cc}\p{Cf}]/u.test(path)) invalidRegistry("unsafe_executable", ["cmd"], "Registry commands must identify contained payload files.");
+  const segments = path.split("/");
+  if (segments.some((segment) => segment === ".." || segment === "" || /[. ]$/u.test(segment) && segment !== ".")) invalidRegistry("unsafe_executable", ["cmd"], "Registry payload paths cannot traverse, contain empty segments or ambiguous trailing dots/spaces.");
+  const normalized = segments.filter((segment) => segment !== ".").join("/");
+  if (!normalized) invalidRegistry("unsafe_executable", ["cmd"], "Registry commands must identify a payload file.");
+  return normalized;
+}
+function validateRegistryPackage(input, kind) {
+  const npm = /^(?:@[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*\/)?[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*(?:@(?:\*|[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+_-]*|[\^~][0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+_*-]*))?$/u;
+  const python = /^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9._-]*(?:@[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+!_-]*|(?:(?:==|!=|>=|<=|~=|>|<)[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+!*_-]*)(?:,(?:==|!=|>=|<=|~=|>|<)[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+!*_-]*)*)?$/u;
+  if (!(kind === "npx" ? npm : python).test(input)) invalidRegistry("unsafe_package", ["package"], "Registry packages require literal registry names and supported version, tag or range selectors.");
+}
+export {
+  normalizeRegistryExecutable,
+  validateRegistryPackage
+};

package/dist/catalog/limits.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+import type { AcpRegistryLimits } from './contracts.js';
+export declare const DEFAULT_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS: AcpRegistryLimits;
+export declare const MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS: AcpRegistryLimits;
+export declare function resolveAcpRegistryLimits(input?: Partial<AcpRegistryLimits>): AcpRegistryLimits;
+//# sourceMappingURL=limits.d.ts.map

package/dist/catalog/limits.js

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+import { invalidRegistry } from "../shared/errors.js";
+const DEFAULT_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
+  maxSnapshotBytes: 8 * 1024 * 1024,
+  maxEntries: 1024,
+  maxDepth: 16,
+  maxValues: 2e5,
+  maxStringBytes: 16 * 1024,
+  maxArgs: 128,
+  maxEnvEntries: 128
+});
+const MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
+  maxSnapshotBytes: 64 * 1024 * 1024,
+  maxEntries: 1e4,
+  maxDepth: 64,
+  maxValues: 1e6,
+  maxStringBytes: 1024 * 1024,
+  maxArgs: 1024,
+  maxEnvEntries: 1024
+});
+function resolveAcpRegistryLimits(input = {}) {
+  if (input === null || typeof input !== "object" || Object.getPrototypeOf(input) !== Object.prototype) invalidRegistry("invalid_limits", ["limits"], "Registry limits must be a plain object.");
+  const resolved = { ...DEFAULT_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS };
+  for (const key of Reflect.ownKeys(input)) {
+    if (typeof key !== "string" || !Object.hasOwn(MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS, key)) invalidRegistry("invalid_limits", ["limits"], "Unknown registry limit.");
+    const descriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(input, key);
+    if (!descriptor?.enumerable || !Object.hasOwn(descriptor, "value")) invalidRegistry("invalid_limits", ["limits", key], "Registry limits require enumerable data properties.");
+    const value = descriptor.value;
+    const minimum = key === "maxArgs" || key === "maxEnvEntries" ? 0 : 1;
+    if (typeof value !== "number" || !Number.isSafeInteger(value) || value < minimum || value > MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS[key]) {
+      invalidRegistry("invalid_limits", ["limits", key], "Registry limit is outside its supported finite range.");
+    }
+    resolved[key] = value;
+  }
+  return Object.freeze(resolved);
+}
+export {
+  DEFAULT_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS,
+  MAX_ACP_REGISTRY_LIMITS,
+  resolveAcpRegistryLimits
+};

package/dist/catalog/normalize.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import type { z } from 'zod/v4';
+import type { AcpRegistryEntry } from './contracts.js';
+import { type acpRegistrySchemas } from './schemas.js';
+type RawEntry = z.infer<ReturnType<typeof acpRegistrySchemas>['rawEntry']>;
+export declare function normalizeAcpRegistryEntry(input: RawEntry, sourceIdentity: string, channel: 'stable' | 'preview', index: number): AcpRegistryEntry;
+/** Reuses the published shape's closure for normalized snapshot admission without trusting retained digests. */
+export declare function acpRegistryEntryToPublished(entry: AcpRegistryEntry): RawEntry;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=normalize.d.ts.map