@adcp/sdk 7.5.0 → 7.7.0

package/dist/lib/signing/request-context.js

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Adapter helpers that construct the `{ method, url }` shape that
+ * `ResponseLike.request` (and any other caller binding RFC 9421 derived
+ * components back to an originating request) requires.
+ *
+ * Why this exists: `ResponseLike.request.url` MUST be an absolute URL —
+ * `canonicalAuthority` / `canonicalTargetUri` parse via `new URL(...)` and
+ * throw on a relative path. Express handlers ship `req.url` / `req.originalUrl`
+ * as path-only, so adopters reconstruct via
+ * `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${req.originalUrl}`. But `req.protocol`
+ * lies behind a TLS-terminating proxy unless `trust proxy` is set, and
+ * `req.get('host')` is attacker-controllable absent a Host allowlist. A
+ * hostile peer that controls these headers can rebind a signature to
+ * `attacker.example.com` while the operator believes they're signing for
+ * `seller.example.com`.
+ *
+ * The library can warn (JSDoc on `ResponseLike.request`) but can't enforce.
+ * These helpers make the safe path the default path — pass them an inbound
+ * request handle from your platform and they emit a hardened
+ * `{ method, url }` shape.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.requestContextFromExpress = requestContextFromExpress;
+exports.requestContextFromFetch = requestContextFromFetch;
+exports.requestContextFromLambda = requestContextFromLambda;
+/**
+ * Construct a hardened `{ method, url }` from an Express request.
+ *
+ * **You MUST configure `app.set('trust proxy', ...)`** with the IPs of
+ * your trusted reverse proxies before relying on this helper. Without
+ * `trust proxy`, Express returns the literal `req.connection.remoteAddress`
+ * for `req.protocol` and `req.ip` — which a TLS-terminating proxy will
+ * always set to the proxy's address, leaving you blind to whether the
+ * original request actually arrived over HTTPS. This helper trusts what
+ * Express tells it; the operator is responsible for telling Express what
+ * to trust.
+ *
+ * Throws when the `Host` header is missing, doesn't match `hostAllowlist`,
+ * or when the scheme is not `https` (unless `forceHttps: false`).
+ */
+function requestContextFromExpress(req, options = {}) {
+    const host = normalizeHost(req.get('host'));
+    if (!host) {
+        throw new TypeError('requestContextFromExpress: Host header is missing. ' +
+            'Express returned no `host` — either the inbound request omitted it, or your reverse proxy stripped it.');
+    }
+    if (options.hostAllowlist && !hostMatchesAllowlist(host, options.hostAllowlist)) {
+        throw new TypeError(`requestContextFromExpress: Host "${host}" is not in hostAllowlist. ` +
+            `A hostile peer may be trying to rebind your signature origin via Host-header injection. ` +
+            `Add the legitimate value to hostAllowlist, or fix your proxy's Host handling.`);
+    }
+    const protocol = req.protocol;
+    const forceHttps = options.forceHttps !== false;
+    if (forceHttps && protocol !== 'https') {
+        throw new TypeError(`requestContextFromExpress: protocol is "${protocol}", not "https". ` +
+            `Set app.set('trust proxy', ...) so Express sees the X-Forwarded-Proto header, ` +
+            `or pass forceHttps: false for local dev (loopback / mock-server testing).`);
+    }
+    // Defense-in-depth: reject userinfo in originalUrl. A malicious middleware
+    // could mutate req.originalUrl to inject `user@` between host and path —
+    // canonicalAuthority would then sign the userinfo-bearing variant. Express
+    // doesn't normally carry userinfo here but we check rather than trust.
+    if (/[@]/.test(req.originalUrl.split('?')[0] ?? '')) {
+        throw new TypeError('requestContextFromExpress: originalUrl path must not embed userinfo (@).');
+    }
+    return { method: req.method, url: `${protocol}://${host}${req.originalUrl}` };
+}
+/**
+ * Construct `{ method, url }` from a Fetch / WHATWG `Request`. Trivial
+ * passthrough; included for API symmetry with the Express / Lambda
+ * helpers. No proxy hardening needed — `request.url` is the absolute URL
+ * the runtime constructed from the wire, and Workers / Deno / Bun all
+ * terminate TLS at the edge so `https` is honest.
+ */
+function requestContextFromFetch(request) {
+    // WHATWG accepts `https://user:pw@host/path` as a valid Request URL and
+    // echoes it back verbatim. `canonicalAuthority` would then sign the
+    // userinfo-bearing form, splitting the signature namespace between
+    // userinfo and userinfo-stripped variants of the same logical origin.
+    // Reject at construction time — userinfo never belongs in a signed
+    // `@authority` / `@target-uri`.
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = new URL(request.url);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new TypeError(`requestContextFromFetch: request.url "${request.url}" is not a parseable URL.`);
+    }
+    if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+        throw new TypeError('requestContextFromFetch: request.url must not embed userinfo. ' +
+            'A signed @authority component with userinfo creates a verifier-splitting confusion vector.');
+    }
+    return { method: request.method, url: request.url };
+}
+/**
+ * Construct `{ method, url }` from an AWS Lambda API Gateway v2 / ALB
+ * event. Reads `requestContext.domainName` for the authority, `rawPath` +
+ * `rawQueryString` for the target (v2 / ALB), falling back to `path` +
+ * `queryStringParameters` reconstruction (v1).
+ *
+ * Always emits `https://` — Lambda is not addressable over plain HTTP
+ * through API Gateway / ALB in any documented configuration.
+ */
+function requestContextFromLambda(event, options = {}) {
+    const domainName = event.requestContext.domainName;
+    if (!domainName) {
+        throw new TypeError('requestContextFromLambda: event.requestContext.domainName is missing. ' +
+            'API Gateway v2 / ALB events should always carry this; ' +
+            'is this event shaped like something else?');
+    }
+    const host = normalizeHost(domainName);
+    if (!host) {
+        throw new TypeError('requestContextFromLambda: domainName is empty after normalization.');
+    }
+    if (options.hostAllowlist && !hostMatchesAllowlist(host, options.hostAllowlist)) {
+        throw new TypeError(`requestContextFromLambda: domainName "${host}" is not in hostAllowlist. ` +
+            `Multi-tenant API Gateway misroute? Add the legitimate value, or fix the API mapping.`);
+    }
+    const method = event.requestContext.http?.method ?? event.requestContext.httpMethod ?? event.httpMethod;
+    if (!method) {
+        throw new TypeError('requestContextFromLambda: HTTP method is missing from the event.');
+    }
+    const path = event.rawPath ?? event.path ?? '/';
+    // Lambda's domainName won't carry a trailing dot in supported configs but
+    // we normalize here so a future shape change can't bypass the allowlist.
+    let url = `https://${host}${path}`;
+    if (event.rawQueryString) {
+        url += `?${event.rawQueryString}`;
+    }
+    else if (event.queryStringParameters) {
+        const params = Object.entries(event.queryStringParameters)
+            .filter(([, v]) => v !== undefined)
+            .map(([k, v]) => `${encodeURIComponent(k)}=${encodeURIComponent(v)}`);
+        if (params.length)
+            url += `?${params.join('&')}`;
+    }
+    return { method, url };
+}
+/**
+ * Normalize a Host / domainName value for allowlist comparison. Lowercase
+ * + trim handle the obvious cases; trailing-dot stripping closes a
+ * documented Host-header bypass where `example.com.` is a distinct string
+ * from `example.com` on some stacks. IPv6 brackets are preserved so the
+ * allowlist entry and the inbound value agree on bracket presence.
+ */
+function normalizeHost(raw) {
+    if (!raw)
+        return '';
+    let h = raw.trim().toLowerCase();
+    // Strip trailing dot from FQDN. Bracketed IPv6 cannot legitimately
+    // carry a trailing dot, so this only fires on hostnames.
+    if (h.endsWith('.') && !h.endsWith(']'))
+        h = h.slice(0, -1);
+    return h;
+}
+function hostMatchesAllowlist(host, allowlist) {
+    return allowlist.some(entry => normalizeHost(entry) === host);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=request-context.js.map

package/dist/lib/signing/request-context.js.map

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package/dist/lib/signing/response-verifier.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/**
+ * RFC 9421 response-signing verifier (§2.2.9).
+ *
+ * Companion to `verifier.ts` (request signatures) and `webhook-verifier.ts`
+ * (webhook callbacks). This verifier runs on the buyer / receiver side of
+ * a signed response: a client receives a response from a seller agent and
+ * hands it here, with the originating request URL the client sent, for
+ * signature validation before parsing the body.
+ *
+ * Distinct from request / webhook signing:
+ *   - Tag: `adcp/response-signing/v1`.
+ *   - Key purpose: `adcp_use: "response-signing"`.
+ *   - Default covered components: `@status`, `@authority`, `@target-uri`,
+ *     plus `content-type` + `content-digest` when the body is non-empty.
+ *   - The originating request URL is carried explicitly on `ResponseLike.request`
+ *     because RFC 9421 §2.2 binds response signatures to their request
+ *     context via `@authority` and `@target-uri`. The client supplies the URL
+ *     it actually sent — a malformed reconstruction (e.g. `req.protocol`
+ *     lying behind a proxy) will trip step 6a or fail the crypto check.
+ *
+ * Checklist steps below mirror the 13-step shape in `webhook-verifier.ts`
+ * so failures point at the same step numbers the request and webhook
+ * verifiers use. Numbers are 1-based.
+ */
+import { type ResponseLike } from './canonicalize';
+import type { JwksResolver } from './jwks';
+import { type ReplayStore } from './replay';
+import { type RevocationStore } from './revocation';
+export interface VerifyResponseOptions {
+    jwks: JwksResolver;
+    replayStore: ReplayStore;
+    revocationStore: RevocationStore;
+    /** Now in seconds since epoch. Defaults to `Date.now() / 1000`. */
+    now?: () => number;
+    /**
+     * Optional tag override — spec currently defines exactly
+     * `adcp/response-signing/v1`; the override lets test vectors pin a
+     * version.
+     */
+    requiredTag?: string;
+    /** Optional reverse-lookup (kid → publisher URL) for result attribution. */
+    agentUrlForKeyid?: (keyid: string) => string | undefined;
+}
+export interface VerifyResponseResult {
+    status: 'verified';
+    keyid: string;
+    agent_url?: string;
+    verified_at: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Verify an inbound response's RFC 9421 signature.
+ *
+ * Ordering invariant matches the webhook verifier: cheap invariant checks
+ * (tag, alg, window, components) run before JWKS resolution; revocation and
+ * rate-abuse run before cryptographic verify so an attacker can't amplify
+ * Ed25519/ECDSA work. Replay insert commits only after every earlier check
+ * passes — any signature failing crypto verify never consumes a cap entry.
+ *
+ * The replay scope is `(keyid, @target-uri-of-originating-request)`. Two
+ * responses to two different request URLs under the same keyid use
+ * independent replay budgets — same shape as webhook verification.
+ *
+ * Throws {@link ResponseSignatureError} on the first failed step.
+ */
+export declare function verifyResponseSignature(response: ResponseLike, options: VerifyResponseOptions): Promise<VerifyResponseResult>;
+/**
+ * Options for {@link createResponseVerifier}. Identical to
+ * {@link VerifyResponseOptions} except `replayStore` and `revocationStore`
+ * are optional — the factory defaults them once at creation time so replay
+ * state is shared across every response the returned verifier handles.
+ */
+export interface CreateResponseVerifierOptions extends Omit<VerifyResponseOptions, 'replayStore' | 'revocationStore'> {
+    /**
+     * Stores `(keyid, scope, nonce)` tuples for replay detection. Defaults to
+     * a fresh {@link InMemoryReplayStore} — suitable for single-process
+     * deployments only. **Multi-replica deployments MUST pass an explicit
+     * shared store** (Redis, Postgres, etc.); the default in-memory store
+     * does not survive process boundaries, so a signature accepted on
+     * replica A is invisible to replica B and can be replayed there within
+     * the signature window.
+     */
+    replayStore?: ReplayStore;
+    /**
+     * Consulted for revoked `kid` before accepting a signature. Defaults to a
+     * fresh {@link InMemoryRevocationStore}, which starts empty and does not
+     * poll for updates. Pass a store backed by your secrets manager or admin
+     * tooling when you revoke keys at runtime.
+     */
+    revocationStore?: RevocationStore;
+}
+/**
+ * Create a bound response-signature verifier with shared replay and
+ * revocation stores. Mirrors {@link createWebhookVerifier} for the response
+ * profile.
+ *
+ * **Why a factory?** Replay detection requires the same store instance to
+ * be consulted across every response. Constructing stores inside a
+ * per-response call would silently defeat replay dedup. The factory pattern
+ * captures stores in closure scope at wire-up time.
+ *
+ * **Multi-replica deployments MUST pass an explicit `replayStore`** backed
+ * by a shared persistence layer.
+ */
+export declare function createResponseVerifier(options: CreateResponseVerifierOptions): (response: ResponseLike) => Promise<VerifyResponseResult>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=response-verifier.d.ts.map

package/dist/lib/signing/response-verifier.d.ts.map

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package/dist/lib/signing/response-verifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * RFC 9421 response-signing verifier (§2.2.9).
+ *
+ * Companion to `verifier.ts` (request signatures) and `webhook-verifier.ts`
+ * (webhook callbacks). This verifier runs on the buyer / receiver side of
+ * a signed response: a client receives a response from a seller agent and
+ * hands it here, with the originating request URL the client sent, for
+ * signature validation before parsing the body.
+ *
+ * Distinct from request / webhook signing:
+ *   - Tag: `adcp/response-signing/v1`.
+ *   - Key purpose: `adcp_use: "response-signing"`.
+ *   - Default covered components: `@status`, `@authority`, `@target-uri`,
+ *     plus `content-type` + `content-digest` when the body is non-empty.
+ *   - The originating request URL is carried explicitly on `ResponseLike.request`
+ *     because RFC 9421 §2.2 binds response signatures to their request
+ *     context via `@authority` and `@target-uri`. The client supplies the URL
+ *     it actually sent — a malformed reconstruction (e.g. `req.protocol`
+ *     lying behind a proxy) will trip step 6a or fail the crypto check.
+ *
+ * Checklist steps below mirror the 13-step shape in `webhook-verifier.ts`
+ * so failures point at the same step numbers the request and webhook
+ * verifiers use. Numbers are 1-based.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.verifyResponseSignature = verifyResponseSignature;
+exports.createResponseVerifier = createResponseVerifier;
+const canonicalize_1 = require("./canonicalize");
+const content_digest_1 = require("./content-digest");
+const errors_1 = require("./errors");
+const parser_1 = require("./parser");
+const crypto_1 = require("./crypto");
+const replay_1 = require("./replay");
+const revocation_1 = require("./revocation");
+const types_1 = require("./types");
+/**
+ * Verify an inbound response's RFC 9421 signature.
+ *
+ * Ordering invariant matches the webhook verifier: cheap invariant checks
+ * (tag, alg, window, components) run before JWKS resolution; revocation and
+ * rate-abuse run before cryptographic verify so an attacker can't amplify
+ * Ed25519/ECDSA work. Replay insert commits only after every earlier check
+ * passes — any signature failing crypto verify never consumes a cap entry.
+ *
+ * The replay scope is `(keyid, @target-uri-of-originating-request)`. Two
+ * responses to two different request URLs under the same keyid use
+ * independent replay budgets — same shape as webhook verification.
+ *
+ * Throws {@link ResponseSignatureError} on the first failed step.
+ */
+async function verifyResponseSignature(response, options) {
+    const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+    const requiredTag = options.requiredTag ?? types_1.RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG;
+    // Step 1: both signature headers present AND parseable. Bound-pair rule.
+    const sigInputHeader = (0, canonicalize_1.getHeaderValue)(response.headers, 'Signature-Input');
+    const sigHeader = (0, canonicalize_1.getHeaderValue)(response.headers, 'Signature');
+    if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_header_malformed', 1, 'Response is missing Signature or Signature-Input headers.');
+    }
+    let parsedInput;
+    let parsedSig;
+    try {
+        parsedInput = (0, parser_1.parseSignatureInput)(sigInputHeader);
+        parsedSig = (0, parser_1.parseSignature)(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_header_malformed', 1, err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
+    }
+    // Step 2: required params present.
+    requireParams(parsedInput);
+    // Step 3: tag match.
+    if (parsedInput.params.tag !== requiredTag) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_tag_invalid', 3, `Signature tag must be "${requiredTag}"; got "${parsedInput.params.tag}".`);
+    }
+    // Step 4: alg allowlist.
+    if (!types_1.ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_alg_not_allowed', 4, `Signature alg "${parsedInput.params.alg}" is not in the AdCP allowlist.`);
+    }
+    // Step 5: window valid.
+    validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);
+    // Step 6: covered components must include the response-signing mandatory set.
+    validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components, response.body);
+    // Step 6a: `@target-uri` syntactic validation against the originating-
+    // request URL the caller passed in. Same rationale as the webhook
+    // verifier — flag dangerous URI shapes (non-https, userinfo, fragment)
+    // before cryptographic work. Distinct from `header_malformed`, which
+    // flags the Signature / Signature-Input headers.
+    //
+    // Note: response-side `@target-uri` comes from `response.request.url`,
+    // which is the *client's* reconstruction of what they sent. This check
+    // most often fires on caller-side bugs (Express `req.protocol` lying
+    // behind a non-trust-proxy reverse proxy → http://...) rather than on
+    // wire-level attacker payloads. See ResponseLike.request JSDoc.
+    validateTargetUri(response.request.url);
+    // Step 7: resolve keyid.
+    const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);
+    if (!jwk) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_key_unknown', 7, `No JWK found for keyid "${parsedInput.params.keyid}".`);
+    }
+    if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_key_unknown', 7, `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid "${jwk.kid}" does not match requested keyid "${parsedInput.params.keyid}".`);
+    }
+    // Step 8: key purpose — MUST be scoped for response signing.
+    //
+    // Same split as webhook: "no purpose declared" vs "declared but wrong".
+    // The former needs the publisher to add a purpose; the latter needs a
+    // new keypair (purpose binding is the whole point of `adcp_use`).
+    if (jwk.adcp_use === undefined || !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify')) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_key_purpose_invalid', 8, `JWK "${jwk.kid}" is not scoped for response-signing verification.`);
+    }
+    if (jwk.adcp_use !== 'response-signing') {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_mode_mismatch', 8, `JWK "${jwk.kid}" declares adcp_use="${jwk.adcp_use}" but this endpoint requires "response-signing".`);
+    }
+    // Step 9: revocation. The shared revocation store throws
+    // `request_signature_revocation_stale` when its cached snapshot is past
+    // grace — re-map to the response taxonomy so callers see consistent codes.
+    try {
+        if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {
+            throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK "${jwk.kid}" is revoked.`);
+        }
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof errors_1.RequestSignatureError && err.code === 'request_signature_revocation_stale') {
+            throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_revocation_stale', 9, err.message);
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+    // Replay scope is `(keyid, @target-uri-of-originating-request)` — same
+    // rationale as webhook signing. A response to /adcp/get_products MUST NOT
+    // count against the replay budget for a response to /adcp/create_media_buy
+    // under the same keyid.
+    const replayScope = (0, canonicalize_1.canonicalTargetUri)(response.request.url);
+    // Step 9a: per-keyid rate abuse. Distinct code from step 12 replay — cap
+    // exhaustion is a compromised-key / misconfig signal, not "same nonce
+    // twice."
+    if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_rate_abuse', 9, `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}.`);
+    }
+    // Pre-check replay before crypto so a replayed nonce short-circuits an
+    // expensive Ed25519 / ECDSA verify.
+    if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_replayed', 12, `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window.`);
+    }
+    // Step 10: cryptographic verify. Use the verbatim signatureParamsValue
+    // from the parsed input so byte-identity with what the signer sent is
+    // preserved regardless of param-order differences across SDKs.
+    const base = (0, canonicalize_1.buildResponseSignatureBase)(parsedInput.components, response, parsedInput.params, parsedInput.signatureParamsValue);
+    const publicKey = (0, crypto_1.jwkToPublicKey)(jwk);
+    const valid = (0, crypto_1.verifySignature)(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);
+    if (!valid) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_invalid', 10, 'Cryptographic verification of response signature base failed.');
+    }
+    // Step 11: content-digest match (only when the signature covered it).
+    if (parsedInput.components.includes('content-digest')) {
+        const digestHeader = (0, canonicalize_1.getHeaderValue)(response.headers, 'Content-Digest');
+        if (!digestHeader || !(0, content_digest_1.contentDigestMatches)(digestHeader, response.body ?? '')) {
+            throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_digest_mismatch', 11, 'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash.');
+        }
+    }
+    // Step 13: commit nonce. Insert AFTER every prior check passes — external
+    // traffic can't grow the cap because any signature failing at step 10
+    // never reaches this point.
+    const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + types_1.CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;
+    const ttl = Math.max(remaining, types_1.MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + types_1.CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);
+    const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);
+    if (insertResult === 'replayed') {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_replayed', 13, `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window.`);
+    }
+    if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_rate_abuse', 13, `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded on commit for keyid=${jwk.kid}.`);
+    }
+    const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);
+    return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, ...(agent_url !== undefined && { agent_url }), verified_at: now };
+}
+function requireParams(parsed) {
+    const required = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];
+    const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);
+    if (missing.length) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_params_incomplete', 2, `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}.`);
+    }
+}
+function validateWindow(created, expires, now) {
+    // Same shape as webhook: every window failure (expired, negative window,
+    // over-long window, created-in-future) folds to a single code. Specific
+    // subtype lives in the error message for diagnostics.
+    if (expires <= created) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created.');
+    }
+    if (expires - created > types_1.MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_window_invalid', 5, `Signature window exceeds ${types_1.MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum.`);
+    }
+    if (now < created - types_1.CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance.');
+    }
+    if (now > expires + types_1.CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired.');
+    }
+}
+function validateCoveredComponents(components, body) {
+    for (const mandatory of types_1.RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {
+        if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {
+            throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_components_incomplete', 6, `Covered components must include "${mandatory}".`);
+        }
+    }
+    // When the response carries a body, `content-digest` coverage is required
+    // — an unbound body is the cross-purpose footgun the signer's default
+    // opt-out behavior is designed to prevent. The signer omits
+    // content-digest only when the body is empty (e.g. 204 No Content); the
+    // verifier mirrors that envelope.
+    const hasBody = (body ?? '').length > 0;
+    if (hasBody && !components.includes('content-digest')) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_components_incomplete', 6, 'Response carries a body but "content-digest" is not in covered components.');
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Syntactic validation of the originating-request `@target-uri` value. Four
+ * failure modes mirror the webhook verifier:
+ *   - URL doesn't parse at all.
+ *   - Scheme is not https (response signatures bound to http will fail
+ *     strict-HTTPS verifier profiles; loopback hosts are exempt for local
+ *     test mock servers).
+ *   - Authority contains userinfo — credentials don't belong in a signed URI.
+ *   - URL carries a fragment — fragments are client-side and never transmitted.
+ *
+ * Each throws `response_target_uri_malformed`. The error message names the
+ * failure reason.
+ */
+function validateTargetUri(rawUrl) {
+    let url;
+    try {
+        url = new URL(rawUrl);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_target_uri_malformed', 6, `@target-uri "${rawUrl}" is not a parseable URL.`);
+    }
+    if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopbackHost(url.hostname)) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_target_uri_malformed', 6, `@target-uri must use https; got "${url.protocol}" in "${rawUrl}".`);
+    }
+    if (url.username || url.password) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_target_uri_malformed', 6, '@target-uri must not embed userinfo.');
+    }
+    if (url.hash) {
+        throw new errors_1.ResponseSignatureError('response_target_uri_malformed', 6, '@target-uri must not carry a fragment.');
+    }
+}
+function isLoopbackHost(hostname) {
+    if (!hostname)
+        return false;
+    const normalized = hostname.toLowerCase();
+    return normalized === 'localhost' || normalized === '::1' || normalized.startsWith('127.');
+}
+/**
+ * Create a bound response-signature verifier with shared replay and
+ * revocation stores. Mirrors {@link createWebhookVerifier} for the response
+ * profile.
+ *
+ * **Why a factory?** Replay detection requires the same store instance to
+ * be consulted across every response. Constructing stores inside a
+ * per-response call would silently defeat replay dedup. The factory pattern
+ * captures stores in closure scope at wire-up time.
+ *
+ * **Multi-replica deployments MUST pass an explicit `replayStore`** backed
+ * by a shared persistence layer.
+ */
+function createResponseVerifier(options) {
+    const replayStore = options.replayStore ?? new replay_1.InMemoryReplayStore();
+    const revocationStore = options.revocationStore ?? new revocation_1.InMemoryRevocationStore();
+    return (response) => verifyResponseSignature(response, { ...options, replayStore, revocationStore });
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=response-verifier.js.map

package/dist/lib/signing/response-verifier.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/lib/signing/server.d.ts

@@ -8,10 +8,11 @@
  * capability cache). The aggregate `@adcp/sdk/signing` barrel re-exports
  * both for back-compat.
  */
-export { buildSignatureBase, canonicalAuthority, canonicalMethod, canonicalTargetUri, formatSignatureParams, getHeaderValue, type RequestLike, type SignatureParams, } from './canonicalize';
+export { buildResponseSignatureBase, buildSignatureBase, canonicalAuthority, canonicalMethod, canonicalTargetUri, formatSignatureParams, getHeaderValue, type RequestLike, type ResponseLike, type SignatureParams, } from './canonicalize';
 export { computeContentDigest, contentDigestMatches, parseContentDigest } from './content-digest';
+export { requestContextFromExpress, requestContextFromFetch, requestContextFromLambda, type ExpressRequestLike, type FetchRequestLike, type LambdaRequestEvent, type RequestContextFromExpressOptions, type RequestContextFromLambdaOptions, } from './request-context';
 export { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';
-export { RequestSignatureError, type RequestSignatureErrorCode, WebhookSignatureError, type WebhookSignatureErrorCode, } from './errors';
+export { RequestSignatureError, type RequestSignatureErrorCode, ResponseSignatureError, type ResponseSignatureErrorCode, WebhookSignatureError, type WebhookSignatureErrorCode, } from './errors';
 export { StaticJwksResolver, type JwksResolver } from './jwks';
 export { HttpsJwksResolver, type HttpsJwksResolverOptions } from './jwks-https';
 export { BrandJsonJwksResolver, BrandJsonResolverError, type BrandAgentType, type BrandJsonJwksResolverOptions, type BrandJsonResolverErrorCode, } from './brand-jwks';
@@ -20,8 +21,9 @@ export { InMemoryReplayStore, type InMemoryReplayStoreOptions, type ReplayInsert
 export { PostgresReplayStore, REPLAY_CACHE_MIGRATION, getReplayStoreMigration, sweepExpiredReplays, type PostgresReplayStoreOptions, type SweepExpiredReplaysOptions, } from './postgres-replay-store';
 export { InMemoryRevocationStore, type RevocationStore } from './revocation';
 export { HttpsRevocationStore, type HttpsRevocationStoreOptions } from './revocation-https';
-export { ALLOWED_ALGS, CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS, MANDATORY_COMPONENTS, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS, REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG, type AdcpJsonWebKey, type ContentDigestPolicy, type RevocationSnapshot, type VerifiedSigner, type VerifierCapability, type VerifyResult, } from './types';
+export { ALLOWED_ALGS, CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS, MANDATORY_COMPONENTS, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS, REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG, RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS, RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG, type AdcpJsonWebKey, type ContentDigestPolicy, type RevocationSnapshot, type VerifiedSigner, type VerifierCapability, type VerifyResult, } from './types';
 export { verifyRequestSignature, type VerifyRequestOptions } from './verifier';
+export { createResponseVerifier, verifyResponseSignature, type CreateResponseVerifierOptions, type VerifyResponseOptions, type VerifyResponseResult, } from './response-verifier';
 export { createWebhookVerifier, verifyWebhookSignature, WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS, WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG, type CreateWebhookVerifierOptions, type VerifyWebhookOptions, type VerifyWebhookResult, } from './webhook-verifier';
 export { createExpressVerifier, type ExpressLike, type ExpressMiddlewareOptions } from './middleware';
 export { resolveAgent, getAgentJwks, createAgentJwksSet, AgentResolverError, attackerInfluencedFields, ATTACKER_INFLUENCED, readBrandJsonUrl, readIdentityPosture, type AgentResolution, type AgentProtocol, type AgentResolverErrorCode, type AgentResolverErrorDetail, type AgentEntry, type AgentJwksResult, type CapabilitiesWithBrandJsonUrl, type CreateAgentJwksSetOptions, type FetchCapabilitiesFn, type GetAgentJwksOptions, type IdentityKeyOriginPurpose, type IdentityKeyOrigins, type IdentityPosture, type ResolveAgentOptions, type TraceStep, } from './agent-resolver';

package/dist/lib/signing/server.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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