@adcp/sdk 6.8.0 → 6.10.0

package/skills/cross-cutting.md

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+# Cross-cutting rules for every build-*-agent skill
+
+Every `build-*-agent` skill points here. These rules apply regardless of which specialism you're building. The hello-adapter fork targets in `examples/hello_*_adapter_*.ts` wire all of them — read this section once if you're forking, every time if you're building from scratch.
+
+**Quick reference** — deep-link to a specific rule from your skill or PR review:
+
+- [§ idempotency_key](#idempotency_key-is-required-on-every-mutating-call) — required on mutating tools (28 tools, table below)
+- [§ Resolve-then-authorize](#resolve-then-authorize--uniform-errors-for-not-found--not-yours) — byte-equivalent errors for cross-tenant lookups
+- [§ Authentication](#authentication-is-mandatory) — `serve({ authenticate })` baseline
+- [§ RFC 9421 Signature headers](#dont-break-when-rfc-9421-signature-headers-arrive) — transparent pass-through even if not claimed
+- [§ ctx_metadata safety](#ctx_metadata-is-not-for-credentials) — re-derive bearers per request, never store in ctx_metadata
+- [§ Account resolution](#account-resolution-pick-a-security-preset) — four `AccountStore` security presets
+- [§ Webhooks](#webhooks-stable-operation_id-across-retries) — stable `operation_id` across retries
+- [§ Spec reference](#spec-reference) — `docs/llms.txt` is the canonical shape source
+
+## `idempotency_key` is required on every mutating call
+
+Every mutating tool requires a client-supplied `idempotency_key`. The full list (authoritative — derived at runtime from `MUTATING_TASKS` in `src/lib/utils/idempotency.ts`, 28 tools grouped by skill domain):
+
+| Skill domain | Mutating tools |
+| --- | --- |
+| account (cross-cutting — used by every adopter that registers buyer accounts or reports usage) | `sync_accounts`, `report_usage` |
+| media-buy (sales) | `create_media_buy`, `update_media_buy`, `sync_audiences`, `sync_catalogs`, `sync_event_sources`, `log_event`, `provide_performance_feedback` |
+| creative | `sync_creatives`, `build_creative` |
+| signals | `activate_signal` |
+| governance | `sync_plans`, `sync_governance`, `report_plan_outcome`, `create_property_list`, `update_property_list`, `delete_property_list`, `create_collection_list`, `update_collection_list`, `delete_collection_list`, `create_content_standards`, `update_content_standards`, `calibrate_content` |
+| brand-rights | `acquire_rights`, `update_rights` |
+| sponsored-intelligence | `si_initiate_session`, `si_send_message` |
+
+Wire `createIdempotencyStore({ ... })` once and pass it to `createAdcpServerFromPlatform(platform, { idempotency })`. The framework handles replay detection, payload-hash conflict (`IDEMPOTENCY_CONFLICT`), expiry (`IDEMPOTENCY_EXPIRED`), and in-flight parallelism. Don't reimplement in handlers.
+
+Handlers must return the same response when the same key is replayed.
+
+## Resolve-then-authorize — uniform errors for not-found / not-yours
+
+The AdCP spec § error-handling MUSTs **byte-equivalent responses** for "id exists but caller lacks access" vs "id does not exist." Same error code (`REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND` or domain-specific `*_NOT_FOUND`), same message, same headers, same latency. Distinguishing them leaks cross-tenant existence information — an attacker who learns that `mb_0x1234` returns `PERMISSION_DENIED` while `mb_0xabcd` returns `REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND` can enumerate every live id across every tenant you host.
+
+The rule applies to every observable channel: `error.code` / `message` / `field` / `details`, HTTP status, A2A `task.status.state`, MCP `isError`, response headers (`ETag`, `Cache-Control`, rate-limit, CDN tags), webhook/audit dispatch, logs with tenant correlation. Same work on both paths — don't short-circuit on "id format invalid" with a faster path; an attacker will measure latency.
+
+How to get it right:
+
+- Both paths return `REFERENCE_NOT_FOUND` (or the domain-specific `*_NOT_FOUND`). Never `PERMISSION_DENIED` or `FORBIDDEN` on an id lookup.
+- Don't echo the probed id in `error.details` — or echo it in both paths identically.
+- Route both paths through the same response constructor so headers are set identically.
+
+`adcp fuzz` runs a paired-probe invariant that enforces this automatically. Pass `--auth-token` + `--auth-token-cross-tenant` for full coverage. See [`VALIDATE-YOUR-AGENT.md` § Uniform-error-response invariant](../docs/guides/VALIDATE-YOUR-AGENT.md#uniform-error-response-invariant-paired-probe).
+
+## Authentication is mandatory
+
+An agent that accepts unauthenticated requests is non-compliant — the universal `security_baseline` storyboard fails it. Wire `serve({ authenticate })` with `verifyApiKey`, `verifyBearer`, or `anyOf(...)` from `@adcp/sdk/server` before you claim any specialism.
+
+## Don't break when RFC 9421 Signature headers arrive
+
+Even if you don't claim `signed-requests`, a buyer may send `Signature-Input` / `Signature` headers. Your transport must pass through without rejecting. If you do claim the specialism, verify per the signed-requests delta in your skill.
+
+## `ctx_metadata` is not for credentials
+
+The wire-strip protects buyer responses but **does not** protect server-side log lines, error envelopes, heap dumps, or adopter-generated strings. Re-derive bearers per request from `ctx.authInfo` + your token cache; embed only non-secret upstream IDs in `ctx_metadata`.
+
+Full rationale: [`docs/guides/CTX-METADATA-SAFETY.md`](../docs/guides/CTX-METADATA-SAFETY.md).
+
+## Account resolution: pick a security preset
+
+The hello adapters use simple in-memory `accounts.resolution: 'lookup'` against a known map. Production adopters pick one of the four `AccountStore` presets:
+
+- `createOAuthPassthroughResolver` — buyer-OAuth-passes-through (Shape B)
+- `createRosterAccountStore` — pre-loaded roster (Shape C)
+- `createDerivedAccountStore` — single-tenant `'derived'` mode (Shape D)
+- `createTenantStore` — multi-tenant with built-in isolation gate
+
+`createTenantStore` is the right default for any adopter handling more than one advertiser. It refuses inline `{account_id}` references unless your store explicitly lists them — that's a hard security gate, not a soft warning.
+
+## Webhooks: stable `operation_id` across retries
+
+Async tasks (creative review, IO approval, signal activation, plan outcome reporting) emit completion webhooks. Use `ctx.emitWebhook({ url, payload, operation_id })` — the framework handles RFC 9421 signing, stable `idempotency_key` across retries, backoff, terminal-error handling. Pass `webhooks: { signerKey }` to `createAdcpServerFromPlatform(platform, { webhooks })`.
+
+`operation_id` rules — this is the top at-least-once-delivery bug:
+
+- Stable across retries. `creative_review.${creative_id}` or `report_usage.${report_batch_id}`, **not** a fresh UUID per retry.
+- Unique per logical event. Two completions for the same creative_id with different review outcomes are two events with two operation_ids.
+
+## Spec reference
+
+For exact response shapes, error codes, optional fields, and discriminated unions: `docs/llms.txt` (single-fetch full protocol overview) or `schemas/cache/3.0.6/bundled/<protocol>/`. Don't read the generated TypeScript types — they exist for compile-time enforcement, not for teaching you the shape.