@adcp/sdk 15.8.1 → 16.0.0-beta.1

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/canonicalization.json

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+{
+  "$comment": "URL canonicalization conformance vectors for the AdCP RFC 9421 request-signing profile. Each case asserts the canonical @target-uri and @authority values a signer MUST compute from the as-received URL before emitting the signature base, and that a verifier MUST recompute before verifying. Independent of cryptographic signing — an SDK can run this set without keys, crypto, or a full verifier harness. Cited by docs/building/implementation/security.mdx §AdCP RFC 9421 profile, `@target-uri` canonicalization.",
+  "version": "3.2",
+  "spec_reference": "#adcp-rfc-9421-profile",
+  "cases": [
+    {
+      "name": "scheme-lowercase",
+      "rule": "step 1: lowercase the scheme",
+      "input_url": "HTTPS://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "host-lowercase",
+      "rule": "step 2: lowercase the host",
+      "input_url": "https://Seller.Example.COM/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/p",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "dns-root-dot-stripped",
+      "rule": "step 2: strip one trailing DNS root-label dot after host normalization",
+      "input_url": "https://example.com./p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://example.com/p",
+      "expected_authority": "example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "dns-root-dot-with-port-stripped",
+      "rule": "step 2 + step 4: strip one trailing DNS root-label dot and preserve a non-default port",
+      "input_url": "https://example.com.:8443/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://example.com:8443/p",
+      "expected_authority": "example.com:8443"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "idn-to-punycode",
+      "rule": "step 2: UTS-46 Nontransitional ToASCII → Punycode A-label",
+      "input_url": "https://bücher.example/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://xn--bcher-kva.example/p",
+      "expected_authority": "xn--bcher-kva.example",
+      "$comment": "Punycode of 'bücher' is 'bcher-kva' → ACE label 'xn--bcher-kva'. Verifiable against any UTS-46-conformant IDN tool."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "idn-mixed-case-to-punycode",
+      "rule": "step 2: UTS-46 case-folds non-ASCII before Punycode; naive ASCII-lowercase + Punycode diverges",
+      "input_url": "https://BÜCHER.Example/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://xn--bcher-kva.example/p",
+      "expected_authority": "xn--bcher-kva.example",
+      "$comment": "Pins UTS-46 Nontransitional behavior. A signer that lowercases to 'bücher' via locale-dependent ASCII lowercasing before ToASCII still produces the same A-label here because 'Ü' → 'ü' is a UTS-46 mapping, but implementations that skip UTS-46 entirely (e.g., raw idnaEncodeLabel) can diverge on other scripts — this case is the canary."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "idn-u-label-root-dot-stripped",
+      "rule": "step 2: ToASCII then strip one trailing DNS root-label dot on the U-label path",
+      "input_url": "https://bücher.example./p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://xn--bcher-kva.example/p",
+      "expected_authority": "xn--bcher-kva.example"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "idn-a-label-root-dot-stripped",
+      "rule": "step 2: strip one trailing DNS root-label dot on the equivalent A-label path",
+      "input_url": "https://xn--bcher-kva.example./p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://xn--bcher-kva.example/p",
+      "expected_authority": "xn--bcher-kva.example",
+      "$comment": "This case and idn-u-label-root-dot-stripped MUST produce identical bytes; an ASCII fast path must not preserve the root dot."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "multiple-trailing-dots-rejected",
+      "rule": "step 2: more than one trailing dot creates an empty DNS label and is malformed",
+      "input_url": "https://example.com../p",
+      "reject": true,
+      "reject_reason": "multiple trailing dots in DNS hostname",
+      "expected_error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "internal-empty-dns-label-rejected",
+      "rule": "step 2: consecutive dots create an empty DNS label and are malformed",
+      "input_url": "https://example..com/p",
+      "reject": true,
+      "reject_reason": "empty DNS label in hostname",
+      "expected_error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "ipv6-host-hex-lowercased",
+      "rule": "step 2: IPv6 brackets preserved; hex digits inside lowercased",
+      "input_url": "https://[2001:DB8::1]/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://[2001:db8::1]/p",
+      "expected_authority": "[2001:db8::1]"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "ipv6-host-with-port",
+      "rule": "step 2 + step 4: IPv6 brackets + non-default port preserved",
+      "input_url": "https://[::1]:8443/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://[::1]:8443/p",
+      "expected_authority": "[::1]:8443"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "userinfo-stripped",
+      "rule": "step 3: strip userinfo",
+      "input_url": "https://user:pass@seller.example.com/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/p",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "default-port-https-stripped",
+      "rule": "step 4: strip :443 for https",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com:443/adcp/create_media_buy",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "default-port-http-stripped",
+      "rule": "step 4: strip :80 for http",
+      "input_url": "http://seller.example.com:80/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "http://seller.example.com/p",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "non-default-port-preserved",
+      "rule": "step 4: preserve non-default ports",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com:8443/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com:8443/p",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com:8443"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "dot-segment-collapsed",
+      "rule": "step 5: remove_dot_segments (RFC 3986 §5.2.4)",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/./create_media_buy",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "double-dot-segment-collapsed",
+      "rule": "step 5: remove_dot_segments resolves /a/b/../c to /a/c",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/a/b/../c",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/a/c",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "consecutive-slashes-preserved",
+      "rule": "step 5: consecutive slashes preserved byte-for-byte (NOT collapsed)",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/a//b",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/a//b",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "RFC 3986 does not mandate collapsing consecutive slashes. Preserving closes a path-confusion attack surface where the server routes /a//b differently from /a/b; deployments MUST disable slash-folding on signed routes (nginx merge_slashes off; Express: do not pre-normalize; Go http.ServeMux 1.22+: use explicit http.Handler)."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "dot-segment-with-consecutive-slashes",
+      "rule": "step 5: remove_dot_segments + preserve consecutive slashes; /a/.//b → /a//b",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/a/.//b",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/a//b",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "remove_dot_segments resolves /./ but does not collapse the following //. Pins the interaction explicitly — some parsers eagerly collapse // during dot-segment processing."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "double-dot-segment-with-consecutive-slashes",
+      "rule": "step 5: remove_dot_segments across a consecutive-slash boundary; /a//../b → /a/b",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/a//../b",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/a/b",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "remove_dot_segments treats // as 'segment + empty segment'; /../ pops the empty segment, leaving /a/b. Pins this behavior so parsers that treat // as a single boundary don't emit /b."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "empty-path-with-authority-becomes-slash",
+      "rule": "step 5: empty path with authority → /",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com?x=1",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/?x=1",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "empty-path-no-query-becomes-slash",
+      "rule": "step 5: empty path with authority → / (no query present)",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "Step 5's condition is the path and the authority; the query is not part of it. The queried spelling above is step 5's illustrative example, not its trigger, and an implementation that reads it as the trigger passes that case while leaving this one unslashed. Keep both."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "empty-path-no-query-non-default-port-becomes-slash",
+      "rule": "step 5: empty path with authority → / (port preserved from step 4)",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com:8443",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com:8443/",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com:8443",
+      "$comment": "The slash lands after the port, not between host and port. A fix applied to the host rather than the path emits seller.example.com/:8443."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "empty-path-no-query-ipv6-becomes-slash",
+      "rule": "step 5: empty path with authority → / (IPv6 literal)",
+      "input_url": "https://[2001:db8::1]",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://[2001:db8::1]/",
+      "expected_authority": "[2001:db8::1]",
+      "$comment": "Brackets are preserved per step 2 and the slash goes outside them."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "empty-path-empty-query-becomes-slash",
+      "rule": "steps 5 + 7: empty path → /, and the trailing ? is still preserved",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com?",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/?",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "The two rules compose rather than compete. This is also where a query-gated reading of step 5 fails on its own terms: the raw URL does carry a ?, but the parsed query is the empty string, so a condition written against the query reads false and emits a path-less https://seller.example.com? -- a form no RFC 3986 normalizer produces."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "percent-encoded-hex-uppercased",
+      "rule": "step 6: uppercase %xx hex digits",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/path%2fhere",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/path%2Fhere",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "%2F is a reserved gen-delim and remains percent-encoded; only the hex case is normalized."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "percent-encoded-reserved-preserved",
+      "rule": "step 6: reserved characters remain percent-encoded; only hex case normalized",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/a%3Ab%3Fc",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/a%3Ab%3Fc",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "%3A (':') and %3F ('?') are reserved sub-delims / gen-delims and MUST stay encoded. Implementers who over-decode produce an invalid path."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "percent-encoded-unreserved-tilde-decoded",
+      "rule": "step 6: decode percent-encoded unreserved '~' (RFC 3986 §2.3)",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/%7Efoo",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/~foo",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "%7E is the unreserved character '~'; RFC 3986 §6.2.2.2 requires decoding. Verifiers that leave it encoded fail step 10 on cross-SDK traffic."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "percent-encoded-unreserved-alpha-decoded",
+      "rule": "step 6: decode percent-encoded unreserved ALPHA (general rule, not just ~)",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/%41%42C",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/ABC",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com",
+      "$comment": "%41 ('A') and %42 ('B') are unreserved ALPHA. Implementers commonly only decode %7E/%2D/%5F/%2E and miss the general rule — this case catches that bug."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "query-byte-preserved",
+      "rule": "step 7: preserve query string byte-for-byte (no reordering, no re-encoding)",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/p?b=2&a=1&c=3",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/p?b=2&a=1&c=3",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "query-plus-not-decoded",
+      "rule": "step 7: '+' is preserved, NOT interpreted as space",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/p?x=a+b",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/p?x=a+b",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "trailing-empty-query-preserved",
+      "rule": "step 7: trailing '?' with empty query preserved (distinct from no '?')",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/p?",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/p?",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "no-query-preserved",
+      "rule": "step 7: URL with no '?' stays with no '?'",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/p",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/p",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "fragment-stripped",
+      "rule": "step 8: strip fragment (RFC 9421 §2.2.2)",
+      "input_url": "https://seller.example.com/p#frag",
+      "expected_target_uri": "https://seller.example.com/p",
+      "expected_authority": "seller.example.com"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "malformed-port-without-host",
+      "rule": "step 3: authority with port but no host is malformed",
+      "input_url": "https://:443/p",
+      "reject": true,
+      "reject_reason": "authority missing host",
+      "expected_error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "malformed-userinfo-without-host",
+      "rule": "step 3: authority with userinfo but no host is malformed",
+      "input_url": "https://user@/p",
+      "reject": true,
+      "reject_reason": "authority missing host",
+      "expected_error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "malformed-empty-authority",
+      "rule": "step 3: empty authority is malformed",
+      "input_url": "https:///p",
+      "reject": true,
+      "reject_reason": "empty authority",
+      "expected_error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "malformed-ipv6-missing-closing-bracket",
+      "rule": "step 2: bracketed IPv6 host missing closing bracket is malformed",
+      "input_url": "https://[::1/p",
+      "reject": true,
+      "reject_reason": "IPv6 literal missing closing bracket",
+      "expected_error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "malformed-bare-ipv6",
+      "rule": "step 2: IPv6 address outside brackets is malformed (ambiguous with port)",
+      "input_url": "https://fe80::1/p",
+      "reject": true,
+      "reject_reason": "IPv6 literal not bracketed",
+      "expected_error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed",
+      "$comment": "Parsers variously treat '::1' as port or as host; rejecting unambiguously removes the interop divergence."
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "malformed-ipv6-zone-identifier",
+      "rule": "step 2: IPv6 zone identifier (RFC 6874) is node-local and MUST be rejected in signed URLs",
+      "input_url": "https://[fe80::1%25eth0]/p",
+      "reject": true,
+      "reject_reason": "IPv6 zone identifier in signed URL",
+      "expected_error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed",
+      "$comment": "RFC 6874 §1 defines zone-ids as node-local; they have no meaning outside the signing host. A verifier on a different node cannot interpret them. Rejecting at the signer (MUST NOT sign) and verifier (MUST reject) closes the ambiguity."
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/negative/026-non-ascii-host.json

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+  "name": "URL authority contains raw IDN U-label (non-ASCII bytes in host)",
+  "spec_reference": "#adcp-rfc-9421-profile (@target-uri canonicalization: hosts MUST be ASCII A-labels; RFC 5891 §4.4); security.mdx error table: raw non-ASCII host → request_target_uri_malformed",
+  "signing_profile_version": "3.1",
+  "reference_now": 1776520800,
+  "request": {
+    "method": "POST",
+    "url": "https://bücher.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+    "headers": {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Signature-Input": "sig1=(\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+      "Signature": "sig1=:fYwfZG_HXkIxr0bNLUGRpwl0gSO3-birWx-20-GY9868cMWxtU_gSKOSFWzI6T9q_CII_UQOA0ogwyV3gyp_CA:"
+    },
+    "body": "{\"idempotency_key\":\"vector-negative-026-non-ascii-host\",\"account\":{\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"acmeoutdoor.example\"},\"operator\":\"pinnacle-agency.example\",\"sandbox\":false},\"packages\":[{\"product_id\":\"prod-1\",\"budget\":5000.0,\"pricing_option_id\":\"cpm_usd_fixed\",\"paused\":false}],\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"brand.example\"},\"start_time\":\"2027-01-04T00:00:00Z\",\"end_time\":\"2027-02-01T00:00:00Z\",\"paused\":false,\"plan_id\":\"plan_001\"}"
+  },
+  "verifier_capability": {
+    "supported": true,
+    "covers_content_digest": "either",
+    "required_for": [
+      "create_media_buy"
+    ]
+  },
+  "jwks_ref": [
+    "test-ed25519-2026"
+  ],
+  "expected_outcome": {
+    "success": false,
+    "error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed",
+    "failed_step": 10
+  },
+  "$comment": "Host label 'bücher' is a Unicode U-label; the AdCP @target-uri algorithm requires A-label (Punycode, 'xn--bcher-kva') form. Accepting a raw U-label on the wire risks a canonicalization-differential: UTS-46 Nontransitional processing produces one A-label, naive lowercase + Punycode produces another (see canonicalization.json case 'idn-mixed-case-to-punycode'), and non-ASCII-aware libraries may round-trip the bytes unchanged. Verifier MUST reject rather than guess, with request_target_uri_malformed (the security.mdx error table lists 'raw non-ASCII host' under that code; the 3.1 corpus originally graded this as request_signature_header_malformed, corrected in the 3.2.4 maintenance corpus). The Signature is a real Ed25519 signature by test-ed25519-2026 over expected_signature_base, which uses the A-label form 'xn--bcher-kva.example.com': a verifier that silently applies ToASCII to the raw U-label verifies successfully and wrongly accepts, so the host is the only fault. Companion canonicalization.json cases 'idn-to-punycode' and 'idn-mixed-case-to-punycode' exercise the SIGNER side (expect A-label output from U-label input after explicit UTS-46 processing); this vector exercises the VERIFIER side (reject U-label bytes received on the wire inside a signed request).",
+  "expected_signature_base": "\"@method\": POST\n\"@target-uri\": https://xn--bcher-kva.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy\n\"@authority\": xn--bcher-kva.example.com\n\"content-type\": application/json\n\"@signature-params\": (\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\""
+}

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/negative/029-duplicate-signature-label.json

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+  "name": "Signature header declares label 'sig1' twice (malformed structured dictionary)",
+  "spec_reference": "#verifier-checklist-requests step 1 (RFC 9421 §4.2 Signature is a Dictionary; RFC 8941 §3.2 keys are unique; AdCP rejects duplicate labels rather than retaining the last)",
+  "signing_profile_version": "3.1",
+  "reference_now": 1776520800,
+  "request": {
+    "method": "POST",
+    "url": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+    "headers": {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Signature-Input": "sig1=(\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+      "Signature": "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:, sig1=:BAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:"
+    },
+    "body": "{\"idempotency_key\":\"vector-negative-029-duplicate-signature-label\",\"account\":{\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"acmeoutdoor.example\"},\"operator\":\"pinnacle-agency.example\",\"sandbox\":false},\"packages\":[{\"product_id\":\"prod-1\",\"budget\":5000.0,\"pricing_option_id\":\"cpm_usd_fixed\",\"paused\":false}],\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"brand.example\"},\"start_time\":\"2027-01-04T00:00:00Z\",\"end_time\":\"2027-02-01T00:00:00Z\",\"paused\":false,\"plan_id\":\"plan_001\"}"
+  },
+  "verifier_capability": {
+    "supported": true,
+    "covers_content_digest": "either",
+    "required_for": [
+      "create_media_buy"
+    ]
+  },
+  "jwks_ref": [
+    "test-ed25519-2026"
+  ],
+  "expected_outcome": {
+    "success": false,
+    "error_code": "request_signature_header_malformed",
+    "failed_step": 1
+  },
+  "$comment": "RFC 9421 §4.2 defines the Signature field as a Dictionary, and RFC 8941 §3.2 makes dictionary keys unique, and a standard parser (RFC 8941 §4.2.2) resolves a duplicate by silently overwriting with the last value. That overwrite is the ambiguity: AdCP step 1 therefore treats a repeated label as malformed, the same downgrade-protection posture as 021, and verifiers MUST reject rather than retain the last value. Signature-Input carries sig1 exactly once and is well formed; only the Signature header repeats the label. Accepting it lets two parties disagree on which signature bytes belong to sig1 — one verifies the first, another reads the last — over a Signature-Input both agree on. Same rule as 021-duplicate-signature-input-label, applied to the other signature header. Both values are well-formed 64-byte sf-binary placeholders, so a verifier that rejects only on an unparseable signature will not reject here."
+}

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/negative/030-content-digest-key-case.json

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+  "name": "Content-Digest carries SHA-256 and sha-256 (uppercase dictionary key is not a case-insensitive synonym)",
+  "spec_reference": "#verifier-checklist-requests step 1 (RFC 9530 §2 Content-Digest is an RFC 8941 Dictionary; RFC 8941 §3.1.2 keys are lowercase only)",
+  "signing_profile_version": "3.1",
+  "reference_now": 1776520800,
+  "request": {
+    "method": "POST",
+    "url": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+    "headers": {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Content-Digest": "SHA-256=:qgPvy3VlFK_BtENbAvUhJn_MsgGdHhxlZHKt2itYaxc:, sha-256=:qgPvy3VlFK_BtENbAvUhJn_MsgGdHhxlZHKt2itYaxc:",
+      "Signature-Input": "sig1=(\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\" \"content-digest\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+      "Signature": "sig1=:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA:"
+    },
+    "body": "{\"idempotency_key\":\"vector-negative-030-content-digest-key-case\",\"account\":{\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"acmeoutdoor.example\"},\"operator\":\"pinnacle-agency.example\",\"sandbox\":false},\"packages\":[{\"product_id\":\"prod-1\",\"budget\":5000.0,\"pricing_option_id\":\"cpm_usd_fixed\",\"paused\":false}],\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"brand.example\"},\"start_time\":\"2027-01-04T00:00:00Z\",\"end_time\":\"2027-02-01T00:00:00Z\",\"paused\":false,\"plan_id\":\"plan_001\"}"
+  },
+  "verifier_capability": {
+    "supported": true,
+    "covers_content_digest": "required",
+    "required_for": [
+      "create_media_buy"
+    ]
+  },
+  "jwks_ref": [
+    "test-ed25519-2026"
+  ],
+  "expected_outcome": {
+    "success": false,
+    "error_code": "request_signature_header_malformed",
+    "failed_step": 1
+  },
+  "$comment": "RFC 9530 §2 Content-Digest is an RFC 8941 Dictionary, and the RFC 8941 §3.1.2 key production admits lowercase characters only (a-z, 0-9, '_', '-', '.', '*'; first character a-z or '*'). 'SHA-256' is therefore a parse-invalid key (RFC 8941 §4.2.3.3: parsing fails when the first character is not lcalpha or '*'), not a case-insensitive synonym of 'sha-256' and not a second spelling of the same algorithm. Verifiers MUST NOT fold case to reconcile the two members. Grading is on the error code, so a folding verifier that reports a duplicate algorithm still returns the expected code; this vector catches verifiers that ignore the unknown key or compare keys as written and accept the header, after which a signer and verifier may disagree on which value entered the signature base. Verifier MUST reject at step 1. Both members carry the correct sha-256 of the body so the digest value itself is not the fault; sibling of 023-multi-valued-content-digest (same algorithm twice, same spelling)."
+}

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/negative/031-malformed-host-authority.json

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+{
+  "name": "Host header carries an unbracketed IPv6 literal (malformed authority) while the URL is clean",
+  "spec_reference": "#adcp-rfc-9421-profile (@authority derived from the as-received Host header and canonicalized by the URL canonicalization algorithm; malformed authority → request_target_uri_malformed)",
+  "signing_profile_version": "3.1",
+  "reference_now": 1776520800,
+  "request": {
+    "method": "POST",
+    "url": "https://[::1]/adcp/create_media_buy",
+    "headers": {
+      "Host": "::1",
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Signature-Input": "sig1=(\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+      "Signature": "sig1=:54AboGWe1BvlA-epah2osf0Zqsvj_9e5SMO-AUxjIHHAmc-gm8qKMKjSPDzw3TJwsHYHgzc5pqJ_4X-xFmydDA:"
+    },
+    "body": "{\"idempotency_key\":\"vector-negative-031-malformed-host-authority\",\"account\":{\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"acmeoutdoor.example\"},\"operator\":\"pinnacle-agency.example\",\"sandbox\":false},\"packages\":[{\"product_id\":\"prod-1\",\"budget\":5000.0,\"pricing_option_id\":\"cpm_usd_fixed\",\"paused\":false}],\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"brand.example\"},\"start_time\":\"2027-01-04T00:00:00Z\",\"end_time\":\"2027-02-01T00:00:00Z\",\"paused\":false,\"plan_id\":\"plan_001\"}"
+  },
+  "verifier_capability": {
+    "supported": true,
+    "covers_content_digest": "either",
+    "required_for": [
+      "create_media_buy"
+    ]
+  },
+  "jwks_ref": [
+    "test-ed25519-2026"
+  ],
+  "expected_signature_base": "\"@method\": POST\n\"@target-uri\": https://[::1]/adcp/create_media_buy\n\"@authority\": [::1]\n\"content-type\": application/json\n\"@signature-params\": (\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+  "expected_outcome": {
+    "success": false,
+    "error_code": "request_target_uri_malformed",
+    "failed_step": 10
+  },
+  "$comment": "The URL is the valid bracketed form https://[::1]/..., and the Signature is a real Ed25519 signature by test-ed25519-2026 over the base computed from the URL authority '[::1]', so the Host header is the only fault. The profile derives @authority from the as-received Host header and canonicalizes it by the same algorithm as @target-uri; an IPv6 literal outside brackets ('::1') is ambiguous with a port and is malformed (canonicalization.json case malformed-bare-ipv6), so the verifier MUST reject with request_target_uri_malformed at step 10. A verifier that derives @authority from the URL alone never judges the header, computes the signed base, verifies the signature, and wrongly accepts. failed_step is informational: step 10 is where @authority derivation happens; grading is on the error code."
+}

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/positive/013-two-signature-labels-distinct.json

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+  "name": "Two distinct signature labels on both Signature-Input and Signature — verifier processes sig1 and does not reject the dictionaries",
+  "spec_reference": "#adcp-rfc-9421-profile (One signature per request); #verifier-checklist-requests step 1 (duplicate-key rejection applies to repeated labels, not to distinct ones)",
+  "signing_profile_version": "3.1",
+  "reference_now": 1776520800,
+  "request": {
+    "method": "POST",
+    "url": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+    "headers": {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Signature-Input": "sig1=(\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\", sig2=(\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"m4Fq2xYt9ZbCwLJd7sVn8g\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+      "Signature": "sig1=:U51PJzU9nMJxMAH_u-UDpSecT5SQX1-deSnWE3XpFo-BLT2_2h5FgMltntNCW05chhmFnjZEzkRmaYKeU0UUBw:, sig2=:AwoRGB8mLTQ7QklQV15lbHN6gYiPlp2kq7K5wMfO1dzj6vH4_wYNFBsiKTA3PkVMU1phaG92fYSLkpmgp661vA:"
+    },
+    "body": "{\"idempotency_key\":\"vector-positive-013-two-signature-labels-distinct\",\"account\":{\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"acmeoutdoor.example\"},\"operator\":\"pinnacle-agency.example\",\"sandbox\":false},\"packages\":[{\"product_id\":\"prod-1\",\"budget\":5000.0,\"pricing_option_id\":\"cpm_usd_fixed\",\"paused\":false}],\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"brand.example\"},\"start_time\":\"2027-01-04T00:00:00Z\",\"end_time\":\"2027-02-01T00:00:00Z\",\"paused\":false,\"plan_id\":\"plan_001\"}"
+  },
+  "verifier_capability": {
+    "supported": true,
+    "covers_content_digest": "either",
+    "required_for": [
+      "create_media_buy"
+    ]
+  },
+  "jwks_ref": [
+    "test-ed25519-2026"
+  ],
+  "expected_signature_base": "\"@method\": POST\n\"@target-uri\": https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy\n\"@authority\": seller.example.com\n\"content-type\": application/json\n\"@signature-params\": (\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+  "expected_outcome": {
+    "success": true,
+    "verified_label": "sig1"
+  },
+  "$comment": "False-positive guard for negative/029 and 021: Signature-Input and Signature each carry two DISTINCT labels (sig1, sig2), which is legal. sig1 is a real Ed25519 signature over expected_signature_base; sig2 has a different covered-components set, a different nonce, and a well-formed 64-byte value that does not verify. Verifiers MUST process exactly one label (conventionally sig1) and ignore the rest; attempting sig2 and rejecting is non-conformant. Differs from 004-multiple-signature-labels only in sig2's signature bytes: 004 uses a run of 'A' (decodes to a 66-byte zero value, not a 64-byte signature), so a verifier that shape-validates every Signature member could pass 004 by luck; here the extra member is a correctly sized 64-byte signature. Signature generated with the test-ed25519-2026 private key from expected_signature_base."
+}

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/positive/014-content-digest-two-algorithms.json

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+  "name": "Content-Digest carries sha-256 and sha-512, both correct — distinct algorithm keys are legal",
+  "spec_reference": "#verifier-checklist-requests steps 1 and 11 (RFC 9530 §2: Content-Digest is a Dictionary keyed by lowercase algorithm name; RFC 8941 §3.1.2)",
+  "signing_profile_version": "3.1",
+  "reference_now": 1776520800,
+  "request": {
+    "method": "POST",
+    "url": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+    "headers": {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Content-Digest": "sha-256=:vyR23LVTR1W-_gnNrZDaxId_kmAB7lQ34b1NNNhX9a0:, sha-512=:qORTgRshnU8ahelPs1uOk75o3XC2L6LDEWoAlnFrNXrfjMk0Cil1vkqbjFwE9KHRsTNDyAsPD1_-eW8kBnFQOA:",
+      "Signature-Input": "sig1=(\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\" \"content-digest\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+      "Signature": "sig1=:ULMYyZqThGeyjciOwuH8Zp8-1MnrMTYQj2vbmN4QjGe9xDRU9gR9UnR_utuy5Ja7YZc3jgDgOYuyCC95mEeZCA:"
+    },
+    "body": "{\"idempotency_key\":\"vector-positive-014-content-digest-two-algorithms\",\"account\":{\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"acmeoutdoor.example\"},\"operator\":\"pinnacle-agency.example\",\"sandbox\":false},\"packages\":[{\"product_id\":\"prod-1\",\"budget\":5000.0,\"pricing_option_id\":\"cpm_usd_fixed\",\"paused\":false}],\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"brand.example\"},\"start_time\":\"2027-01-04T00:00:00Z\",\"end_time\":\"2027-02-01T00:00:00Z\",\"paused\":false,\"plan_id\":\"plan_001\"}"
+  },
+  "verifier_capability": {
+    "supported": true,
+    "covers_content_digest": "required",
+    "required_for": [
+      "create_media_buy"
+    ]
+  },
+  "jwks_ref": [
+    "test-ed25519-2026"
+  ],
+  "expected_signature_base": "\"@method\": POST\n\"@target-uri\": https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy\n\"@authority\": seller.example.com\n\"content-type\": application/json\n\"content-digest\": sha-256=:vyR23LVTR1W-_gnNrZDaxId_kmAB7lQ34b1NNNhX9a0:, sha-512=:qORTgRshnU8ahelPs1uOk75o3XC2L6LDEWoAlnFrNXrfjMk0Cil1vkqbjFwE9KHRsTNDyAsPD1_-eW8kBnFQOA:\n\"@signature-params\": (\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\" \"content-digest\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+  "expected_outcome": {
+    "success": true
+  },
+  "$comment": "False-positive guard for negative/023 and 030. Content-Digest carries two members with distinct lowercase algorithm keys, sha-256 and sha-512, each the correct digest of the body (unpadded Base64URL, as in the rest of the 3.1 root corpus). A verifier that rejects every multi-member Content-Digest, or every comma in it, fails here; a verifier that checks only one algorithm still passes because both are correct. content-digest is covered and the Signature is a real Ed25519 signature by test-ed25519-2026 over expected_signature_base, which includes the Content-Digest value verbatim."
+}

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/positive/015-bracketed-ipv6-host-with-port.json

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+{
+  "name": "Bracketed IPv6 literal with non-default port in both the URL and the Host header",
+  "spec_reference": "#adcp-rfc-9421-profile (@authority derived from as-received Host; IPv6 brackets preserved, non-default port kept)",
+  "signing_profile_version": "3.1",
+  "reference_now": 1776520800,
+  "request": {
+    "method": "POST",
+    "url": "https://[2001:db8::1]:8443/adcp/create_media_buy",
+    "headers": {
+      "Host": "[2001:db8::1]:8443",
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Signature-Input": "sig1=(\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+      "Signature": "sig1=:KFJa1rmiEAYePBhzr1bHsjvkvrD9cs7MXGPiVv6wD9LZINvTTeDR50N3mE5GaCwbcuxaesexETAJeTcj4MPYDg:"
+    },
+    "body": "{\"idempotency_key\":\"vector-positive-015-bracketed-ipv6-host-with-port\",\"account\":{\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"acmeoutdoor.example\"},\"operator\":\"pinnacle-agency.example\",\"sandbox\":false},\"packages\":[{\"product_id\":\"prod-1\",\"budget\":5000.0,\"pricing_option_id\":\"cpm_usd_fixed\",\"paused\":false}],\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"brand.example\"},\"start_time\":\"2027-01-04T00:00:00Z\",\"end_time\":\"2027-02-01T00:00:00Z\",\"paused\":false,\"plan_id\":\"plan_001\"}"
+  },
+  "verifier_capability": {
+    "supported": true,
+    "covers_content_digest": "either",
+    "required_for": [
+      "create_media_buy"
+    ]
+  },
+  "jwks_ref": [
+    "test-ed25519-2026"
+  ],
+  "expected_signature_base": "\"@method\": POST\n\"@target-uri\": https://[2001:db8::1]:8443/adcp/create_media_buy\n\"@authority\": [2001:db8::1]:8443\n\"content-type\": application/json\n\"@signature-params\": (\"@method\" \"@target-uri\" \"@authority\" \"content-type\");created=1776520800;expires=1776521100;nonce=\"KXYnfEfJ0PBRZXQyVXfVQA\";keyid=\"test-ed25519-2026\";alg=\"ed25519\";tag=\"adcp/request-signing/v1\"",
+  "expected_outcome": {
+    "success": true
+  },
+  "$comment": "False-positive guard for negative/031. The Host header carries a well-formed bracketed IPv6 authority with a non-default port; it byte-matches the authority of the canonical @target-uri, so @authority is '[2001:db8::1]:8443' and the request verifies. Without this vector a verifier passes 031 by rejecting every Host header that contains ':' or '['. Extends 011-ipv6-authority (no Host header, default port) and 012 (default port stripped) to a non-default port carried on the Host header. Signature generated with the test-ed25519-2026 private key from expected_signature_base."
+}

package/compliance/cache/3.2.4/test-vectors/request-signing/profile-3.2/negative/001-no-signature-header.json

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+{
+  "name": "AdCP 3.2 unsigned request to an operation in required_for (Content-Digest sent, nothing signed)",
+  "spec_reference": "#verifier-checklist-requests pre-check (required_for enforcement); AdCP 3.2 profile per #content-digest-and-proxy-compatibility and #adcp-rfc-9421-profile binary value encoding",
+  "signing_profile_version": "3.2",
+  "reference_now": 1776520800,
+  "request": {
+    "method": "POST",
+    "url": "https://seller.example.com/adcp/create_media_buy",
+    "headers": {
+      "Content-Type": "application/json",
+      "Content-Digest": "sha-256=:nODniPasrOwG+VeIC4UcO5eGL3o1AGoffQ8Ih3JDVx0=:"
+    },
+    "body": "{\"idempotency_key\":\"vector-profile-3-2-negative-001-no-signature-header\",\"account\":{\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"acmeoutdoor.example\"},\"operator\":\"pinnacle-agency.example\",\"sandbox\":false},\"packages\":[{\"product_id\":\"prod-1\",\"budget\":5000.0,\"pricing_option_id\":\"cpm_usd_fixed\",\"paused\":false}],\"brand\":{\"domain\":\"brand.example\"},\"start_time\":\"2027-01-04T00:00:00Z\",\"end_time\":\"2027-02-01T00:00:00Z\",\"paused\":false,\"plan_id\":\"plan_001\"}"
+  },
+  "verifier_capability": {
+    "supported": true,
+    "covers_content_digest": "required",
+    "required_for": [
+      "create_media_buy"
+    ]
+  },
+  "jwks_ref": [
+    "test-ed25519-2026"
+  ],
+  "expected_outcome": {
+    "success": false,
+    "error_code": "request_signature_required",
+    "failed_step": 0
+  },
+  "$comment": "3.2-profile counterpart of negative/001-no-signature-header.json. AdCP 3.2 profile: the verifier advertises covers_content_digest='required' and the request carries a correct Content-Digest, but no usable signature is presented, so the step-0 fault is the only fault. Generated by scripts/generate-request-signing-profile-3.2-vectors.mjs from the test keys in keys.json; do not hand-edit."
+}