@adcp/sdk 13.0.0-rc.7 → 13.0.0-rc.9

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/ClientCredentialsFlow.mjs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { fromMCPTokens } from "./types.mjs";
 import { resolveSecret } from "./secret-resolver.mjs";
 import { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from "../../net/index.mjs";
 import { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from "../../protocols/responseSizeLimit.mjs";
+import { createAbortError, throwIfAborted, withAbortSignal } from "../../protocols/abort.mjs";
 const MAX_AS_ERROR_LENGTH = 200;
 class ClientCredentialsExchangeError extends Error {
   constructor(message, kind, oauthError, oauthErrorDescription, httpStatus) {
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ function validateTokenEndpoint(tokenEndpoint, options = {}) {
   return url;
 }
 async function exchangeClientCredentials(credentials, options = {}) {
+  throwIfAborted(options.signal);
   const fetchImpl = wrapFetchWithSizeLimit(options.fetch ?? fetch);
   const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 3e4;
   validateTokenEndpoint(credentials.token_endpoint, { allowPrivateIp: options.allowPrivateIp });
@@ -87,18 +89,30 @@ async function exchangeClientCredentials(credentials, options = {}) {
     body.set("client_id", clientId);
     body.set("client_secret", clientSecret);
   }
-  const controller = new AbortController();
-  const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);
   let response;
+  let bodyText;
+  const timeoutError = new Error(`Client credentials exchange timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`);
+  timeoutError.name = "TimeoutError";
   try {
-    response = await fetchImpl(credentials.token_endpoint, {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers,
-      body: body.toString(),
-      signal: controller.signal
-    });
+    ({ response, bodyText } = await withAbortSignal(
+      [options.signal],
+      timeoutMs,
+      async (signal) => {
+        const tokenResponse = await fetchImpl(credentials.token_endpoint, {
+          method: "POST",
+          headers,
+          body: body.toString(),
+          signal
+        });
+        return { response: tokenResponse, bodyText: await tokenResponse.text() };
+      },
+      { timeoutError }
+    ));
   } catch (err) {
-    if (err.name === "AbortError") {
+    if (options.signal?.aborted) {
+      throw createAbortError(options.signal.reason);
+    }
+    if (err === timeoutError) {
       throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(
         `Token endpoint ${credentials.token_endpoint} did not respond within ${timeoutMs}ms.`,
         "network"
@@ -108,10 +122,7 @@ async function exchangeClientCredentials(credentials, options = {}) {
       `Failed to reach token endpoint ${credentials.token_endpoint}: ${err.message}`,
       "network"
     );
-  } finally {
-    clearTimeout(timeout);
   }
-  const bodyText = await response.text();
   let parsed;
   try {
     parsed = bodyText ? JSON.parse(bodyText) : void 0;
@@ -137,11 +148,28 @@ async function exchangeClientCredentials(credentials, options = {}) {
   }
   return fromMCPTokens(parsed);
 }
-const inFlightRefresh = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-function coalesceKeyFor(agent, credentials, force) {
-  return `${force ? "force" : "normal"}\0${agent.id}\0${credentials.token_endpoint}\0${credentials.client_id}`;
+const inFlightRefresh = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
+async function waitForRefresh(entry, signal) {
+  if (signal?.aborted) throw createAbortError(signal.reason);
+  entry.waiters += 1;
+  let abortListener;
+  try {
+    if (!signal) return await entry.promise;
+    const aborted = new Promise((_resolve, reject) => {
+      abortListener = () => reject(createAbortError(signal.reason));
+      signal.addEventListener("abort", abortListener, { once: true });
+    });
+    return await Promise.race([entry.promise, aborted]);
+  } finally {
+    if (abortListener && signal) signal.removeEventListener("abort", abortListener);
+    entry.waiters -= 1;
+    if (entry.waiters === 0 && !entry.settled && !entry.controller.signal.aborted) {
+      entry.controller.abort(createAbortError(signal?.reason ?? "No callers remain for token refresh"));
+    }
+  }
 }
 async function ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, options = {}) {
+  throwIfAborted(options.signal);
   if (!agent.oauth_client_credentials) {
     throw new Error(
       `ensureClientCredentialsTokens called for agent '${agent.id}' with no oauth_client_credentials configured.`
@@ -153,19 +181,32 @@ async function ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, options = {}) {
   if (cachedIsValid) {
     return cached;
   }
-  const coalesceKey = coalesceKeyFor(agent, agent.oauth_client_credentials, options.force === true);
-  const existing = inFlightRefresh.get(coalesceKey);
-  if (existing) {
-    const tokens = await existing;
+  const refreshMode = options.force ? "force" : "normal";
+  let agentRefreshes = inFlightRefresh.get(agent);
+  const existing = agentRefreshes?.get(refreshMode);
+  if (existing && !existing.controller.signal.aborted) {
+    const tokens = await waitForRefresh(existing, options.signal);
     agent.oauth_tokens = tokens;
     return tokens;
   }
-  const exchange = (async () => {
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const entry = {
+    promise: void 0,
+    controller,
+    waiters: 0,
+    settled: false
+  };
+  if (!agentRefreshes) {
+    agentRefreshes = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+    inFlightRefresh.set(agent, agentRefreshes);
+  }
+  entry.promise = (async () => {
     try {
       const tokens = await exchangeClientCredentials(agent.oauth_client_credentials, {
         fetch: options.fetch,
         timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,
-        allowPrivateIp: options.allowPrivateIp
+        allowPrivateIp: options.allowPrivateIp,
+        signal: controller.signal
       });
       agent.oauth_tokens = tokens;
       if (options.storage) {
@@ -173,11 +214,15 @@ async function ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, options = {}) {
       }
       return tokens;
     } finally {
-      inFlightRefresh.delete(coalesceKey);
+      entry.settled = true;
+      if (agentRefreshes?.get(refreshMode) === entry) {
+        agentRefreshes.delete(refreshMode);
+        if (agentRefreshes.size === 0) inFlightRefresh.delete(agent);
+      }
     }
   })();
-  inFlightRefresh.set(coalesceKey, exchange);
-  return exchange;
+  agentRefreshes.set(refreshMode, entry);
+  return waitForRefresh(entry, options.signal);
 }
 export {
   ClientCredentialsExchangeError,

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/ClientCredentialsFlow.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/ClientCredentialsFlow.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * OAuth 2.0 client credentials grant — RFC 6749 §4.4.\n *\n * For machine-to-machine use cases (CI compliance runs, automated checks)\n * where there is no user to walk through an authorization-code flow. The\n * client POSTs its ID + secret to the authorization server's token endpoint\n * and gets back an access token directly.\n *\n * This file provides:\n * - {@link exchangeClientCredentials}: one-shot token exchange. Use for the\n *   initial fetch during `--save-auth` and for forced refresh.\n * - {@link ensureClientCredentialsTokens}: reads the cached tokens on an\n *   `AgentConfig`, checks expiry, re-exchanges if needed, and persists the\n *   refreshed tokens via an optional {@link OAuthConfigStorage}.\n *\n * Why a dedicated module instead of the MCP SDK's `OAuthClientProvider`:\n * client credentials doesn't need discovery, dynamic client registration,\n * PKCE, or authorization code exchange — all the plumbing that provider\n * exists to coordinate. A direct token POST and a cached-token check is the\n * entire protocol. The call path keeps using the plain `Authorization:\n * Bearer` header path — the same path it already uses for `auth_token`.\n *\n * **Security note (library consumers):** `token_endpoint` is passed to\n * `fetch` directly. Callers that accept untrusted `AgentConfig` values\n * from network requests (e.g. a hosted compliance service accepting\n * user-supplied configs) MUST validate the URL against an allowlist or\n * SSRF-block private IPs before invoking these helpers. The CLI and\n * operator-driven flows are already trusted.\n */\n\nimport { fromMCPTokens, type OAuthTokens, type AgentConfig, type AgentOAuthTokens } from './types';\nimport type { AgentOAuthClientCredentials } from '../../types/adcp';\nimport type { OAuthConfigStorage } from './types';\nimport { resolveSecret } from './secret-resolver';\nimport { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from '../../net';\nimport { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from '../../protocols/responseSizeLimit';\n\n/** Max length we'll echo from an AS-supplied error description into errors. */\nconst MAX_AS_ERROR_LENGTH = 200;\n\n/**\n * Raised when the authorization server rejects a client credentials\n * exchange or the token endpoint is unreachable/malformed.\n *\n * The {@link kind} discriminator lets callers branch without\n * string-matching on the message:\n * - `oauth`: the AS returned a structured OAuth error (RFC 6749 §5.2 —\n *   `invalid_client`, `invalid_grant`, `invalid_scope`, …). Read\n *   {@link oauthError} / {@link oauthErrorDescription}.\n * - `malformed`: the AS returned HTTP 200 but no `access_token`, or a\n *   non-JSON body.\n * - `network`: the exchange never reached the AS (DNS failure, connection\n *   refused, timeout, TLS error).\n */\nexport class ClientCredentialsExchangeError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'client_credentials_exchange_failed';\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    public readonly kind: 'oauth' | 'malformed' | 'network',\n    public readonly oauthError?: string,\n    public readonly oauthErrorDescription?: string,\n    public readonly httpStatus?: number\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'ClientCredentialsExchangeError';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link exchangeClientCredentials}.\n */\nexport interface ExchangeClientCredentialsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Custom fetch implementation (default: global `fetch`).\n   * Primarily a testing hook — lets unit tests stub the authorization server\n   * without intercepting the global.\n   */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * Request timeout in milliseconds (default: 30_000). Guards against a\n   * silently hung authorization server blocking the caller indefinitely.\n   */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Allow `token_endpoint` to resolve to a private / loopback IP address.\n   * Default: false (SSRF guard). The CLI opts in because the operator is\n   * explicitly configuring the endpoint; hosted consumers accepting\n   * user-supplied configs should leave this off.\n   */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * RFC 6749 §2.3.1 application/x-www-form-urlencoded encoding.\n *\n * Differs from `encodeURIComponent` in two important ways:\n * 1. Spaces are encoded as `+`, not `%20`.\n * 2. The characters `!'()*` are percent-encoded (URI component leaves them\n *    alone).\n *\n * A secret containing any of those chars would hash to a different Basic\n * string than the AS computes, producing a spurious `invalid_client`.\n */\nfunction formUrlEncode(value: string): string {\n  return encodeURIComponent(value)\n    .replace(/%20/g, '+')\n    .replace(/!/g, '%21')\n    .replace(/'/g, '%27')\n    .replace(/\\(/g, '%28')\n    .replace(/\\)/g, '%29')\n    .replace(/\\*/g, '%2A');\n}\n\n/**\n * Strip control chars (C0, C1, DEL) and truncate.\n *\n * Defensive cleanup on AS-controlled strings we print to a TTY. A\n * malicious or compromised AS could emit ANSI escape sequences or CRLF\n * payloads in `error_description`; we don't want those rewriting terminal\n * titles or forging log lines.\n */\nfunction sanitizeAsMessage(raw: string): string {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex\n  const stripped = raw.replace(/[\\x00-\\x1F\\x7F-\\x9F]/g, ' ');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_AS_ERROR_LENGTH) return stripped;\n  return stripped.slice(0, MAX_AS_ERROR_LENGTH) + '…';\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate the token endpoint before we hit it. Three checks, in order:\n *\n * 1. Parse as a URL. Unparseable → `malformed`.\n * 2. Reject URLs that carry `user:pass@` userinfo — they'd leak via error\n *    messages and log aggregators, and the OAuth client credentials live\n *    in `client_id` / `client_secret`, never the URL.\n * 3. Reject plaintext `http://` outside `localhost` / loopback IPs.\n *    RFC 6749 §3.1 requires TLS; the loopback carve-out covers local dev\n *    authorization servers where plaintext is not a leak risk.\n * 4. Reject private / loopback / link-local IPs unless `allowPrivateIp`.\n *    The library default is a SSRF guard; the CLI (operator-driven) opts\n *    in because a user pointing at `localhost:8080` is legitimate. Network\n *    code behind this call will still do DNS resolution, so this is a\n *    best-effort literal-IP / known-loopback check — host allowlisting\n *    upstream is the right control for adversarial environments.\n */\nfunction validateTokenEndpoint(tokenEndpoint: string, options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean } = {}): URL {\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(tokenEndpoint);\n  } catch {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(`Invalid token_endpoint URL: ${tokenEndpoint}`, 'malformed');\n  }\n\n  if (url.username || url.password) {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `token_endpoint must not contain userinfo (user:pass@). Put credentials in client_id / client_secret instead.`,\n      'malformed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  const host = url.hostname;\n  const isLoopback = host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '[::1]' || host === '::1';\n\n  if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !(url.protocol === 'http:' && isLoopback)) {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `token_endpoint must be HTTPS (got ${url.protocol}//${host}). The client secret would be sent in plaintext over HTTP. Use https:// (or http://localhost for local dev).`,\n      'malformed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!options.allowPrivateIp && isLikelyPrivateUrl(tokenEndpoint)) {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `token_endpoint resolves to a private or loopback address (${host}). Pass { allowPrivateIp: true } to exchangeClientCredentials / ensureClientCredentialsTokens if this is intentional (operator-driven CLI or local test setups).`,\n      'malformed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  return url;\n}\n\n/**\n * Exchange client credentials for an access token.\n *\n * Secret values in `credentials.client_id` / `client_secret` may be `$ENV:VAR`\n * references — they are resolved here at exchange time. Missing env vars\n * surface as `MissingEnvSecretError` (from `secret-resolver`), which\n * callers typically print with the variable name for the user to fix.\n *\n * @throws {ClientCredentialsExchangeError} on any non-2xx response, malformed 200, or network failure\n * @throws {MissingEnvSecretError} if a `$ENV:VAR` ref points at an unset var\n */\nexport async function exchangeClientCredentials(\n  credentials: AgentOAuthClientCredentials,\n  options: ExchangeClientCredentialsOptions = {}\n): Promise<AgentOAuthTokens> {\n  // Wrap with the response-size-limit guard so a hostile token endpoint\n  // can't buffer-bomb on every refresh. Pass-through when no\n  // `withResponseSizeLimit` slot is active. (#1175)\n  const fetchImpl = wrapFetchWithSizeLimit(options.fetch ?? fetch);\n  const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 30_000;\n\n  validateTokenEndpoint(credentials.token_endpoint, { allowPrivateIp: options.allowPrivateIp });\n\n  const clientId = resolveSecret(credentials.client_id);\n  const clientSecret = resolveSecret(credentials.client_secret);\n  const authMethod = credentials.auth_method ?? 'basic';\n\n  const body = new URLSearchParams();\n  body.set('grant_type', 'client_credentials');\n  if (credentials.scope) {\n    body.set('scope', credentials.scope);\n  }\n  // RFC 8707 resource indicators — emitted as one `resource` field per URI\n  // so the AS receives the full list. URLSearchParams#append is the only\n  // way to produce repeated keys in form encoding.\n  if (credentials.resource) {\n    const resources = Array.isArray(credentials.resource) ? credentials.resource : [credentials.resource];\n    for (const r of resources) body.append('resource', r);\n  }\n  if (credentials.audience) {\n    body.set('audience', credentials.audience);\n  }\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n\n  if (authMethod === 'basic') {\n    // RFC 6749 §2.3.1: form-urlencode ID/secret before base64 (NOT URI\n    // component encoding — space is `+`, and `!'()*` must be percent-\n    // encoded). Most deployed servers accept raw values too, but spec\n    // compliance avoids a footgun with secrets containing those chars.\n    const encoded = Buffer.from(`${formUrlEncode(clientId)}:${formUrlEncode(clientSecret)}`, 'utf-8').toString(\n      'base64'\n    );\n    headers.authorization = `Basic ${encoded}`;\n  } else {\n    body.set('client_id', clientId);\n    body.set('client_secret', clientSecret);\n  }\n\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs);\n\n  let response: Response;\n  try {\n    response = await fetchImpl(credentials.token_endpoint, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: body.toString(),\n      signal: controller.signal,\n    });\n  } catch (err) {\n    if ((err as { name?: string }).name === 'AbortError') {\n      throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n        `Token endpoint ${credentials.token_endpoint} did not respond within ${timeoutMs}ms.`,\n        'network'\n      );\n    }\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `Failed to reach token endpoint ${credentials.token_endpoint}: ${(err as Error).message}`,\n      'network'\n    );\n  } finally {\n    clearTimeout(timeout);\n  }\n\n  const bodyText = await response.text();\n  let parsed: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  try {\n    parsed = bodyText ? (JSON.parse(bodyText) as Record<string, unknown>) : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    // Non-JSON response; parsed stays undefined, handled below.\n  }\n\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    const rawOauthError = typeof parsed?.error === 'string' ? parsed.error : undefined;\n    const rawOauthDesc = typeof parsed?.error_description === 'string' ? parsed.error_description : undefined;\n    const oauthError = rawOauthError ? sanitizeAsMessage(rawOauthError) : undefined;\n    const oauthDesc = rawOauthDesc ? sanitizeAsMessage(rawOauthDesc) : undefined;\n    const message =\n      oauthError || oauthDesc\n        ? `Client credentials exchange failed: ${oauthError ?? 'error'}${oauthDesc ? ` — ${oauthDesc}` : ''}`\n        : `Client credentials exchange failed with HTTP ${response.status}: ${sanitizeAsMessage(bodyText) || '(empty body)'}`;\n    const kind = rawOauthError ? 'oauth' : 'malformed';\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(message, kind, oauthError, oauthDesc, response.status);\n  }\n\n  if (!parsed || typeof parsed.access_token !== 'string') {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `Token endpoint returned HTTP ${response.status} but no access_token. Body: ${sanitizeAsMessage(bodyText)}`,\n      'malformed',\n      undefined,\n      undefined,\n      response.status\n    );\n  }\n\n  return fromMCPTokens(parsed as unknown as OAuthTokens);\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link ensureClientCredentialsTokens}.\n */\nexport interface EnsureClientCredentialsOptions extends ExchangeClientCredentialsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Storage backend used to persist refreshed tokens. Optional — if omitted,\n   * tokens are only mutated on the in-memory `agent` object and the caller\n   * is responsible for persisting.\n   */\n  storage?: OAuthConfigStorage;\n  /**\n   * Force a re-exchange even if the cached token looks valid. Useful after a\n   * 401 in case the authorization server rotated something out-of-band.\n   */\n  force?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Expiration skew (ms). Treat the token as expired this many milliseconds\n   * before its nominal `expires_at` — protects against clock skew and\n   * in-flight requests. Default: 60_000 (1 minute). The interactive auth\n   * code flow uses 5 minutes; client credentials refresh is cheap (single\n   * POST) so the shorter window is fine here.\n   */\n  expirationSkewMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * In-flight refresh coalescing map. Keyed by the tuple\n * `(agent.id, token_endpoint, client_id)` — concurrent\n * `ensureClientCredentialsTokens` calls for the same credentials share a\n * single token POST instead of each racing to exchange the same secret.\n *\n * Two different `AgentConfig` objects that accidentally reuse the same\n * `id` (e.g. two tenants both creating `cli-agent`) but hold different\n * credentials won't cross-contaminate — the endpoint + client_id in the\n * key keeps them distinct.\n *\n * Cleared on completion regardless of success/failure.\n *\n * Note: this is an in-process map. Multi-process deployments (worker\n * pools, multiple CLI invocations, horizontally scaled Node servers)\n * don't coalesce across workers — each process will do its own refresh.\n * For the CLI this is fine; for high-throughput server deployments,\n * coalesce upstream at the storage layer.\n */\nconst inFlightRefresh = new Map<string, Promise<AgentOAuthTokens>>();\n\n/**\n * Compute the coalesce key for `ensureClientCredentialsTokens`. `force: true`\n * uses a distinct bucket so a 401-triggered forced refresh never piggybacks\n * on a still-pending non-forced exchange — the whole point of forcing is\n * that the in-flight token is *known* stale, so awaiting it would defeat\n * the retry.\n */\nfunction coalesceKeyFor(agent: AgentConfig, credentials: AgentOAuthClientCredentials, force: boolean): string {\n  return `${force ? 'force' : 'normal'}\\u0000${agent.id}\\u0000${credentials.token_endpoint}\\u0000${credentials.client_id}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ensure an agent has a valid access token, refreshing via client credentials\n * if the cached one is missing or expired. Idempotent and safe to call\n * before every request.\n *\n * Concurrent calls for the same `agent.id` are coalesced into a single\n * token POST via an in-process promise map — the common case of a\n * storyboard fan-out firing 10 tool calls in parallel does one refresh,\n * not ten.\n *\n * **Mutation:** this function writes `agent.oauth_tokens` in place. That is\n * the contract the MCP SDK's `OAuthClientProvider` pattern also uses, and\n * it lets the CLI's file-backed storage see the same object. Callers that\n * share an `AgentConfig` across different logical agents must copy first.\n *\n * Precondition: `agent.oauth_client_credentials` must be set. Throws a plain\n * Error if not — callers are expected to branch on its presence before\n * calling this.\n */\nexport async function ensureClientCredentialsTokens(\n  agent: AgentConfig,\n  options: EnsureClientCredentialsOptions = {}\n): Promise<AgentOAuthTokens> {\n  if (!agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `ensureClientCredentialsTokens called for agent '${agent.id}' with no oauth_client_credentials configured.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const skew = options.expirationSkewMs ?? 60_000;\n  const cached = agent.oauth_tokens;\n  const cachedIsValid =\n    !options.force &&\n    cached?.access_token &&\n    (!cached.expires_at || new Date(cached.expires_at).getTime() - Date.now() > skew);\n\n  if (cachedIsValid) {\n    return cached!;\n  }\n\n  const coalesceKey = coalesceKeyFor(agent, agent.oauth_client_credentials, options.force === true);\n  const existing = inFlightRefresh.get(coalesceKey);\n  if (existing) {\n    const tokens = await existing;\n    agent.oauth_tokens = tokens;\n    return tokens;\n  }\n\n  const exchange = (async () => {\n    try {\n      const tokens = await exchangeClientCredentials(agent.oauth_client_credentials!, {\n        fetch: options.fetch,\n        timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n        allowPrivateIp: options.allowPrivateIp,\n      });\n      agent.oauth_tokens = tokens;\n      if (options.storage) {\n        await options.storage.saveAgent(agent);\n      }\n      return tokens;\n    } finally {\n      inFlightRefresh.delete(coalesceKey);\n    }\n  })();\n\n  inFlightRefresh.set(coalesceKey, exchange);\n  return 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/ClientCredentialsFlow.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * OAuth 2.0 client credentials grant — RFC 6749 §4.4.\n *\n * For machine-to-machine use cases (CI compliance runs, automated checks)\n * where there is no user to walk through an authorization-code flow. The\n * client POSTs its ID + secret to the authorization server's token endpoint\n * and gets back an access token directly.\n *\n * This file provides:\n * - {@link exchangeClientCredentials}: one-shot token exchange. Use for the\n *   initial fetch during `--save-auth` and for forced refresh.\n * - {@link ensureClientCredentialsTokens}: reads the cached tokens on an\n *   `AgentConfig`, checks expiry, re-exchanges if needed, and persists the\n *   refreshed tokens via an optional {@link OAuthConfigStorage}.\n *\n * Why a dedicated module instead of the MCP SDK's `OAuthClientProvider`:\n * client credentials doesn't need discovery, dynamic client registration,\n * PKCE, or authorization code exchange — all the plumbing that provider\n * exists to coordinate. A direct token POST and a cached-token check is the\n * entire protocol. The call path keeps using the plain `Authorization:\n * Bearer` header path — the same path it already uses for `auth_token`.\n *\n * **Security note (library consumers):** `token_endpoint` is passed to\n * `fetch` directly. Callers that accept untrusted `AgentConfig` values\n * from network requests (e.g. a hosted compliance service accepting\n * user-supplied configs) MUST validate the URL against an allowlist or\n * SSRF-block private IPs before invoking these helpers. The CLI and\n * operator-driven flows are already trusted.\n */\n\nimport { fromMCPTokens, type OAuthTokens, type AgentConfig, type AgentOAuthTokens } from './types';\nimport type { AgentOAuthClientCredentials } from '../../types/adcp';\nimport type { OAuthConfigStorage } from './types';\nimport { resolveSecret } from './secret-resolver';\nimport { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from '../../net';\nimport { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from '../../protocols/responseSizeLimit';\nimport { createAbortError, throwIfAborted, withAbortSignal } from '../../protocols/abort';\n\n/** Max length we'll echo from an AS-supplied error description into errors. */\nconst MAX_AS_ERROR_LENGTH = 200;\n\n/**\n * Raised when the authorization server rejects a client credentials\n * exchange or the token endpoint is unreachable/malformed.\n *\n * The {@link kind} discriminator lets callers branch without\n * string-matching on the message:\n * - `oauth`: the AS returned a structured OAuth error (RFC 6749 §5.2 —\n *   `invalid_client`, `invalid_grant`, `invalid_scope`, …). Read\n *   {@link oauthError} / {@link oauthErrorDescription}.\n * - `malformed`: the AS returned HTTP 200 but no `access_token`, or a\n *   non-JSON body.\n * - `network`: the exchange never reached the AS (DNS failure, connection\n *   refused, timeout, TLS error).\n */\nexport class ClientCredentialsExchangeError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'client_credentials_exchange_failed';\n  constructor(\n    message: string,\n    public readonly kind: 'oauth' | 'malformed' | 'network',\n    public readonly oauthError?: string,\n    public readonly oauthErrorDescription?: string,\n    public readonly httpStatus?: number\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'ClientCredentialsExchangeError';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link exchangeClientCredentials}.\n */\nexport interface ExchangeClientCredentialsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Custom fetch implementation (default: global `fetch`).\n   * Primarily a testing hook — lets unit tests stub the authorization server\n   * without intercepting the global.\n   */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * Request timeout in milliseconds (default: 30_000). Guards against a\n   * silently hung authorization server blocking the caller indefinitely.\n   */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Allow `token_endpoint` to resolve to a private / loopback IP address.\n   * Default: false (SSRF guard). The CLI opts in because the operator is\n   * explicitly configuring the endpoint; hosted consumers accepting\n   * user-supplied configs should leave this off.\n   */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Caller-owned cancellation signal, composed with `timeoutMs`. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n/**\n * RFC 6749 §2.3.1 application/x-www-form-urlencoded encoding.\n *\n * Differs from `encodeURIComponent` in two important ways:\n * 1. Spaces are encoded as `+`, not `%20`.\n * 2. The characters `!'()*` are percent-encoded (URI component leaves them\n *    alone).\n *\n * A secret containing any of those chars would hash to a different Basic\n * string than the AS computes, producing a spurious `invalid_client`.\n */\nfunction formUrlEncode(value: string): string {\n  return encodeURIComponent(value)\n    .replace(/%20/g, '+')\n    .replace(/!/g, '%21')\n    .replace(/'/g, '%27')\n    .replace(/\\(/g, '%28')\n    .replace(/\\)/g, '%29')\n    .replace(/\\*/g, '%2A');\n}\n\n/**\n * Strip control chars (C0, C1, DEL) and truncate.\n *\n * Defensive cleanup on AS-controlled strings we print to a TTY. A\n * malicious or compromised AS could emit ANSI escape sequences or CRLF\n * payloads in `error_description`; we don't want those rewriting terminal\n * titles or forging log lines.\n */\nfunction sanitizeAsMessage(raw: string): string {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex\n  const stripped = raw.replace(/[\\x00-\\x1F\\x7F-\\x9F]/g, ' ');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_AS_ERROR_LENGTH) return stripped;\n  return stripped.slice(0, MAX_AS_ERROR_LENGTH) + '…';\n}\n\n/**\n * Validate the token endpoint before we hit it. Three checks, in order:\n *\n * 1. Parse as a URL. Unparseable → `malformed`.\n * 2. Reject URLs that carry `user:pass@` userinfo — they'd leak via error\n *    messages and log aggregators, and the OAuth client credentials live\n *    in `client_id` / `client_secret`, never the URL.\n * 3. Reject plaintext `http://` outside `localhost` / loopback IPs.\n *    RFC 6749 §3.1 requires TLS; the loopback carve-out covers local dev\n *    authorization servers where plaintext is not a leak risk.\n * 4. Reject private / loopback / link-local IPs unless `allowPrivateIp`.\n *    The library default is a SSRF guard; the CLI (operator-driven) opts\n *    in because a user pointing at `localhost:8080` is legitimate. Network\n *    code behind this call will still do DNS resolution, so this is a\n *    best-effort literal-IP / known-loopback check — host allowlisting\n *    upstream is the right control for adversarial environments.\n */\nfunction validateTokenEndpoint(tokenEndpoint: string, options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean } = {}): URL {\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(tokenEndpoint);\n  } catch {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(`Invalid token_endpoint URL: ${tokenEndpoint}`, 'malformed');\n  }\n\n  if (url.username || url.password) {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `token_endpoint must not contain userinfo (user:pass@). Put credentials in client_id / client_secret instead.`,\n      'malformed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  const host = url.hostname;\n  const isLoopback = host === 'localhost' || host === '127.0.0.1' || host === '[::1]' || host === '::1';\n\n  if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !(url.protocol === 'http:' && isLoopback)) {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `token_endpoint must be HTTPS (got ${url.protocol}//${host}). The client secret would be sent in plaintext over HTTP. Use https:// (or http://localhost for local dev).`,\n      'malformed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!options.allowPrivateIp && isLikelyPrivateUrl(tokenEndpoint)) {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `token_endpoint resolves to a private or loopback address (${host}). Pass { allowPrivateIp: true } to exchangeClientCredentials / ensureClientCredentialsTokens if this is intentional (operator-driven CLI or local test setups).`,\n      'malformed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  return url;\n}\n\n/**\n * Exchange client credentials for an access token.\n *\n * Secret values in `credentials.client_id` / `client_secret` may be `$ENV:VAR`\n * references — they are resolved here at exchange time. Missing env vars\n * surface as `MissingEnvSecretError` (from `secret-resolver`), which\n * callers typically print with the variable name for the user to fix.\n *\n * @throws {ClientCredentialsExchangeError} on any non-2xx response, malformed 200, or network failure\n * @throws {MissingEnvSecretError} if a `$ENV:VAR` ref points at an unset var\n */\nexport async function exchangeClientCredentials(\n  credentials: AgentOAuthClientCredentials,\n  options: ExchangeClientCredentialsOptions = {}\n): Promise<AgentOAuthTokens> {\n  throwIfAborted(options.signal);\n\n  // Wrap with the response-size-limit guard so a hostile token endpoint\n  // can't buffer-bomb on every refresh. Pass-through when no\n  // `withResponseSizeLimit` slot is active. (#1175)\n  const fetchImpl = wrapFetchWithSizeLimit(options.fetch ?? fetch);\n  const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 30_000;\n\n  validateTokenEndpoint(credentials.token_endpoint, { allowPrivateIp: options.allowPrivateIp });\n\n  const clientId = resolveSecret(credentials.client_id);\n  const clientSecret = resolveSecret(credentials.client_secret);\n  const authMethod = credentials.auth_method ?? 'basic';\n\n  const body = new URLSearchParams();\n  body.set('grant_type', 'client_credentials');\n  if (credentials.scope) {\n    body.set('scope', credentials.scope);\n  }\n  // RFC 8707 resource indicators — emitted as one `resource` field per URI\n  // so the AS receives the full list. URLSearchParams#append is the only\n  // way to produce repeated keys in form encoding.\n  if (credentials.resource) {\n    const resources = Array.isArray(credentials.resource) ? credentials.resource : [credentials.resource];\n    for (const r of resources) body.append('resource', r);\n  }\n  if (credentials.audience) {\n    body.set('audience', credentials.audience);\n  }\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n\n  if (authMethod === 'basic') {\n    // RFC 6749 §2.3.1: form-urlencode ID/secret before base64 (NOT URI\n    // component encoding — space is `+`, and `!'()*` must be percent-\n    // encoded). Most deployed servers accept raw values too, but spec\n    // compliance avoids a footgun with secrets containing those chars.\n    const encoded = Buffer.from(`${formUrlEncode(clientId)}:${formUrlEncode(clientSecret)}`, 'utf-8').toString(\n      'base64'\n    );\n    headers.authorization = `Basic ${encoded}`;\n  } else {\n    body.set('client_id', clientId);\n    body.set('client_secret', clientSecret);\n  }\n\n  let response: Response;\n  let bodyText: string;\n  const timeoutError = new Error(`Client credentials exchange timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`);\n  timeoutError.name = 'TimeoutError';\n  try {\n    ({ response, bodyText } = await withAbortSignal(\n      [options.signal],\n      timeoutMs,\n      async signal => {\n        const tokenResponse = await fetchImpl(credentials.token_endpoint, {\n          method: 'POST',\n          headers,\n          body: body.toString(),\n          signal,\n        });\n        return { response: tokenResponse, bodyText: await tokenResponse.text() };\n      },\n      { timeoutError }\n    ));\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (options.signal?.aborted) {\n      throw createAbortError(options.signal.reason);\n    }\n    if (err === timeoutError) {\n      throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n        `Token endpoint ${credentials.token_endpoint} did not respond within ${timeoutMs}ms.`,\n        'network'\n      );\n    }\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `Failed to reach token endpoint ${credentials.token_endpoint}: ${(err as Error).message}`,\n      'network'\n    );\n  }\n\n  let parsed: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  try {\n    parsed = bodyText ? (JSON.parse(bodyText) as Record<string, unknown>) : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    // Non-JSON response; parsed stays undefined, handled below.\n  }\n\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    const rawOauthError = typeof parsed?.error === 'string' ? parsed.error : undefined;\n    const rawOauthDesc = typeof parsed?.error_description === 'string' ? parsed.error_description : undefined;\n    const oauthError = rawOauthError ? sanitizeAsMessage(rawOauthError) : undefined;\n    const oauthDesc = rawOauthDesc ? sanitizeAsMessage(rawOauthDesc) : undefined;\n    const message =\n      oauthError || oauthDesc\n        ? `Client credentials exchange failed: ${oauthError ?? 'error'}${oauthDesc ? ` — ${oauthDesc}` : ''}`\n        : `Client credentials exchange failed with HTTP ${response.status}: ${sanitizeAsMessage(bodyText) || '(empty body)'}`;\n    const kind = rawOauthError ? 'oauth' : 'malformed';\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(message, kind, oauthError, oauthDesc, response.status);\n  }\n\n  if (!parsed || typeof parsed.access_token !== 'string') {\n    throw new ClientCredentialsExchangeError(\n      `Token endpoint returned HTTP ${response.status} but no access_token. Body: ${sanitizeAsMessage(bodyText)}`,\n      'malformed',\n      undefined,\n      undefined,\n      response.status\n    );\n  }\n\n  return fromMCPTokens(parsed as unknown as OAuthTokens);\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link ensureClientCredentialsTokens}.\n */\nexport interface EnsureClientCredentialsOptions extends ExchangeClientCredentialsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Storage backend used to persist refreshed tokens. Optional — if omitted,\n   * tokens are only mutated on the in-memory `agent` object and the caller\n   * is responsible for persisting.\n   */\n  storage?: OAuthConfigStorage;\n  /**\n   * Force a re-exchange even if the cached token looks valid. Useful after a\n   * 401 in case the authorization server rotated something out-of-band.\n   */\n  force?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Expiration skew (ms). Treat the token as expired this many milliseconds\n   * before its nominal `expires_at` — protects against clock skew and\n   * in-flight requests. Default: 60_000 (1 minute). The interactive auth\n   * code flow uses 5 minutes; client credentials refresh is cheap (single\n   * POST) so the shorter window is fine here.\n   */\n  expirationSkewMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * In-flight refresh coalescing map. Scoped by `AgentConfig` object identity\n * so only callers deliberately sharing one configuration can share a bearer.\n * A string key built from public OAuth fields is insufficient here: two\n * tenants can reuse an agent id, endpoint, and client id while differing in\n * secret, scope, audience, or resource.\n *\n * Cleared on completion regardless of success/failure.\n *\n * Note: this is an in-process map. Multi-process deployments (worker\n * pools, multiple CLI invocations, horizontally scaled Node servers)\n * don't coalesce across workers — each process will do its own refresh.\n * For the CLI this is fine; for high-throughput server deployments,\n * coalesce upstream at the storage layer.\n */\ninterface InFlightRefresh {\n  promise: Promise<AgentOAuthTokens>;\n  controller: AbortController;\n  waiters: number;\n  settled: boolean;\n}\n\ntype RefreshMode = 'normal' | 'force';\n\nconst inFlightRefresh = new WeakMap<AgentConfig, Map<RefreshMode, InFlightRefresh>>();\n\nasync function waitForRefresh(entry: InFlightRefresh, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<AgentOAuthTokens> {\n  if (signal?.aborted) throw createAbortError(signal.reason);\n  entry.waiters += 1;\n  let abortListener: (() => void) | undefined;\n  try {\n    if (!signal) return await entry.promise;\n    const aborted = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {\n      abortListener = () => reject(createAbortError(signal.reason));\n      signal.addEventListener('abort', abortListener, { once: true });\n    });\n    return await Promise.race([entry.promise, aborted]);\n  } finally {\n    if (abortListener && signal) signal.removeEventListener('abort', abortListener);\n    entry.waiters -= 1;\n    if (entry.waiters === 0 && !entry.settled && !entry.controller.signal.aborted) {\n      entry.controller.abort(createAbortError(signal?.reason ?? 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Throws a plain\n * Error if not — callers are expected to branch on its presence before\n * calling this.\n */\nexport async function ensureClientCredentialsTokens(\n  agent: AgentConfig,\n  options: EnsureClientCredentialsOptions = {}\n): Promise<AgentOAuthTokens> {\n  throwIfAborted(options.signal);\n\n  if (!agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `ensureClientCredentialsTokens called for agent '${agent.id}' with no oauth_client_credentials configured.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const skew = options.expirationSkewMs ?? 60_000;\n  const cached = agent.oauth_tokens;\n  const cachedIsValid =\n    !options.force &&\n    cached?.access_token &&\n    (!cached.expires_at || new Date(cached.expires_at).getTime() - Date.now() > skew);\n\n  if (cachedIsValid) {\n    return cached!;\n  }\n\n  const refreshMode: RefreshMode = options.force ? 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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.d.mts

@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ export interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {
     timeoutMs?: number;
     /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */
     fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
     /**
      * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of
      * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in
@@ -128,4 +130,5 @@ export declare function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl: string, options?: {
     allowPrivateIp?: boolean;
     timeoutMs?: number;
     fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null>;

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.d.ts

@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ export interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {
     timeoutMs?: number;
     /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */
     fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
     /**
      * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of
      * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in
@@ -128,5 +130,6 @@ export declare function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl: string, options?: {
     allowPrivateIp?: boolean;
     timeoutMs?: number;
     fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null>;
 //# sourceMappingURL=authorization-required.d.ts.map

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.d.ts.map

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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.js

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ __export(authorization_required_exports, {
 module.exports = __toCommonJS(authorization_required_exports);
 var import_net = require('../../net/index.js');
 var import_errors = require('../../errors/index.js');
+var import_abort = require('../../protocols/abort.js');
 var import_diagnostics = require('./diagnostics.js');
 const MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;
 const MAX_SCOPES = 64;
@@ -87,7 +88,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url) => allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== void 0 && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;
   let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;
   if (!challengeHeader) {
-    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+    const probe = await probeAgent401(
+      agentUrl,
+      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,
+      options.timeoutMs,
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
+    );
     if (probe.status !== 401) {
       return null;
     }
@@ -108,7 +115,8 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
       challenge.resource_metadata,
       allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),
       options.timeoutMs,
-      options.fetchFn
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
     );
     if (prm && typeof prm === "object") {
       const resource = prm.resource;
@@ -128,7 +136,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     let md;
     let source;
     if (asUrl) {
-      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+      const res = await fetchJson(
+        asUrl,
+        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),
+        options.timeoutMs,
+        options.fetchFn,
+        options.signal
+      );
       if (res && typeof res === "object") {
         md = res;
         source = "rfc-8414";
@@ -137,7 +151,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     if (!md) {
       const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);
       if (oidcUrl) {
-        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+        const res = await fetchJson(
+          oidcUrl,
+          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),
+          options.timeoutMs,
+          options.fetchFn,
+          options.signal
+        );
         if (res && typeof res === "object") {
           md = res;
           source = "openid-configuration";
@@ -168,11 +188,17 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   return requirements;
 }
 async function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, options = {}) {
-  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+  const probe = await probeAgent401(
+    agentUrl,
+    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,
+    options.timeoutMs,
+    options.fetchFn,
+    options.signal
+  );
   if (probe.status !== 401) return null;
   return (0, import_diagnostics.parseWWWAuthenticate)(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);
 }
-async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method: "tools/list" });
   try {
     const res = await (0, import_net.ssrfSafeFetch)(agentUrl, {
@@ -183,11 +209,13 @@ async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
       },
       body,
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers["www-authenticate"] };
   } catch {
+    (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(signal);
     return { status: 0 };
   }
 }
@@ -218,18 +246,20 @@ function buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer) {
   const base = u.pathname.endsWith("/") ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;
   return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
 }
-async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   try {
     const res = await (0, import_net.ssrfSafeFetch)(url, {
       method: "GET",
       headers: { accept: "application/json" },
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     if (res.status !== 200) return void 0;
     return (0, import_net.decodeBodyAsJsonOrText)(res.body, res.headers["content-type"]);
   } catch {
+    (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(signal);
     return void 0;
   }
 }

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. 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Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { throwIfAborted } from '../../protocols/abort';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(\n      agentUrl,\n      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn,\n      options.signal\n    );\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn,\n      options.signal\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(\n        asUrl,\n        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),\n        options.timeoutMs,\n        options.fetchFn,\n        options.signal\n      );\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(\n          oidcUrl,\n          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),\n          options.timeoutMs,\n          options.fetchFn,\n          options.signal\n        );\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetchFn?: typeof fetch; signal?: AbortSignal } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(\n    agentUrl,\n    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,\n    options.timeoutMs,\n    options.fetchFn,\n    options.signal\n  );\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      signal,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    throwIfAborted(signal);\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(\n  url: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      signal,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    throwIfAborted(signal);\n    return undefined;\n  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