@adcp/sdk 13.0.0-rc.7 → 13.0.0-rc.8

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.js

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ __export(authorization_required_exports, {
 module.exports = __toCommonJS(authorization_required_exports);
 var import_net = require('../../net/index.js');
 var import_errors = require('../../errors/index.js');
+var import_abort = require('../../protocols/abort.js');
 var import_diagnostics = require('./diagnostics.js');
 const MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;
 const MAX_SCOPES = 64;
@@ -87,7 +88,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url) => allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== void 0 && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;
   let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;
   if (!challengeHeader) {
-    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+    const probe = await probeAgent401(
+      agentUrl,
+      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,
+      options.timeoutMs,
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
+    );
     if (probe.status !== 401) {
       return null;
     }
@@ -108,7 +115,8 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
       challenge.resource_metadata,
       allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),
       options.timeoutMs,
-      options.fetchFn
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
     );
     if (prm && typeof prm === "object") {
       const resource = prm.resource;
@@ -128,7 +136,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     let md;
     let source;
     if (asUrl) {
-      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+      const res = await fetchJson(
+        asUrl,
+        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),
+        options.timeoutMs,
+        options.fetchFn,
+        options.signal
+      );
       if (res && typeof res === "object") {
         md = res;
         source = "rfc-8414";
@@ -137,7 +151,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     if (!md) {
       const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);
       if (oidcUrl) {
-        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+        const res = await fetchJson(
+          oidcUrl,
+          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),
+          options.timeoutMs,
+          options.fetchFn,
+          options.signal
+        );
         if (res && typeof res === "object") {
           md = res;
           source = "openid-configuration";
@@ -168,11 +188,17 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   return requirements;
 }
 async function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, options = {}) {
-  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+  const probe = await probeAgent401(
+    agentUrl,
+    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,
+    options.timeoutMs,
+    options.fetchFn,
+    options.signal
+  );
   if (probe.status !== 401) return null;
   return (0, import_diagnostics.parseWWWAuthenticate)(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);
 }
-async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method: "tools/list" });
   try {
     const res = await (0, import_net.ssrfSafeFetch)(agentUrl, {
@@ -183,11 +209,13 @@ async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
       },
       body,
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers["www-authenticate"] };
   } catch {
+    (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(signal);
     return { status: 0 };
   }
 }
@@ -218,18 +246,20 @@ function buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer) {
   const base = u.pathname.endsWith("/") ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;
   return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
 }
-async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   try {
     const res = await (0, import_net.ssrfSafeFetch)(url, {
       method: "GET",
       headers: { accept: "application/json" },
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     if (res.status !== 200) return void 0;
     return (0, import_net.decodeBodyAsJsonOrText)(res.body, res.headers["content-type"]);
   } catch {
+    (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(signal);
     return void 0;
   }
 }

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetchFn?: typeof fetch } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(\n  url: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAYA,iBAAsD;AACtD,oBAAoE;AACpE,yBAAoE;AAQpE,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAM3B,MAAM,aAAa;AAOnB,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAQ7B,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAuB;AAC9C,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,6BAA6B,EAAE;AAC9D,MAAI,SAAS,UAAU,mBAAoB,QAAO;AAClD,SAAO,GAAG,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;AACrD;AAYA,SAAS,kBAAkB,GAAuD;AAChF,QAAM,SAAiC,CAAC;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,qBAAsB;AACxD,WAAO,CAAC,IAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/B;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,IACV,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,SAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvG,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,SAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvG;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAwEO,MAAM,gCAAgC,0CAA4B;AAAA;AAAA,EAE9D,UAAU;AAAA,EACV;AAAA,EAET,YAAY,cAAyC,SAAkB;AACrE,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,wBAAwB,YAAY,GAAG,WAAW,eAAe,YAAY,CAAC;AAC3G,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,eAAe;AAIpB,SAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAI,KAAK,SAAgC,aAAa;AAAA,EACzE;AACF;AASA,SAAS,wBAAwB,KAA+D;AAC9F,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,yBAAyB,CAAC,IAAI,cAAe,QAAO;AAC7D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,wBAAwB,IAAI;AAAA,IAC5B,gBAAgB,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB,GAAI,IAAI,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,IAAI,qBAAqB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtF,GAAI,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,oBAAoB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACvE;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,KAAwC;AAC9D,QAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,gCAAgC;AACrF,MAAI,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAC3B,UAAM,KAAK,yBAAyB,IAAI,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAAA,EAChE;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,UAAU,mBAAmB;AACnC,UAAM,KAAK,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,IAAI,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG;AAAA,EAChF;AACA,QAAM,KAAK,mFAAmF;AAC9F,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB;AAsCA,eAAsB,kCACpB,UACA,UAAwC,CAAC,GACE;AAM3C,QAAM,wBAAwB,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AACxD,QAAM,cAAc,SAAS,QAAQ;AACrC,QAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC,QAC5B,yBAAyB,gBAAgB,UAAa,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM;AAE1E,MAAI,kBAAkB,QAAQ;AAC9B,MAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB;AACpB,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,cAAc,UAAU,uBAAuB,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACrG,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK;AAExB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,sBAAkB,MAAM;AAAA,EAC1B;AAEA,QAAM,gBAAY,yCAAqB,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC9D,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,UAAU,WAAW,UAAU;AAE/C,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,QAAM,eAA0C;AAAA,IAC9C;AAAA,IACA,qBAAqB,UAAU,oBAAoB,gBAAgB,UAAU,iBAAiB,IAAI;AAAA,IAClG,gBAAgB,UAAU,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IACrE,WAAW,kBAAkB,SAAS;AAAA,EACxC;AAIA,MAAI,UAAU,qBAAqB,cAAc,UAAU,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAC7E,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,MAChB,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,qBAAqB,UAAU,iBAAiB;AAAA,MAChD,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,YAAM,WAAY,IAA+B;AACjD,YAAM,UAAW,IAA4C;AAC7D,UAAI,OAAO,aAAa,SAAU,cAAa,WAAW,gBAAgB,QAAQ;AAClF,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAC1B,cAAM,eAAe,QAClB,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,EAC7E,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,aAAa,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3B,uBAAa,uBAAuB;AACpC,uBAAa,sBAAsB,aAAa,CAAC;AAAA,QACnD;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,MAAI,aAAa,qBAAqB;AACpC,UAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,aAAa,mBAAmB;AAClF,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,qBAAqB,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AAClG,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,aAAK;AACL,iBAAS;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI;AACP,YAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,aAAa,mBAAmB;AACtE,UAAI,SAAS;AACX,cAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,SAAS,qBAAqB,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtG,YAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,eAAK;AACL,mBAAS;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,IAAI;AACN,mBAAa,iBAAiB;AAC9B,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,2BAA2B,UAAU;AACjD,qBAAa,wBAAwB,gBAAgB,GAAG,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAChF;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,mBAAmB,UAAU;AACzC,qBAAa,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,GAAG,cAAc;AAAA,MAChE;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,0BAA0B,UAAU;AAChD,qBAAa,uBAAuB,gBAAgB,GAAG,qBAAqB;AAAA,MAC9E;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACtC,cAAM,SAAS,GAAG,iBACf,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,EACzD,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,EACnB,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,cAAa,kBAAkB;AAAA,MACxD;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAC3C,cAAM,SAAS,GAAG,sBACf,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,EACzD,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EACX,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,cAAa,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAC5D;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAeA,eAAsB,mBACpB,UACA,UAAoF,CAAC,GAC3C;AAC1C,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,cAAc,UAAU,QAAQ,kBAAkB,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AAC/G,MAAI,MAAM,WAAW,IAAK,QAAO;AACjC,aAAO,yCAAqB,MAAM,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC3D;AAOA,eAAe,cACb,UACA,gBACA,WACA,SACuD;AACvD,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,QAAQ,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3E,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,UAAM,0BAAc,UAAU;AAAA,MACxC,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS;AAAA,QACP,gBAAgB;AAAA,QAChB,QAAQ;AAAA,MACV;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE;AAAA,EAChF,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;AASA,SAAS,SAAS,OAAmC;AACnD,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,EACxB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,OAAwB;AAC7C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AACvB,WAAO,EAAE,aAAa,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa;AAAA,EACnD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,oCAAoC,QAAoC;AAC/E,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACxB,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE;AACxE,SAAO,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,QAAQ;AACtE;AAWA,SAAS,sBAAsB,QAAoC;AACjE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACxB,QAAM,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ;AAC1G,SAAO,GAAG,IAAI;AAChB;AAEA,eAAe,UACb,KACA,gBACA,WACA,SACkB;AAClB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,UAAM,0BAAc,KAAK;AAAA,MACnC,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,MACtC;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,QAAI,IAAI,WAAW,IAAK,QAAO;AAC/B,eAAO,mCAAuB,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,CAAC;AAAA,EACrE,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { throwIfAborted } from '../../protocols/abort';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(\n      agentUrl,\n      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn,\n      options.signal\n    );\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn,\n      options.signal\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(\n        asUrl,\n        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),\n        options.timeoutMs,\n        options.fetchFn,\n        options.signal\n      );\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(\n          oidcUrl,\n          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),\n          options.timeoutMs,\n          options.fetchFn,\n          options.signal\n        );\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetchFn?: typeof fetch; signal?: AbortSignal } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(\n    agentUrl,\n    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,\n    options.timeoutMs,\n    options.fetchFn,\n    options.signal\n  );\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      signal,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    throwIfAborted(signal);\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(\n  url: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      signal,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    throwIfAborted(signal);\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAYA,iBAAsD;AACtD,oBAAoE;AACpE,mBAA+B;AAC/B,yBAAoE;AAQpE,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAM3B,MAAM,aAAa;AAOnB,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAQ7B,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAuB;AAC9C,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,6BAA6B,EAAE;AAC9D,MAAI,SAAS,UAAU,mBAAoB,QAAO;AAClD,SAAO,GAAG,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;AACrD;AAYA,SAAS,kBAAkB,GAAuD;AAChF,QAAM,SAAiC,CAAC;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,qBAAsB;AACxD,WAAO,CAAC,IAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/B;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,IACV,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,SAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvG,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,SAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvG;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAwEO,MAAM,gCAAgC,0CAA4B;AAAA;AAAA,EAE9D,UAAU;AAAA,EACV;AAAA,EAET,YAAY,cAAyC,SAAkB;AACrE,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,wBAAwB,YAAY,GAAG,WAAW,eAAe,YAAY,CAAC;AAC3G,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,eAAe;AAIpB,SAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAI,KAAK,SAAgC,aAAa;AAAA,EACzE;AACF;AASA,SAAS,wBAAwB,KAA+D;AAC9F,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,yBAAyB,CAAC,IAAI,cAAe,QAAO;AAC7D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,wBAAwB,IAAI;AAAA,IAC5B,gBAAgB,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB,GAAI,IAAI,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,IAAI,qBAAqB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtF,GAAI,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,oBAAoB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACvE;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,KAAwC;AAC9D,QAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,gCAAgC;AACrF,MAAI,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAC3B,UAAM,KAAK,yBAAyB,IAAI,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAAA,EAChE;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,UAAU,mBAAmB;AACnC,UAAM,KAAK,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,IAAI,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG;AAAA,EAChF;AACA,QAAM,KAAK,mFAAmF;AAC9F,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB;AAwCA,eAAsB,kCACpB,UACA,UAAwC,CAAC,GACE;AAM3C,QAAM,wBAAwB,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AACxD,QAAM,cAAc,SAAS,QAAQ;AACrC,QAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC,QAC5B,yBAAyB,gBAAgB,UAAa,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM;AAE1E,MAAI,kBAAkB,QAAQ;AAC9B,MAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB;AACpB,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK;AAExB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,sBAAkB,MAAM;AAAA,EAC1B;AAEA,QAAM,gBAAY,yCAAqB,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC9D,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,UAAU,WAAW,UAAU;AAE/C,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,QAAM,eAA0C;AAAA,IAC9C;AAAA,IACA,qBAAqB,UAAU,oBAAoB,gBAAgB,UAAU,iBAAiB,IAAI;AAAA,IAClG,gBAAgB,UAAU,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IACrE,WAAW,kBAAkB,SAAS;AAAA,EACxC;AAIA,MAAI,UAAU,qBAAqB,cAAc,UAAU,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAC7E,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,MAChB,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,qBAAqB,UAAU,iBAAiB;AAAA,MAChD,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,YAAM,WAAY,IAA+B;AACjD,YAAM,UAAW,IAA4C;AAC7D,UAAI,OAAO,aAAa,SAAU,cAAa,WAAW,gBAAgB,QAAQ;AAClF,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAC1B,cAAM,eAAe,QAClB,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,EAC7E,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,aAAa,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3B,uBAAa,uBAAuB;AACpC,uBAAa,sBAAsB,aAAa,CAAC;AAAA,QACnD;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,MAAI,aAAa,qBAAqB;AACpC,UAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,aAAa,mBAAmB;AAClF,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,QAChB;AAAA,QACA,qBAAqB,KAAK;AAAA,QAC1B,QAAQ;AAAA,QACR,QAAQ;AAAA,QACR,QAAQ;AAAA,MACV;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,aAAK;AACL,iBAAS;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI;AACP,YAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,aAAa,mBAAmB;AACtE,UAAI,SAAS;AACX,cAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,UAChB;AAAA,UACA,qBAAqB,OAAO;AAAA,UAC5B,QAAQ;AAAA,UACR,QAAQ;AAAA,UACR,QAAQ;AAAA,QACV;AACA,YAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,eAAK;AACL,mBAAS;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,IAAI;AACN,mBAAa,iBAAiB;AAC9B,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,2BAA2B,UAAU;AACjD,qBAAa,wBAAwB,gBAAgB,GAAG,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAChF;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,mBAAmB,UAAU;AACzC,qBAAa,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,GAAG,cAAc;AAAA,MAChE;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,0BAA0B,UAAU;AAChD,qBAAa,uBAAuB,gBAAgB,GAAG,qBAAqB;AAAA,MAC9E;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACtC,cAAM,SAAS,GAAG,iBACf,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,EACzD,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,EACnB,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,cAAa,kBAAkB;AAAA,MACxD;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAC3C,cAAM,SAAS,GAAG,sBACf,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,EACzD,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EACX,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,cAAa,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAC5D;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAeA,eAAsB,mBACpB,UACA,UAA0G,CAAC,GACjE;AAC1C,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAClB;AAAA,IACA,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC1B,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,QAAQ;AAAA,EACV;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,WAAW,IAAK,QAAO;AACjC,aAAO,yCAAqB,MAAM,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC3D;AAOA,eAAe,cACb,UACA,gBACA,WACA,SACA,QACuD;AACvD,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,QAAQ,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3E,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,UAAM,0BAAc,UAAU;AAAA,MACxC,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS;AAAA,QACP,gBAAgB;AAAA,QAChB,QAAQ;AAAA,MACV;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE;AAAA,EAChF,QAAQ;AACN,qCAAe,MAAM;AACrB,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;AASA,SAAS,SAAS,OAAmC;AACnD,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,EACxB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,OAAwB;AAC7C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AACvB,WAAO,EAAE,aAAa,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa;AAAA,EACnD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,oCAAoC,QAAoC;AAC/E,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACxB,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE;AACxE,SAAO,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,QAAQ;AACtE;AAWA,SAAS,sBAAsB,QAAoC;AACjE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACxB,QAAM,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ;AAC1G,SAAO,GAAG,IAAI;AAChB;AAEA,eAAe,UACb,KACA,gBACA,WACA,SACA,QACkB;AAClB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,UAAM,0BAAc,KAAK;AAAA,MACnC,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,MACtC;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,QAAI,IAAI,WAAW,IAAK,QAAO;AAC/B,eAAO,mCAAuB,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,CAAC;AAAA,EACrE,QAAQ;AACN,qCAAe,MAAM;AACrB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from "../../net/index.mjs";
 import { AuthenticationRequiredError } from "../../errors/index.mjs";
+import { throwIfAborted } from "../../protocols/abort.mjs";
 import { parseWWWAuthenticate } from "./diagnostics.mjs";
 const MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;
 const MAX_SCOPES = 64;
@@ -62,7 +63,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url) => allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== void 0 && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;
   let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;
   if (!challengeHeader) {
-    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+    const probe = await probeAgent401(
+      agentUrl,
+      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,
+      options.timeoutMs,
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
+    );
     if (probe.status !== 401) {
       return null;
     }
@@ -83,7 +90,8 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
       challenge.resource_metadata,
       allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),
       options.timeoutMs,
-      options.fetchFn
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
     );
     if (prm && typeof prm === "object") {
       const resource = prm.resource;
@@ -103,7 +111,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     let md;
     let source;
     if (asUrl) {
-      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+      const res = await fetchJson(
+        asUrl,
+        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),
+        options.timeoutMs,
+        options.fetchFn,
+        options.signal
+      );
       if (res && typeof res === "object") {
         md = res;
         source = "rfc-8414";
@@ -112,7 +126,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     if (!md) {
       const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);
       if (oidcUrl) {
-        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+        const res = await fetchJson(
+          oidcUrl,
+          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),
+          options.timeoutMs,
+          options.fetchFn,
+          options.signal
+        );
         if (res && typeof res === "object") {
           md = res;
           source = "openid-configuration";
@@ -143,11 +163,17 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   return requirements;
 }
 async function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, options = {}) {
-  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+  const probe = await probeAgent401(
+    agentUrl,
+    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,
+    options.timeoutMs,
+    options.fetchFn,
+    options.signal
+  );
   if (probe.status !== 401) return null;
   return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);
 }
-async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method: "tools/list" });
   try {
     const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {
@@ -158,11 +184,13 @@ async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
       },
       body,
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers["www-authenticate"] };
   } catch {
+    throwIfAborted(signal);
     return { status: 0 };
   }
 }
@@ -193,18 +221,20 @@ function buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer) {
   const base = u.pathname.endsWith("/") ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;
   return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
 }
-async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   try {
     const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {
       method: "GET",
       headers: { accept: "application/json" },
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     if (res.status !== 200) return void 0;
     return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers["content-type"]);
   } catch {
+    throwIfAborted(signal);
     return void 0;
   }
 }

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetchFn?: typeof fetch } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(\n  url: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAYA,SAAS,eAAe,8BAA8B;AACtD,SAAS,mCAA2D;AACpE,SAAS,4BAA2D;AAQpE,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAM3B,MAAM,aAAa;AAOnB,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAQ7B,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAuB;AAC9C,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,6BAA6B,EAAE;AAC9D,MAAI,SAAS,UAAU,mBAAoB,QAAO;AAClD,SAAO,GAAG,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;AACrD;AAYA,SAAS,kBAAkB,GAAuD;AAChF,QAAM,SAAiC,CAAC;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,qBAAsB;AACxD,WAAO,CAAC,IAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/B;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,IACV,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,SAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvG,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,SAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvG;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAwEO,MAAM,gCAAgC,4BAA4B;AAAA;AAAA,EAE9D,UAAU;AAAA,EACV;AAAA,EAET,YAAY,cAAyC,SAAkB;AACrE,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,wBAAwB,YAAY,GAAG,WAAW,eAAe,YAAY,CAAC;AAC3G,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,eAAe;AAIpB,SAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAI,KAAK,SAAgC,aAAa;AAAA,EACzE;AACF;AASA,SAAS,wBAAwB,KAA+D;AAC9F,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,yBAAyB,CAAC,IAAI,cAAe,QAAO;AAC7D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,wBAAwB,IAAI;AAAA,IAC5B,gBAAgB,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB,GAAI,IAAI,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,IAAI,qBAAqB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtF,GAAI,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,oBAAoB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACvE;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,KAAwC;AAC9D,QAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,gCAAgC;AACrF,MAAI,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAC3B,UAAM,KAAK,yBAAyB,IAAI,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAAA,EAChE;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,UAAU,mBAAmB;AACnC,UAAM,KAAK,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,IAAI,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG;AAAA,EAChF;AACA,QAAM,KAAK,mFAAmF;AAC9F,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB;AAsCA,eAAsB,kCACpB,UACA,UAAwC,CAAC,GACE;AAM3C,QAAM,wBAAwB,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AACxD,QAAM,cAAc,SAAS,QAAQ;AACrC,QAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC,QAC5B,yBAAyB,gBAAgB,UAAa,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM;AAE1E,MAAI,kBAAkB,QAAQ;AAC9B,MAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB;AACpB,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,cAAc,UAAU,uBAAuB,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACrG,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK;AAExB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,sBAAkB,MAAM;AAAA,EAC1B;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,qBAAqB,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC9D,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,UAAU,WAAW,UAAU;AAE/C,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,QAAM,eAA0C;AAAA,IAC9C;AAAA,IACA,qBAAqB,UAAU,oBAAoB,gBAAgB,UAAU,iBAAiB,IAAI;AAAA,IAClG,gBAAgB,UAAU,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IACrE,WAAW,kBAAkB,SAAS;AAAA,EACxC;AAIA,MAAI,UAAU,qBAAqB,cAAc,UAAU,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAC7E,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,MAChB,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,qBAAqB,UAAU,iBAAiB;AAAA,MAChD,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,YAAM,WAAY,IAA+B;AACjD,YAAM,UAAW,IAA4C;AAC7D,UAAI,OAAO,aAAa,SAAU,cAAa,WAAW,gBAAgB,QAAQ;AAClF,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAC1B,cAAM,eAAe,QAClB,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,EAC7E,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,aAAa,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3B,uBAAa,uBAAuB;AACpC,uBAAa,sBAAsB,aAAa,CAAC;AAAA,QACnD;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,MAAI,aAAa,qBAAqB;AACpC,UAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,aAAa,mBAAmB;AAClF,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,qBAAqB,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AAClG,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,aAAK;AACL,iBAAS;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI;AACP,YAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,aAAa,mBAAmB;AACtE,UAAI,SAAS;AACX,cAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,SAAS,qBAAqB,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtG,YAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,eAAK;AACL,mBAAS;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,IAAI;AACN,mBAAa,iBAAiB;AAC9B,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,2BAA2B,UAAU;AACjD,qBAAa,wBAAwB,gBAAgB,GAAG,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAChF;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,mBAAmB,UAAU;AACzC,qBAAa,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,GAAG,cAAc;AAAA,MAChE;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,0BAA0B,UAAU;AAChD,qBAAa,uBAAuB,gBAAgB,GAAG,qBAAqB;AAAA,MAC9E;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACtC,cAAM,SAAS,GAAG,iBACf,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,EACzD,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,EACnB,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,cAAa,kBAAkB;AAAA,MACxD;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAC3C,cAAM,SAAS,GAAG,sBACf,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,EACzD,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EACX,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,cAAa,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAC5D;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAeA,eAAsB,mBACpB,UACA,UAAoF,CAAC,GAC3C;AAC1C,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,cAAc,UAAU,QAAQ,kBAAkB,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AAC/G,MAAI,MAAM,WAAW,IAAK,QAAO;AACjC,SAAO,qBAAqB,MAAM,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC3D;AAOA,eAAe,cACb,UACA,gBACA,WACA,SACuD;AACvD,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,QAAQ,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3E,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,cAAc,UAAU;AAAA,MACxC,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS;AAAA,QACP,gBAAgB;AAAA,QAChB,QAAQ;AAAA,MACV;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE;AAAA,EAChF,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;AASA,SAAS,SAAS,OAAmC;AACnD,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,EACxB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,OAAwB;AAC7C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AACvB,WAAO,EAAE,aAAa,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa;AAAA,EACnD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,oCAAoC,QAAoC;AAC/E,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACxB,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE;AACxE,SAAO,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,QAAQ;AACtE;AAWA,SAAS,sBAAsB,QAAoC;AACjE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACxB,QAAM,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ;AAC1G,SAAO,GAAG,IAAI;AAChB;AAEA,eAAe,UACb,KACA,gBACA,WACA,SACkB;AAClB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,MACnC,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,MACtC;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,QAAI,IAAI,WAAW,IAAK,QAAO;AAC/B,WAAO,uBAAuB,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,CAAC;AAAA,EACrE,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { throwIfAborted } from '../../protocols/abort';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(\n      agentUrl,\n      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn,\n      options.signal\n    );\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn,\n      options.signal\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(\n        asUrl,\n        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),\n        options.timeoutMs,\n        options.fetchFn,\n        options.signal\n      );\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(\n          oidcUrl,\n          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),\n          options.timeoutMs,\n          options.fetchFn,\n          options.signal\n        );\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetchFn?: typeof fetch; signal?: AbortSignal } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(\n    agentUrl,\n    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,\n    options.timeoutMs,\n    options.fetchFn,\n    options.signal\n  );\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      signal,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    throwIfAborted(signal);\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(\n  url: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      signal,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    throwIfAborted(signal);\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAYA,SAAS,eAAe,8BAA8B;AACtD,SAAS,mCAA2D;AACpE,SAAS,sBAAsB;AAC/B,SAAS,4BAA2D;AAQpE,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAM3B,MAAM,aAAa;AAOnB,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAQ7B,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAuB;AAC9C,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,6BAA6B,EAAE;AAC9D,MAAI,SAAS,UAAU,mBAAoB,QAAO;AAClD,SAAO,GAAG,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC;AACrD;AAYA,SAAS,kBAAkB,GAAuD;AAChF,QAAM,SAAiC,CAAC;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7C,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,qBAAsB;AACxD,WAAO,CAAC,IAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/B;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,IACV,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,SAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvG,GAAI,EAAE,UAAU,SAAY,EAAE,OAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnE,GAAI,EAAE,sBAAsB,SAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvG;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAwEO,MAAM,gCAAgC,4BAA4B;AAAA;AAAA,EAE9D,UAAU;AAAA,EACV;AAAA,EAET,YAAY,cAAyC,SAAkB;AACrE,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,wBAAwB,YAAY,GAAG,WAAW,eAAe,YAAY,CAAC;AAC3G,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,eAAe;AAIpB,SAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAI,KAAK,SAAgC,aAAa;AAAA,EACzE;AACF;AASA,SAAS,wBAAwB,KAA+D;AAC9F,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,yBAAyB,CAAC,IAAI,cAAe,QAAO;AAC7D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,wBAAwB,IAAI;AAAA,IAC5B,gBAAgB,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB,GAAI,IAAI,uBAAuB,EAAE,uBAAuB,IAAI,qBAAqB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtF,GAAI,IAAI,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,oBAAoB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EACvE;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,KAAwC;AAC9D,QAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,gCAAgC;AACrF,MAAI,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAC3B,UAAM,KAAK,yBAAyB,IAAI,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAAA,EAChE;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,UAAU,mBAAmB;AACnC,UAAM,KAAK,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,IAAI,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,GAAG;AAAA,EAChF;AACA,QAAM,KAAK,mFAAmF;AAC9F,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;AACvB;AAwCA,eAAsB,kCACpB,UACA,UAAwC,CAAC,GACE;AAM3C,QAAM,wBAAwB,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AACxD,QAAM,cAAc,SAAS,QAAQ;AACrC,QAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC,QAC5B,yBAAyB,gBAAgB,UAAa,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM;AAE1E,MAAI,kBAAkB,QAAQ;AAC9B,MAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB;AACpB,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK;AAExB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,sBAAkB,MAAM;AAAA,EAC1B;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,qBAAqB,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC9D,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,UAAU,WAAW,UAAU;AAE/C,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,QAAM,eAA0C;AAAA,IAC9C;AAAA,IACA,qBAAqB,UAAU,oBAAoB,gBAAgB,UAAU,iBAAiB,IAAI;AAAA,IAClG,gBAAgB,UAAU,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IACrE,WAAW,kBAAkB,SAAS;AAAA,EACxC;AAIA,MAAI,UAAU,qBAAqB,cAAc,UAAU,iBAAiB,GAAG;AAC7E,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,MAChB,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,qBAAqB,UAAU,iBAAiB;AAAA,MAChD,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACV;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,YAAM,WAAY,IAA+B;AACjD,YAAM,UAAW,IAA4C;AAC7D,UAAI,OAAO,aAAa,SAAU,cAAa,WAAW,gBAAgB,QAAQ;AAClF,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAC1B,cAAM,eAAe,QAClB,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,EAC7E,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,aAAa,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3B,uBAAa,uBAAuB;AACpC,uBAAa,sBAAsB,aAAa,CAAC;AAAA,QACnD;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,MAAI,aAAa,qBAAqB;AACpC,UAAM,QAAQ,oCAAoC,aAAa,mBAAmB;AAClF,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,QAChB;AAAA,QACA,qBAAqB,KAAK;AAAA,QAC1B,QAAQ;AAAA,QACR,QAAQ;AAAA,QACR,QAAQ;AAAA,MACV;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,aAAK;AACL,iBAAS;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI;AACP,YAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,aAAa,mBAAmB;AACtE,UAAI,SAAS;AACX,cAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,UAChB;AAAA,UACA,qBAAqB,OAAO;AAAA,UAC5B,QAAQ;AAAA,UACR,QAAQ;AAAA,UACR,QAAQ;AAAA,QACV;AACA,YAAI,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAClC,eAAK;AACL,mBAAS;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,IAAI;AACN,mBAAa,iBAAiB;AAC9B,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,2BAA2B,UAAU;AACjD,qBAAa,wBAAwB,gBAAgB,GAAG,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAChF;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,mBAAmB,UAAU;AACzC,qBAAa,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,GAAG,cAAc;AAAA,MAChE;AACA,UAAI,OAAO,GAAG,0BAA0B,UAAU;AAChD,qBAAa,uBAAuB,gBAAgB,GAAG,qBAAqB;AAAA,MAC9E;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACtC,cAAM,SAAS,GAAG,iBACf,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,EACzD,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,EACnB,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,cAAa,kBAAkB;AAAA,MACxD;AACA,UAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAC3C,cAAM,SAAS,GAAG,sBACf,OAAO,CAAC,MAA4B,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,EACzD,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EACX,IAAI,eAAe;AACtB,YAAI,OAAO,SAAS,EAAG,cAAa,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAC5D;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAeA,eAAsB,mBACpB,UACA,UAA0G,CAAC,GACjE;AAC1C,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAClB;AAAA,IACA,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAC1B,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,QAAQ;AAAA,EACV;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,WAAW,IAAK,QAAO;AACjC,SAAO,qBAAqB,MAAM,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC3D;AAOA,eAAe,cACb,UACA,gBACA,WACA,SACA,QACuD;AACvD,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,QAAQ,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3E,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,cAAc,UAAU;AAAA,MACxC,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS;AAAA,QACP,gBAAgB;AAAA,QAChB,QAAQ;AAAA,MACV;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,EAAE;AAAA,EAChF,QAAQ;AACN,mBAAe,MAAM;AACrB,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,EACrB;AACF;AASA,SAAS,SAAS,OAAmC;AACnD,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE;AAAA,EACxB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,OAAwB;AAC7C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AACvB,WAAO,EAAE,aAAa,YAAY,EAAE,aAAa;AAAA,EACnD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,oCAAoC,QAAoC;AAC/E,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACxB,QAAM,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE;AACxE,SAAO,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,0CAA0C,QAAQ;AACtE;AAWA,SAAS,sBAAsB,QAAoC;AACjE,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACxB,QAAM,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ;AAC1G,SAAO,GAAG,IAAI;AAChB;AAEA,eAAe,UACb,KACA,gBACA,WACA,SACA,QACkB;AAClB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,MACnC,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,MACtC;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,cAAc,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/C,GAAI,UAAU,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,CAAC;AACD,QAAI,IAAI,WAAW,IAAK,QAAO;AAC/B,WAAO,uBAAuB,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,CAAC;AAAA,EACrE,QAAQ;AACN,mBAAe,MAAM;AACrB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.d.mts

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ export interface DiscoveryOptions {
     timeout?: number;
     /** Custom fetch function (for testing or custom HTTP handling) */
     fetch?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }
 /**
  * Discover OAuth metadata from an MCP server

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.d.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ export interface DiscoveryOptions {
     timeout?: number;
     /** Custom fetch function (for testing or custom HTTP handling) */
     fetch?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }
 /**
  * Discover OAuth metadata from an MCP server

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"discovery.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAIH;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B,wCAAwC;IACxC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B,gCAAgC;IAChC,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,iEAAiE;IACjE,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B,wBAAwB;IACxB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,4CAA4C;IAC5C,gCAAgC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC5C,+BAA+B;IAC/B,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACpC,4BAA4B;IAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,4CAA4C;IAC5C,qCAAqC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjD,uBAAuB;IACvB,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CAC7B;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,8CAA8C;IAC9C,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,kEAAkE;IAClE,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;CACtB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAsB,qBAAqB,CACzC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,OAAO,GAAE,gBAAqB,GAC7B,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAyD/B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,wBAAsB,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,GAAE,gBAAqB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAGtG;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,wBAAsB,2BAA2B,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,GAAE,gBAAqB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAGpH"}
+{"version":3,"file":"discovery.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAKH;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B,wCAAwC;IACxC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B,gCAAgC;IAChC,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,iEAAiE;IACjE,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC/B,wBAAwB;IACxB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,4CAA4C;IAC5C,gCAAgC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAC5C,+BAA+B;IAC/B,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACpC,4BAA4B;IAC5B,qBAAqB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjC,4CAA4C;IAC5C,qCAAqC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACjD,uBAAuB;IACvB,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CAC7B;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,8CAA8C;IAC9C,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,kEAAkE;IAClE,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACrB,iEAAiE;IACjE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CACtB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAsB,qBAAqB,CACzC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,OAAO,GAAE,gBAAqB,GAC7B,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CA0D/B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,wBAAsB,aAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,GAAE,gBAAqB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAGtG;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,wBAAsB,2BAA2B,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,GAAE,gBAAqB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAGpH"}

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.js

@@ -24,9 +24,11 @@ __export(discovery_exports, {
 });
 module.exports = __toCommonJS(discovery_exports);
 var import_responseSizeLimit = require('../../protocols/responseSizeLimit.js');
+var import_abort = require('../../protocols/abort.js');
 async function discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   const { timeout = 5e3, fetch: providedFetch = fetch } = options;
   const customFetch = (0, import_responseSizeLimit.wrapFetchWithSizeLimit)(providedFetch);
+  (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(options.signal);
   try {
     const baseUrl = new URL(agentUrl);
     const pathname = baseUrl.pathname.endsWith("/") ? baseUrl.pathname.slice(0, -1) : baseUrl.pathname;
@@ -35,12 +37,12 @@ async function discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     const rootUrl = new URL("/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", baseUrl.origin);
     const urlsToTry = pathAwareUrl ? [pathAwareUrl, rootUrl] : [rootUrl];
     for (const metadataUrl of urlsToTry) {
-      const controller = new AbortController();
-      const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeout);
+      const timeoutSignal = AbortSignal.timeout(timeout);
+      const signal = options.signal ? AbortSignal.any([options.signal, timeoutSignal]) : timeoutSignal;
       try {
         const response = await customFetch(metadataUrl.toString(), {
           headers: { Accept: "application/json" },
-          signal: controller.signal
+          signal
         });
         if (!response.ok) {
           continue;
@@ -51,13 +53,13 @@ async function discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, options = {}) {
         }
         return metadata;
       } catch {
+        (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(options.signal);
         continue;
-      } finally {
-        clearTimeout(timeoutId);
       }
     }
     return null;
   } catch {
+    (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(options.signal);
     return null;
   }
 }

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * OAuth Discovery utilities\n *\n * Functions to discover OAuth capabilities of MCP servers.\n * MCP servers expose OAuth metadata at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\n */\n\nimport { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from '../../protocols/responseSizeLimit';\n\n/**\n * OAuth Authorization Server Metadata\n * @see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414\n */\nexport interface OAuthMetadata {\n  /** URL of the authorization endpoint */\n  authorization_endpoint: string;\n  /** URL of the token endpoint */\n  token_endpoint: string;\n  /** URL of the dynamic client registration endpoint (optional) */\n  registration_endpoint?: string;\n  /** Issuer identifier */\n  issuer?: string;\n  /** PKCE code challenge methods supported */\n  code_challenge_methods_supported?: string[];\n  /** Response types supported */\n  response_types_supported?: string[];\n  /** Grant types supported */\n  grant_types_supported?: string[];\n  /** Token endpoint auth methods supported */\n  token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported?: string[];\n  /** Scopes supported */\n  scopes_supported?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for OAuth discovery\n */\nexport interface DiscoveryOptions {\n  /** Timeout in milliseconds (default: 5000) */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Custom fetch function (for testing or custom HTTP handling) */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\n/**\n * Discover OAuth metadata from an MCP server\n *\n * Fetches the OAuth Authorization Server Metadata from the well-known endpoint.\n * Returns null if the server doesn't support OAuth or the metadata isn't available.\n *\n * @param agentUrl - The MCP server URL\n * @param options - Discovery options\n * @returns OAuth metadata or null if not available\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const metadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata('https://agent.example.com/mcp');\n * if (metadata) {\n *   console.log('Authorization URL:', metadata.authorization_endpoint);\n *   console.log('Supports dynamic registration:', !!metadata.registration_endpoint);\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport async function discoverOAuthMetadata(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoveryOptions = {}\n): Promise<OAuthMetadata | null> {\n  // Wrap with the response-size-limit guard so a hostile metadata endpoint\n  // can't buffer-bomb during discovery. Pass-through when no\n  // `withResponseSizeLimit` slot is active. (#1175)\n  const { timeout = 5000, fetch: providedFetch = fetch } = options;\n  const customFetch = wrapFetchWithSizeLimit(providedFetch);\n\n  try {\n    const baseUrl = new URL(agentUrl);\n\n    // RFC 8414 path-aware discovery: try path-suffixed URL first, then fall back to root.\n    // For https://example.com/mcp, try:\n    //   1. https://example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/mcp\n    //   2. https://example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (fallback)\n    const pathname = baseUrl.pathname.endsWith('/') ? baseUrl.pathname.slice(0, -1) : baseUrl.pathname;\n    const hasPath = pathname !== '' && pathname !== '/';\n\n    const pathAwareUrl = hasPath ? new URL(`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`, baseUrl.origin) : null;\n    const rootUrl = new URL('/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', baseUrl.origin);\n\n    const urlsToTry = pathAwareUrl ? [pathAwareUrl, rootUrl] : [rootUrl];\n\n    for (const metadataUrl of urlsToTry) {\n      const controller = new AbortController();\n      const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeout);\n\n      try {\n        const response = await customFetch(metadataUrl.toString(), {\n          headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n          signal: controller.signal,\n        });\n\n        if (!response.ok) {\n          continue;\n        }\n\n        const metadata = (await response.json()) as OAuthMetadata;\n\n        // Validate required fields\n        if (!metadata.authorization_endpoint || !metadata.token_endpoint) {\n          continue;\n        }\n\n        return metadata;\n      } catch {\n        // Parse error, timeout, or network error on this URL -- try next\n        continue;\n      } finally {\n        clearTimeout(timeoutId);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  } catch {\n    // Network error, timeout, or invalid URL - agent doesn't support OAuth\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if an MCP server supports OAuth authentication\n *\n * This is a simple boolean check - use discoverOAuthMetadata() if you need\n * the actual endpoints.\n *\n * @param agentUrl - The MCP server URL\n * @param options - Discovery options\n * @returns true if the server supports OAuth\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * if (await supportsOAuth('https://agent.example.com/mcp')) {\n *   console.log('Agent requires OAuth authentication');\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport async function supportsOAuth(agentUrl: string, options: DiscoveryOptions = {}): Promise<boolean> {\n  const metadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, options);\n  return metadata !== null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if an MCP server supports dynamic client registration\n *\n * Servers that support dynamic registration allow clients to register\n * automatically without pre-configured credentials.\n *\n * @param agentUrl - The MCP server URL\n * @param options - Discovery options\n * @returns true if the server supports dynamic client registration\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * if (await supportsDynamicRegistration('https://agent.example.com/mcp')) {\n *   console.log('Agent supports automatic client registration');\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport async function supportsDynamicRegistration(agentUrl: string, options: DiscoveryOptions = {}): Promise<boolean> {\n  const metadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, options);\n  return metadata?.registration_endpoint !== undefined;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAOA,+BAAuC;AAwDvC,eAAsB,sBACpB,UACA,UAA4B,CAAC,GACE;AAI/B,QAAM,EAAE,UAAU,KAAM,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM,IAAI;AACzD,QAAM,kBAAc,iDAAuB,aAAa;AAExD,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ;AAMhC,UAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC1F,UAAM,UAAU,aAAa,MAAM,aAAa;AAEhD,UAAM,eAAe,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,0CAA0C,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI;AAC/G,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,2CAA2C,QAAQ,MAAM;AAEjF,UAAM,YAAY,eAAe,CAAC,cAAc,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AAEnE,eAAW,eAAe,WAAW;AACnC,YAAM,aAAa,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACvC,YAAM,YAAY,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO;AAE9D,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,WAAW,MAAM,YAAY,YAAY,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,UACzD,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,UACtC,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,QACrB,CAAC;AAED,YAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI;AAChB;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,cAAM,WAAY,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAGtC,YAAI,CAAC,SAAS,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAChE;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,eAAO;AAAA,MACT,QAAQ;AAEN;AAAA,MACF,UAAE;AACA,qBAAa,SAAS;AAAA,MACxB;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,QAAQ;AAEN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAmBA,eAAsB,cAAc,UAAkB,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAqB;AACtG,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,sBAAsB,UAAU,OAAO;AAC9D,SAAO,aAAa;AACtB;AAmBA,eAAsB,4BAA4B,UAAkB,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAqB;AACpH,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,sBAAsB,UAAU,OAAO;AAC9D,SAAO,UAAU,0BAA0B;AAC7C;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * OAuth Discovery utilities\n *\n * Functions to discover OAuth capabilities of MCP servers.\n * MCP servers expose OAuth metadata at /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\n */\n\nimport { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from '../../protocols/responseSizeLimit';\nimport { throwIfAborted } from '../../protocols/abort';\n\n/**\n * OAuth Authorization Server Metadata\n * @see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414\n */\nexport interface OAuthMetadata {\n  /** URL of the authorization endpoint */\n  authorization_endpoint: string;\n  /** URL of the token endpoint */\n  token_endpoint: string;\n  /** URL of the dynamic client registration endpoint (optional) */\n  registration_endpoint?: string;\n  /** Issuer identifier */\n  issuer?: string;\n  /** PKCE code challenge methods supported */\n  code_challenge_methods_supported?: string[];\n  /** Response types supported */\n  response_types_supported?: string[];\n  /** Grant types supported */\n  grant_types_supported?: string[];\n  /** Token endpoint auth methods supported */\n  token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported?: string[];\n  /** Scopes supported */\n  scopes_supported?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for OAuth discovery\n */\nexport interface DiscoveryOptions {\n  /** Timeout in milliseconds (default: 5000) */\n  timeout?: number;\n  /** Custom fetch function (for testing or custom HTTP handling) */\n  fetch?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n/**\n * Discover OAuth metadata from an MCP server\n *\n * Fetches the OAuth Authorization Server Metadata from the well-known endpoint.\n * Returns null if the server doesn't support OAuth or the metadata isn't available.\n *\n * @param agentUrl - The MCP server URL\n * @param options - Discovery options\n * @returns OAuth metadata or null if not available\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const metadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata('https://agent.example.com/mcp');\n * if (metadata) {\n *   console.log('Authorization URL:', metadata.authorization_endpoint);\n *   console.log('Supports dynamic registration:', !!metadata.registration_endpoint);\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport async function discoverOAuthMetadata(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoveryOptions = {}\n): Promise<OAuthMetadata | null> {\n  // Wrap with the response-size-limit guard so a hostile metadata endpoint\n  // can't buffer-bomb during discovery. Pass-through when no\n  // `withResponseSizeLimit` slot is active. (#1175)\n  const { timeout = 5000, fetch: providedFetch = fetch } = options;\n  const customFetch = wrapFetchWithSizeLimit(providedFetch);\n  throwIfAborted(options.signal);\n\n  try {\n    const baseUrl = new URL(agentUrl);\n\n    // RFC 8414 path-aware discovery: try path-suffixed URL first, then fall back to root.\n    // For https://example.com/mcp, try:\n    //   1. https://example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/mcp\n    //   2. https://example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (fallback)\n    const pathname = baseUrl.pathname.endsWith('/') ? baseUrl.pathname.slice(0, -1) : baseUrl.pathname;\n    const hasPath = pathname !== '' && pathname !== '/';\n\n    const pathAwareUrl = hasPath ? new URL(`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`, baseUrl.origin) : null;\n    const rootUrl = new URL('/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', baseUrl.origin);\n\n    const urlsToTry = pathAwareUrl ? [pathAwareUrl, rootUrl] : [rootUrl];\n\n    for (const metadataUrl of urlsToTry) {\n      const timeoutSignal = AbortSignal.timeout(timeout);\n      const signal = options.signal ? AbortSignal.any([options.signal, timeoutSignal]) : timeoutSignal;\n\n      try {\n        const response = await customFetch(metadataUrl.toString(), {\n          headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n          signal,\n        });\n\n        if (!response.ok) {\n          continue;\n        }\n\n        const metadata = (await response.json()) as OAuthMetadata;\n\n        // Validate required fields\n        if (!metadata.authorization_endpoint || !metadata.token_endpoint) {\n          continue;\n        }\n\n        return metadata;\n      } catch {\n        throwIfAborted(options.signal);\n        // Parse error, timeout, or network error on this URL -- try next\n        continue;\n      }\n    }\n\n    return null;\n  } catch {\n    throwIfAborted(options.signal);\n    // Network error, timeout, or invalid URL - agent doesn't support OAuth\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if an MCP server supports OAuth authentication\n *\n * This is a simple boolean check - use discoverOAuthMetadata() if you need\n * the actual endpoints.\n *\n * @param agentUrl - The MCP server URL\n * @param options - Discovery options\n * @returns true if the server supports OAuth\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * if (await supportsOAuth('https://agent.example.com/mcp')) {\n *   console.log('Agent requires OAuth authentication');\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport async function supportsOAuth(agentUrl: string, options: DiscoveryOptions = {}): Promise<boolean> {\n  const metadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, options);\n  return metadata !== null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if an MCP server supports dynamic client registration\n *\n * Servers that support dynamic registration allow clients to register\n * automatically without pre-configured credentials.\n *\n * @param agentUrl - The MCP server URL\n * @param options - Discovery options\n * @returns true if the server supports dynamic client registration\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * if (await supportsDynamicRegistration('https://agent.example.com/mcp')) {\n *   console.log('Agent supports automatic client registration');\n * }\n * ```\n */\nexport async function supportsDynamicRegistration(agentUrl: string, options: DiscoveryOptions = {}): Promise<boolean> {\n  const metadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, options);\n  return metadata?.registration_endpoint !== undefined;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAOA,+BAAuC;AACvC,mBAA+B;AA0D/B,eAAsB,sBACpB,UACA,UAA4B,CAAC,GACE;AAI/B,QAAM,EAAE,UAAU,KAAM,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM,IAAI;AACzD,QAAM,kBAAc,iDAAuB,aAAa;AACxD,mCAAe,QAAQ,MAAM;AAE7B,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ;AAMhC,UAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC1F,UAAM,UAAU,aAAa,MAAM,aAAa;AAEhD,UAAM,eAAe,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,0CAA0C,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI;AAC/G,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,2CAA2C,QAAQ,MAAM;AAEjF,UAAM,YAAY,eAAe,CAAC,cAAc,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AAEnE,eAAW,eAAe,WAAW;AACnC,YAAM,gBAAgB,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO;AACjD,YAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,SAAS,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,QAAQ,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI;AAEnF,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,WAAW,MAAM,YAAY,YAAY,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,UACzD,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,UACtC;AAAA,QACF,CAAC;AAED,YAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI;AAChB;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,cAAM,WAAY,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAGtC,YAAI,CAAC,SAAS,0BAA0B,CAAC,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAChE;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,eAAO;AAAA,MACT,QAAQ;AACN,yCAAe,QAAQ,MAAM;AAE7B;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,QAAQ;AACN,qCAAe,QAAQ,MAAM;AAE7B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAmBA,eAAsB,cAAc,UAAkB,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAqB;AACtG,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,sBAAsB,UAAU,OAAO;AAC9D,SAAO,aAAa;AACtB;AAmBA,eAAsB,4BAA4B,UAAkB,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAqB;AACpH,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,sBAAsB,UAAU,OAAO;AAC9D,SAAO,UAAU,0BAA0B;AAC7C;","names":[]}