@adcp/sdk 13.0.0-rc.6 → 13.0.0-rc.8

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/MCPOAuthProvider.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/MCPOAuthProvider.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * MCP OAuth Provider\n *\n * Implements the MCP SDK's OAuthClientProvider interface\n * using AgentConfig for token storage.\n */\n\nimport type { OAuthClientProvider } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/auth.js';\nimport type {\n  OAuthClientMetadata,\n  OAuthClientInformation,\n  OAuthClientInformationFull,\n  OAuthTokens,\n  OAuthFlowHandler,\n  OAuthProviderConfig,\n  OAuthConfigStorage,\n  AgentConfig,\n} from './types';\nimport { DEFAULT_CLIENT_METADATA, toMCPTokens, fromMCPTokens, toMCPClientInfo, fromMCPClientInfo } from './types';\nimport { randomBytes } from 'crypto';\n\n/**\n * MCP OAuth Client Provider\n *\n * This provider stores OAuth tokens directly in the AgentConfig,\n * using the same structure as static auth tokens.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const agent: AgentConfig = {\n *   id: 'my-agent',\n *   name: 'My Agent',\n *   agent_uri: 'https://agent.example.com/mcp',\n *   protocol: 'mcp',\n *   // OAuth tokens stored here after auth flow\n *   oauth_tokens: { access_token: '...', refresh_token: '...' }\n * };\n *\n * const provider = new MCPOAuthProvider({\n *   agent,\n *   flowHandler: new CLIFlowHandler(),\n *   storage: myConfigStorage  // Optional: persists tokens\n * });\n *\n * const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(url, {\n *   authProvider: provider\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport class MCPOAuthProvider implements OAuthClientProvider {\n  private agent: AgentConfig;\n  private readonly storage?: OAuthConfigStorage;\n  private readonly flowHandler: OAuthFlowHandler;\n  private readonly _clientMetadata: OAuthClientMetadata;\n  private readonly allowHttp: boolean;\n\n  constructor(config: OAuthProviderConfig) {\n    this.agent = config.agent;\n    this.storage = config.storage;\n    this.flowHandler = config.flowHandler;\n    this._clientMetadata = config.clientMetadata;\n    this.allowHttp = config.allowHttp === true;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Create a provider for CLI usage\n   */\n  static forCLI(\n    agent: AgentConfig,\n    flowHandler: OAuthFlowHandler,\n    storage?: OAuthConfigStorage,\n    clientMetadataOverrides?: Partial<OAuthClientMetadata>,\n    options?: { allowHttp?: boolean }\n  ): MCPOAuthProvider {\n    // Build complete client metadata with required fields\n    const clientMetadata: OAuthClientMetadata = {\n      ...DEFAULT_CLIENT_METADATA,\n      redirect_uris: [flowHandler.getRedirectUrl().toString()],\n      ...clientMetadataOverrides,\n    };\n\n    return new MCPOAuthProvider({\n      agent,\n      flowHandler,\n      storage,\n      clientMetadata,\n      allowHttp: options?.allowHttp,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // ========================================\n  // OAuthClientProvider interface\n  // ========================================\n\n  get redirectUrl(): string | URL {\n    return this.flowHandler.getRedirectUrl();\n  }\n\n  get clientMetadata(): OAuthClientMetadata {\n    return this._clientMetadata;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validate the protected resource URL from server metadata (RFC 9728).\n   *\n   * Servers behind reverse proxies or DNS aliases may advertise a canonical\n   * resource URL (RFC 8707) that differs from the URL the client connected to.\n   * We allow cross-origin resource URLs because agent configs are pre-configured\n   * by the user, not discovered from untrusted sources. The authorization server\n   * remains the final gatekeeper for token audience validation.\n   *\n   * Non-HTTPS resource URLs are rejected by default. Construct the provider\n   * with `allowHttp: true` to lift that restriction for local development —\n   * mirrors the CLI's `--allow-http` flag.\n   */\n  async validateResourceURL(serverUrl: string | URL, resource?: string): Promise<URL | undefined> {\n    if (!resource) {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    const resourceURL = new URL(resource);\n\n    if (resourceURL.protocol !== 'https:' && !this.allowHttp) {\n      throw new Error(`Server at ${serverUrl} advertised non-HTTPS resource URL: ${resource}`);\n    }\n\n    return resourceURL;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Generate OAuth state parameter\n   */\n  async state(): Promise<string> {\n    return randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Load client information from agent config\n   */\n  async clientInformation(): Promise<OAuthClientInformation | undefined> {\n    if (this.agent.oauth_client) {\n      return toMCPClientInfo(this.agent.oauth_client);\n    }\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Save client information after dynamic registration\n   */\n  async saveClientInformation(clientInfo: OAuthClientInformationFull): Promise<void> {\n    this.agent.oauth_client = fromMCPClientInfo(clientInfo);\n    await this.persistAgent();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Load existing tokens from agent config\n   */\n  async tokens(): Promise<OAuthTokens | undefined> {\n    if (this.agent.oauth_tokens) {\n      return toMCPTokens(this.agent.oauth_tokens);\n    }\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Save tokens after authorization\n   * Also cleans up the temporary code verifier\n   */\n  async saveTokens(tokens: OAuthTokens): Promise<void> {\n    this.agent.oauth_tokens = fromMCPTokens(tokens);\n    // Clean up temporary code verifier after successful token exchange\n    delete this.agent.oauth_code_verifier;\n    await this.persistAgent();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Redirect user to authorization URL\n   */\n  async redirectToAuthorization(authorizationUrl: URL): Promise<void> {\n    await this.flowHandler.redirectToAuthorization(authorizationUrl);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Save PKCE code verifier\n   */\n  async saveCodeVerifier(codeVerifier: string): Promise<void> {\n    this.agent.oauth_code_verifier = codeVerifier;\n    await this.persistAgent();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Load PKCE code verifier\n   * The MCP SDK calls saveCodeVerifier() before authorization and\n   * retrieves it here during token exchange.\n   */\n  async codeVerifier(): Promise<string> {\n    if (!this.agent.oauth_code_verifier) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'No PKCE code verifier found. The OAuth flow may have been interrupted or ' +\n          'the agent config was modified. Please try authenticating again.'\n      );\n    }\n    return this.agent.oauth_code_verifier;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Invalidate credentials when server indicates they're invalid\n   */\n  async invalidateCredentials(scope: 'all' | 'client' | 'tokens' | 'verifier'): Promise<void> {\n    switch (scope) {\n      case 'all':\n        delete this.agent.oauth_tokens;\n        delete this.agent.oauth_client;\n        delete this.agent.oauth_code_verifier;\n        break;\n      case 'tokens':\n        delete this.agent.oauth_tokens;\n        break;\n      case 'client':\n        delete this.agent.oauth_client;\n        break;\n      case 'verifier':\n        delete this.agent.oauth_code_verifier;\n        break;\n    }\n    await this.persistAgent();\n  }\n\n  // ========================================\n  // Additional methods\n  // ========================================\n\n  /**\n   * Persist agent config to storage if configured\n   */\n  private async persistAgent(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.storage) {\n      await this.storage.saveAgent(this.agent);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Wait for the OAuth callback\n   * Call this after UnauthorizedError is thrown\n   */\n  async waitForCallback(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.flowHandler.waitForCallback();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Clean up resources\n   */\n  async cleanup(): Promise<void> {\n    await this.flowHandler.cleanup();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if we have valid, non-expired OAuth tokens\n   * @returns true if access_token exists and hasn't expired (with 5 minute buffer)\n   */\n  hasValidTokens(): boolean {\n    const tokens = this.agent.oauth_tokens;\n    if (!tokens?.access_token) return false;\n\n    // Check expiration if available\n    if (tokens.expires_at) {\n      const expiresAt = new Date(tokens.expires_at);\n      // Consider expired if within 5 minutes of expiration\n      if (expiresAt.getTime() - Date.now() < 5 * 60 * 1000) {\n        return false;\n      }\n    }\n\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if we have a refresh token available for token refresh\n   * @returns true if refresh_token is present\n   */\n  hasRefreshToken(): boolean {\n    return !!this.agent.oauth_tokens?.refresh_token;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Clear all OAuth data for this agent\n   */\n  async clearAuth(): Promise<void> {\n    await this.invalidateCredentials('all');\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the agent config this provider manages\n   * @returns The AgentConfig with OAuth tokens populated after successful auth\n   */\n  getAgent(): AgentConfig {\n    return this.agent;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get the agent identifier\n   * @returns The agent's unique ID\n   */\n  getAgentId(): string {\n    return this.agent.id;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAkBA,SAAS,yBAAyB,aAAa,eAAe,iBAAiB,yBAAyB;AACxG,SAAS,mBAAmB;AA8BrB,MAAM,iBAAgD;AAAA,EACnD;AAAA,EACS;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,QAA6B;AACvC,SAAK,QAAQ,OAAO;AACpB,SAAK,UAAU,OAAO;AACtB,SAAK,cAAc,OAAO;AAC1B,SAAK,kBAAkB,OAAO;AAC9B,SAAK,YAAY,OAAO,cAAc;AAAA,EACxC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,OAAO,OACL,OACA,aACA,SACA,yBACA,SACkB;AAElB,UAAM,iBAAsC;AAAA,MAC1C,GAAG;AAAA,MACH,eAAe,CAAC,YAAY,eAAe,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,MACvD,GAAG;AAAA,IACL;AAEA,WAAO,IAAI,iBAAiB;AAAA,MAC1B;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACtB,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,IAAI,cAA4B;AAC9B,WAAO,KAAK,YAAY,eAAe;AAAA,EACzC;AAAA,EAEA,IAAI,iBAAsC;AACxC,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAeA,MAAM,oBAAoB,WAAyB,UAA6C;AAC9F,QAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AACb,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAEA,UAAM,cAAc,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ;AAEpC,QAAI,YAAY,aAAa,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW;AACxD,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,uCAAuC,QAAQ,EAAE;AAAA,IACzF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,QAAyB;AAC7B,WAAO,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,WAAW;AAAA,EAC7C;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,oBAAiE;AACrE,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,cAAc;AAC3B,aAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY;AAAA,IAChD;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,sBAAsB,YAAuD;AACjF,SAAK,MAAM,eAAe,kBAAkB,UAAU;AACtD,UAAM,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,EAC1B;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,SAA2C;AAC/C,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,cAAc;AAC3B,aAAO,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5C;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,MAAM,WAAW,QAAoC;AACnD,SAAK,MAAM,eAAe,cAAc,MAAM;AAE9C,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAClB,UAAM,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,EAC1B;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,wBAAwB,kBAAsC;AAClE,UAAM,KAAK,YAAY,wBAAwB,gBAAgB;AAAA,EACjE;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,iBAAiB,cAAqC;AAC1D,SAAK,MAAM,sBAAsB;AACjC,UAAM,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,EAC1B;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,MAAM,eAAgC;AACpC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,MAAM,qBAAqB;AACnC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MAEF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,EACpB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,sBAAsB,OAAgE;AAC1F,YAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,MACb,KAAK;AACH,eAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAClB,eAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAClB,eAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAClB;AAAA,MACF,KAAK;AACH,eAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAClB;AAAA,MACF,KAAK;AACH,eAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAClB;AAAA,MACF,KAAK;AACH,eAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAClB;AAAA,IACJ;AACA,UAAM,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,EAC1B;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EASA,MAAc,eAA8B;AAC1C,QAAI,KAAK,SAAS;AAChB,YAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACzC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,MAAM,kBAAmC;AACvC,WAAO,KAAK,YAAY,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC1C;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,UAAyB;AAC7B,UAAM,KAAK,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,EACjC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,iBAA0B;AACxB,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM;AAC1B,QAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,aAAc,QAAO;AAGlC,QAAI,OAAO,YAAY;AACrB,YAAM,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU;AAE5C,UAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,KAAM;AACpD,eAAO;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,kBAA2B;AACzB,WAAO,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,MAAM,cAAc;AAAA,EACpC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,MAAM,YAA2B;AAC/B,UAAM,KAAK,sBAAsB,KAAK;AAAA,EACxC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,WAAwB;AACtB,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMA,aAAqB;AACnB,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,EACpB;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/MCPOAuthProvider.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * MCP OAuth Provider\n *\n * Implements the MCP SDK's OAuthClientProvider interface\n * using AgentConfig for token storage.\n */\n\nimport type { OAuthClientProvider } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/auth.js';\nimport type {\n  OAuthClientMetadata,\n  OAuthClientInformation,\n  OAuthClientInformationFull,\n  OAuthTokens,\n  OAuthFlowHandler,\n  OAuthProviderConfig,\n  OAuthConfigStorage,\n  AgentConfig,\n} from './types';\nimport { DEFAULT_CLIENT_METADATA, toMCPTokens, fromMCPTokens, toMCPClientInfo, fromMCPClientInfo } from './types';\nimport { randomBytes } from 'crypto';\nimport { validateOAuthResourceUrl } from './resource-url';\n\n/**\n * MCP OAuth Client Provider\n *\n * This provider stores OAuth tokens directly in the AgentConfig,\n * using the same structure as static auth tokens.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const agent: AgentConfig = {\n *   id: 'my-agent',\n *   name: 'My Agent',\n *   agent_uri: 'https://agent.example.com/mcp',\n *   protocol: 'mcp',\n *   // OAuth tokens stored here after auth flow\n *   oauth_tokens: { access_token: '...', refresh_token: '...' }\n * };\n *\n * const provider = new MCPOAuthProvider({\n *   agent,\n *   flowHandler: new CLIFlowHandler(),\n *   storage: myConfigStorage  // Optional: persists tokens\n * });\n *\n * const transport = new StreamableHTTPClientTransport(url, {\n *   authProvider: provider\n * });\n * ```\n */\nexport class MCPOAuthProvider implements OAuthClientProvider {\n  private agent: AgentConfig;\n  private readonly storage?: OAuthConfigStorage;\n  private readonly flowHandler: OAuthFlowHandler;\n  private readonly _clientMetadata: OAuthClientMetadata;\n  private readonly allowHttp: boolean;\n  private readonly configuredResourceOverride?: string | null;\n\n  constructor(config: OAuthProviderConfig) {\n    this.agent = config.agent;\n    this.storage = config.storage;\n    this.flowHandler = config.flowHandler;\n    this._clientMetadata = config.clientMetadata;\n    this.allowHttp = config.allowHttp === true;\n    this.configuredResourceOverride = config.resourceOverride;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Create a provider for CLI usage\n   */\n  static forCLI(\n    agent: AgentConfig,\n    flowHandler: OAuthFlowHandler,\n    storage?: OAuthConfigStorage,\n    clientMetadataOverrides?: Partial<OAuthClientMetadata>,\n    options?: { allowHttp?: boolean; resourceOverride?: string | null }\n  ): MCPOAuthProvider {\n    // Build complete client metadata with required fields\n    const clientMetadata: OAuthClientMetadata = {\n      ...DEFAULT_CLIENT_METADATA,\n      redirect_uris: [flowHandler.getRedirectUrl().toString()],\n      ...clientMetadataOverrides,\n    };\n\n    return new MCPOAuthProvider({\n      agent,\n      flowHandler,\n      storage,\n      clientMetadata,\n      allowHttp: options?.allowHttp,\n      resourceOverride: options?.resourceOverride,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // ========================================\n  // OAuthClientProvider interface\n  // ========================================\n\n  get redirectUrl(): string | URL {\n    return this.flowHandler.getRedirectUrl();\n  }\n\n  get clientMetadata(): OAuthClientMetadata {\n    return this._clientMetadata;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validate the protected resource URL from server metadata (RFC 9728).\n   *\n   * Servers behind reverse proxies or DNS aliases may advertise a canonical\n   * resource URL (RFC 8707) that differs from the URL the client connected to.\n   * We allow cross-origin resource URLs because agent configs are pre-configured\n   * by the user, not discovered from untrusted sources. The authorization server\n   * remains the final gatekeeper for token audience validation.\n   *\n   * Non-HTTPS resource URLs are rejected by default. Construct the provider\n   * with `allowHttp: true` to lift that restriction for local development —\n   * mirrors the CLI's `--allow-http` flag.\n   */\n  async validateResourceURL(serverUrl: string | URL, resource?: string): Promise<URL | undefined> {\n    const selectedResource =\n      this.configuredResourceOverride === null\n        ? resource\n        : (this.configuredResourceOverride ?? this.agent.oauth_resource ?? resource);\n    if (!selectedResource) {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    return validateOAuthResourceUrl(selectedResource, { allowHttp: this.allowHttp });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Generate OAuth state parameter\n   */\n  async state(): Promise<string> {\n    return randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Load client information from agent config\n   */\n  async clientInformation(): Promise<OAuthClientInformation | undefined> {\n    if (this.agent.oauth_client) {\n      return toMCPClientInfo(this.agent.oauth_client);\n    }\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Save client information after dynamic registration\n   */\n  async saveClientInformation(clientInfo: OAuthClientInformationFull): Promise<void> {\n    this.agent.oauth_client = fromMCPClientInfo(clientInfo);\n    await this.persistAgent();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Load existing tokens from agent config\n   */\n  async tokens(): Promise<OAuthTokens | undefined> {\n    if (this.agent.oauth_tokens) {\n      return toMCPTokens(this.agent.oauth_tokens);\n    }\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Save tokens after authorization\n   * Also cleans up the temporary code verifier\n   */\n  async saveTokens(tokens: OAuthTokens): Promise<void> {\n    this.agent.oauth_tokens = fromMCPTokens(tokens);\n    // Clean up temporary code verifier after successful token exchange\n    delete this.agent.oauth_code_verifier;\n    await this.persistAgent();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Redirect user to authorization URL\n   */\n  async redirectToAuthorization(authorizationUrl: URL): Promise<void> {\n    await this.flowHandler.redirectToAuthorization(authorizationUrl);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Save PKCE code verifier\n   */\n  async saveCodeVerifier(codeVerifier: string): Promise<void> {\n    this.agent.oauth_code_verifier = codeVerifier;\n    await this.persistAgent();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Load PKCE code verifier\n   * The MCP SDK calls saveCodeVerifier() before authorization and\n   * retrieves it here during token exchange.\n   */\n  async codeVerifier(): Promise<string> {\n    if (!this.agent.oauth_code_verifier) {\n      throw new Error(\n        'No PKCE code verifier found. The OAuth flow may have been interrupted or ' +\n          'the agent config was modified. Please try authenticating again.'\n      );\n    }\n    return this.agent.oauth_code_verifier;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Invalidate credentials when server indicates they're invalid\n   */\n  async invalidateCredentials(scope: 'all' | 'client' | 'tokens' | 'verifier'): Promise<void> {\n    switch (scope) {\n      case 'all':\n        delete this.agent.oauth_tokens;\n        delete this.agent.oauth_client;\n        delete this.agent.oauth_code_verifier;\n        break;\n      case 'tokens':\n        delete this.agent.oauth_tokens;\n        break;\n      case 'client':\n        delete this.agent.oauth_client;\n        break;\n      case 'verifier':\n        delete this.agent.oauth_code_verifier;\n        break;\n    }\n    await this.persistAgent();\n  }\n\n  // ========================================\n  // Additional methods\n  // ========================================\n\n  /**\n   * Persist agent config to storage if configured\n   */\n  private async persistAgent(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.storage) {\n      await this.storage.saveAgent(this.agent);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Wait for the OAuth callback\n   * Call this after UnauthorizedError is thrown\n   */\n  async waitForCallback(): Promise<string> {\n    return this.flowHandler.waitForCallback();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Clean up resources\n   */\n  async cleanup(): Promise<void> {\n    await this.flowHandler.cleanup();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Check if we have valid, non-expired OAuth tokens\n   * @returns true if access_token exists and hasn't expired (with 5 minute buffer)\n   */\n  hasValidTokens(): boolean {\n    const tokens = this.agent.oauth_tokens;\n    if (!tokens?.access_token) return false;\n\n    // Check expiration if available\n    if (tokens.expires_at) {\n      const expiresAt = new Date(tokens.expires_at);\n      // Consider expired if within 5 minutes of expiration\n      if (expiresAt.getTime() - 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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.d.mts

@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ export interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {
     timeoutMs?: number;
     /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */
     fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
     /**
      * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of
      * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in
@@ -128,4 +130,5 @@ export declare function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl: string, options?: {
     allowPrivateIp?: boolean;
     timeoutMs?: number;
     fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null>;

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.d.ts

@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ export interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {
     timeoutMs?: number;
     /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */
     fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
     /**
      * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of
      * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in
@@ -128,5 +130,6 @@ export declare function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl: string, options?: {
     allowPrivateIp?: boolean;
     timeoutMs?: number;
     fetchFn?: typeof fetch;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null>;
 //# sourceMappingURL=authorization-required.d.ts.map

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.d.ts.map

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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.js

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ __export(authorization_required_exports, {
 module.exports = __toCommonJS(authorization_required_exports);
 var import_net = require('../../net/index.js');
 var import_errors = require('../../errors/index.js');
+var import_abort = require('../../protocols/abort.js');
 var import_diagnostics = require('./diagnostics.js');
 const MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;
 const MAX_SCOPES = 64;
@@ -87,7 +88,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url) => allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== void 0 && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;
   let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;
   if (!challengeHeader) {
-    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+    const probe = await probeAgent401(
+      agentUrl,
+      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,
+      options.timeoutMs,
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
+    );
     if (probe.status !== 401) {
       return null;
     }
@@ -108,7 +115,8 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
       challenge.resource_metadata,
       allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),
       options.timeoutMs,
-      options.fetchFn
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
     );
     if (prm && typeof prm === "object") {
       const resource = prm.resource;
@@ -128,7 +136,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     let md;
     let source;
     if (asUrl) {
-      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+      const res = await fetchJson(
+        asUrl,
+        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),
+        options.timeoutMs,
+        options.fetchFn,
+        options.signal
+      );
       if (res && typeof res === "object") {
         md = res;
         source = "rfc-8414";
@@ -137,7 +151,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     if (!md) {
       const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);
       if (oidcUrl) {
-        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+        const res = await fetchJson(
+          oidcUrl,
+          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),
+          options.timeoutMs,
+          options.fetchFn,
+          options.signal
+        );
         if (res && typeof res === "object") {
           md = res;
           source = "openid-configuration";
@@ -168,11 +188,17 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   return requirements;
 }
 async function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, options = {}) {
-  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+  const probe = await probeAgent401(
+    agentUrl,
+    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,
+    options.timeoutMs,
+    options.fetchFn,
+    options.signal
+  );
   if (probe.status !== 401) return null;
   return (0, import_diagnostics.parseWWWAuthenticate)(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);
 }
-async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method: "tools/list" });
   try {
     const res = await (0, import_net.ssrfSafeFetch)(agentUrl, {
@@ -183,11 +209,13 @@ async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
       },
       body,
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers["www-authenticate"] };
   } catch {
+    (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(signal);
     return { status: 0 };
   }
 }
@@ -218,18 +246,20 @@ function buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer) {
   const base = u.pathname.endsWith("/") ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;
   return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
 }
-async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   try {
     const res = await (0, import_net.ssrfSafeFetch)(url, {
       method: "GET",
       headers: { accept: "application/json" },
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     if (res.status !== 200) return void 0;
     return (0, import_net.decodeBodyAsJsonOrText)(res.body, res.headers["content-type"]);
   } catch {
+    (0, import_abort.throwIfAborted)(signal);
     return void 0;
   }
 }

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetchFn?: typeof fetch } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(\n  url: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { throwIfAborted } from '../../protocols/abort';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(\n      agentUrl,\n      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn,\n      options.signal\n    );\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn,\n      options.signal\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(\n        asUrl,\n        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),\n        options.timeoutMs,\n        options.fetchFn,\n        options.signal\n      );\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(\n          oidcUrl,\n          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),\n          options.timeoutMs,\n          options.fetchFn,\n          options.signal\n        );\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetchFn?: typeof fetch; signal?: AbortSignal } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(\n    agentUrl,\n    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,\n    options.timeoutMs,\n    options.fetchFn,\n    options.signal\n  );\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      signal,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    throwIfAborted(signal);\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(\n  url: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      signal,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    if 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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from "../../net/index.mjs";
 import { AuthenticationRequiredError } from "../../errors/index.mjs";
+import { throwIfAborted } from "../../protocols/abort.mjs";
 import { parseWWWAuthenticate } from "./diagnostics.mjs";
 const MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;
 const MAX_SCOPES = 64;
@@ -62,7 +63,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url) => allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== void 0 && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;
   let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;
   if (!challengeHeader) {
-    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+    const probe = await probeAgent401(
+      agentUrl,
+      allowPrivateIpOnAgent,
+      options.timeoutMs,
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
+    );
     if (probe.status !== 401) {
       return null;
     }
@@ -83,7 +90,8 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
       challenge.resource_metadata,
       allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),
       options.timeoutMs,
-      options.fetchFn
+      options.fetchFn,
+      options.signal
     );
     if (prm && typeof prm === "object") {
       const resource = prm.resource;
@@ -103,7 +111,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     let md;
     let source;
     if (asUrl) {
-      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+      const res = await fetchJson(
+        asUrl,
+        allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl),
+        options.timeoutMs,
+        options.fetchFn,
+        options.signal
+      );
       if (res && typeof res === "object") {
         md = res;
         source = "rfc-8414";
@@ -112,7 +126,13 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
     if (!md) {
       const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);
       if (oidcUrl) {
-        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+        const res = await fetchJson(
+          oidcUrl,
+          allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl),
+          options.timeoutMs,
+          options.fetchFn,
+          options.signal
+        );
         if (res && typeof res === "object") {
           md = res;
           source = "openid-configuration";
@@ -143,11 +163,17 @@ async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   return requirements;
 }
 async function probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, options = {}) {
-  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);
+  const probe = await probeAgent401(
+    agentUrl,
+    options.allowPrivateIp ?? false,
+    options.timeoutMs,
+    options.fetchFn,
+    options.signal
+  );
   if (probe.status !== 401) return null;
   return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);
 }
-async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", id: 1, method: "tools/list" });
   try {
     const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {
@@ -158,11 +184,13 @@ async function probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
       },
       body,
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers["www-authenticate"] };
   } catch {
+    throwIfAborted(signal);
     return { status: 0 };
   }
 }
@@ -193,18 +221,20 @@ function buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer) {
   const base = u.pathname.endsWith("/") ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;
   return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
 }
-async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn) {
+async function fetchJson(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, fetchFn, signal) {
   try {
     const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {
       method: "GET",
       headers: { accept: "application/json" },
       allowPrivateIp,
+      signal,
       ...timeoutMs !== void 0 ? { timeoutMs } : {},
       ...fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}
     });
     if (res.status !== 200) return void 0;
     return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers["content-type"]);
   } catch {
+    throwIfAborted(signal);
     return void 0;
   }
 }

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      options.fetchFn\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number; fetchFn?: typeof fetch } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs, options.fetchFn);\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(\n  url: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n      ...(fetchFn ? { trustedFetchFn: fetchFn } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { throwIfAborted } from '../../protocols/abort';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /** Scoped fetch implementation for the agent, PRM, and AS metadata probes. */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. 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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.d.mts

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ export interface DiscoveryOptions {
     timeout?: number;
     /** Custom fetch function (for testing or custom HTTP handling) */
     fetch?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }
 /**
  * Discover OAuth metadata from an MCP server

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.d.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ export interface DiscoveryOptions {
     timeout?: number;
     /** Custom fetch function (for testing or custom HTTP handling) */
     fetch?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Caller cancellation, including the absolute task deadline. */
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
 }
 /**
  * Discover OAuth metadata from an MCP server