@adaptic/backend-legacy 0.0.1037 → 0.0.1039

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Files changed (101) hide show
  1. package/esm/auth/credential-fields.d.ts +19 -0
  2. package/esm/auth/credential-fields.d.ts.map +1 -0
  3. package/esm/auth/credential-fields.js.map +1 -0
  4. package/esm/auth/credential-fields.mjs +42 -0
  5. package/esm/auth/credential-redaction.d.ts +56 -0
  6. package/esm/auth/credential-redaction.d.ts.map +1 -0
  7. package/esm/auth/credential-redaction.js.map +1 -0
  8. package/esm/auth/credential-redaction.mjs +99 -0
  9. package/esm/auth/mutation-authorization.d.ts +206 -0
  10. package/esm/auth/mutation-authorization.d.ts.map +1 -0
  11. package/esm/auth/mutation-authorization.js.map +1 -0
  12. package/esm/auth/mutation-authorization.mjs +271 -0
  13. package/esm/auth/nested-write-inspector.d.ts +94 -0
  14. package/esm/auth/nested-write-inspector.d.ts.map +1 -0
  15. package/esm/auth/nested-write-inspector.js.map +1 -0
  16. package/esm/auth/nested-write-inspector.mjs +185 -0
  17. package/esm/auth/nested-write-policy.d.ts +95 -0
  18. package/esm/auth/nested-write-policy.d.ts.map +1 -0
  19. package/esm/auth/nested-write-policy.js.map +1 -0
  20. package/esm/auth/nested-write-policy.mjs +154 -0
  21. package/esm/auth/service-token.d.ts +11 -1
  22. package/esm/auth/service-token.d.ts.map +1 -1
  23. package/esm/auth/service-token.js.map +1 -1
  24. package/esm/auth/service-token.mjs +31 -5
  25. package/esm/auth/token-verifier.d.ts +9 -1
  26. package/esm/auth/token-verifier.d.ts.map +1 -1
  27. package/esm/auth/token-verifier.js.map +1 -1
  28. package/esm/auth/user-write-content.d.ts +41 -0
  29. package/esm/auth/user-write-content.d.ts.map +1 -0
  30. package/esm/auth/user-write-content.js.map +1 -0
  31. package/esm/auth/user-write-content.mjs +100 -0
  32. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/credential-field-coverage.harness.d.ts +55 -0
  33. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/credential-field-coverage.harness.d.ts.map +1 -0
  34. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/credential-field-coverage.harness.js.map +1 -0
  35. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/credential-field-coverage.harness.mjs +438 -0
  36. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/credential-field-guard.harness.d.ts +34 -0
  37. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/credential-field-guard.harness.d.ts.map +1 -0
  38. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/credential-field-guard.harness.js.map +1 -0
  39. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/credential-field-guard.harness.mjs +212 -0
  40. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/mutation-auth-guard.harness.d.ts +49 -0
  41. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/mutation-auth-guard.harness.d.ts.map +1 -0
  42. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/mutation-auth-guard.harness.js.map +1 -0
  43. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/mutation-auth-guard.harness.mjs +402 -0
  44. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/ts-node-harness.d.ts +10 -0
  45. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/ts-node-harness.d.ts.map +1 -0
  46. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/ts-node-harness.js.map +1 -0
  47. package/esm/middleware/__tests__/ts-node-harness.mjs +71 -0
  48. package/esm/middleware/audit-logger.d.ts +18 -1
  49. package/esm/middleware/audit-logger.d.ts.map +1 -1
  50. package/esm/middleware/audit-logger.js.map +1 -1
  51. package/esm/middleware/audit-logger.mjs +36 -13
  52. package/esm/middleware/audit-payload-guard.d.ts +85 -0
  53. package/esm/middleware/audit-payload-guard.d.ts.map +1 -0
  54. package/esm/middleware/audit-payload-guard.js.map +1 -0
  55. package/esm/middleware/audit-payload-guard.mjs +97 -0
  56. package/esm/middleware/credential-field-guard.d.ts +160 -0
  57. package/esm/middleware/credential-field-guard.d.ts.map +1 -0
  58. package/esm/middleware/credential-field-guard.js.map +1 -0
  59. package/esm/middleware/credential-field-guard.mjs +479 -0
  60. package/esm/middleware/generated-type-names.d.ts +44 -0
  61. package/esm/middleware/generated-type-names.d.ts.map +1 -0
  62. package/esm/middleware/generated-type-names.js.map +1 -0
  63. package/esm/middleware/generated-type-names.mjs +73 -0
  64. package/esm/middleware/guard-log-throttle.d.ts +80 -0
  65. package/esm/middleware/guard-log-throttle.d.ts.map +1 -0
  66. package/esm/middleware/guard-log-throttle.js.map +1 -0
  67. package/esm/middleware/guard-log-throttle.mjs +87 -0
  68. package/esm/middleware/mutation-account-facts.d.ts +140 -0
  69. package/esm/middleware/mutation-account-facts.d.ts.map +1 -0
  70. package/esm/middleware/mutation-account-facts.js.map +1 -0
  71. package/esm/middleware/mutation-account-facts.mjs +212 -0
  72. package/esm/middleware/mutation-auth-guard.d.ts +82 -0
  73. package/esm/middleware/mutation-auth-guard.d.ts.map +1 -0
  74. package/esm/middleware/mutation-auth-guard.js.map +1 -0
  75. package/esm/middleware/mutation-auth-guard.mjs +425 -0
  76. package/esm/middleware/mutation-tenant-facts.d.ts +58 -0
  77. package/esm/middleware/mutation-tenant-facts.d.ts.map +1 -0
  78. package/esm/middleware/mutation-tenant-facts.js.map +1 -0
  79. package/esm/middleware/mutation-tenant-facts.mjs +75 -0
  80. package/esm/middleware/trading-policy-audit.d.ts +172 -0
  81. package/esm/middleware/trading-policy-audit.d.ts.map +1 -0
  82. package/esm/middleware/trading-policy-audit.js.map +1 -0
  83. package/esm/middleware/trading-policy-audit.mjs +309 -0
  84. package/esm/resolvers/custom/BrokerageAccountCredentialStatusResolver.d.ts +22 -0
  85. package/esm/resolvers/custom/BrokerageAccountCredentialStatusResolver.d.ts.map +1 -0
  86. package/esm/resolvers/custom/BrokerageAccountCredentialStatusResolver.js.map +1 -0
  87. package/esm/resolvers/custom/BrokerageAccountCredentialStatusResolver.mjs +63 -0
  88. package/esm/resolvers/custom/index.d.ts +1 -0
  89. package/esm/resolvers/custom/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  90. package/esm/resolvers/custom/index.js.map +1 -1
  91. package/esm/resolvers/custom/index.mjs +1 -0
  92. package/package.json +1 -1
  93. package/resolvers/custom/BrokerageAccountCredentialStatusResolver.cjs +100 -0
  94. package/resolvers/custom/BrokerageAccountCredentialStatusResolver.d.ts +22 -0
  95. package/resolvers/custom/BrokerageAccountCredentialStatusResolver.d.ts.map +1 -0
  96. package/resolvers/custom/BrokerageAccountCredentialStatusResolver.js.map +1 -0
  97. package/resolvers/custom/index.cjs +4 -1
  98. package/resolvers/custom/index.d.ts +1 -0
  99. package/resolvers/custom/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  100. package/resolvers/custom/index.js.map +1 -1
  101. package/server.cjs +40 -3
@@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Credential-field guard: stored credentials resolve, and can be filtered or
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+ * sorted on, only for a verified service principal.
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+ *
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+ * ## Why this exists
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+ *
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+ * The `/graphql` context admits a request that presents no bearer token as a
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+ * null principal — context-level enforcement is staged per
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+ * `docs/security/2026-08-23-graphql-auth-enforcement-runbook.md` because live
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+ * callers still depend on that path. The generated Prisma types expose every
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+ * scalar column as a plain field, including the broker API key and secret on
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+ * `AlpacaAccount` and the OAuth, session and invite tokens on the auth models.
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+ * With a null principal admitted, those columns are readable by anyone who can
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+ * reach the endpoint.
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+ *
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+ * Hiding the field alone is not enough. A filter, sort or cursor over a
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+ * credential column is an oracle: `where: { APISecret: { startsWith: "a" } }`
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+ * answers "does any row match" without ever selecting the field, and a caller
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+ * can walk the whole secret one character at a time. `groupBy` and the
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+ * `_min` / `_max` aggregates return the column's value directly. So the guard
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+ * covers every way a query can observe a credential, not just the field.
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+ *
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+ * A stored credential is only ever needed by a service acting for the
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+ * platform — the engine placing an order with an account's key. No end user,
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+ * admin session or anonymous caller needs the raw value, so the read surface
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+ * admits `kind: "server"` only. Writes of a credential are governed by the
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+ * mutation authentication guard, not here.
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+ *
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+ * ## What is guarded
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+ *
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+ * 1. **Output** — a credential field on its model type and on that model's
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+ * `GroupBy` / `MinAggregate` / `MaxAggregate` output types, and on the
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+ * `CreateManyAndReturn…` / `UpdateManyAndReturn…` row types a bulk write
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+ * returns.
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+ * 2. **Filter and sort input** — any argument that names a credential field:
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+ * a key in the model's own `…Where…`, `…OrderBy…` or `…Having…` input types
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+ * at any nesting depth (AND / OR / NOT, relation filters reached from other
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+ * models), and a `by` / `distinct` value of the model's `ScalarFieldEnum`.
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+ * 3. **Copies in audit payloads** — `AuditLog` JSON payloads hold credentials
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+ * copied from mutation variables. The same middleware serves them redacted
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+ * to user and anonymous principals and refuses those principals predicates
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+ * over them; the rules and their reasons are in `audit-payload-guard`.
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+ *
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+ * ## Modes (`CREDENTIAL_FIELD_GUARD_MODE`, read on every request)
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+ *
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+ * - `enforce` — deny with `FORBIDDEN`. This is the default, and the value any
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+ * unset or unrecognised setting resolves to: a guard whose configuration
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+ * cannot be read must refuse, never admit.
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+ * - `shadow` — resolve unchanged, but count and log every access `enforce`
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+ * would deny. Exists only to confirm, before enforcing, that no legitimate
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+ * caller reads a credential without a service principal.
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+ * - `off` — no-op.
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+ *
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+ * @module middleware/credential-field-guard
55
+ */
56
+ import { GraphQLEnumType, GraphQLError, GraphQLInputObjectType, GraphQLList, getNullableType, } from 'graphql';
57
+ import { Counter } from 'prom-client';
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+ import { CREDENTIAL_FIELDS } from '../auth/credential-fields.mjs';
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+ import { metricsRegistry } from '../config/metrics.mjs';
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+ import { logger } from '../utils/logger.mjs';
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+ import { auditPayloadOutputField, auditPayloadEnumFieldsFor, auditPayloadPredicateFieldsFor, readsAuditPayloadRaw, redactAuditPayload, } from './audit-payload-guard.mjs';
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+ import { indexGeneratedTypes } from './generated-type-names.mjs';
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+ import { GuardLogThrottle } from './guard-log-throttle.mjs';
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+ /**
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+ * The stored credential columns this guard serves to a service principal
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+ * only. Defined in `auth/credential-fields`, re-exported for existing callers.
67
+ */
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+ export { CREDENTIAL_FIELDS };
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+ /** Where the generated schema exposes each credential column. */
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+ const CREDENTIAL_TYPES = indexGeneratedTypes(CREDENTIAL_FIELDS);
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+ /**
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+ * The credential fields an input type's keys can reference as a predicate,
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+ * or `undefined` when it is not a credential model's predicate type.
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+ *
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+ * @internal Exported for the schema-coverage test, which walks every input
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+ * type in the served schema and fails if a credential column appears in a
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+ * predicate type this function does not claim.
78
+ */
79
+ export function credentialPredicateFieldsFor(typeName) {
80
+ return CREDENTIAL_TYPES.predicateFields(typeName);
81
+ }
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+ /**
83
+ * The credential fields an output type exposes as values, or `undefined`.
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+ *
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+ * @internal Exported for the schema-coverage test (see above).
86
+ */
87
+ export function credentialOutputFieldsFor(typeName) {
88
+ return CREDENTIAL_TYPES.outputFields(typeName);
89
+ }
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+ /**
91
+ * The credential values a `<Model>ScalarFieldEnum` can name, or `undefined`.
92
+ *
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+ * @internal Exported for the schema-coverage test (see above).
94
+ */
95
+ export function credentialEnumValuesFor(typeName) {
96
+ return CREDENTIAL_TYPES.enumFields(typeName);
97
+ }
98
+ /**
99
+ * Walk one argument value alongside its GraphQL input type and collect every
100
+ * place it names a guarded column.
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+ *
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+ * Type-directed rather than key-directed: a key called `token` is a
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+ * credential only inside a credential model's predicate type, so an unrelated
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+ * input that happens to use the same key name is never flagged.
105
+ */
106
+ function collectInputReferences(type, value, found) {
107
+ if (value === null || value === undefined)
108
+ return;
109
+ const nullable = getNullableType(type);
110
+ if (nullable instanceof GraphQLList) {
111
+ const inner = nullable.ofType;
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+ const items = Array.isArray(value) ? value : [value];
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+ for (const item of items)
114
+ collectInputReferences(inner, item, found);
115
+ return;
116
+ }
117
+ if (nullable instanceof GraphQLEnumType) {
118
+ if (typeof value !== 'string')
119
+ return;
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+ if (CREDENTIAL_TYPES.enumFields(nullable.name)?.has(value)) {
121
+ found.credential.push(`${nullable.name}.${value}`);
122
+ }
123
+ if (auditPayloadEnumFieldsFor(nullable.name)?.has(value)) {
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+ found.auditPayload.push(`${nullable.name}.${value}`);
125
+ }
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+ return;
127
+ }
128
+ if (nullable instanceof GraphQLInputObjectType && typeof value === 'object') {
129
+ const credential = CREDENTIAL_TYPES.predicateFields(nullable.name);
130
+ const auditPayload = auditPayloadPredicateFieldsFor(nullable.name);
131
+ const fieldDefs = nullable.getFields();
132
+ for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value)) {
133
+ if (child === undefined)
134
+ continue;
135
+ if (credential?.has(key))
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+ found.credential.push(`${nullable.name}.${key}`);
137
+ if (auditPayload?.has(key))
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+ found.auditPayload.push(`${nullable.name}.${key}`);
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+ const def = fieldDefs[key];
140
+ if (def)
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+ collectInputReferences(def.type, child, found);
142
+ }
143
+ }
144
+ }
145
+ /**
146
+ * Every guarded column a field's arguments name. Both lists are empty when
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+ * the field takes no arguments or names no guarded column.
148
+ */
149
+ export function findGuardedArgumentReferences(info, args) {
150
+ const found = { credential: [], auditPayload: [] };
151
+ if (!args || Object.keys(args).length === 0)
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+ return found;
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+ const fieldDef = info.parentType.getFields()[info.fieldName];
154
+ if (!fieldDef)
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+ return found;
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+ for (const argDef of fieldDef.args) {
157
+ collectInputReferences(argDef.type, args[argDef.name], found);
158
+ }
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+ return found;
160
+ }
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+ /**
162
+ * Every credential reference in a field's arguments, as `TypeName.field`
163
+ * strings. Empty when the field takes no arguments or names no credential.
164
+ */
165
+ export function findCredentialArgumentReferences(info, args) {
166
+ return findGuardedArgumentReferences(info, args).credential;
167
+ }
168
+ /** The credential field this resolver outputs, as `TypeName.field`, if any. */
169
+ export function findCredentialOutputField(info) {
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+ const fields = CREDENTIAL_TYPES.outputFields(info.parentType.name);
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+ return fields?.has(info.fieldName)
172
+ ? `${info.parentType.name}.${info.fieldName}`
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+ : undefined;
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+ }
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+ /**
176
+ * Resolve the guard mode from `CREDENTIAL_FIELD_GUARD_MODE`. Anything other
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+ * than an explicit `shadow` or `off` enforces.
178
+ */
179
+ export function getCredentialFieldGuardMode() {
180
+ const raw = (process.env.CREDENTIAL_FIELD_GUARD_MODE ?? '').trim().toLowerCase();
181
+ if (raw === 'shadow' || raw === 'off')
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+ return raw;
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+ return 'enforce';
184
+ }
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+ /**
186
+ * Credential-surface accesses by surface, decision and principal kind. The
187
+ * `would_deny` series in `shadow` is the list of callers that enforcement
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+ * would break; it must be empty of legitimate callers before enforcing.
189
+ */
190
+ export const credentialFieldAccessTotal = new Counter({
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+ name: 'graphql_credential_field_access_total',
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+ help: 'Reads of, or predicates over, stored credential columns on /graphql, by ' +
193
+ 'surface (output | argument), decision (allowed | would_deny | denied) and ' +
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+ 'principal kind (server | admin | user | none). Only kind=server is allowed.',
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+ labelNames: ['surface', 'decision', 'principal_kind'],
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+ registers: [metricsRegistry],
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+ });
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+ /**
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+ * Audit payload accesses by principals that read payloads redacted (user and
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+ * anonymous). Reads (`output`) are counted by what redaction did to them;
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+ * predicates (`argument`) by whether they were refused. In `shadow`,
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+ * `would_redact` with `carried_value="true"` counts reads that served a stored
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+ * credential value — the exposure enforcement closes.
204
+ */
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+ export const auditPayloadAccessTotal = new Counter({
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+ name: 'graphql_audit_payload_access_total',
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+ help: 'Reads of, or predicates over, AuditLog JSON payload columns on /graphql by a principal ' +
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+ 'that reads them redacted (user | none), by surface (output | argument), decision ' +
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+ '(unchanged | redacted | would_redact | denied | would_deny), principal kind, and whether ' +
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+ 'a replaced value held anything (carried_value: true | false | n/a).',
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+ labelNames: ['surface', 'decision', 'principal_kind', 'carried_value'],
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+ registers: [metricsRegistry],
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+ });
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+ /**
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+ * Longest caller-supplied value (forwarded chain, user agent, operation name,
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+ * service subject) a log line or throttle key keeps, in characters.
217
+ */
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+ const MAX_ATTRIBUTION_LENGTH = 256;
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+ /** Truncate a caller-supplied value so a padded one cannot bloat the log or the throttle. */
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+ function bounded(value) {
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+ return value.slice(0, MAX_ATTRIBUTION_LENGTH);
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+ }
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+ /** Throttle window for the identity log line, per distinct caller key. */
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+ const LOG_THROTTLE_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
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+ /**
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+ * Distinct caller keys one scope (principal kind plus connection address) may
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+ * log per window. Well above the handful of callers one edge address carries;
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+ * a scope that spends it is rotating caller-supplied values, and says so.
229
+ */
230
+ const LOG_KEYS_PER_SCOPE = 256;
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+ /** Distinct scopes the throttle tracks per window. */
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+ const LOG_MAX_SCOPES = 64;
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+ const logThrottle = new GuardLogThrottle({
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+ windowMs: LOG_THROTTLE_MS,
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+ keysPerScope: LOG_KEYS_PER_SCOPE,
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+ maxScopes: LOG_MAX_SCOPES,
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+ });
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+ /**
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+ * Charge one decision line to the throttle. Returns whether to write the line;
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+ * when the scope has just spent its budget, writes the scope's single overflow
241
+ * notice instead and returns false.
242
+ */
243
+ function admitLogLine(scope, key, nowMs) {
244
+ const verdict = logThrottle.admit(scope, key, nowMs);
245
+ if (verdict.action === 'log')
246
+ return true;
247
+ if (verdict.action === 'overflow') {
248
+ logger.warn('[credential-field-guard] decision log budget spent for a caller scope', {
249
+ scope: verdict.scope,
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+ keysPerScope: LOG_KEYS_PER_SCOPE,
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+ dedupWindowMs: LOG_THROTTLE_MS,
252
+ consequence: 'further distinct callers in this scope are not logged until the window ends; ' +
253
+ 'the decision counters still count every access',
254
+ });
255
+ }
256
+ return false;
257
+ }
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+ /** Message for a credential column reached by a non-service principal. */
259
+ const CREDENTIAL_ACCESS_MESSAGE = '[credential-field-guard] credential access by a non-service principal';
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+ /** Message for a predicate over an audit payload by a principal that reads it redacted. */
261
+ const AUDIT_PAYLOAD_PREDICATE_MESSAGE = '[credential-field-guard] audit payload predicate by a principal that reads payloads redacted';
262
+ /** Audit payload key paths one log line lists; the count is always logged. */
263
+ const MAX_LOGGED_PATHS = 16;
264
+ /** Log a denied or would-deny access at most once per caller key per window. */
265
+ function logDecision(message, decision, surface, references, principal, info, request, nowMs) {
266
+ const operationName = bounded(info.operation?.name?.value ?? '<unnamed>');
267
+ const userAgent = bounded(headerValue(request?.headers?.['user-agent']));
268
+ // The source is part of the key: two callers sending the same operation
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+ // with the same user agent (every Node `fetch` sends `node`) are different
270
+ // callers, and a key without the source logs only the first of them per
271
+ // window — which is exactly the attribution a pre-enforcement review of the
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+ // would-deny set depends on. The connection address scopes the key's budget
273
+ // (the caller cannot set it); the forwarded chain, which the caller can,
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+ // only distinguishes keys inside that budget.
275
+ const source = callerSource(request);
276
+ const referenceKey = [...new Set(references)].sort().join(',');
277
+ const key = `${decision}|${surface}|${referenceKey}|${operationName}|${userAgent}|${source.forwardedFor}`;
278
+ if (!admitLogLine(`${principal}|${source.ip}`, key, nowMs))
279
+ return;
280
+ logger.warn(message, {
281
+ decision,
282
+ surface,
283
+ references,
284
+ principalKind: principal,
285
+ operationName,
286
+ ip: source.ip,
287
+ forwardedFor: source.forwardedFor,
288
+ userAgent,
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+ dedupWindowMs: LOG_THROTTLE_MS,
290
+ });
291
+ }
292
+ /**
293
+ * Log a service principal's credential read at most once per caller key per
294
+ * window.
295
+ *
296
+ * Every holder of the service secret is `kind: "server"`, so the metric alone
297
+ * cannot say WHICH holder read a broker key. The signed credential's `sub`
298
+ * (`adaptic-engine:<host>:<pid>`, `adaptic-platform:…`, an operator toolkit's
299
+ * `adaptic-audit:…`) can, and it is what an operator needs to tell a known
300
+ * service from a leaked secret. It goes to the log, not the metric label,
301
+ * because host:pid is unbounded. A static `SERVER_AUTH_TOKEN` names no caller
302
+ * and logs as `<unattributed>`.
303
+ */
304
+ function logServiceRead(sub, reference, info, request, nowMs) {
305
+ const operationName = bounded(info.operation?.name?.value ?? '<unnamed>');
306
+ const caller = bounded(sub ?? '<unattributed>');
307
+ const source = callerSource(request);
308
+ const key = `allowed|${caller}|${reference}|${operationName}|${source.forwardedFor}`;
309
+ if (!admitLogLine(`server|${source.ip}`, key, nowMs))
310
+ return;
311
+ logger.info('[credential-field-guard] credential read by a service principal', {
312
+ decision: 'allowed',
313
+ serviceSub: caller,
314
+ reference,
315
+ operationName,
316
+ ip: source.ip,
317
+ forwardedFor: source.forwardedFor,
318
+ dedupWindowMs: LOG_THROTTLE_MS,
319
+ });
320
+ }
321
+ /**
322
+ * Log an audit payload read that redaction changes, or would change, at most
323
+ * once per caller key per window. The line names the key paths that held
324
+ * credentials, never their values.
325
+ */
326
+ function logAuditPayloadRead(decision, reference, paths, principal, info, request, nowMs) {
327
+ const operationName = bounded(info.operation?.name?.value ?? '<unnamed>');
328
+ const userAgent = bounded(headerValue(request?.headers?.['user-agent']));
329
+ const source = callerSource(request);
330
+ const key = `payload|${decision}|${reference}|${operationName}|${userAgent}|${source.forwardedFor}`;
331
+ if (!admitLogLine(`${principal}|${source.ip}`, key, nowMs))
332
+ return;
333
+ logger.warn('[credential-field-guard] audit payload holding credentials read by a principal that reads payloads redacted', {
334
+ decision,
335
+ reference,
336
+ credentialPaths: paths.slice(0, MAX_LOGGED_PATHS).map((p) => bounded(p.path)),
337
+ credentialPathCount: paths.length,
338
+ carriedValue: paths.some((p) => p.carriesValue),
339
+ principalKind: principal,
340
+ operationName,
341
+ ip: source.ip,
342
+ forwardedFor: source.forwardedFor,
343
+ userAgent,
344
+ dedupWindowMs: LOG_THROTTLE_MS,
345
+ });
346
+ }
347
+ /**
348
+ * Where a request came from, as far as this process can tell.
349
+ *
350
+ * `req.ip` is the address `trust proxy` resolves, and behind the production
351
+ * edge it resolves to the edge's own pool (an operator's laptop and a hosted
352
+ * service log the same handful of addresses), so on its own it cannot tell
353
+ * callers apart. The raw `X-Forwarded-For` chain carries the hops the edge
354
+ * saw. It is caller-supplied at its left end, so it is attribution evidence
355
+ * for an operator reading the log, never an identity the guard decides on.
356
+ */
357
+ function callerSource(request) {
358
+ return {
359
+ ip: bounded(request?.ip ?? '<none>'),
360
+ forwardedFor: bounded(headerValue(request?.headers?.['x-forwarded-for'])),
361
+ };
362
+ }
363
+ function headerValue(value) {
364
+ if (Array.isArray(value))
365
+ return value.join(',');
366
+ return value ?? '<none>';
367
+ }
368
+ function forbidden(references) {
369
+ return new GraphQLError('Forbidden: stored credentials are readable only by a service principal', {
370
+ extensions: {
371
+ code: 'FORBIDDEN',
372
+ references,
373
+ http: { status: 403 },
374
+ },
375
+ });
376
+ }
377
+ function forbiddenAuditPayloadPredicate(references) {
378
+ return new GraphQLError('Forbidden: audit payload columns can be filtered, sorted or grouped on only by a ' +
379
+ 'service or admin principal', {
380
+ extensions: {
381
+ code: 'FORBIDDEN',
382
+ references,
383
+ http: { status: 403 },
384
+ },
385
+ });
386
+ }
387
+ /**
388
+ * Create the TypeGraphQL global middleware that guards credential columns.
389
+ *
390
+ * Runs on every field. The hot path — a non-credential field with no
391
+ * arguments, or any field for a service principal — returns after a map
392
+ * lookup.
393
+ *
394
+ * @param options - Optional overrides for tests.
395
+ * @returns A {@link MiddlewareFn} for `buildSchema({ globalMiddlewares })`.
396
+ */
397
+ export function createCredentialFieldGuardMiddleware(options = {}) {
398
+ const resolveMode = options.modeProvider ?? getCredentialFieldGuardMode;
399
+ const now = options.now ?? Date.now;
400
+ return async ({ context, args, info }, next) => {
401
+ const proceed = () => next();
402
+ const output = findCredentialOutputField(info);
403
+ const principal = context.principal ?? null;
404
+ if (principal?.kind === 'server') {
405
+ if (output && resolveMode() !== 'off') {
406
+ credentialFieldAccessTotal.inc({
407
+ surface: 'output',
408
+ decision: 'allowed',
409
+ principal_kind: 'server',
410
+ });
411
+ logServiceRead(principal.sub, output, info, context.req, now());
412
+ }
413
+ return proceed();
414
+ }
415
+ const references = findGuardedArgumentReferences(info, args);
416
+ // Admins read audit payloads as stored, so only user and anonymous
417
+ // principals reach the payload rules below.
418
+ const payloadReader = !readsAuditPayloadRaw(principal);
419
+ const payloadOutput = payloadReader ? auditPayloadOutputField(info) : undefined;
420
+ const payloadRefs = payloadReader ? references.auditPayload : [];
421
+ if (!output &&
422
+ references.credential.length === 0 &&
423
+ !payloadOutput &&
424
+ payloadRefs.length === 0) {
425
+ return proceed();
426
+ }
427
+ const mode = resolveMode();
428
+ if (mode === 'off')
429
+ return proceed();
430
+ const principalLabel = principal?.kind ?? 'none';
431
+ const nowMs = now();
432
+ const refusal = mode === 'enforce' ? 'denied' : 'would_deny';
433
+ if (output || references.credential.length > 0) {
434
+ const surface = output ? 'output' : 'argument';
435
+ const credentialRefs = output ? [output, ...references.credential] : references.credential;
436
+ credentialFieldAccessTotal.inc({
437
+ surface,
438
+ decision: refusal,
439
+ principal_kind: principalLabel,
440
+ });
441
+ logDecision(CREDENTIAL_ACCESS_MESSAGE, refusal, surface, credentialRefs, principalLabel, info, context.req, nowMs);
442
+ if (mode === 'enforce')
443
+ throw forbidden(credentialRefs);
444
+ }
445
+ if (payloadRefs.length > 0) {
446
+ auditPayloadAccessTotal.inc({
447
+ surface: 'argument',
448
+ decision: refusal,
449
+ principal_kind: principalLabel,
450
+ carried_value: 'n/a',
451
+ });
452
+ logDecision(AUDIT_PAYLOAD_PREDICATE_MESSAGE, refusal, 'argument', payloadRefs, principalLabel, info, context.req, nowMs);
453
+ if (mode === 'enforce')
454
+ throw forbiddenAuditPayloadPredicate(payloadRefs);
455
+ }
456
+ if (!payloadOutput)
457
+ return proceed();
458
+ const value = await proceed();
459
+ const { redacted, paths } = redactAuditPayload(value);
460
+ const decision = paths.length === 0 ? 'unchanged' : mode === 'enforce' ? 'redacted' : 'would_redact';
461
+ auditPayloadAccessTotal.inc({
462
+ surface: 'output',
463
+ decision,
464
+ principal_kind: principalLabel,
465
+ carried_value: String(paths.some((p) => p.carriesValue)),
466
+ });
467
+ if (paths.length > 0) {
468
+ logAuditPayloadRead(decision, payloadOutput, paths, principalLabel, info, context.req, nowMs);
469
+ }
470
+ // Under enforce the redacted copy is served even when no path was found:
471
+ // the copy is what the rule promises, the path list only describes it.
472
+ return mode === 'enforce' ? redacted : value;
473
+ };
474
+ }
475
+ /** @internal Test hook: forget the log throttle state. */
476
+ export function resetCredentialFieldGuardLogThrottle() {
477
+ logThrottle.reset();
478
+ }
479
+ //# sourceMappingURL=credential-field-guard.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Where the generated GraphQL schema exposes a Prisma model's columns, by
3
+ * type-name convention.
4
+ *
5
+ * typegraphql-prisma names every type after its model, so a guard that must
6
+ * cover "every way a query can observe column X of model M" can derive the
7
+ * whole surface from the model name: the output types that carry column
8
+ * VALUES, the input types that act as predicates over them, and the scalar
9
+ * enum that names them in `by` / `distinct`. The rules live here, once, so
10
+ * each guard that keys on a set of columns applies the same naming rules.
11
+ *
12
+ * @module middleware/generated-type-names
13
+ */
14
+ /**
15
+ * Output types that carry a model's column VALUES, as name suffixes on the
16
+ * model. The `Count` aggregate is absent on purpose: it returns how many rows
17
+ * are non-null, never a value.
18
+ */
19
+ export declare const VALUE_OUTPUT_SUFFIXES: readonly ["", "GroupBy", "MinAggregate", "MaxAggregate"];
20
+ /**
21
+ * Output types that carry a model's column VALUES, as name prefixes on the
22
+ * model. `createManyAndReturn<Model>` / `updateManyAndReturn<Model>` return
23
+ * the written rows as their own generated type rather than as `<Model>`, so a
24
+ * guard keyed only on the model type would serve the guarded columns of every
25
+ * row such a mutation touches — including columns the caller did not write.
26
+ */
27
+ export declare const VALUE_OUTPUT_PREFIXES: readonly ["CreateManyAndReturn", "UpdateManyAndReturn"];
28
+ /** Lookups from a generated type name to the guarded columns it exposes. */
29
+ export interface GeneratedTypeIndex {
30
+ /** Guarded columns an output type carries as values, if any. */
31
+ outputFields(typeName: string): ReadonlySet<string> | undefined;
32
+ /** Guarded columns an input type's keys can reference as a predicate, if any. */
33
+ predicateFields(typeName: string): ReadonlySet<string> | undefined;
34
+ /** Guarded columns a `<Model>ScalarFieldEnum` can name, if it is one. */
35
+ enumFields(typeName: string): ReadonlySet<string> | undefined;
36
+ }
37
+ /**
38
+ * Index the generated types of every model in `fieldsByModel`.
39
+ *
40
+ * @param fieldsByModel - Guarded column names, by Prisma model name.
41
+ * @returns Lookups over the generated type names.
42
+ */
43
+ export declare function indexGeneratedTypes(fieldsByModel: ReadonlyMap<string, ReadonlySet<string>>): GeneratedTypeIndex;
44
+ //# sourceMappingURL=generated-type-names.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"generated-type-names.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/middleware/generated-type-names.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AAEH;;;;GAIG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,0DAA2D,CAAC;AAE9F;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,qBAAqB,yDAA0D,CAAC;AAY7F,4EAA4E;AAC5E,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IACjC,gEAAgE;IAChE,YAAY,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IAChE,iFAAiF;IACjF,eAAe,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;IACnE,yEAAyE;IACzE,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;CAC/D;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CACjC,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,GACtD,kBAAkB,CAoCpB"}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"generated-type-names.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/middleware/generated-type-names.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AAEH;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,CAAU,CAAC;AAE9F;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAU,CAAC;AAE7F;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAU,CAAC;AAEzE,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAAG,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAYnD;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CACjC,aAAuD;IAEvD,MAAM,OAAO,GAA6C,IAAI,GAAG,CAC/D,CAAC,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9C,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,GAAG,CAC1B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,CAAkC,CAC3E;QACD,GAAG,qBAAqB,CAAC,GAAG,CAC1B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,CAAkC,CAC3E;KACF,CAAC,CACH,CAAC;IAEF,gDAAgD;IAChD,+EAA+E;IAC/E,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAEzF,OAAO;QACL,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;QACjD,sEAAsE;QACtE,0EAA0E;QAC1E,2CAA2C;QAC3C,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE;YAC5B,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC;gBACvC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;oBAAE,SAAS;gBAC1C,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;gBAC1C,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;oBAAE,SAAS;gBACnC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;oBAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;gBAC9E,OAAO,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YAClC,CAAC;YACD,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;QACnB,CAAC;QACD,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,EAAE,CACvB,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC;YACzC,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;YACxE,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;KAChB,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC"}
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Where the generated GraphQL schema exposes a Prisma model's columns, by
3
+ * type-name convention.
4
+ *
5
+ * typegraphql-prisma names every type after its model, so a guard that must
6
+ * cover "every way a query can observe column X of model M" can derive the
7
+ * whole surface from the model name: the output types that carry column
8
+ * VALUES, the input types that act as predicates over them, and the scalar
9
+ * enum that names them in `by` / `distinct`. The rules live here, once, so
10
+ * each guard that keys on a set of columns applies the same naming rules.
11
+ *
12
+ * @module middleware/generated-type-names
13
+ */
14
+ /**
15
+ * Output types that carry a model's column VALUES, as name suffixes on the
16
+ * model. The `Count` aggregate is absent on purpose: it returns how many rows
17
+ * are non-null, never a value.
18
+ */
19
+ export const VALUE_OUTPUT_SUFFIXES = ['', 'GroupBy', 'MinAggregate', 'MaxAggregate'];
20
+ /**
21
+ * Output types that carry a model's column VALUES, as name prefixes on the
22
+ * model. `createManyAndReturn<Model>` / `updateManyAndReturn<Model>` return
23
+ * the written rows as their own generated type rather than as `<Model>`, so a
24
+ * guard keyed only on the model type would serve the guarded columns of every
25
+ * row such a mutation touches — including columns the caller did not write.
26
+ */
27
+ export const VALUE_OUTPUT_PREFIXES = ['CreateManyAndReturn', 'UpdateManyAndReturn'];
28
+ /**
29
+ * Input-type name fragments that make a type a read predicate (filter, sort,
30
+ * cursor, aggregate filter) rather than a write payload. A `…WhereUniqueInput`
31
+ * is also how a mutation selects its row, so a guarded key there is an oracle
32
+ * on a write path too.
33
+ */
34
+ const PREDICATE_TYPE_FRAGMENTS = ['Where', 'OrderBy', 'Having'];
35
+ const SCALAR_FIELD_ENUM_SUFFIX = 'ScalarFieldEnum';
36
+ /**
37
+ * Index the generated types of every model in `fieldsByModel`.
38
+ *
39
+ * @param fieldsByModel - Guarded column names, by Prisma model name.
40
+ * @returns Lookups over the generated type names.
41
+ */
42
+ export function indexGeneratedTypes(fieldsByModel) {
43
+ const outputs = new Map([...fieldsByModel].flatMap(([model, fields]) => [
44
+ ...VALUE_OUTPUT_SUFFIXES.map((suffix) => [`${model}${suffix}`, fields]),
45
+ ...VALUE_OUTPUT_PREFIXES.map((prefix) => [`${prefix}${model}`, fields]),
46
+ ]));
47
+ // Longest-first, so the prefix match attributes
48
+ // `AccountLinkingRequestWhereInput` to `AccountLinkingRequest`, not `Account`.
49
+ const modelsLongestFirst = [...fieldsByModel.keys()].sort((a, b) => b.length - a.length);
50
+ return {
51
+ outputFields: (typeName) => outputs.get(typeName),
52
+ // Generated names start with the model name followed by an upper-case
53
+ // letter (`AlpacaAccountWhereInput`), so a model named `Account` does not
54
+ // claim `AccountLinkingRequestWhereInput`.
55
+ predicateFields: (typeName) => {
56
+ for (const model of modelsLongestFirst) {
57
+ if (!typeName.startsWith(model))
58
+ continue;
59
+ const rest = typeName.slice(model.length);
60
+ if (!/^[A-Z]/.test(rest))
61
+ continue;
62
+ if (!PREDICATE_TYPE_FRAGMENTS.some((f) => rest.includes(f)))
63
+ return undefined;
64
+ return fieldsByModel.get(model);
65
+ }
66
+ return undefined;
67
+ },
68
+ enumFields: (typeName) => typeName.endsWith(SCALAR_FIELD_ENUM_SUFFIX)
69
+ ? fieldsByModel.get(typeName.slice(0, -SCALAR_FIELD_ENUM_SUFFIX.length))
70
+ : undefined,
71
+ };
72
+ }
73
+ //# sourceMappingURL=generated-type-names.js.map