@acepaste/ingress 0.9.6 → 0.9.22
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/src/adapters.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/src/adapters.js +76 -6
- package/dist/src/agent-hooks.d.ts +112 -0
- package/dist/src/agent-hooks.js +533 -0
- package/dist/src/approvers.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/src/approvers.js +50 -0
- package/dist/src/audio.d.ts +70 -0
- package/dist/src/audio.js +224 -0
- package/dist/src/audit-changes.d.ts +46 -0
- package/dist/src/audit-changes.js +110 -0
- package/dist/src/audit-local.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/src/audit-local.js +231 -0
- package/dist/src/audit-parsers.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/src/audit.js +48 -0
- package/dist/src/broker.d.ts +92 -1
- package/dist/src/broker.js +222 -3
- package/dist/src/calendar.d.ts +36 -0
- package/dist/src/calendar.js +227 -0
- package/dist/src/captions.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/src/captions.js +209 -0
- package/dist/src/changes.d.ts +105 -0
- package/dist/src/changes.js +174 -0
- package/dist/src/character.js +15 -1
- package/dist/src/classifier-model.d.ts +53 -0
- package/dist/src/classifier-model.js +3 -0
- package/dist/src/classifier.d.ts +41 -0
- package/dist/src/classifier.js +213 -0
- package/dist/src/cli.js +501 -1
- package/dist/src/egress.d.ts +71 -0
- package/dist/src/egress.js +242 -0
- package/dist/src/email.d.ts +42 -0
- package/dist/src/email.js +424 -0
- package/dist/src/engine.d.ts +36 -12
- package/dist/src/engine.js +88 -37
- package/dist/src/image-meta.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/src/image-meta.js +433 -0
- package/dist/src/image.d.ts +110 -0
- package/dist/src/image.js +353 -0
- package/dist/src/index.d.ts +50 -5
- package/dist/src/index.js +28 -3
- package/dist/src/localguard.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/src/localguard.js +61 -0
- package/dist/src/meaning.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/src/meaning.js +77 -22
- package/dist/src/messages.d.ts +79 -0
- package/dist/src/messages.js +431 -0
- package/dist/src/nearby.d.ts +52 -0
- package/dist/src/nearby.js +186 -0
- package/dist/src/netpolicy.js +50 -19
- package/dist/src/provenance.d.ts +56 -0
- package/dist/src/provenance.js +114 -0
- package/dist/src/qr.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/src/qr.js +113 -0
- package/dist/src/safeguards.d.ts +61 -0
- package/dist/src/safeguards.js +199 -0
- package/dist/src/served.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/src/served.js +53 -0
- package/dist/src/shell-commands.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/src/shell-commands.js +291 -0
- package/dist/src/shortcuts.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/src/shortcuts.js +220 -0
- package/dist/src/stream.d.ts +88 -0
- package/dist/src/stream.js +119 -0
- package/dist/src/terminal.d.ts +29 -0
- package/dist/src/terminal.js +313 -0
- package/dist/src/tooldefs.d.ts +84 -0
- package/dist/src/tooldefs.js +122 -0
- package/dist/src/types.d.ts +50 -6
- package/dist/src/types.js +15 -2
- package/dist/src/visibility.d.ts +23 -3
- package/dist/src/visibility.js +285 -78
- package/native/ingress-presence.swift +48 -0
- package/native/ingress-vision.swift +417 -0
- package/package.json +3 -1
package/dist/src/engine.js
CHANGED
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@@ -21,9 +21,16 @@ import { scanSupplyChain } from "./supplychain.js";
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import { scanCode } from "./codepass.js";
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import { scanSecrets, redactSecrets, collectSecrets, scrubExcerpt } from "./secrets.js";
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import { attachEvidence } from "./evidence.js";
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import {
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import { adaptByKind, decodeEntities, detectKind, KINDS_WITH_MARKUP } from "./adapters.js";
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import { inspectImage } from "./image.js";
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import { detectImageFormat } from "./image-meta.js";
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import { inspectAudio } from "./audio.js";
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const MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 50_000_000;
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const MAX_AUDIO_BYTES = 200_000_000;
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import { servedWords, compareServed } from "./served.js";
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import { scanClassifier } from "./classifier.js";
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import { runSandbox } from "./sandbox.js";
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import { DEFAULT_CONFIG, ENGINE_VERSION, RULESET_VERSION, } from "./types.js";
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import { DEFAULT_CONFIG, ENGINE_VERSION, RULESET_VERSION, TRUST_SUSPECT_FACTOR, } from "./types.js";
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const sha256 = (s) => createHash("sha256").update(s, "utf8").digest("hex");
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export const ASSEMBLED_LIMITS = { fragments: 32, fragmentBytes: 64_000, assembledBytes: 256_000 };
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export class IngressEngine {
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@@ -177,9 +184,58 @@ export class IngressEngine {
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if (bytes > this.config.maxBodyBytes) {
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return this.refuse(url, [{ pass: "policy", kind: "policy.denied_source", confidence: 0.5, severity: 0.5, message: `content is ${bytes} bytes, over the ${this.config.maxBodyBytes} byte limit`, action: "none" }], {}, t0, "text");
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}
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const kind = opts.isHtml === true ? "html" : opts.isHtml === false ? "text" : detectKind(opts.contentType ?? "", content, opts.url ?? "");
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const kind = opts.kind ?? (opts.isHtml === true ? "html" : opts.isHtml === false ? "text" : detectKind(opts.contentType ?? "", content, opts.url ?? ""));
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const rule = url.startsWith("inline:") ? undefined : this.domainRule(url);
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return this.guarded(url, kind, t0, () => this.analyze({ url, finalUrl: url, redirectChain: [], raw: content, kind, externalRules: [], timings: {}, t0, override: !!opts.override, extraFindings: [], rule
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return this.guarded(url, kind, t0, () => this.analyze({ url, finalUrl: url, redirectChain: [], raw: content, kind, externalRules: [], timings: {}, t0, override: !!opts.override, extraFindings: [], rule,
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// what devices broadcast is the lowest-trust content there is, unless the caller knows better
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source: kind === "nearby" && !opts.source?.trust ? { channel: "nearby devices", ...opts.source, trust: 6 } : opts.source,
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hints: { spoken: opts.spoken, outsideSpeakers: opts.outsideSpeakers, knownDevices: opts.knownDevices } }));
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}
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/**
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* Gate an image: what it says to a person, and what it says only to a machine (see image.ts).
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* The delivered text is the text a person can read in the picture, with a line for each code in it.
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* Whether the picture itself goes on to the model is the caller's decision, made on the verdict.
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*/
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async scanImage(bytes, opts = {}) {
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const t0 = performance.now();
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const url = opts.url ?? "inline:image";
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if (opts.quarantined)
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return this.refuse(url, [{ pass: "policy", kind: "policy.denied_source", confidence: 1, severity: 1, message: `source is quarantined by your organization: ${opts.quarantined}`, action: "none" }], {}, t0, "image", "hostile", true);
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if (bytes.length > MAX_IMAGE_BYTES)
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return this.refuse(url, [{ pass: "policy", kind: "policy.denied_source", confidence: 0.5, severity: 0.5, message: `image is ${bytes.length} bytes, over the ${MAX_IMAGE_BYTES} byte limit`, action: "none" }], {}, t0, "image");
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const rule = url.startsWith("inline:") ? undefined : this.domainRule(url);
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return this.guarded(url, "image", t0, async () => {
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// an SVG is markup: its text, hidden or shown, is read as a page's is
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if (detectImageFormat(bytes) === "svg") {
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const text = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: false }).decode(bytes);
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const extra = /<script\b|\son[a-z]+\s*=|<foreignObject\b|javascript:/i.test(text)
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? [{ pass: "channel", kind: "image.active_content", confidence: 0.5, severity: 0.6, message: "this SVG carries scripts, event handlers or embedded HTML: it is a program as well as a picture", action: "none" }]
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: [];
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return this.analyze({ url, finalUrl: url, redirectChain: [], raw: text, kind: "html", externalRules: [], timings: {}, t0, override: !!opts.override, extraFindings: extra, rule, source: opts.source });
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}
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const ti = performance.now();
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const insp = await inspectImage(bytes, { vision: opts.vision, caption: opts.caption, sourceText: opts.sourceText });
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return this.analyze({ url, finalUrl: url, redirectChain: [], raw: insp.report, kind: "image", externalRules: [], timings: { visibility: performance.now() - ti }, t0, override: !!opts.override, extraFindings: insp.findings, rule, source: opts.source, adapted: { segments: insp.segments, findings: [] }, imageCoverage: insp.coverage });
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});
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}
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/**
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* Gate a sound recording: what is said in it, and what is there only for a machine (see audio.ts).
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* The delivered text is the transcript of what a listener hears. `captions`, when given, are compared with
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* what was said.
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*/
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async scanAudio(bytes, opts = {}) {
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const t0 = performance.now();
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const url = opts.url ?? "inline:audio";
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if (opts.quarantined)
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return this.refuse(url, [{ pass: "policy", kind: "policy.denied_source", confidence: 1, severity: 1, message: `source is quarantined by your organization: ${opts.quarantined}`, action: "none" }], {}, t0, "audio", "hostile", true);
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if (bytes.length > MAX_AUDIO_BYTES)
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return this.refuse(url, [{ pass: "policy", kind: "policy.denied_source", confidence: 0.5, severity: 0.5, message: `recording is ${bytes.length} bytes, over the ${MAX_AUDIO_BYTES} byte limit`, action: "none" }], {}, t0, "audio");
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const rule = url.startsWith("inline:") ? undefined : this.domainRule(url);
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return this.guarded(url, "audio", t0, async () => {
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const ti = performance.now();
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const insp = await inspectAudio(bytes, { transcriber: opts.transcriber });
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return this.analyze({ url, finalUrl: url, redirectChain: [], raw: insp.report, kind: "audio", externalRules: [], timings: { visibility: performance.now() - ti }, t0, override: !!opts.override, extraFindings: insp.findings, rule, source: opts.source, adapted: { segments: insp.segments, findings: [] }, audioCoverage: insp.coverage });
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});
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}
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/**
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* Gate what the model will actually receive when several sources are combined (search
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@@ -222,7 +278,7 @@ export class IngressEngine {
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}
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/** Cheap structural pre-check: pathological nesting makes the HTML parser super-linear. Refuse before parsing. */
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structuralAbuse(raw, kind) {
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if (kind
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if (!KINDS_WITH_MARKUP.has(kind))
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return null;
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// Depth is what the parser would build, not a count of open tags: <li>, <p>, <dd>, <tr> and friends close
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// implicitly, a closing tag closes everything still open inside it, and script, style and comment bodies are
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@@ -296,9 +352,10 @@ export class IngressEngine {
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const abuse = this.structuralAbuse(a.raw, a.kind);
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if (abuse)
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return this.refuse(a.url, [{ pass: "policy", kind: "policy.denied_source", confidence: 0.8, severity: 0.7, message: `structural abuse: ${abuse}`, action: "none" }], timings, a.t0, a.kind);
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// entity decoding for
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// entity decoding for kinds without markup of their own (parse5 decodes for HTML, and for the HTML inside
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// an email or an event: decoding first would turn text a message quotes, "<div hidden>", into a tag)
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let raw = a.raw;
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if (a.kind
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if (!KINDS_WITH_MARKUP.has(a.kind) && !a.adapted) {
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const dec = decodeEntities(raw);
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if (dec.suspicious > 0) {
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findings.push({ pass: "character", kind: "unicode.entity_smuggling", confidence: Math.min(0.95, 0.6 + dec.suspicious * 0.05), severity: 0.7, message: `${dec.suspicious} HTML entities decoding to invisible or format characters`, excerpt: dec.sample, action: "neutralized" });
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findings.push(...v.findings);
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}
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else {
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const r = a.
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const r = a.adapted ?? adaptByKind(a.kind, raw, a.hints);
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segments = r.segments;
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findings.push(...r.findings);
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if (a.kind === "javascript")
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@@ -356,7 +413,11 @@ export class IngressEngine {
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}
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// character pass
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const tch = performance.now();
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// Text recognised in a picture has no characters of its own: the recogniser chose them, and on small print it
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// mixes alphabets freely. Lookalike-letter findings there say something about the recogniser, not the author.
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// The characters that are really in an image file are its metadata, its codes' payloads and appended text.
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const authored = a.kind === "image" ? segments.filter((s) => /^image\/(?:metadata|code|after-end)/.test(s.path)) : a.kind === "audio" ? segments.filter((s) => s.path.startsWith("audio/metadata")) : segments;
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const charAll = scanCharacters(authored.map((s) => s.text).join("\n"));
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findings.push(...charAll.findings);
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let cleanedSegments = segments.map((s) => ({ ...s, text: scanCharacters(s.text).cleaned }));
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timings.character = performance.now() - tch;
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passesRun.push("code");
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// meaning pass over cleaned segments and decoded payloads
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const tm = performance.now();
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findings.push(...scanMeaning({ segments: cleanedSegments, decodedPayloads: charAll.decodedPayloads }));
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findings.push(...scanMeaning({ kind: a.kind, segments: cleanedSegments, decodedPayloads: charAll.decodedPayloads }));
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timings.meaning = performance.now() - tm;
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passesRun.push("meaning");
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// learned pass: what the delivered text and each hidden passage resemble
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if (this.config.classifier) {
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const tcl = performance.now();
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// what the model was trained on is a message's subject and body: its address lines (From, To, Date) are
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// not prose, and a line of addresses is not evidence of anything
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const deliveredText = cleanedSegments.filter((s) => (s.visibility === "visible" || (s.visibility === "attribute" && s.path.endsWith("@alt"))) && !/\/header:(from|to|cc|reply-to|date)$|\/sender$|\/speaker$/.test(s.path)).map((s) => s.text).join("\n");
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findings.push(...scanClassifier({ visible: deliveredText, segments: cleanedSegments, kind: a.kind }));
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timings.classifier = performance.now() - tcl;
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passesRun.push("classifier");
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}
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// plugins
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if (this.config.detectors.length) {
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const tp = performance.now();
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@@ -446,7 +517,9 @@ export class IngressEngine {
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// score and tier (per-domain thresholds override)
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const score = aggregate(findings, { cloakingCompared: passesRun.includes("cloaking") });
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const hostileAt = a.rule?.hostileThreshold ?? this.config.hostileThreshold;
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// content from strangers, open channels and broadcasts needs less evidence to be refused; trust never loosens the default
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const trust = a.source?.trust;
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const suspectAt = (a.rule?.suspectThreshold ?? this.config.suspectThreshold) * (trust ? TRUST_SUSPECT_FACTOR[trust] ?? 1 : 1);
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const tier = score >= hostileAt ? "hostile" : score >= suspectAt ? "suspect" : "clean";
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// delivered text: clean passes; suspect passes only under human override; hostile never
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const overridden = tier === "suspect" && a.override;
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delivered = neutralizeMeaning(delivered);
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delivered = scrubExcerpt(delivered, knownSecrets);
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}
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const receipt = this.receipt({ url: a.url, finalUrl: a.finalUrl, redirectChain: a.redirectChain, kind: a.kind, raw: a.raw, delivered, tier, score, findings, overridden, passesRun, acepasteInvisibleCount: countHostileInvisibles(a.raw) });
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const receipt = this.receipt({ url: a.url, finalUrl: a.finalUrl, redirectChain: a.redirectChain, kind: a.kind, raw: a.raw, delivered, tier, score, findings, overridden, passesRun, acepasteInvisibleCount: countHostileInvisibles(a.raw), trust });
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const envelope = buildEnvelope(a.finalUrl, tier, delivered, findings, receipt, overridden);
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timings.total = performance.now() - a.t0;
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if (tier !== "clean")
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this.deps.log(buildLogEntry(a.finalUrl, tier, score, findings, safePayloads, receipt, overridden));
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return { tier, score, contentKind: a.kind, delivered, envelope, findings, receipt, timings, overridden, coverage: { code: codeScan.coverage } };
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return { tier, score, contentKind: a.kind, delivered, envelope, findings, receipt, timings, overridden, coverage: { code: codeScan.coverage, ...(a.imageCoverage ? { image: a.imageCoverage } : {}), ...(a.audioCoverage ? { audio: a.audioCoverage } : {}) } };
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}
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async fetchStylesheets(html, baseUrl) {
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const rules = [];
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tier: r.tier, score: +r.score.toFixed(4),
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overridden: r.overridden,
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passesRun: r.passesRun,
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trust: r.trust, // omitted from the canonical body when the caller gave none, so older receipts verify unchanged
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findings: r.findings.map(({ pass, kind, confidence, severity, action, evidenceClass, band, artifactDigest }) => ({ pass, kind, confidence: +confidence.toFixed(3), severity, action, evidenceClass, band, artifactDigest })),
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previous: this.config.chainReceipts ? this.lastReceiptDigest : undefined,
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signatureAlg: ecdsa ? "ecdsa-p256-sha256" : this.config.signingKey ? "hmac-sha256" : undefined,
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@@ -748,30 +822,7 @@ export function aggregate(findings, ctx = {}) {
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|
748
822
|
score = Math.min(1, score + 0.1);
|
|
749
823
|
return +score.toFixed(4);
|
|
750
824
|
}
|
|
751
|
-
|
|
752
|
-
export function servedWords(text) {
|
|
753
|
-
const t = text
|
|
754
|
-
.replace(/!?\[([^\]]*)\]\([^)]*\)/g, " $1 ") // [label](target) and  -> label
|
|
755
|
-
.replace(/<\/?[a-z][^>]*>/gi, " ") // stray tags
|
|
756
|
-
.replace(/\b(?:https?:\/\/|www\.)\S+/gi, " ") // bare URLs
|
|
757
|
-
.replace(/[#>*_`~|\-]{1,}/g, " "); // markdown syntax
|
|
758
|
-
return t.toLowerCase().split(/[^\p{L}\p{N}']+/u).filter((w) => w.length > 2);
|
|
759
|
-
}
|
|
760
|
-
/** how much of what the agent received is absent from what the browser received (word occurrences, not distinct words) */
|
|
761
|
-
export function compareServed(agentText, humanText) {
|
|
762
|
-
const A = servedWords(agentText);
|
|
763
|
-
const H = new Set(servedWords(humanText));
|
|
764
|
-
const only = A.filter((w) => !H.has(w));
|
|
765
|
-
let run = 0, longestAgentOnlyRun = 0;
|
|
766
|
-
for (const w of A) {
|
|
767
|
-
run = H.has(w) ? 0 : run + 1;
|
|
768
|
-
if (run > longestAgentOnlyRun)
|
|
769
|
-
longestAgentOnlyRun = run;
|
|
770
|
-
}
|
|
771
|
-
const sampleSeen = new Set();
|
|
772
|
-
const sample = only.filter((w) => (sampleSeen.has(w) ? false : (sampleSeen.add(w), true))).slice(0, 30).join(" ");
|
|
773
|
-
return { agentWords: A.length, agentOnlyWords: only.length, agentOnlyShare: A.length ? only.length / A.length : 0, longestAgentOnlyRun, sample };
|
|
774
|
-
}
|
|
825
|
+
export { servedWords, compareServed };
|
|
775
826
|
/**
|
|
776
827
|
* Spotlighting-style envelope. Random boundary so content cannot forge the
|
|
777
828
|
* closing marker. The model is told, in one line, how to treat the content.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* What an image file carries besides its picture: text in metadata, data after the end of the image, extra
|
|
3
|
+
* frames. Pure parsing, no dependencies, any platform. The pixels themselves are read by the vision helper
|
|
4
|
+
* (image.ts); this module reads the container.
|
|
5
|
+
*
|
|
6
|
+
* Why it matters: a model, or the code in front of it, may be handed a file's description, comment or XMP
|
|
7
|
+
* packet along with the picture. A person looking at the picture is shown none of it.
|
|
8
|
+
*/
|
|
9
|
+
export type ImageFormat = "png" | "jpeg" | "gif" | "webp" | "bmp" | "tiff" | "heic" | "avif" | "ico" | "svg" | "pdf" | "unknown";
|
|
10
|
+
export interface ImageMeta {
|
|
11
|
+
format: ImageFormat;
|
|
12
|
+
width?: number;
|
|
13
|
+
height?: number;
|
|
14
|
+
/** frames or pages, when the container says (animated PNG, GIF) */
|
|
15
|
+
frames?: number;
|
|
16
|
+
/** text found in the container: where, and what it says */
|
|
17
|
+
texts: Array<{
|
|
18
|
+
field: string;
|
|
19
|
+
text: string;
|
|
20
|
+
}>;
|
|
21
|
+
/** bytes after the image's own end marker */
|
|
22
|
+
trailingBytes: number;
|
|
23
|
+
/** what the trailing bytes look like, when they look like another file */
|
|
24
|
+
trailingLooksLike?: string;
|
|
25
|
+
/** an embedded preview picture (EXIF thumbnail): a second image nobody is shown */
|
|
26
|
+
hasThumbnail: boolean;
|
|
27
|
+
notes: string[];
|
|
28
|
+
}
|
|
29
|
+
export declare function detectImageFormat(b: Uint8Array): ImageFormat;
|
|
30
|
+
/** What a run of bytes looks like, when it looks like the start of some other kind of file. */
|
|
31
|
+
export declare function looksLike(b: Uint8Array): string | undefined;
|
|
32
|
+
/** Read an image file's container. Never throws: a file that cannot be parsed is reported as such. */
|
|
33
|
+
export declare function readImageMeta(bytes: Uint8Array): ImageMeta;
|